Abstract
Large-scale infrastructure projects are often finished late and over the initially planned cost. In Germany, this has been subject to heated controversy over the alleged waste of public money. The Elbphilharmonie in Hamburg, the Berlin–Brandenburg Airport (BER), and Stuttgart 21 are prominent examples. This chapter examines large-scale infrastructure projects in different sectors, including buildings (construction, maintenance), energy (wind, nuclear), information and communications technology (ICT), defense acquisition, and transportation (airport, bridge, port, road, rail, tunnel, and waterway).
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Notes
- 1.
The numbers in this book slightly differ from the ones presented in a Working Paper in May 2015, published on the Hertie School of Governance website. A few projects were taken out of the database due to comparability issues and new ones were added. The most significant change affects the Toll Collect and the FISCUS project, which were originally listed as having had 1150 % cost overruns. After internal debates and a discussion with Toll Collect GmbH, we decided that the majority of cost overruns assumed were due to calculated economic damage (e.g. revenue loss from toll fees due to implementation problems), which should be excluded for comparability issues. Both projects are now listed as having had 100 % cost overruns, a number the Toll Collect GmbH confirmed.
- 2.
Projects are identified as “small” if they were planned to cost less than €50 million, “medium” if they were planned to cost more than €50 million and less than €500 million, and “large” if they were planned to cost more than €500 million.
- 3.
Cantarelli et al. (2012), however, compared all projects if they were finished or “90 % finished.” This was not possible to do for this study, because the data on schedule times was too imprecise across projects. Additionally, it is also possible to learn a lot from unfinished projects. This study hence strictly separates between finished projects and unfinished projects.
- 4.
To compare cost numbers at different points in time, we include inflation. We adjust the number value of the initially planned cost of a project for historical inflation for CPI2010 baseline for the period of planned construction. Inflation during unintended additional time of the project is considered part of the cost overrun percentage.
- 5.
Based on whether or not the Google Search entry terms “(Project Name)” and “protest” yielded results after four pages.
- 6.
In addition, there are a few factors about the Gesundheitskarte that this study did not examine in depth. The key challenge was that the implementation clashed with many special interests that have to do with the particularities of the German national health-care system.
- 7.
Data availability bias might explain this result. There seemed to less media coverage of smaller projects if they were not particularly problematic. Most of the data entries are hence from one publication, the “Schwarzbuch” by the Bund der Steuerzahler, while the sources are more varied for medium or large projects.
- 8.
An OECD report (2012) defines PPPs as “long term agreements between the government and a private partner whereby the private partner delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the associated risks.”
- 9.
The Staatsoper, scheduled to finish in 2015, increased in cost at the time of the data collection. Like with other projects, it may have increased even further since this study finished data collection by the end of 2014.
- 10.
Great Britain, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, northern Germany, northern France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland.
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Kostka, G., Anzinger, N. (2016). Large Infrastructure Projects in Germany: A Cross-sectoral Analysis. In: Kostka, G., Fiedler, J. (eds) Large Infrastructure Projects in Germany. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29233-5_2
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