Abstract
Uncertainty permeates politics, and it shapes outcomes in important ways. Despite this central role, it is often viewed by social scientists as an unsolvable mystery, or else relegated to the analytical margin by being treated simply as an “error term” in quantitative models (Cioffi-Revilla in Politics and uncertainty: theory, models and applications. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998: xiii). Political economy was the first field to recognize the significance of uncertainty, and several early works established the theoretical foundations for exploring the role of uncertainty within a variety of political contexts. Among these works lies James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s (The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962) study of The Calculus of Consent which focused attention on the idea that constitutional choices are made under conditions of uncertainty. This inevitably and predictably affects the outcome of efforts to draft constitutions, they argued, because it is uncertainty about the future that leads constitutional architects to establish rules serving the general interest, rather than their own self-interest.
Our Constitution is in actual operation;
everything appears to promise that it will last;
but nothing in this world is certain but death and taxes.
Benjamin Franklin, 1789
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Notes
- 1.
Katz notes, as in England, the colonial electorate at this time was limited to men of substance which generally meant men who owned property. In the American colonies, however, at least 25 % and probably closer to 50 % of adult males could vote, while it is estimated only about 10 % of adult men in Britain could vote.
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de Clercy, C. (2015). Uncertainty and the General Interest in the American Constitution: Testing the “Veil of Ignorance” Hypothesis in Constitutional Choice. In: Imbeau, L., Jacob, S. (eds) Behind a Veil of Ignorance?. Studies in Public Choice, vol 32. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14953-0_5
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