Abstract
Pragma-dialectical analysis aims at a rational reconstruction of the ‘deep structure’ of argumentative discourse by revealing those aspects of the discourse that are relevant to the resolution of a difference of opinion. For this endeavour a methodical integration of normative and descriptive insights is required that enables the analyst to interpret the empirical data adequately in the light of the chosen perspective. In this paper, we shall discuss some of the theoretical starting-points of pragma-dialectical analysis as a systematic enterprise of normative reconstruction.
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Notes
- 1.
This paper is based on our work with Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS) in 1989–1990. The complete results of this work will appear in Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse, which the four of us wrote together (to be published).
- 2.
Whether it makes any sense at all to carry out a resolution-oriented reconstruction depends on whether certain ‘higher order conditions’ for critical discussion have been fulfilled. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988) make a distinction between second order conditions concerning the discussion attitude of the parties and third order conditions concerning the circumstances in which the resolution process takes place.
- 3.
In such an analysis, argumentative discourse is treated as a discussion aimed at resolving a dispute. In practice, the discourse can, of course, also serve other goals, requiring other types of analysis. There may just as well be more than one goal at the same time, so that pragma-dialectical analysis not only reveals only part of what is at stake but also becomes more complex. cf. van Eemeren et al. (to be published).
- 4.
For a discussion of the pragma-dialectical tools for reconstructing argumentative discourse see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1990a).
- 5.
- 6.
For a discussion of the emic/etic distinction and the various approaches to conversation, see also Taylor and Cameron (1987).
- 7.
Among the discourse analysts who adopt an interpretive approach are Kreckel (1981), who aims for a participant-oriented typology of illocutionary acts, and Clarke (1983). Among the protagonists of an analytic approach are the social psychologists Duncan and Fiske (1977), who concentrate on the statistical study of ‘objective’ external features of the discourse, and Edmondson (1981), who proposes a classification of illocutions in which the language user’s own perceptions are being discounted.
- 8.
We use the terms a priori and a posteriori without adopting all their Kantian philosophical connotations. In discourse research, the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori approach often amounts to a distinction between inductive and hypothetico-deductive theorizing.
- 9.
Edmondson (1981) goes even further in following an analytic and a priori line of approach. He does not want to rely on a taxonomy of speech acts which is, in any way, derived from ordinary language use and proposes his own taxonomy based on theoretical considerations.
- 10.
To a certain extent, the rules for critical discussion can be seen as specific regulations of principles that already apply in ordinary discourse. Proposing normative rules for critical discussions has more ties with reality than some people think. To give an example, one could refer to the similarities between the starting point in the ideal model that the participants in a critical discussion are striving for the resolution of a dispute on the one hand, and the fact that in ordinary discourse there is a preference for agreement among the interlocutors.
- 11.
In practice, of course, it is not at all uncommon for one of the rules of communication to be broken, but this does not necessarily mean that the Principle of Communication has been abandoned altogether. If this is the case, however, then the person doing so is reneging on a basic convention of the community to which he belongs.
- 12.
It might be useful to note here that we renamed Searle’s ‘sincerity conditions’, responsibility conditions, in order to achieve the externalization we aim for, and to clarify what kind of commitments a speaker undertakes by performing a certain speech act, irrespective of the mental state he is in.
- 13.
One important complication that should be born in mind when determining the appropriateness of a certain continuation is that a relevant reaction need not necessarily be appropriate in the sense that it meets the speaker’s wishes or expectations most closely: turning down a request may be as relevant as accepting it. cf., for the distinction between descriptive and normative relevance, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1990b). In this article several objects, domains, and aspects of relevance are distinguished.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Grootendorst, R. (2015). Making the Best of Argumentative Discourse. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_28
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