Abstract
A problem for physicalists are the so-called ‘qualia’. In this essay we will discuss the term qualia first, followed by a brief description of Pettit’s theory of phenomenal consciousness. When we speak about qualia, we mean a concept that has specific properties. In the third part of this essay we will argue that Pettit’s theory of phenomenal consciousness is indeed suggesting rather than denying if not the existence of qualia but something that shares their fundamental properties. The conclusion of this paper is finally that phenomenal content destroys a functionalist view in the philosophy of mind.
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Notes
- 1.
The description in the next four paragraphs follows Dennett (1988).
Reference
Dennett, Daniel C. 1988. Quining Qualia. In Consciousness in contemporary science, ed. A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, 381–414. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Dessouky, J., Peters, T. (2016). Discovering the Properties of ‘Qualia’ in Pettit’s Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. In: Derpmann, S., Schweikard, D. (eds) Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26103-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26103-4_4
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