Abstract
The usual way of conceiving corruption refers to individual behavior, such as the payment of bribes to public officers in order to obtain benefits (which could be called the "subjective" side of corruption). This is an indispensable but insufficient approach to understand and overcome corruption. It is also essential to cope with the “objective” side of corruption, which is represented by the degeneration of the institutional system and its rules. This chapter analyses some cases of “objective” corruption of the institutional system and tries to indicate possible remedies, particularly with regard to simplifying legislation, reducing administrative procedures and discretionary powers, enhancing public controls, improving transparency in public procurement. Putting in act these remedies against “objective” corruption can help reducing the incentives and occasions of “subjective” corruption.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
On the negative effects of excessive and inaccessible legislation, see (Bingham 2011, p. 37 ff).
- 2.
The last available indexes are, respectively: World Bank Group, Doing Business. Measuring Business Regulations, 2014; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 2014.
- 3.
Among the many initiatives, see: the program of the European Commission named “REFIT” (Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme), which aims at making EU law simpler and reducing regulatory costs, thus contributing to a clear, stable and predictable regulatory framework; for an effective synthesis of OECD efforts aimed at regulatory reform, see Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance, 2012.
- 4.
Law Commission Act, 1965.
- 5.
The most recent Program of the Commission for the next 3 years is contained in Law Commission, The Work of the Law Commission. Incorporating the Twelfth Programme, October 2014.
- 6.
On the reduction of discretionary power in various economic sectors, see (D’Alberti 2008, p. 99 ff).
- 7.
See on this point (Barbieri and Giavazzi 2014).
- 8.
It is telling that the last OECD Global Forum on Competition (Paris, 27–28 February 2014) has been devoted to the theme “Fighting Corruption and Promoting Competition” and discussed how anti-competitive behavior and corruption interact in different ways: inter alia, in public procurement, or through regulation restricting business licensing and entry to market.
- 9.
US Freedom of Information Act, 1967; UK Freedom of Information Act, 2000.
References
Barbieri, G., and F. Giavazzi. 2014. Corruzione a norma di legge. Milano, Rizzoli: La lobby delle grandi opere che affonda l’Italia.
Bingham, T. 2011. The rule of law. London: Penguin.
D’Alberti, M. 2008. Poteri pubblici, mercati e globalizzazione. Bologna, Il Mulino.
Graf Lambsdorff, J. 2006. Causes and consequences of corruption: What do we know from a cross-section of countries. In International handbook on the economics of corruption, ed. S. Rose-Ackerman. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Mandeville, B. 1989. Fable of the bees: or, private vices, publick benefits (1724). London: Penguin.
Mény, Y. 1992. La corruption de la République. Paris: Fayard.
Rose-Ackerman, S. 2006. Introduction and overview. In International handbook on the economics of corruption, ed. S. Rose-Ackerman. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
D’Alberti, M. (2015). Corruption of the Institutional System: Remedies. In: Paganetto, L. (eds) Achieving Dynamism in an Anaemic Europe. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14099-5_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14099-5_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-14098-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-14099-5
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)