Abstract
There is a tendency in recent scholarship to take the fourteenth-century debate on the issue of how to account for self-knowledge, that is, for knowledge concerning one’s own occurring mental states and acts, as being embedded in the more general debate about how to account for consciousness. My general aim in this paper is to reconsider the extent to which comparing the medieval discussion with contemporary discussions of consciousness can be fruitful. This more general aim should be achieved by focusing on the account of Walter Chatton, a representative of the medieval debate. I argue that Chatton’s distinction between two kinds of experience or awareness ultimately fails to play the role he assigns to it, namely to account for propositional self-awareness (awareness that one is in a certain state). If successful, the discussion of Chatton’s case helps rendering explicit the limits of comparing medieval conceptions with contemporary conceptions of consciousness more exactly.
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Notes
- 1.
See Brower-Toland (2012).
- 2.
For the purpose of this paper, I use the terms “conscious” and “aware” as synonyms. Fred Dretske puts it in the following way: “Being conscious of a thing (or fact) is being aware of it. Accordingly, ‘conscious awareness’ and ‘consciously aware’ are redundancies” (Dretske [1997], 773).
- 3.
I do not claim that the implication – an act of perceiving x (normally) yields perceptual awareness of x – was ever fully theoretically articulated in medieval conceptions or even in terminology. By saying that an act A is intentional, I mean that the A is directed at a thing x such that x is the object of A. To get a better idea of what talking of ‘intentionality’ involves, it may be helpful to consider a more recent conception of intentionality, namely that in the tradition of Husserl’s phenomenology: It is common there to distinguish between intentional relational acts and intentional non-relational acts. That an intentional act is relational means that a thing a (or several things a, b, c, …) exists to which the act relates as its object. Acts of perceptions are intentional in this sense. For instance, seeing a cat implies that a cat exists to which the act of seeing relates as its object. By contrast, that an intentional act is non-relational means that there exists nothing which is the object of the act. Acts of thinking about fictional entities are non-relationally intentional in this sense, such as thinking about a unicorn. See Husserl (1988), 32–34, 77–80. Since in this paper, I am mostly concerned with what are relationally intentional acts, e.g., acts of perception and of (intellectual) thinking, for the sake of convenience I speak of intentional acts tout court.
- 4.
Augustinus, De trinitate XI, c. 8, n. 15 (PL 42, 996).
- 5.
Compare for instance Ockham, Quodl. I, q.14 (OT IX, 81).
- 6.
- 7.
Dretske (1997), 774.
- 8.
See Zahavi (2008), 23 for this latter reading.
- 9.
Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 5, 121.
- 10.
Compare Dretske (1997), 774 for this use.
- 11.
See Brower-Toland (2012) for a competent discussion of this debate.
- 12.
As Brower-Toland admits, the assumption that the medieval discussion can be adequately rendered in terms of consciousness and self-consciousness lacks a systematic justification yet, compare Brower-Toland (2012).
- 13.
Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 5, 117–129. Ockham treats the problem of self-knowledge in terms of higher-order acts taking first-order acts as their objects in Ord., prol., q. 1, a. 1 (OT I, 39–44) and in Quodl. I, q. 14 (OT IX, 78–82).
- 14.
- 15.
See Dretske (1999), 104. It would be misleading, of course, to hold that either Ockham or Chatton ever made the explicit distinction between awareness of objects and awareness of facts in Dretske’s sense, since neither of them admits of facts in his respective ontology.
- 16.
Concerning the medieval use of the Latin expression ‘actus’: in an Aristotelian sense, ‘actus’ indicates the actualization of the intellectual or volitional powers as opposed to their mere potentiality. Roughly speaking, a mental act in this sense marks a mental episode in the modern sense. In contemporary philosophy, it is common to refer to mental episodes that are extended in time as (actual) states, whereas medieval authors referred to them also as ‘acts’. In this paper, by talking about ‘acts’ I mean to cover all kinds of mental episodes.
- 17.
For Ockham’s conception of intuition see Panaccio (2010).
- 18.
For a discussion of this threat of an infinite regress see Yrjönsuuri (2007), 145–146.
- 19.
“[…] dico quod anima assentit rei significatae per istam ‚ego intelligo [lapidem]‘sine omni intuitiva, quia praeter istam propositionem ‚ego intelligo lapidem‘, quae propositio componitur ex cognitionibus abstractivis, sive causetur per intuitivam sive non, non requiritur nisi quod illa intellectio recipiatur in mente. Hoc sufficit, quia ipsamet intellectio nata est causare assensum respectu sui sine omni intuitiva eius media.” Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 5, 121. The translation relies heavily on Brower-Toland’s, see Brower-Toland (2012).
- 20.
I add the bracketed ‘correct(ly)’ since of course one acquires knowledge only if one judges correctly.
- 21.
In the Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias, Chatton however, most often talks about acts of assent (and dissent), not about acts of judging.
- 22.
In what follows, I keep translating ‘intelligo lapidem’ as ‘I am thinking about a stone’, although ‘I am intellectually seizing a stone’ might be closer to the Latin expression. However, the latter sounds a bit odd to English-speaking persons.
- 23.
Husserl also distinguishes between non-propositional and propositional intentional acts. See Husserl [2](1988), §38, 130–133.
- 24.
The example implies that the subject has this stone-thought in the presence of a stone.
- 25.
Just as Ockham, Chatton is committed to the view that there are not only inscriptions and utterances of sentences, but also what he calls ‘propositions in the mind’ (propositiones in mente). See his Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q.1, art. 1, 22; q.3, art. 4, 213–214.
- 26.
In this paper, I use the term ‘proposition’ to render the Latin ‘propositio’. By ‘proposition’ I refer to (occurrences) of written or spoken sentences (that is, inscriptions and utterances) or – if not indicated otherwise – to occurrences of propositional acts of thinking that p.
- 27.
To be exact: it is necessary that the subject entertains a thought of that form.
- 28.
He ascribes the view that the very object of assent is a ‘proposition’ to Ockham. See Chatton, Reportatio, Prol., q.1, art. 1, 20 f. There he argues against Ockham.
- 29.
“[…] probo quod tam actus credenda quam actus sciendi et opinandi, et quilibet actus assentiendi quem habet intellectus per hoc quod format complexum significans rem extra, habeat rem extra pro obiecto et non illud complexum.” Reportatio, Prol., q. 1, art. 1, 20–21.
- 30.
His opponent Ockham develops this point in Quodl. III, q. 8 (OT IX, 232–237). See Panaccio (2009).
- 31.
See Brower-Toland (2012) for discussion.
- 32.
“Et si non formet illud complexum, non causatur assensus rei significatae per complexum; et per consequens non assentiet se intelligere, quia percipere se intelligere vel assentire se intelligere est assensus causatus per ipsammet intellectionem lapidis mediante formatione complexi […].” Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 5, 125. (Italics mine).
- 33.
In modern terms, wondering, doubting, denying that p are called propositional attitudes.
- 34.
Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 1, art. 1, 25. See also Yrjönsuuri (2007), 147 on this point.
- 35.
I add this qualification (‘partial’) here because in the case of assenting that one is φ-ing an F the thought is both about the act of φ-ing an F and about an F.
- 36.
I add this qualification (‘at least partly’) because the actual entertaining of the thought that one is φ-ing (an F) is another cause of assent.
- 37.
See section “The Mechanics of Assent” above, the first passage quoted there. Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 5, 121.
- 38.
“Confirmo istud, quia anima dupliciter experitur aliquid: quia experitur aliquid sicut obiectum, et aliquid experitur sicut subiectum vivum experitur proprium actum; aliter enim iretur in infinitum, quia si solum experitur actum suum sicut obiectum, igitur est ibi alius actus cuius iste est obiectum, et illum experitur. Aut igitur sicut actum et non obiectum, et habetur propositum. Aut sicut obiectum per alium actum, et sic in infinitum.” Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 5, 121. The translation relies heavily on Brower-Toland’s, see Brower-Toland (2012).
- 39.
I choose the rather careful formulation that a subject experiences his own act of, say, hearing, although one could be tempted to say that according to Chatton, a subject experiences his own act of hearing as his own act. The latter, however, is not explicitly stated by Chatton (I thank Dominik Perler for drawing my attention to the importance of drawing the difference between experiencing one’s own act and experiencing one’s own act as one’s own here).
- 40.
On this point see Michon (2007), 133.
- 41.
“[…] experiri non est nisi subiectum vivum recipere suum actum.” Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 5, 121.
- 42.
See above (A) and (B).
- 43.
See the passage quoted in fn 33 above.
- 44.
“[…] omnis […] veritas theologica nata esset probari per istam propositionem ‘ego video sic esse in re sicut significatur per propositionem talem’. Sed ista propositio non est aeque evidenter vera circumscripta visione sicut ipsa posita, quia circumscripta visione haec propositio ‘ego video sic esse in re’ est propositio falsa. Igitur propositio non est aeque evidenter vera sicut posita visione.” Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 6, 137. In this article from the Reportatio Chatton answers the question whether God could cause evident knowledge of (theological) beliefs in the subject without the vision of Him, although these beliefs are (normally) acquired only by means of such a vision. See Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 2, art. 6, 129. Chatton’s point is that assent to a proposition of the form ‘I see that it is thus-and-so’ is evident only if the proposition in question is true. Such a proposition is true if and only if such an act of seeing actually obtains in the subject.
- 45.
According to Chatton, acts of the will are also intentional acts. See Reportatio et Lectura, prol., q. 6, art. 2, 339. There is no reason why it should not be possible to experience one’s act of willing non-intentionally as well.
- 46.
Unfortunately, I cannot discuss the interesting question here how self-knowledge with respect to negative first-person thoughts such as ‘I do not want ice cream’ or ‘I am not angry’ can be acquired in Chatton’s view. At first view, however, it seems that judgments concerning such negative propositions can be made only inferentially. The point is that in this case, there simply is no occurring act that would (partially) cause such an act of judging. There is only the negative proposition. However, it is difficult to see why the occurrence of such a proposition should be sufficient to cause assent.
- 47.
I am hesitant to consider seriously the possibility that Chatton’s conception of a non-intentional act-experience implies some basic form of self-awareness that – in an Avicennian sense – constitutes the human self on the one hand and enables the subject to reflect on himself (by means of a higher-order act). I thank Jari Kaukua for drawing my attention to this alternative). One reason is that to my knowledge, Chatton draws this distinction between two ways of experiencing something only in his debate with Ockham for the purpose of avoiding an infinite regress in the way described. Thus one could suspect that his distinction is somewhat ad hoc.
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Schierbaum, S. (2016). Subjective Experience and Self-Knowledge: Chatton’s Approach and Its Problems. In: Kaukua, J., Ekenberg, T. (eds) Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26914-6_10
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