Abstract
Like Dworkin, Rawls allows state support for art, while at the same time arguing for state neutrality. In order to be neutral, this state support is only legitimate if there is a unanimous consensus about the value of art and about state support. However, taking into account reasonable pluralism, this consensus is an impossible aim and this is why Rawls’s argumentation is not fully convincing. In addition, he uses the concept of public goods in two distinct ways, which is rather confusing. In order to create conceptual clarity, we will make a distinction between public and nonpublic goods on one hand, and perfectionist and nonperfectionist goods on the other.
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Notes
- 1.
For the difference between direct and indirect benefits, see e.g. Feinberg (1994). Dworkin (1985, 224 ff) also mentions that some goods are directly to someone’s advantage, while other goods are indirectly to someone’s advantage. Besides, a combination of direct and indirect benefits is also possible. Vaccination programs for instance, are in a direct way to the advantage of the vaccinated people, but at the same time, they are also in an indirect way to the advantage of non-vaccinated people. In this regard, we can speak about spillover benefits.
- 2.
Rawls frequently mentions arts and humanities all together, but I will only focus on state support for art here.
- 3.
It is rather confusing that Rawls uses the term ‘public goods’ here as well, even though art is not necessary to everyone’s advantage. In the next section, I will further clarify this concept of public goods and propose an alternative conceptual framework, in order to avoid further confusion.
- 4.
In A Theory of Justice (§43), Rawls distinguishes five branches that are needed in order to guarantee the socio-economic conditions in a just society: the exchange branch, the allocation branch, the stabilization branch, the transfer branch and the distribution branch. Different from the last four branches, the exchange branch is not required in order to realize justice as fairness: “[…] the basis of this scheme is the benefit principle and not the principles of justice” (Rawls 1971, 283). Accordingly, there is a distinction between “the exchange budget” that can be used to support valuable goods on one hand, and “the national budget” that is used for public goods that are to everyone’s advantage (i.e. public goods characterized by publicness and sometimes also by non-excludability, indivisibility, and the risk of free-riding) on the other. Regarding state subsidies for art, the exchange branch seems to be the only option for Rawls.
- 5.
As George Klosko (2003, 189 n.44) rightly remarks, the borders between perfectionism and neutrality are very close here.
- 6.
Wicksel (1967, cited in Johnson 2010, 191) writes: “It will always be theoretically possible, and approximately so in practice, to find a distribution of costs such that all parties regard the expenditure as beneficial and may therefore approve it unanimously”.
References
Dworkin, Ronald. 1985. Can a liberal state support art? In A matter of principle, ed. Ronald Dworkin, 221–233. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feinberg, Joel. 1994. Not with my tax money. The problem of justifying government subsidies for the arts. Public Affairs Quarterly 8(2): 101–123.
Johnson, Marianne. 2010. Wicksell’s social philosophy and his unanimity rule. Review of Social Economy 68(2): 187–204.
Klosko, George. 2003. Reasonable rejection and neutrality of justification. In Perfectionism and neutrality. Essays in liberal theory, ed. Stephen Wall and George Klosko, 167–189. Lanham: Rowman & Littleffield Publishers.
Rawls, John. 1971. A theory of justice. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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Franken, L. (2016). John Rawls: Liberal Neutrality and Subsidizing Art. In: Liberal Neutrality and State Support for Religion. Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28944-1_6
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