Skip to main content

Abstract

In the last decade performance evaluation of the Board of Directors has become a best practice at national and international level. Italy is an interesting area of analysis given the high concentration of ownership that characterizes companies, including listed companies. In this context the choices of governance that affect the level of disclosure, for which the expectation is to have a low level of disclosure on the practice of BE (Board Evaluation).The first purpose of this paper is to present a résumé on the state of the art in terms of BE for Italian listed companies at 31st December 2012, in terms of presence/absence of the practice of disclosure and its more or less extensive disclosure. The second objective is to highlight the modality of adoption of BE and the third is to analyze the relationship between the quality of BE (measured using as a proxy the disclosure on its setting up) and corporate governance. The results reveal there are few companies that use board evaluation and that there is a relationship between BE adoption and good governance and between the quality of BE and good governance.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Abdelsalam, O. H., & Street, D. L. (2007). Corporate governance and the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. listed companies. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 16, 111–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Abdullah, S. N. (2004). Board composition, CEO duality and performance among Malaysian listed companies. International Journal of Business in Society, 4(4), 47–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Adams, M., & Hossain, M. (1998). Managerial discretion and voluntary disclosure: Empirical evidence from the New Zealand life industry. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 17, 245–281.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P. (2005). The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(2), 343–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, A., & Salterio, S. (2002). Function vs. form. CMA Management, 76, 23–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beasley, M. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 71, 443–465.

    Google Scholar 

  • Belcourt, M., & Kluge, H. (1999). Measuring board performance. Ivey Business Journal, 63, 26–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 257–273.

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  • Bhatala, C. T., & Rao, R. P. (1995). The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics, 16(1), 59–69.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bonson, E., & Escobar, T. (2006). Digital reporting in Eastern European: An empirical study. International Journal of Accounting Information System, 7, 299–318.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bozec, Y., & Bozec, R. (2007). Ownership concentration and corporate governance practices: Substitution or expropriation effects? Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences/Revue canadienne des sciences de l’administration, 24(3), 182–195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bozzolan, S., Favotto, F., & Ricceri, F. (2003). Italian annual intellectual capital disclosure: An empirical analysis. Journal of Intellectual capital, 4(4), 543–558.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2003). Corporate governance and firm performance (Georgia State University Working Paper).

    Google Scholar 

  • Carcio, W. (2004). Board governance: A social systems perspective. Academic of Management Executive, 18, 97–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cerbioni, F., & Parbonetti, A. (2007). Corporate governance and intellectual capital disclosure: An analysis of European biotechnology companies. European Accounting Review, 16(4), 791–826.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charan, R. (2009). Owing up: The 14 question every board member need to ask. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chau, G., & Gray, S. (2002). Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. The International Journal of Accounting, 37, 247–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, C. J., & Jaggi, P. B. (2000). Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19, 285–310.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cheng, E., & Courtenay, S. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting, 41, 262–289.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, T., & Klettner, A. (2010). Board effectiveness and performance. Australian Council of Superannuation Investors Research Paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • CNFP and AFEP. (1995). The boards of directors of listed companies in France, Vienot report. Paris: Conseil National du Patronat Français—Association Française des Entreprises Privées.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conger, J. A., Finegold, D., & Lawler, E. E. (1998). Appraising boardroom performance. Harvard Business Review, 76(1), 136–148.

    CAS  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Conger, J. A., & Lawler, E. E. (2001). Building a high-performing board: How to choose the right members. Business Strategy Review, 12, 11–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conger, J. A., Lawler, E. E., & Finegold, D. L. (2001). Corporate boards: New strategies for adding value at the top. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Corporate Governance Committee. (2011). Corporate governance code—Italian code of conduct. Milan: Corporate Governance Committee.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coskun, M., & Sayilir, O. (2012). Relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of Turkish companies. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(14). 59–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dechow, P. R., & Sweeney, S. A. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulations: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance, 41, 1325–1359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dulewicz, V., & Herbert, P. (2008). Current practice of FTSE 350 Boards concerning the appointment, evaluation and development of directors, boards and committees post the Combined Code’. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 4(1), 99–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Durnev, A., & Kim, E. H. (2005). To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment and valuation. Journal of Finance, 60, 1461–1493.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eng, L., & Mak, Y. (2003). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22, 325–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301–325.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferguson, W. J. (2001). Performance in the boardroom: How should it be assessed? Real Estate Finance, 17, 49–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fombrun, C., & Shanley, M. (1990). What’s in a name? Reputation building and corporate strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 87–99.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forbes, D., & Milliken, F. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision making groups. Academy of Management Review, 24, 489–505.

    Google Scholar 

  • German Panel on Corporate Governance. (2000). Corporate governance rules for quoted German companies. Frankfurt: German Panel on Corporate Governance.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate governance structure and performance of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(7/8), 1034–1062.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hendry, K., & Kiel, G. C. (2004). The role of the board in firm strategy: Integrating agency and organisational control perspectives. Corporate Governance, 12, 500–520.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huse, M. (2007). Boards, governance and value creation: The human side of Corporate Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Huse, M., Minichilli, A., & Schoning, A. (2005). The value of process-oriented boardroom dynamics. Organizational Dynamics, 34, 285–297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingley, C. B., & Van Der Walt, N. T. (2001). The strategic board: The changing role of directors in developing and maintaining corporate capability. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9(3), 174–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingley, C. B., & Van Der Walt, N. T. (2002). Board dynamics and the politics of appraisal. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 10, 163–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kiel, G., & Beck, J. (2006). Seven steps to effective board and director evaluations. Company Secretary, 588–592.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kiel, G., & Nicholson, G. J. (2005). Evaluating board and directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13, 613–631.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kiel, G. C., Nicholson, G. J., & Barclay, M. A. (2005). Board, director and CEO, evaluation. Sydney: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klapper, L., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection and performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10, 703–728.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lawler, E. E., & Finegold, D. (2005). The changing face of corporate boards. MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(2), 67–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawler, E. E., Finegold, D., Benson, G., & Conger, J. A. (2002). Adding value in the boardroom. MIT Sloan Management Review, 43(2), 92–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leblanc, R., & Gillies, J. (2005). Inside the boardroom; How boards really work and the coming revolution in corporate governance. Toronto, ON: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leung, S., & Horwitz, B. (2004). Director ownership and voluntary segment disclosure: Hong Kong experience. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 15(3), 235–260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. (2000). The economic consequences of increased disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Research, 38(3), 91–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levinsohn, A. (2001). FASB weights the value of voluntary disclosure. Strategic Finance, 72–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lim, S., Matolcsy, Z., & Chow, D. (2007). The association between board composition and different types of voluntary disclosure. European Accounting Review, 16, 555–583.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Long, T. (2006). This year’s model: Influences on board and director evaluation. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(6), 547–557.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lorsch, J. W. (1995). Empowering the board. Harvard Business Review, 73(1), 107–117.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lorsch, J. W., & MacIver, E. (1989). Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s corporate boards. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macagnan, C. B. (2009). Voluntary disclosure of intangible resources and stock profitability, Intangible capital disclosure practices and effects on the cost of equity capital: UK evidence. The institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Intangible Capital, 5(1), 1–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mace, M. L. G. (1971). Directors: Myth and reality. Boston: Division of Research Graduate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mangena, M., & Pike, R. (2010). The effect of audit committee shareholding, financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures. Accounting and Business Research, 35(4), 327–349.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Minichilli, A., Gabrielsson, J., & Huse, M. (2007). Board evaluations: Making a fit between the purpose and the system. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 609–622.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, J., Chia, C., & Loh, A. (1995). Voluntary disclosure of segment information, further evidence in Australia. Accounting and Finance, 35(2), 1–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nadler, D. A. (2004). What’s the board’s role in strategy development?: Engaging the board in corporate strategy. Strategy & Leadership, 32(5), 25–33.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Nicholson, G., Kiel, G., & Tunny, J. A. (2012). Board evaluations: Contemporary thinking and practice. In D. Bransons & T. Clarke (Eds.), THE SAGE handbook of corporate governance (pp. 285–324). London: Sage.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • O’Neal, D., & Thomas, H. (1996). Developing the strategic board. Long Range Planning, 29(3), 314–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • OECD. (2004). Principles of corporate governance. Paris: OECD.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prevost, A. K., Rao, R. P., & Hossain, M. (2002). Board composition in New Zealand: An agency perspective. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29, 731–760.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rediker, K., & Seth, A. (1995). Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal, 16(2), 85–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt, S. L., & Brauer, M. (2006). Strategic governance: How to assess board effectiveness in guiding strategy execution. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(1), 13–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shukeri, S. N., Shin, O., & Shaari, M. S. (2012). Does board of directors; characteristics affect firm performance: Evidence from Malaysian public listed companies. International Business Research, 5(9), 120–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sonnenfeld, J. A. (2002). What makes great boards great. Harvard Business Review, 80(9), 106–113.

    PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Sonnenfeld, J. (2004). Good governance and the misleading myth of bad metrics. Academy of Management Executive, 18, 108–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stybel, L. J., & Peabody, M. (2005). How should board directors evaluate themselves? MIT Sloan Management Review, 47, 67–72.

    Google Scholar 

  • Toronto Stock Exchange. (1994). Toronto report—Where were the directors? Guidelines for improved corporate governance in Canada. Toronto, ON: Toronto Stock Exchange.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tricker, R. I. (1984). Corporate governance: Practices, procedures, and powers in British companies and their boards of directors. Aldershot: Gower Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang, K., Sewon, C., & Claibone, M. C. (2008). Determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in an emerging market: Evidence from China. International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 17(1), 14–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wright, C., & Rwabizambuga, A. (2006). Institutional pressures, corporate reputation, and voluntary codes of conduct: An examination of the equator principles. Business and Society Review, 111(1), 89–117.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zattoni, A., & Cuomo, F. (2008). Why adopt codes of good governance? A comparison of institutional and efficiency perspectives. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(1), 1–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Graziella Sicoli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Rubino, F., Giovanni, B., Mazzotta, R., Sicoli, G., Paolo, T., Maurizio, R. (2016). Board Evaluation in Italian Listed Companies. In: Bilgin, M., Danis, H., Demir, E., Can, U. (eds) Business Challenges in the Changing Economic Landscape - Vol. 1. Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics, vol 2/1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22596-8_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics