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Multi-domain Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme from Pairings

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Network and System Security (NSS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8792))

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Abstract

In trusted computing, a Trusted Platform Module(TPM) is used to enhance the security of the platform. When the TPM proofs his identity to a remote verifier, the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) method is adopted by the Trusted Computing Group(TCG) to provide anonymous authentication. But the original DAA scheme in TCG specifications can only work well in a single domain, which can not be used in multi domains directly. It is necessary to improve the single domain DAA to be available in multi domains. In this paper, we proposed a multi-domain DAA scheme, which is based on proxy signature and a pairings based DAA method. The proxy signature is used to delegate the trusted relationship and domain authentication, while the pairings based DAA method is used for the computation platform authentication when a trusted platform accessing another domain. Then the DAA authentication protocol is also designed. Finally, the analysis on the protocol are given, the results show that the proposed scheme is secure and effective.

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Yang, L., Ma, J., Wang, W., Cao, C. (2014). Multi-domain Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme from Pairings. In: Au, M.H., Carminati, B., Kuo, CC.J. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8792. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11698-3_47

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11698-3_47

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-11697-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-11698-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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