Abstract
In discussions directed towards solving a conflict of opinion the participants try to convince one another of the acceptability or unacceptability of the opinion that is under discussion. If the participants are co-operative, this means that they are prepared to externalize their position with regard to the opinion and to advance argumentation for or against it. In this article, which is a condensed translation of an article originally published in Dutch (van Eemeren and Grootendorst in Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing 2:271–310, 1980), the authors try to indicate, by reference to the speech act theory, what this entails. In the way in which it was originally conceived, the speech act theory is inadequate to characterize argumentation. In the authors’ view this objection can be met by regarding argumentation as an illocutionary act complex at a textual level. They formulate the conditions obtaining for a happy performance of this act complex and explain that for the speaker the performance is linked by convention to the perlocutionary act of convincing. In the case of an externalized discussion this means that with his argumentation the speaker tries to make the listener, in turn, perform an illocutionary act in which he expresses his acceptance of non-acceptance of the opinion.
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Notes
- 1.
It is important to note that this definition of the term argumentation must be regarded as a stipulative definition.
- 2.
Our reason for wishing to achieve consistent externalization corresponds to the reason given by Popper in Objective Knowledge for the “linguistic formulation” of theories: only a formulated theory can be the subject of a critical discussion: a theory which is merely believed does not lend itself for discussion (1972, 31, 66). Likewise only verbally expressed opinions lend themselves for critical discussion. In order to solve a conflict of opinion in a reasonable way, the parties involved have to make clear, at every stage of the discussion, not only their positions towards the opinion, but also their argumentation for or against it. This means, inter alia, that they have to state their standpoint and their arguments expressis verbis or at least in such a way that their standpoint and their arguments are “knowable” from what they have said.
- 3.
cf. Franck (1980, 182–192) for similar criticism of speech act theory.
- 4.
Against the view that arguing always requires the performance of one or more speech acts one might advance the argument that it is sometimes possible to convince someone of something without saying a word, as by merely showing him something. The speaker can show the listener fingerprints so that he comes to the conclusion desired by the speaker, viz. that the speaker has indeed accused the right person of the crime. Quite apart from the fact that in colloquial speech no one would ever term such a mutely performed (and effective) attempt as convincing argumentation, it would be right to observe here that this process of convincing must always be based more or less on the following train of thought: “These are the fingerprints of suspect X, these fingerprints must be those of the culprit because there was no one else at the scene of the crime, therefore X is the culprit”. Only seeing the fingerprints is not enough, nor is it decisive, for the effectiveness of the attempts at convincing: the listener must also endorse to the above reasoning. Whether the reasoning itself remains implicit or is formulated explicitly is of secondary importance. In this case both speaker and listener act on the tacit assumption of this reasoning, but if asked to do so they would be able to make it explicit and would be able to affirm explicitly that they endorse it. We therefore prefer in such cases not to speak of a non-verbal attempt to convince and a non-verbal argumentative act, but instead to refer to an implicit (“pre-verbal”) performance of the speech acts of arguing and convincing.
- 5.
The breach of the one-to-one relationship which makes it problematical to regard arguing as an illocutionary act also occurs in the case of indirect speech acts (Searle 1979a, 30–57). In contrast to argumentation, indirect speech acts, however, do not have to consist of more than one expressed sentence (indeed, they generally do consist of only one expressed sentence), nor are they in any specific manner connected with any other utterance (whereas argumentation is always connected with an opinion). Furthermore, in the case of indirect speech acts the primary force is not solely determined by the literal meaning of the sentence uttered and the secondary force is, while in the case of argumentation the forces are in both cases determined to the same extent by the meaning of the sentences uttered.
- 6.
Naturally it is also possible in other cases that two or more sentences together constitute a complete whole. A statement, for example, can very well consist of two sentences. But in that case the two sentences composing the statement are each in themselves statements, and that is not true in the case of argumentation. The person who sends a telegram stating “Father dying. Mother not well either” is in fact making two separate statements, albeit interconnected ones.
- 7.
Quasthoff (1978) does not regard arguing as a speech act at all. However, her use of the term “speech act” appears to be synonymous with the term illocutionary act. It would be mistaken to conclude that Quasthoff holds the view that arguing also, or even perhaps predominantly, takes place with non-verbal means.
- 8.
cf. Searle and Vanderveken (1985).
- 9.
Fogelin too appears, though without saying so in so many words, to make a distinction between the argumentative force at the textual level and an (other) illocutionary force at sentence level. The illocutionary acts which at sentence level are the most characteristic are, according to him, statements. On the relation between the two levels he observes: “Arguments […], like promises and bets, are not used to make statements. Although an argument is (typically) constructed from statements, the argument itself, taken as a whole, is not a statement” (1978, 34; our italics). Searle, again, who incidentally hardly refers to arguing at all, sees a connection between assertions and argumentation. He regards as the distinguishing feature of argumentative speech acts the circumstance that, unlike assertions and related illocutionary acts, they are primarily attempts to convince. Referring to assert, state (that) and affirm he observes: “Unlike argue these do not seem to be essentially tied to convince. Thus “I am simply stating that p and not attempting to convince you” is acceptable, but “I am arguing that p and not attempting to convince you” sounds inconsistent” (1970, 66). According to Öhlschläger (1979, 44), however, argumentation is not necessarily an attempt to convince, but he does not explain this statement.
- 10.
What we understand by the illocutionary act complex of argumentation appears to come closest to what Kopperschmidt (following Habermas 1973, 241) calls a “Kette” or “Sequenz” of speech acts (1980, 88–89). van Dijk (1978) and Quasthoff (1978), when introducing the terms makro-taalhandeling (macro-speech-act) and Handlungsschema (action schema), disregard the distinction between text genres and functional language use units and the distinction between illocutionary forces at textual level and illocutionary forces at sentence level. Quasthoff moreover turns out to think that arguing is not an illocutionary act, so that in her view there can also be no question of an argumentative illocutionary force (1978, 6). This kind of approach to argumentation makes it very difficult to do justice to the connection which in our view exists between the illocutionary acts at sentence level which jointly constitute an argumentation and the conditions for a happy performance of the illocutionary act complex of arguing.
- 11.
Argumentation has the connecting function at textual level in common with the other members of the group of illocutionary acts which Austin terms expositives and which he defines as follows: “Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying usages and of references” (1976, 161). In our view the majority of Austin’s examples could likewise best be situated at a textual level. In his proposal for a better classification of illocutionary acts Searle does not call Austin’s “expositives” a separate class, but he does refer to the connecting function of some illocutionary acts as a possible criterion for classification (1979b, 6), The group of expositives he places entirely within his category of assertives, referring to their characteristic feature “that they mark certain relations between the assertive illocutionary act and the rest of the discourse or the context of utterance” as not more than an “added feature” (1979b, 13).
- 12.
The common testing function of argumentative speech acts distinguishes these speech acts from the text genres, in which there is no such all-embracing covering function; the text genres tend rather to correspond to what sociolinguists sometimes call speech events (see e.g. Gumperz 1972, 17; Hymes 1962, 1967).
- 13.
In our view one of the preliminary conditions for the happiness of the illocutionary act complex of argumentation at the textual level is that the conditions which apply to the happiness of the specific illocutionary acts at sentence level which together constitute the argumentation have been fulfilled during the argumentation. If the argumentation consists of two elementary illocutionary acts which have the force of assertions, then the argumentation is not happy, for example, if the preparatory condition for the making of assertions, viz. that the speaker has evidence (arguments etc.) for the validity of the propositions he is expressing in his assertions, has not been met. The specific thing about the conditions for argumentation at the textual level is that they are calculated to connect the constituent illocutionary acts with a particular opinion.
- 14.
The reason for referring in the conditions for argumentation (both pro and contra) to the acceptance or non-acceptance of the opinion and the argumentative expressed propositions, instead of referring—as is commonly done in the speech act analyses of Searle and his followers—to believing, is that in this way it is possible to bring about the externalization of the discussion which we desire. Here Searle’s theory reveals a remarkable inconsistency: the conditions for the happiness of illocutionary acts are always stated from the point of view of the speaker and assume circumstances which may be known to the speaker, but in the case of preparatory conditions Searle regularly includes in his analyses a condition which is stated from the point of view of the listener and relates to a circumstance which, in the way in which it is referred to by Searle, cannot always be known to the speaker (see Searle 1970, 66–67).
- 15.
cf. Harder and Kock (1976, 50–59) for similar consequences of “presupposition failure”.
- 16.
Incidentally we are of the opinion that illocutionary and perlocutionary acts always have different happiness/effectiveness conditions and are thus two distinct sorts of act. Austin, too (with Searle following close behind), clearly and emphatically makes the same assumption, but Holdcroft, for example, finds that perlocutionary acts are really a special sort of illocutionary act (1978, 20, 21), while Sadock opines that illocutionary acts are a special sort of perlocutionary act (1974, 153).
- 17.
In the first instance Cohen appears to feel that the acceptance of the illocutionary act is not a perlocutionary effect which can occur in all cases of illocutionary acts. For example, he regards the acceptance of a promise as a perlocutionary effect as being alongside the other sorts of associated perlocution, warning, arguing and threatening (1973, 499). But a little later he takes account of the possibility that this is a general perlocutionary effect (1973, 501).
- 18.
As we do, Searle accounts it one of the preparatory conditions for the happiness of a promise that the speaker must believe that what he is promising is valued positively by the listener (1970, 58–59). Our objection concerns his rider that the listener must indeed valise positively the thing promised before the illocutionary act can be called happy. The same objection, in fact, also applies to the other preparatory condition, in which Searle requires that it be unclear both to the speaker and to the listener that what the speaker is promising he would normally have done even without the promise (1970, 59). By thus involving the listener in the conditions for promising, Searle is in fact requiring that the speaker always has a correct assessment of the listener’s thoughts, wishes and expectations in order to ensure a happy performance of the illocutionary act. But a speaker can very well promise his listener something that he either does not want at all or which he has been expecting for some time anyway. In that case it is also quite possible that the listener realizes perfectly well that the speaker is giving him a promise. Essential to the happiness of the illocutionary act, in our view, is that the listener can recognize the speaker’s intention to make a promise. Whether this intention corresponds to what the listener thinks, wishes or expects is immaterial to the happiness of the act as illocutionary act, but can at most have an effect on the achievement of the perlocutionary effect striven for by the speaker.
- 19.
Austin too regards acceptance as an illocutionary act. In the final lecture of How to do things with words he classifies accept in the group of illocutionary acts which he calls expositives. He notes of this category that some of the examples might equally rightly have been included in some other category. For accept and some other illocutionary acts, he says, the group of commisives (to which promise also belongs) might be considered (1976, 162). This suggestion is understandable, since accept has in common with promise that the happiness of its performance as an illocutionary act results in the speaker becoming committed in some specific manner. (We also believe that the observation that accept should preferably be seen as an illocutionary act is of greater importance than the question of what place this act should be alloted in Austin’s classification. Moreover, Austin’s classification is itself far from perfect; for criticism and an alternative, see Searle 1979b, 1–9).
- 20.
Here we endorse a fairly well established convention in the social sciences by which act is regarded as a conscious, intentional and controllable form of behavior.
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Else Barth, Dorothea Franck, Hartmut Haberland, Herman Parret and Daniel Vanderveken for their useful comments.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Grootendorst, R. (2015). The Speech Acts of Arguing and Convincing in Externalized Discussions. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_15
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