Abstract
The most basic property of human language is that in each of its variants, it provides an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions that receive interpretations at two interfaces, sensorymotor for externalization and conceptual-intentional for mental processes. A central problem, then, is to determine the nature of the recursive procedures that have this property. General scientific norms direct inquiry to the simplest possible solution – minimal recursion – to deepen explanatory power and expedite the study of language acquisition, and to offer some hope for some eventual insight into evolution of the language capacity. Pursuit of this objective has led to elimination of many unwanted stipulations and also grounding some fundamental properties of universal grammar. Among other consequences, it provides evidence for an asymmetry of the interfaces, with externalization an ancillary procedure, a conclusion consistent with well-known properties of language and the very limited evidence about evolution.
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Notes
- 1.
Adopting what Soare (1996) calls the Recursion Convention, as is common practice, though in his careful conceptual and historical review Soare recommends replacing “recursive” by “computable” when the general framework is Turing computability, the usual case.
- 2.
Sauerland and Gärtner (2007).
- 3.
One illustration, which has become influential in recent years (in rather misleading ways, I think), is “chunking” of running text into word-like elements. In my Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory LSLT (1955), I took for granted that this is done by statistical analysis of transitional probabilities, modifying a proposal of Zellig Harris’s for detection of morphemes (not the right units, however, because morphemes are too abstract, lacking the required sequential properties; but a necessary assumption given the principled procedural ban on level-mixing). There is no reason to suppose that such analytic procedures relate at all closely to how a child analyzes discourse, making use of a variety of information, such as recognition of familiar words. It is also now known that the procedure does not work unless supplemented by prosodic information. See Yang (2004), Shukla et al. (2011).
- 4.
- 5.
In Chomsky (1986), I suggested that the term I-language be used instead of grammar, in one of the senses of this ambiguous term. I added that any other concept of language might be called a variety of E-language (“E” for external). The latter term has come to be used to refer to a (finite) corpus of material, or to some infinite object generated by the I-language, usually a set of well-formed formulas WFF. This usage is unfortunate, and should be abandoned, I think. A corpus is not a language in any sense. A set of WFFs is a formal language, determined by some finite generative procedure. Apart from its derivative character, it is not even clear that such a set can be coherently identified for human language; see LSLT, Chomsky (1957), and much since. In actual practice dimensions of deviance have been a rich and productive topic of inquiry since the early days of generative grammar.
- 6.
That much can ever be learned about evolution of language, or of cognition generally, is by no means obvious. For well-argued (and unfortunately, largely ignored) skepticism on the topic, see evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin (1998). There is a huge and growing literature on evolution of language, but it seems to be almost entirely devoted to a different topic, speculations about evolution of communication; and in fact the alleged target, language, is rarely even characterized. Study of evolution of the eye can proceed only so far as we know what an eye is. The same holds for language or anything else.
- 7.
Crain (2012), focusing primarily on “logical nativism, which is the proposal that humans are biologically equipped with the tools for logical reasoning,” a contingent property that allows for very limited variation among languages and is not derivable from assumptions of rationality. The thesis traces to Pinker (1984). A contrasting thesis is Kenneth Wexler’s “Very-Early Parameter-Setting (VEPS), holding that from the earliest observable ages (around 18 months), children have set their parameters correctly” (Wexler 2002); also well-supported empirically.
- 8.
For detailed critical discussion, see among others Crain, Wexler, op. cit. On the failure of the most careful efforts to establish the non-existence thesis, see Berwick et al. (2011); also below.
- 9.
Note that this picture could in principle accommodate the more complex and widely explored thesis that CI considerations enter into externalization; as usually formulated, that Spell-Out accesses LF. Questions then arise about cyclicity and other matters.
- 10.
See Gallego (2012), for various developments of the general idea.
- 11.
In embedded contexts, under some conditions, a residue of the raised copy remains, providing additional support for the copy theory; see Trinh (2011) for review and analysis. Reflexes of movement through intermediate positions have also been discovered, including verb-raising (Esther Torrego, Spanish), agreement (Sandra Chung, Chamorro; Chris Collins, Ewe), deletion of verbal affix (Doug Saddy, Indonesian). Some accounts of covert movement allow for the internal copy alone to remain after externalization.
- 12.
See Berwick, op. cit. The critique there is understated, failing to make clear a more fundamental point: the proposed methods, or very similar ones, would work for a pseudo-language that relied on linear order, but no such language exists, surely not an accident. There is evidence from neuroscience that while invented systems conforming to UG (with structure-dependence) activate normal language areas, those that use linear order do not, and are presumably treated as non-linguistic puzzles. See Musso et al. (2003). Note that the problem with (10) cannot be reduced to a principle that predicates do not tolerate gaps; they easily do, as in “(it is a shame to see) how angry John is at the world,” etc. More generally, there are, to my knowledge, no accounts of any non-trivial linguistic phenomena in terms of non-linguistic cognitive processes alone, though it is common to claim that they alone suffice. See note 8.
- 13.
Separate question have to do with referring and binding theory, where questions arise relating to modes of conceptualization (“cognitive value”). See Heim 1998.
- 14.
See Chomsky (2013).
- 15.
See Tattersall (1998) for general discussion.
- 16.
It is perhaps worth noting that the general picture seems plausible, maybe even necessary, to leading evolutionary biologists; for quotes from Nobel Laureates, see Chomsky (2005).
- 17.
Reliance on internal computational capacity may yield infinite digital outputs, but that of course does not entail that the output system has its own recursive procedures. Thus externalization of generated I-language expressions does not entail that the vocal apparatus incorporates a recursive procedure. Same with use of the alphabet, or the number system, if it is an offshoot of I-language; or infinite digital visual displays, or other examples that can easily be constructed.
- 18.
It is worth noting that the most elementary concepts of human languages, such as those used for denoting, seem to be radically different from those found in animal communication systems, raising very serious problems for evolution of language and thought. Perhaps insuperable problems, Lewontin’s arguments suggest. Note also that these comments do not touch on far broader and in many respects convoluted issues of what should be regarded as constituting thought.
- 19.
For arguments on early resort to IM in acquisition, see Roeper (2013).
- 20.
For extensive review and discussion, see Landau (2013).
- 21.
Merge is either available by virtue of UG, or unattainable. In general, there no way to learn a system of unbounded computation: addition, Merge or any other. That has been clear at least since David Hume. Separate questions have to do with the stage of development at which these properties are exhibited by the child in performance, either perception or (often much later) production.
- 22.
A further proposal is that this alleged property of Pirahä derives from the cultural features of the community, but these, if they exist, would not be known to a child acquiring the language, hence could have no bearing on UG, just as in the case of TE. On these matters see Everett (2005), Nevins et al. (2009), and subsequent interchange.
- 23.
For discussion, see Chomsky (2013).
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Chomsky, N. (2014). Minimal Recursion: Exploring the Prospects. In: Roeper, T., Speas, M. (eds) Recursion: Complexity in Cognition. Studies in Theoretical Psycholinguistics, vol 43. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05086-7_1
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