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eCK Secure Single Round ID-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols with Master Perfect Forward Secrecy

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Network and System Security (NSS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8792))

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Abstract

Recently, extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol, proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin, is considered to be one of the stronger security models that covers many attacks on existing models. Unfortunately, it does not capture the very sensitive security barricades, the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and the Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (MPFS) in ID-based setting. An ID-based AKE protocol with PFS (resp. MPFS) ensures that the revealing of static keys of the parties (resp. the master secret key of the private key generator), must not compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between the parties. In the current status, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. Proposed here, are the ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. Towards achieving this goal, we also construct ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and the remaining one with MFS, almost at the same computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK Secure Single Round AKE protocols. All of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India

    Tapas Pandit & Rana Barua

  2. Indian Institute of Technology, Patna, India

    Somanath Tripathy

Authors
  1. Tapas Pandit
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  2. Rana Barua
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  3. Somanath Tripathy
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong

    Man Ho Au

  2. Department of Computer Science and Communication, University of Insubria, Via Mazzini, 5, 21100, Varese, Italy

    Barbara Carminati

  3. Ming Hsieh Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Southern California, 3740 McClintock Avenue, EEB 100, 90089-2560, Los Angeles, CA, USA

    C.-C. Jay Kuo

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Pandit, T., Barua, R., Tripathy, S. (2014). eCK Secure Single Round ID-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols with Master Perfect Forward Secrecy. In: Au, M.H., Carminati, B., Kuo, CC.J. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8792. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11698-3_33

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11698-3_33

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-11697-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-11698-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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