Abstract
Legal theory differentiates between statutory analogy (analogia legis) and legal analogy (analogia iuris). Traditionally, statutory analogy (analogia legis) is considered an interpretive argument, which refers to the application of a legal norm regulating a case to an essentially similar case for which no legal norm exists. On the contrary, legal analogy is used in order to fill IN gaps where the statutory analogy does not provide a solution. In these cases, the analogy is not established according to norms, but to the so-called “general principle of law”. The analogia iuris can be conceived of as a reference to principles deduced from the “natural law” or from the laws shared by the “civilized nations”. In this case, the analogy is ideologically dependent on a peculiar cultural point of view (i.e. the natural law school or traditional legal liberalism). Thus, “legal principles” can also be drawn from the legal system or from constitutional provisions. In this case, however, there is no apparent difference from statutory analogy. In other words: either the analogia iuris is a strategic device used in order to cover an ideological position, or it is an interpretive scheme, which is no different from the statutory analogy. More generally, considering analogy from a rhetorical point of view, that is as a rhetorical argument whose persuasive force depends on degrees of resemblance, the distinction between analogia iuris and legis become marginal, and a reductionist approach can be applied to the analysis of judicial discourse.
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Notes
- 1.
“La ragione per la quale sovente l’analogia viene distinta da una ‘interpretazione estensiva’ va ricercata nei divieti di analogia che talune organizzazioni giuridiche pongono in taluni casi (ad esempio in materia di norme penali, in materia di norme speciali).” See also infra n. 6.
- 2.
MacCormick and Summers includes in the category of systematic arguments, among others: (a) “arguments invoking precedents already interpreting the statute at hand”; (b) “arguments based on statutory analogies. For example, when a case is not provided for in the statute, the case is to be treated in the same fashion that closely analogous cases are treated in the statute”; (c) “arguments appealing to general principles potentially or actually operative within the field in which the interpretational issue arises” (MacCormick and Summers 1991). As Harm Kloosterhuis underlined, “this means that analogy argumentation is only relevant when a linguistic reading of the norm is unacceptable (in case of the interpretation of a norm) or impossible (in case of a gap) (Kloosterhuis 2000, pp. 178–179).
- 3.
Peczenik’s definition of (statutory) analogy argumentation reads as follows: “One applies a statutory rule to a case which, viewed from the ordinary linguistic angle, is included in neither the core nor the periphery of the application area of the statute in question, but resembles the cases covered by this statute in essential respects” (Peczenik 1989, p. 392; Kloosterhuis 2000, p. 177)
- 4.
See also MacCormick (2005, pp. 208–209): “Of course, to spell out what is relevant in the likeness between case A and C is, in effect, to formulate a legal principle, and this can be characterized as a form of inductive reasoning. For once it is articulated in this way, the procedure works from individual instances to explanatory or justificatory generalizations of these, then returns to the now coherently connected decision about the current problem”.
- 5.
“Our capability to find or to see similar patterns in different stories explains our ability to formulate broad abstract statements of principle that cover the cases. Principled reasoning presupposes analogical thinking, not vice versa” (MacCormick 2005, p. 207).
- 6.
“A principle that can be shown to be itself anchored in established law it is then relevant to legally justifying the decision in the instant case, albeit the decision is one that in this restricted sense ‘extends the law’” (MacCormick 2005, p. 211).
- 7.
Obviously, there is a difference between using the expression “rhetorical argument” in a technical argumentative sense, and using the expression “rhetorical device”, as Posner seems to do, in the lay sense of “not based on fact” or “deceptive”. However, even considering this different use of the term “rhetorical”, with the expression “surface phenomenon” Posner suggests a two-level model and distinguishes between a superficial “rhetorical” dimension and a deeper structure (“legal reasoning”).
- 8.
This category includes the classic legal arguments, which find their most complete formulation in the work of Tarello: psychological argument (appeal to the will of the legislator), historical argument (assumption of continuity: hypothesis of the conservative legislator), a contrario argument, literal argument (syntactical and grammatical considerations), coherency of the legal system argument (horizontal: between statutes; vertical: interpretation according to the Constitution and to supranational and international law), argument from the completeness of the legal system, economical argument (hypothesis of non-redundancy of the legislator), ab absurdo argument (apagogical argument), systematic argument ( sedes materiae or topographic argument, argument from terminological consistency, conceptualistic or dogmatic argument), naturalistic argument (hypothesis of the powerless legislator, reference to common sense), a simili argument ( analogia legis) and argument from general principles ( analogia juris), teleological argument (hypothesis of the legislator with purposes), a fortiori argument ( a minori ad maius, a maiori ad minus), authoritative or ab exemplo argument (reference to opinio doctorum, reference to precedents, reference to other jurisdictions, etc.), argument from equity (principles of justice used to select the meanings of provisions), naturalistic argument. (Tarello 1974, 1980; Damele et al. 2011)
- 9.
“As is fairly obvious, judges’ opinions in the legal reports of problem cases concern mainly justification, and the question how and why this judicial reasoning is persuasive addresses particularly the issue of its persuasiveness in the process of justification (…). As Bruce Anderson says, the claim to have made a ‘discovery’ must remain a contestable claim until a satisfactory justification can be stated” (MacCormick 2005, pp. 208–209).
- 10.
“Nella nostra cultura, esso funziona come regola (e relativo argomento) di interpretazione, e precisamente come la regola secondo cui: essendo dato un enunciato normativo che predica una qualificazione normativa di un termine dell’enunciato che sta per un soggetto o una classe di soggetti, si deve estendere il significato di quel termine a comprendere soggetti o classi di soggetti anche non strettamente e letteralmente inclusi, e che però presentino con i soggetti letteralmente inclusi una somiglianza o ‘analogia’ assunta come rilevante in ordine alla identità di disciplina giuridica (almeno per quanto concerne la qualificazione in questione) (…). “L’argomento a simili funziona, in sede interpretativa, come veicolo di interpretazione ‘estensiva’”.
- 11.
Interesting enough, in his analysis of the argument from analogy considered from a rhetorical perspective, Peter Mengel concludes that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) fail to formulate criteria for the validity of analogy argumentation because they mistake validity for rhetorical efficiency. However, from a rhetorical point of view, persuasive efficiency is more important than “logical” validity. In point of fact, the normative criterion, introduced by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, of the “universal audience” is itself a matter of rhetorical efficiency (Mengel 1995; Kloosterhuis 1997).
- 12.
“Il modello della analogia (…) è la proporzione matematica. (…) La differenza tra la proporzione matematica (che permette di individuare analiticamente il termine incognito) e l’analogica (che persuade retoricamente del termine incognito) risiede ovviamente nel carattere necessario del termine numerico incognito da un lato, e nella mera persuasione dell’esistenza del termine incognito dell’analogia dall’altro lato.”
- 13.
“(…) negli impieghi giuridici l’argomento analogico è presto divenuto uno schema basato non già su due coppie di membri, bensì su una serie di tre soli membri (…). In questi usi giuridici, lo schema dell’analogia è argomento produttivo di norme nuove solo in quanto lo si consideri come volto ad asserire l’esistenza di una norma che q è Z mentre esisteva solo la norma che p è Z; ma se lo si considera un argomento interpretativo di un enunciato ‘p è Z’ esso appare come una estensione del vocabolo rappresentato da p a coprire anche q, in modo da attribuire all’enunciato normativo ‘p è Z’ il significato normativo che p e q sono Z”.
- 14.
“Il ricorso ai principi di ‘diritto naturale’ o ‘comuni a tutte le nazioni civili’ serve a poco data la evidente dipendenza ideologica di tali nozioni e data la divisione culturale della cultura e degli operatori giuridici; l’induzione dei principi generali dal complesso degli enunciati del diritto positivo si risolve o in analogia legis (o materiae) ovvero in mera ‘estensione’ di enunciati ben ‘particolari’, talché non v’è ragione di individuare un argomento ulteriore (…). Insomma, l’argomento a partire dai principi generali è uno schema vuoto, che serve a coprire di volta in volta disparate operazioni”.
- 15.
“La forza persuasiva dell’argomento analogico dipende dalla propesione dell’uditorio ad accettare la rilevanza della somiglianza o analogia di p e q al fine di disciplinarli egualmente. Poiché questa rilevanza ha bisogno di essere argomentata a sua volta, l’argomento analogico tende a venire associato ad altri argomenti (…) che funzionano come supporti della detta rilevanza”.
- 16.
See supra § 4.
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Damele, G. (2014). Analogia Legis and Analogia Iuris: An Overview from a Rhetorical Perspective. In: Ribeiro, H. (eds) Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy. Argumentation Library, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06334-8_14
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