Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

Before analyzing Agazzi’s conception of Artificial Intelligence, an historical overview is offered of the different ways in which the problem of imitating or reproducing human thought has been approached since the Middle Ages till now. My review of Agazzi’s position is mainly based on two essays: “Alcune osservazioni sul problema dell’intelligenza artificiale” (Some observation on the problem of the artificial intelligence, 1967) and “Operationality and intentionality: the missing link of the artificial intelligence” (1981). In these Agazzi carries out a deep analysis and criticism of the different approaches to this topic (especially computationalism and functionalism) and outlines his own articulated conception. In his view today’s computers (or intelligent artificial systems in general) cannot be said to have thought or feeling analogue to those of human beings because they are not endowed with intentionality. In such a way Agazzi anticipated of about 15 years this celebrated thesis maintained by John Searle . It is possible to build complex machines capable of realizing performances very similar to those of human reasoning or goal-oriented behaviors. This similarity, however, is confined to the capability of performing certain operations, while the difference that still remains is the capability to give meanings to such operations and their results, and to intentionally propose goals to themselves.