Abstract
One of the most puzzling features of points of view is their bipolarity between the subjective and the objective. First, we will distinguish in a precise way subjective points of view from objective ones. Both of them have a subject as their bearer, so the distinction between subjective and objective points of view will have to be made over the peculiar explicit contents of the points of view involved. After doing that distinction, we will define other connected notions as those of intersubjective points of view and private points of view. Finally, we will consider in detail the positions of relativism and perspectivism. This will offer, so to speak, a panoramic view from the subjective side of points of view. From the objective side, we will analyse the notions of independence from a perspective, absolute points of view, and transcendental points of view. Also, we will distinguish between independence from all perspectives and independence from any particular perspective. The second notion will be crucial for a certain way of understanding objectivity.
This work has been granted by Spanish Government, “Ministerio de Economía y Competividad”, Research Projects FFI2008-01205 (Points of View. A Philosophical Investigation), FFI2011-24549 (Points of View and Temporal Structures), and FFI2014-57409-R (Points of View, Dispositons, and Time. Perspectives in a World of Dispositions).
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Notes
- 1.
About that, see Davidson [33].
- 2.
In that line, see more recently Putnam [111, 113, 114, 115], Rorty [130, 131] and Brandom [12, 13]. One crucial difference between the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus [171] and the Wittgenstein post-Tractatus lies precisely in the contrast between private and intersubjective points of view. The solipsist option of the Tractatus, a private point of view which cannot but be the only correct one, is completely discarded as a serious option by the Wittgenstein of the Investigations [173], especially in relation to the problematic of “following a rule”. And it is discarded too, although for different reasons, by the Wittgenstein of On certainty [172].
- 3.
Davidson [33].
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
In particular, see Cratilo, Teethetus, and Republic.
- 9.
A recent rejection of relativism based on what would be entailed by the identification and interpretation of “other” conceptual schemes, is Davidson [35]. In close connection with some ideas of the Wittgenstein of the Investigations, Putnam [118] is also very interesting. Other analyses and refutations of relativism can be found in Siegel [143]. About relativism in general, see again Clark [29], Haack [56], Hales [57] and Hales (ed.) [58].
- 10.
See, for instance, Putnam [118].
- 11.
See Stroud [156].
- 12.
About that idea, see Moore [97].
- 13.
See Berger and Luckmann [7].
- 14.
See Bloor [8].
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
See McGinn [93].
- 18.
- 19.
See for instance, McDowell [92].
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
See Show [146].
- 24.
See Sellars [141].
- 25.
See Sokal and Bricmont [148] and Sokal [147]. Other authors with relevant contributions to all of these debates are Boghossian [10], Frankfurt [43, 44], Nagel [99], Searle [139] and Williams [168]. From different perspectives, all of them argue against relativism and defend the value of things like truth, reality, objectivity and rationality.
- 26.
- 27.
A paradigmatic presentation of that argument can be found in Russell [133].
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
See Goodman [49].
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
This is argued in Farkas [39].
- 38.
See Chisholm [26].
- 39.
- 40.
Carnap [20].
- 41.
- 42.
For a reconstruction and criticisms of these relativist ideas, see Malotki [91].
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
See Davidson [35].
- 46.
Recanati [123] offers a very clear and useful classification of the main forms of “context dependence”. He distinguishes between pre-semantic context dependences and semantic context dependences. Among the first ones, the most relevant cases are language-relativity, syntactic ambiguity and lexical ambiguity. Among the second ones, the most relevant cases are circumstance-relativity, indexical token-reflexivity, indexical semantic under-specification and modulation. About contextualism in general, see Preyer and Peter [108]. About the relationships between contextualism and relativism, see Richard [127].
- 47.
About that, see Perry [107].
- 48.
Among the vast literature concerning this topic, see García-Carpintero and Kölbel (eds.) [45], Kölbel [72, 73, 74]; Lasersohn [77, 78], MacFarlane [87, 88, 89]; Preyer and Peter [108], Recanati [123], Richard [127], Williamson [169], Cappelen and Hawthorne [19], Stojanovic [154] and López de Sa [86].
- 49.
- 50.
- 51.
- 52.
- 53.
See Putnam [117] and Burge [15, 16, 17]. See also Boghossian [9] and Liz [84]. The need for a perspectival self-consciousness is particularly demanding in the case of thoughts about oneself. The phenomenology of the “I” has been analysed by Chisholm [25] and Castañeda [22]. Its radical indexicality has been emphasised by Perry [107]. And the connections among perception, action, and self-consciousness have been stressed by Hurley [66]. Extending Hurley’s ideas, Noë [104, 105] has defended the non-conceptuality of perspectival self-consciousness. Some of our analyses of points of view would have relevant implications here. Perhaps the proper space for “self-consciouness” and “self-knowledge” is that space which is internal to points of view without being internal to the subjects having those points of view.
- 54.
See Gomila [48].
- 55.
- 56.
In the first field, Kuhn’s notions of “paradigm” and “incommensurability” have had an enormous influence. See Kuhn (1996, 3 ed.). With respect to the second field, see Bloor [8], Barnes and Bloor [5] and Collins [30]. Holding a harder constructivism, see Latour and Wolgar [79] and Knorr-Cetina [69].
- 57.
- 58.
- 59.
See Giere [46].
- 60.
- 61.
- 62.
About “bounded rationality”, and its contrast with “ideal conceptions of rationality”, see Cherniak [24].
- 63.
About that, see Anderson [2].
- 64.
With respect to 1, see the preceding sections. With respect to 2 and 3, see the previous chapter of this book.
- 65.
- 66.
About the relations between “invariance” and “objectivity”, see Nozick [103].
- 67.
- 68.
As we said, the notion of an “absolute conception” of the world, and of ourselves as part of it, comes from Williams [166, 167], and has one on its main sources in Descartes. It has been recently analysed and vindicated by Moore (1987, [97], and criticised by Nielsen [101] and Putnam [110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116].
- 69.
See again Moore [97]. We can also say that, in those cases, truth works as an “extensive” measure. In non-absolute (relative) points of view, truth would work as an “intensive” measure.
- 70.
The classical locus for what we are calling the “transcendental mood” in epistemology is Plato’s criticism of the Sophists rejection that things have a way of being in themselves. Such transcendentalism offers an absolute, non-perspectival ontological position about our epistemic relation with reality.
- 71.
Our definitions of absolute points of view, transcendental points of view (of a conceptual kind), absolutism and transcendentalism fit very well with an exclusivist scientific realism involving projects for naturalizing epistemology, ethics, etc. The peculiar transcendental mood that we find here can be called “scientificism”.
- 72.
- 73.
Plato, for instance in his Cratilus, develops the first option. The second one is one of he main topics of Wittgenstein in his Tractatus, one of the more important works in the transcendentalist tradition.
- 74.
About that, see Stroud [155]. According to him, the main claim of radical scepticism is that a full understanding of the whole of reality is simply non possible.
- 75.
Apart from McTaggart, we have in Mellor [94], one of the most elaborated rejections of the real existence of a “fluent time”. In other chapters of this book, these issues will be discussed in depth.
- 76.
In Russell [134], we can find a clear case of a relational time which is internal to a construed “space of perspectives” without being merely internal to the subjects from which that space of perspectives is construed. The construction of a Russellian space of perspectives is explained in other chapters of this book.
- 77.
And this is so with independence of all the problems about the possibility of “simultaneity” in relation to physical time,.
- 78.
See Russell [134]. A very important reference for Russell’s approach was Leibniz’s Monadology. Leibniz was also an important reference for the perspectivist position of the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset.
- 79.
The details of Russell’s construction of a “space of perspectives” are explained in other chapters of this book. Russell claims that the spaces of experience are “private”. This is consistent with his insistence in that the constructions offered (of a space of perspectives, of a physical space and a physical time, of ordinary things and physical objects, of matter, etc.) could be made from a solipsist basis. According to our definitions, however, a “private point of view” could not be intersubjective. So, to the extent that spaces of experience can be intersubjective, and this can put us on the track of objectivity, they could not be “purely private”.
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Liz Gutiérrez, A.M., Vázquez Campos, M. (2015). Subjective and Objective Aspects of Points of View. In: Vázquez Campos, M., Liz Gutiérrez, A. (eds) Temporal Points of View. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19815-6_2
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