Abstract
In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation the term argumentation is used to refer to a process (“I am still in the middle of my argumentation”) as well as to its result (“Lets examine what her argumentation amounts to”). Characteristically, argumentation is then studied from a communicative perspective. This communication, which can be oral or written, will generally take place by verbal means, but non-verbal elements (such as gestures and images) may also play a part. In pragma-dialectics, argumentation is viewed as aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by critically testing the acceptability of the standpoints at issue. Thus perceived, the study of argumentation does not only have a descriptive dimension that pertains to the way in which argumentation is conducted in communicative practice but also a normative dimension pertaining to the norms of reasonableness that are employed when argumentation is judged for its quality and possible flaws are detected.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
The dialectical conception of reasonableness is inspired by critical rationalists and analytic philosophers, such as Popper (1972, 1974), Albert (1975), Naess (1996), and by formal dialecticians and logicians, such as Hamblin (1970), Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978), and Barth and Krabbe (1982). The pragmatic conception of argumentative discourse as consisting of making regulated communicative moves is rooted in Austin (1962), Searle’s (1969, 1979) ordinary language philosophy, Grice’s (1989) theory of rationality in discourse, and other studies of communication by discourse and conversation analysts. It is in the first place the combination of dialectical and pragmatic insight that distinguishes pragma-dialectics from ‘formal dialectic’ as developed by Barth and Krabbe (1982) that incorporates dialectical insight in a formal (logical) approach.
- 3.
For a more elaborate explanation of the research program, see (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, Chap. 2).
- 4.
- 5.
The metatheoretical premises are for the first time explained in (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984).
- 6.
This does not mean that it is not important to find out to what extent and in which ways internal reasoning and external argumentation diverge, but this research can only be carried out methodically if the two concepts are kept separate.
- 7.
The principle of externalization is at odds with those rhetorical approaches that explain the effectiveness of argumentation by referring, without any further ado, to the presumed psychological states of arguers and their audiences.
- 8.
This terminology was introduced by Barth and Krabbe (1982, pp. 21–22). In their usage, a discussion procedure that fulfills these requirements may claim ‘problem solving validity’ and ‘(semi-)conventional validity’. Semi-conventional validity amounts to intersubjective validity. A series of empirical experiments were carried out to test the inter-subjective acceptability of the critical normativity encapsulated in the pragma-dialectical rules (van Eemeren and Garssen 2002; van Eemeren and Meuffels 2002; van Eemeren et al. 2000). The results provide insight in ordinary language users reasonableness conceptions, their consistency, and the social, cultural and other differences between them. They also provide an empirical basis for developing pedagogically adequate textbooks. O’Keefe (2002) makes clear that a normative ideal, in this case argumentative explicitness, may also be persuasively effective.
- 9.
According to Wenzel (1979, p. 84), a dialectical approach views argumentation as a ‘systematic management of discourse for the purpose of achieving critical decisions’ Its purpose is to establish how discussions should be carried out systematically in order to critically test standpoints. To avoid the dangers of absolutism (or skepticism) and relativism, a dialectical procedure for critical discussion that agrees with a ‘critical’ philosophy of reasonableness incorporates both the product-oriented and process-oriented approaches to argumentation based on the ‘geometrical’ (logical) and the ‘anthropological’ (rhetorical) philosophies of reasonableness. For these philosophies, see Toulmin (1976).
- 10.
For a definition of argumentation as a complex speech act, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 39–46; 1992, pp. 30–33); for the speech act of advancing a standpoint, see Houtlosser (1994); for the distinction between identity conditions and correctness conditions, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 30–31).
- 11.
The term disagreement space was introduced in Jackson (1992, p. 261).
- 12.
A kindred approach to argumentation in which commitments as well as other basic concepts of pragma-dialectics also play a crucial role is Walton and Krabbe (1995).
- 13.
In spite of their different philosophical roots, Habermas’s (1971) ideal speech situation and the ideal model of a critical discussion are in some respects similar. In pragma-dialectics, however, instead of viewing communication as aimed at achieving consensus, intellectual doubt and criticism are seen as the driving forces of progress, and should lead to a continual flux of opinions.
- 14.
A dispute may also be settled by relying on the arbitration of a third party, such as an umpire, a referee or a judge, but then it has not really been resolved.
- 15.
A critical discussion reflects the Socratic dialectic ideal of rational testing of any conviction, not only of statements of a factual kind but also of normative standpoints and value judgments (Albert 1975). Starting from the fallibility of all human standpoints, critical rationalists elevate the methodological concept of critical testing to the guiding principle of problem-solving.
- 16.
In accordance with their critical rationalist philosophy, dialecticians place great emphasis on the consequence of the fact that a proposition and its negation cannot both be acceptable at the same time. The testing of standpoints is thus equated with the detection of inconsistencies (Albert 1975, p. 44).
- 17.
The role of antagonist may coincide with that of protagonist of another—contrary—standpoint, but this need not be so. Expressing doubt regarding the acceptability of a standpoint is not necessarily equivalent with adopting a contrary standpoint of one’s own. If the latter is the case, the difference of opinion is no longer ‘non-mixed’, but ‘mixed’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 13–25).
- 18.
For an analysis of how different types of argumentation structures can come into being, see Snoeck Henkemans (1992).
- 19.
This typology is largely based on Searle (1979, pp. 1–29).
- 20.
This does not mean that they cannot affect the course of the resolution process: sighing that you are unhappy with the discussion, expresses your emotions, which distracts the attention from the resolution process.
- 21.
Due to their dependence on the authority of the speaker or writer in a certain institutional context, declaratives can sometimes lead to a settlement of a dispute.
- 22.
- 23.
Only in exceptional cases, when interpreting a move as a potential contribution to the resolution process is the only charitable option left, an unsupported reconstruction may be warranted ‘for reason’s sake’. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, Chap. 5).
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
For a brief survey of the various approaches to the analysis of discourse and their empirical basis, see van Eemeren et al. (1993, pp. 50–59).
- 27.
Even a discourse that is clearly argumentative will in many respects not correspond to the ideal model of a critical discussion—or at least not directly and complete.
- 28.
- 29.
For the analysis of unexpressed premises, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 60–72).
- 30.
For a discussion of the argumentation structures, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 73–89).
- 31.
For a discussion of the argument schemes, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 94–102).
- 32.
The implicit and unclear way in which the various stages of a critical discussion often appear in argumentative discourse, distorted and accompanied by diversions, should neither give rise to the premature conclusion that the discourse is deficient nor to the superficial conclusion that the ideal model of critical discussion is not realistic. The former is contradicted by pragmatic insight concerning ordinary discourse, the latter by dialectical insight concerning resolving differences of opinion. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, Chap. 4, 1992, Chap. 5; van Eemeren et al. 1993, Chap. 3).
- 33.
See van Eemeren et al. (1993, Chap. 4).
- 34.
There is a difference between these two cases in the degree of ‘conventionalization’. The rhetorical question is, as such, highly conventionalized, whereas the indirectness of the proposal is not. Only in a well-defined context indirectness can be easily detected and correctly interpreted. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 56–59).
- 35.
If the rules of the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure are regarded as first order conditions for having a critical discussion, the internal conditions for a reasonable discussion attitude can be viewed as ‘second order’ conditions relating to the state of mind the discussants are assumed to be in. In practice, people’s freedom to satisfy the second order conditions is sometimes limited by psychological factors beyond their control, such as emotional restraint and personal pressure. There are also external, ‘third order’ conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to be able to conduct a critical discussion properly. They relate to the social circumstances in which the discussion takes place and pertain, for instance, to the power or authority relations between the participants and the discussion situation. Together, the second and third order conditions for conducting a critical discussion in the ideal sense are higher order conditions for resolving differences of opinion. Only if these conditions are satisfied critical reasonableness can be fully realized in practice.
- 36.
An improved version of the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion is to be found in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, Chap. 6).
- 37.
The notions ‘problem-validity’ and ‘conventional validity’, based on insight developed by Crawshay-Williams (Crawshay-Williams 1957), are introduced by Barth and Krabbe (1982). In van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988a, b, 1992) an account is given of the problem-validity of the pragma-dialectical rules; their inter-subjective validity was examined (and to a great extent confirmed) in a series of experimental tests.
- 38.
Such people, being opposed to protectionism of viewpoints and the immunization of any kind of standpoint against criticism, will reject all fundamentalist ‘justificationism’ (Letztbegründung). In taking this view, pragma-dialectics connect with formal dialectics as developed by Barth and Krabbe (1982).
- 39.
See Popper (1971, Chap. 5, note 6).
- 40.
This does not mean that advancing argumentation cannot be combined with, or even include, the use of pathos and ethos, or that relevant arguments cannot be suggested by, or implied in, apparently irrelevant arguments. For an overview of (the history of) classical rhetoric, and an explanation of the role of logos, ethos and pathos, see Kennedy (1994).
- 41.
What is meant by ‘valid in a logical sense’ depends on the logical theory that is used.
- 42.
See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 94–102).
- 43.
The pragma-dialectical identification of fallacies is always conditional. An argumentative move may be regarded as a fallacy only if the discourse is correctly viewed as aimed at resolving a difference of opinion.
- 44.
For an overview of the pre-Hamblin and post-Hamblin theoretical approaches to the fallacies, see (van Eemeren).
- 45.
A ‘zero’ standpoint occurs in a non-mixed difference of opinion when the other party only has doubts about the acceptability of the standpoint. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 13–25).
- 46.
Regrettably, in academic practice there is still a yawning conceptual gap and lack of understanding between the protagonists of a dialectical approach and a rhetorical approach. As generally perceived, in Greek Antiquity the difference amounted initially to a division of labor. According to Toulmin (2001), after the 17th century’s Scientific Revolution, the division became ‘ideological’ and resulted in two mutually isolated paradigms, which were regarded incompatible. Rhetoric has become a field of study in the humanities for scholars interested in communication, discourse analysis and literature. Dialectic was first incorporated in the exact sciences and disappeared with the further formalization of logic in the nineteenth century for a long time almost altogether from sight. Until recently, rhetoricians largely ignored the results of dialectical theorizing, and the other way around. The papers in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2000) are part of an effort to stimulate a rapprochement.
- 47.
What the best way of strategic maneuvering is depends in the last instance always on the contextual limits set by the dialectical situation, the audience that is to be persuaded, and the usable linguistic repertoire.
- 48.
The pragma-dialectical theory as originally developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) can be seen as a dialectical approach to argumentation that keeps an open eye for rhetorical aspects of argumentative reality by studying argumentative discourse from a pragmatic perspective, but does not explicitly take insight from rhetoric into account.
- 49.
- 50.
Because a party who commits a fallacy will at the same time uphold a commitment to complying with the rules of critical discussion, an assumption of reasonableness is conferred on every discussion move (see also Jackson 1995). This assumption is operative even when a particular way of maneuvering violates a certain discussion rule. This explains why fallacies are often not immediately manifest or apparent to others. Echoing the definition of a fallacy criticized by Hamblin (1970, p. 12), one can say that the maneuvering then still ‘seems’ to obey the rules of critical discussion, although in fact it does not. The approach of fallacies as derailments of strategic maneuvering can thus be of help in explaining the deceptive character of (some of) the fallacies.
- 51.
There are some specific derailments of strategic maneuvering that can be generally pinned down as clear-cut violations of a certain rule applying to a particular discussion stage, but they are exceptional.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Houtlosser, P. (2015). The Case of Pragma-Dialectics. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_8
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