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Complementarity Between Formal and Relational Governance Mechanisms in Inter-organizational Networks: Combining Resource-Based and Relational Governance Perspectives

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Interfirm Networks

Abstract

Previous research has mainly focused on the transaction cost view of governance which argues that formal and relational governance mechanisms in interorganizational networks are substitutes. This study extends the work on formal and relational governance in network relationships by developing an integrative framework based on resource-based and relational governance perspectives in order to explain the complementary relationship between formal and relational governance mechanisms. The resource-based and relational governance views argue that formal and relational governance mechanisms function as complements for knowledge creation, knowledge integration and communication in explaining relational outcome. The results from 104 suppliers in the Turkish automotive industry support the complement perspective.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration, Izmir University, Gursel Aksel Bulvari No: 14, 35350, Uckuyular - Izmir, Turkey

    Tugba Gurcaylilar-Yenidogan

  2. Department of Management, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, A-1090, Vienna, Austria

    Josef Windsperger

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  1. Tugba Gurcaylilar-Yenidogan
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  2. Josef Windsperger
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Correspondence to Tugba Gurcaylilar-Yenidogan .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    Josef Windsperger

  2. Centre Recherche en Economic et Management (CREM), Universite de Rennes 1, Rennes Cédex 7, France

    Gérard Cliquet

  3. Institut für Strategisches Management, University of Münster, Münster, Germany

    Thomas Ehrmann

  4. Department of Organization, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Georg Hendrikse

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Gurcaylilar-Yenidogan, T., Windsperger, J. (2015). Complementarity Between Formal and Relational Governance Mechanisms in Inter-organizational Networks: Combining Resource-Based and Relational Governance Perspectives. In: Windsperger, J., Cliquet, G., Ehrmann, T., Hendrikse, G. (eds) Interfirm Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10184-2_12

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