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Game Theory and Security: Recent History and Future Directions

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9406))

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Abstract

Until twenty years ago, the application of game theory (GT) was mostly limited to toy examples. Today, as a result of major technological and algorithmic advances, researchers use game-theoretical models to motivate complex security decisions relating to real-life security problems. This requires models that are an accurate reflection of reality. This paper presents a biased bird’s-eye view of the security-related GT research of the past decade. It presents this research as a move towards increasingly accurate and comprehensive models. We discuss the need for adversarial modeling as well as the internalization of externalities due to security interdependencies. Finally, we identify three promising directions for future research: relaxing common game-theoretical assumptions, creating models that model interdependencies as well as a strategic adversary and modelling interdependencies between attackers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The 2015 version of Panama Institute’s yearly cost of data breach study shows (\(\bullet \)) an increased number of data breaches resulting from attacks by malicious attackers (47 % versus 37 % in 2013), (\(\bullet \)) a 23 % increase in total cost of data breach since 2013, and (\(\bullet \)) shows that attacks have increased in frequency as well as in the cost to remediate the consequences [12, 13]. ENISA, the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security, sees a 25 % increase in the number of data breaches in 2014 compared to 2013 and refers to 2014 as “the year of the data breach’ [16]. They list nearly all cyber threats, such as denial of service attacks and cyber espionage, as increasing.

  2. 2.

    We think this is a confusing name, because there are a lot of security-related games that are not security games.

  3. 3.

    http://teamcore.usc.edu

  4. 4.

    http://heartbleed.com

  5. 5.

    These games do not fit our definition of interdependent game because there is no attack or attacker.

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Acknowledgements

This research is partially funded by the Research Fund KU Leuven.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Jonathan S. A. Merlevede & Tom Holvoet

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  1. Jonathan S. A. Merlevede
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  2. Tom Holvoet
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Correspondence to Jonathan S. A. Merlevede .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom

    MHR Khouzani

  2. University of Brighton, Brighton, United Kingdom

    Emmanouil Panaousis

  3. Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

    George Theodorakopoulos

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Merlevede, J.S.A., Holvoet, T. (2015). Game Theory and Security: Recent History and Future Directions. In: Khouzani, M., Panaousis, E., Theodorakopoulos, G. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9406. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_19

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