Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Autonomy, Interests, Justice and Active Medical Euthanasia

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia

Part of the book series: International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine ((LIME,volume 64))

Abstract

There are 4 main arguments for euthanasia: (1) arguments appealing to consistency (e.g., from passive to active euthanasia); (2) the argument from respect for autonomy; (3) appeals to justice; (4) the argument from interests (mercy or relief of suffering). I will argue that only the last is directly relevant to active euthanasia as a medical intervention, though arguments together from autonomy and justice can in practice (through the backdoor) provide a ground for voluntary active medical euthanasia (AME).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    It is in this sense that there is a relevant moral distinction between intended and foreseen effects. If I give the one magic life-saving bullet to A rather than B because A will live longer, or because A has had a rougher ride through life, or the coin fell in A’s favour, I am not saying that I intend B to die. That at least one dies is an inevitable consequence of whatever is done. I am intending to bring about the most just state of affairs. This is quite different from the usual way in which the distinction between intention and foresight is drawn: a doctor administers a lethal dose of morphine intending to relieve suffering but foreseeing that it will kill the patient. In this case, a death is not an inevitable consequence of whatever is done.

  2. 2.

    Thanks to the Editors for raising this objection.

  3. 3.

    This is Dominic Wilkinson’s objection.

  4. 4.

    Thanks to Dominic Wilkinson for this example.

  5. 5.

    This is sometimes put as relieving suffering, as providing mercy (Rachels 1975). Battin (1994, 101) puts this as the principle of mercy: one ought to relieve a person’s suffering, when this does not preclude the sufferer attaining some overriding good.

  6. 6.

    I am not sure whether pain is bad in itself, or bad because of the way it affects a life in the other ways.

  7. 7.

    Thanks to Dominic Wilkinson for this point.

  8. 8.

    Thanks to Dominic Wilkinson for this example.

References

  • Battin, Margaret Pabst. 1994. The least worst death. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillon, Raanan. 1985. Philosophical medical ethics. Rights. British Medical Journal 290: 1890–1891.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hope, Tony, Julian Savulescu, and Judith Hendrick. 2003. Medical ethics and law: The core curriculum. London: Churchill Livingstone.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahane, Guy, and Julian Savulescu. 2009. The welfarist account of disability. In Disability and disadvantage, eds. Adam Cureton and Kimberley Brownlee, 14–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kuhse, Helga. 1992. Quality of life and the death of “Baby M”: A report from Australia. Bioethics 6: 233–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mill, J.S. 1900. Principles of political economy. New York: P. F. Collier and Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rachels, James. 1975. Active and passive euthanasia. New England Journal of Medicine 292: 78–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rachels, James. 2007. The morality of euthanasia. In The right thing to do, eds. James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, 151–155. New York: McGraw Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, John. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Savulescu, Julian. 2014. A simple solution to the puzzles of end of life? Voluntary palliated starvation. Journal of Medical Ethics 40: 110–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter F, and Franklin G. Miller. 2013. What makes killing wrong? Journal of Medical Ethics 39, 3–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verhagen, A.A. Eduard. 2013. The groningen protocol for newborn euthanasia: Which way did the slippery slope tilt? Journal of Medical Ethics 39: 293–295.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • White, Ben, Willmott Lindy, and Julian Savulescu. 2014. Voluntary palliated starvation: A lawful and ethical way to die? Journal of Law and Medicine 22: 376–386.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson, Dominic, and Julian Savulescu. 2011. Knowing when to stop: Futility in the ICU. Current Opinion in Anaesthesiology 24: 160–165.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson, Dominic J.C., and Julian Savulescu. 2012. Should we allow organ donation euthanasia? Alternatives for maximizing the number and quality of organs for transplantation. Bioethics 26: 32–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilkinson, Dominic J.C., and Julian Savulescu. 2014. Disability, discrimination and death: Is it justified to ration life saving treatment for disabled newborn infants? Monash Bioethics Review 32: 43–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Willmott, Lindy, Ben White, Malcolm K. Smith, and Dominic J.C. Wilkinson. 2014. Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in a patient’s best interests: Australian judicial deliberations. Medical Journal of Australia 201: 545–547.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, The United Kingdom

    Julian Savulescu

Authors
  1. Julian Savulescu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Julian Savulescu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, California, USA

    Michael Cholbi

  2. Dept. of Behavioural Sciences and Philos, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

    Jukka Varelius

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Savulescu, J. (2015). Autonomy, Interests, Justice and Active Medical Euthanasia. In: Cholbi, M., Varelius, J. (eds) New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 64. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22050-5_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation