Abstract
Although logical reasoning is necessary for finding the truth among opposing philosophies, it is possible to overestimate its importance. This happens when consistency in a philosophical system is wrongly considered to be its main or even only criterion. A great philosopher will always be prepared to sacrifice a principle which leads to a falsehood and thus to allow his system to become inconsistent. This is illustrated with examples drawn from ethics (Bentham and Mill) and the philosophy of science (Poincaré and Le Roy).
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Notes
- 1.
See Bentham (1789, Chap. 1). As explained in the Note on the Translation, small capitals indicate that either Nelson or the philosopher being discussed by Nelson (Bentham, in this case) is talking about concepts. These small capitals are not in the German original. Their purpose here is to highlight the frequency and centrality that focusing on concepts has in Nelson’s text.
- 2.
This is a mathematical objection. In calculus it is impossible to find a unique solution satisfying two (or more) maxima at the same time. See Edgeworth (1881, Appendix VI).
- 3.
See Mill (1861, Chap. II).
- 4.
Poincaré’s conventionalism is further discussed in Chapters “Lecture X” and “Lecture XI”. For a modern exposition of this doctrine, see Ben-Menahem (2006).
- 5.
See Le Roy (1899, 1900).
- 6.
Poincaré’s French has, La terre tourne, which is quite accurately rendered by Nelson’s German, Die Erde dreht sich. As any schoolchild has been taught, the earth has two movements, one of rotation and one of translation. The French and German sentences mentioned are neutral as to which of these two movements is meant. The English rendering that best keeps this ambiguity is, ‘The earth moves’ (as in Galileo’s famous eppur si muove). Incidentally, the discussion in Poincaré’s text develops his point first with respect to the first kind of movement (‘The earth rotates’) and then with respect to the second one (‘The earth orbits’).
References
Ben-Menahem, Yemima. 2006. Conventionalism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bentham, Jeremy. 1789. An Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. London: Payne.
Edgeworth, Francis Y. 1881. Mathematical psychics: An essay on the application of mathematics to the moral sciences. London: Kegan Paul.
Le Roy, Édouard. 1899, 1900. Science et philosophie [Science and Philosophy]. Revue de métaphysique et de morale, VII, 375–425, 503–562, 708–731; VIII, 37–72.
Mill, John Stuart. 1861. Utilitarianism. Fraser’s Magazine 64: 391–406, 525–534, 658–673. [Reprinted many times].
Poincaré, Henri. 1902. La science et l’hypothèse. Paris: Flammarion. [English Trans. The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and Method, New York, The Science Press, 1929, pp. 9–197].
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Nelson, L. (2016). Lecture III. In: A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies. Argumentation Library, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_4
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