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Minimum Procedural Rights for Corporations in Corporate Criminal Procedure

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Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability

Abstract

Criminal trials are special, as various procedural guarantees are only available if someone is charged with a criminal offense—but not in administrative or civil proceedings. These guarantees special to criminal justice range from the presumption of innocence over the privilege against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare) to the high standard of proof required for a criminal conviction. Whether and to which extent these guarantees apply in criminal proceedings against legal persons is primarily a question of criminal policy. There are, however limits enshrined in constitutional and human rights law, which also protect legal persons (1). If the legal consequences a legal person faces are limited to incapacitation and restitution, the constitutional and human rights guarantees special to criminal proceedings are inapplicable. They must be adhered to only if the legal consequences include genuine punishment (2). In such cases, the right to a fair trial as well as other, more specific procedural guarantees are to be upheld similarly—but not necessarily equivalent—to criminal proceedings against natural persons, as the principle of individual guilt is limping and the core of the criminal law is not affected. Nemo tenetur and ne bis in idem protection may be enjoyed by the owners, but not necessarily by the legal representatives of a corporation (3). Finally, special care must be taken in order to avoid collateral damage to the criminal justice system overall and to the individual rights of innocent stakeholders in the legal entity. Instead, the trust in the criminal justice system should be strengthened by providing more guarantees—even if they are not constitutionally required (4).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Other legal entities—such as political parties, welfare organizations, or terrorist groups—which may or may not fall under a criminal liability of legal persons, depending on the policy choices of the legislature, are excluded from this analysis.

  2. 2.

    See, inter alia, Tiedemann, in this volume, pp. 11ff.; Vogel (2012).

  3. 3.

    See, inter alia, Tiedemann, in this volume, pp. 11ff.; Engelhart, in this volume, pp. 53ff.

  4. 4.

    Schünemann (2013), p. 200 argues against naming it “criminal punishment” (Strafe) for the fear of masking differences between criminal liability of legal and of natural persons. This can be mitigated, though, by Tiedemann’s proposal (in this volume, pp. 11ff) to use a distinct denomination for a third track of criminal justice. Moreover, the same denomination—“Geldbuße”—is currently used for the sanction imposed for menial infractions by natural persons and for all kinds of infractions by legal persons!

  5. 5.

    Moreover, according to the so-called Radbruch’s formula (1946), there is an intrinsic “crash barrier” to law so that evidently unjust provisions cannot be considered law.

  6. 6.

    Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 3 II.

  7. 7.

    Grundgesetz—German Basic Law, as amended. Translation by Tomuschat and Currie, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (12.2.2014).

  8. 8.

    BVerfGE 12, 6 (8); most recently BVerfG NVwZ 2008, 670 (670); for the similar discussions in Spain and the consequences for corporate criminal procedure see Gómez Colomer (2013).

  9. 9.

    Jarass (2012), Art. 19 para. 15; Arzt (2003), pp. 456 f.

  10. 10.

    ECtHR, judgement of 13.12.2007, application 40998/98, §§ 81, 82.

  11. 11.

    Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 17 para. 5; Van Kempen (2010), p. 3.

  12. 12.

    Van Kempen (2010), p. 3.

  13. 13.

    Borowsky (2011), Art. 51 para. 35.

  14. 14.

    Van Kempen (2010), p. 2.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Van Kempen (2010), p. 3.

  16. 16.

    It should be noted that sanctioning corporations—and therefore legal proceedings against them—may be the rather the exception than the rule, as the mere threat of criminal sanctions intends to pressure corporations to enforce criminal compliance etc.

  17. 17.

    So in Sweden regarding the license to sell alcoholic beverages, cf. ECtHR, judgment of 07.07.1989, application 10873/84; § 28.

  18. 18.

    On this basis, administrative authorities may already impose a model of supervision (“Unternehmens-Kuratel ”) as suggested by Schünemann, most recently 2013, p. 200.

  19. 19.

    See, inter alia, Ennuschat (2011), §§ 37–58 with many further references.

  20. 20.

    Ennuschat (2011), § 37.

  21. 21.

    Cf. Ennuschat (2011), §§ 94–98 with further references.

  22. 22.

    See, inter alia, BVerwG, judgment of 16.03.1982—1C 124/80.

  23. 23.

    ECtHR, judgment of 13.06.1979, application 6833/74, § 50.

  24. 24.

    ECtHR, judgment of 07.07.1989, application 10873/84, § 53; and elsewhere.

  25. 25.

    See, inter alia, ECtHR, judgment of 07.07.1989, application 10873/84, § 46.

  26. 26.

    See, inter alia, ECtHR, judgment of 07.07.1989, application 10873/84, §§ 59, 62 f.

  27. 27.

    BVerwG GewA 1964, 247, p. 248; VG Stuttgart GewA 2011, 443. However, if administrative authorities act quickly enough, they are not bound by the findings of criminal proceedings, even if the administrative decision is later on challenged in court (cf. Ennuschat 2011, § 188).

  28. 28.

    Vogel (2014).

  29. 29.

    Vogel (2014).

  30. 30.

    Vogel (2014).

  31. 31.

    ECtHR, judgment of 08.06.1986, application 5100/71 et al., § 82.

  32. 32.

    Vogel (2014).

  33. 33.

    ECtHR, judgment of 05.05.1995, application 18465/91, § 36.

  34. 34.

    ECtHR, judgment of 05.05.1995, application 18465/91, § 52; ECtHR, judgment of 24.10.1986, application 9118/80, § 65.

  35. 35.

    ECtHR, judgment of 04.11.2008, application 72596/01, § 60 (at end).

  36. 36.

    See, inter alia, ECtHR, judgment of 21.02.1984, application 8544/79 et al., § 53.

  37. 37.

    ECtHR, judgment of 08.06.1986, application 5100/71 et al., § 82.

  38. 38.

    See, inter alia, ECtHR, judgment of 08.06.1986, application 5100/71 et al., § 85; ECtHR, judgment of 04.11.2008, application 72596/01, § 60.

  39. 39.

    Vogel (2014).

  40. 40.

    Indirectly, both the threat of punishment and the actual verdict may also infringe other constitutional guarantees.

  41. 41.

    Vogel (2014).

  42. 42.

    See already above at footnote 38.

  43. 43.

    ECtHR, judgment of 23.11.2006, application 73053/01, § 43.

  44. 44.

    Similarly Van Kempen (2010), p. 3.

  45. 45.

    German Constitutional Court, judgment of 19.03.2013—2 BvR 2628/10, 2 BvR 2883/10, 2 BvR 2155/11—and accompanying English press release.

  46. 46.

    See, inter alia, in reference to nulla poena sine culpa and legal persons, BVerfGE 20, 323.

  47. 47.

    Cf. BVerfGE 95, 220 (242); BVerfGE 118, 168 (203).

  48. 48.

    Van Kempen (2010), pp. 7 ff.; see also Dürig, cited in Remmert (2013), Art. 19 GG at 113: Protecting the human rights of legal persons “is not done for the ‘fictions’ sake [but …] ‘for the humans’ sake’”.

  49. 49.

    The shareholder value, as determined by the stock market, takes a future perspective and may price-in looming financial penalties in advance.

  50. 50.

    The jurisprudence by the ECtHR on the procedural standing of individuals in light of Art. 34 ECHR (“victim”) to bring forward claims on the corporations behalf—which it only accepted for sole owners or two brothers as owners, cf. ECtHR, judgment of 28.03.1990, application 10890/84,§ 49; ECtHR, judgment of 15.11.2007, application 72118/01, §§ 125–126—does not preclude the material position taken here.

  51. 51.

    Häger (2006), Vor §§ 40 bis 43 para. 43; § 40 para. 54 ff.

  52. 52.

    Similarly, ECtHR, decision of 14.02.2006, application 23055/03, held that a company’s director and employee of a corporation who “was not its owner” had no standing regarding an alleged fair trial violation affecting the corporation.

  53. 53.

    ECtHR, judgment of 6.12.1988, application 10590/83, § 77; regarding the applicability of Art. 6 II ECHR to corporations cf. the jurisprudence cited by Van Kempen (2010), p. 15 footnote 70.

  54. 54.

    BVerfGE 9, 167 (170).

  55. 55.

    Cf. BVerfGE 9, 167 (170); BVerfGE 56, 37 (49–59); ECtHR, judgment of 11.07.2006, application 54810/00, § 117; Grabenwarter and Pabel (2012), § 24 para. 126.

  56. 56.

    Drope (2002), pp. 305 ff.

  57. 57.

    BVerfGE 95, 220 (242); BVerfGE 118, 168 (203); this jurisprudence is criticised, inter alia, by Weiß (1998). See also Böse (2002) and Drope (2002), pp. 179 ff. on the constitutional basis of nemo tenetur.

  58. 58.

    Van Kempen (2010), pp. 15 f. Contrary to Engelhart (2012), p. 475, this does not follow from ECtHR, judgment of 27.10.1993, NJW 1995, 1413, as this judgment only concerns the right to be heard.

  59. 59.

    ECtHR, judgment of 11.07.2006, application 54810/00, § 117.

  60. 60.

    Van Kempen (2010), p. 16.

  61. 61.

    See, inter alia, Engelhart (2012), p. 476 with extensive references.

  62. 62.

    Similarly, Minoggio (2003), pp. 128 f extensively refers to the detrimental effects to owners, while still maintaining the legal representatives (and additional high-ranking employees) may remain silent.

  63. 63.

    Contrary to Weiß (1998), p. 296, there is no (valid) moral conflict within a legal representative of a corporation, as it is not his company—but only his employer—which faces punishment. See also Arzt (2003), pp. 457 f., Ransiek (1996), pp. 357 ff.

  64. 64.

    Similarly Engelhart (2012), pp. 458 f. with extensive references.

  65. 65.

    Schünemann’s (2013), p. 200 criticism targets a similar aspect.

  66. 66.

    Brodowski (2012), pp. 115 f.

  67. 67.

    Cf. Packer (1964).

  68. 68.

    Kennedy, cited in Sorensen (1965), p. 528, on the “moon race”.

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Brodowski, D. (2014). Minimum Procedural Rights for Corporations in Corporate Criminal Procedure. In: Brodowski, D., Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parra, M., Tiedemann, K., Vogel, J. (eds) Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05993-8_17

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