Abstract
The end of the last decade saw a media frenzy over possibility of an H1N1 flu pandemic. The frenzy turned out to be misplaced, but it did serve to remind us of a basic truth: that a healthy body can be stricken with a fatal disease which to outward appearances is nearly identical to a common yearly annoyance. There are lessons here for quantum mechanics. In the history of physics, there has never been a healthier body than quantum theory; no theory has ever been more all-encompassing or more powerful. Its calculations are relevant at every scale of physical experience, from subnuclear particles, to table-top lasers, to the cores of neutron stars and even the first 3 min of the universe. Yet since its founding days, many physicists have feared that quantum theory’s common annoyance – the continuing feeling that something at the bottom of it does not make sense – may one day turn out to be the symptom of something fatal.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Most of the time one sees Bayesian probabilities characterized as measures of ignorance or imperfect knowledge. But that description carries with it a metaphysical commitment that is not at all necessary for the personalist Bayesian, where probability theory is an extension of logic. Imperfect knowledge? It sounds like something that, at least in imagination, could be perfected, making all probabilities zero or one – one uses probabilities only because one does not know the true, pre-existing state of affairs. Language like this, the reader will notice, is never used in this paper. All that matters for a personalist Bayesian is that there is uncertainty for whatever reason. There might be uncertainty because there is ignorance of a true state of affairs, but there might be uncertainty because the world itself does not yet know what it will give – i.e., there is an objective indeterminism. As will be argued in later sections, QBism finds its happiest spot in an unflinching combination of “subjective probability” with “objective indeterminism.”
- 3.
Strictly speaking, meliorism is the doctrine “that humans can, through their interference with processes that would otherwise be natural, produce an outcome which is an improvement over the aforementioned natural one.” But we would be reluctant to take a stand on what “improvement” really means. So said, all we mean in the present essay by meliorism is that the world before the agent is malleable to some extent – that his actions really can change it.
- 4.
The term “pluriverse” is again a Jamesian one. He used it interchangeably with the word “multiverse”, which he also invented. The latter however has been coopted by the Everettians, so we will strictly use only the term pluriverse.
- 5.
References
Banks, E.C. 2003. Ernst Mach’s world elements: A study in natural philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Bell, J.S. 1990. Against ‘measurement’. Physics World 3: 33.
Bernardo, J.M., and A.F.M. Smith 1994. Bayesian theory. Chichester: Wiley.
Blume-Kohout, R., C.M. Caves, and I.H. Deutsch. 2002. Climbing mount scalable: Physical-resource requirements for a scalable quantum computer. Foundations of Physics 32: 1641.
Cartwright, N. 1999. The dappled world: A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Caves, C.M., C.A. Fuchs, and R. Schack. 2002. Quantum probabilities as Bayesian probabilities. Physical Review A 65: 022305.
Caves, C.M., C.A. Fuchs, and R. Schack. 2007. Subjective probability and quantum certainty. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38: 255.
de Finetti, B. 1990. Theory of probability. New York: Wiley.
Dupré, J. 1993. The disorder of things: Metaphysical foundations of the disunity of science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Feynman, R.P. 1965. The character of physical law. Cambridge: MIT.
Fuchs, C.A. 2002. Quantum mechanics as quantum information (and only a little more). In Quantum theory: Reconsideration of foundations, ed. A. Khrennikov, 463–543. Växjö: Växjö University Press. arXiv:quant-ph/0205039.
Fuchs, C.A. 2004. On the quantumness of a hilbert space. Quantum Information and Computation 4: 467.
Fuchs, C.A. 2010. Coming of age with quantum information. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fuchs, C.A., and R. Schack. 2004. Unknown quantum states and operations, a bayesian view. In Quantum estimation theory, ed. M.G.A. Paris and J. Řeháček, 151–190. Berlin: Springer.
Fuchs, C.A., and R. Schack. 2013, to appear. Quantum-bayesian coherence. Reviews of Modern Physics. arXiv:1301.3274v1.
Hartle, J.B. 1968. Quantum mechanics of individual systems. American Journal of Physics 36: 704.
James, W. 1884. The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy; Human immortality – Both books bound as one. New York: Dover.
James, W. 1940. Some problems of philosophy. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.
James, W. 1996a. A pluralistic universe. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
James, W. 1996b. Essays in radical empiricism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
James, W. 1997. The meaning of truth. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
Lamberth, D.C. 1999. William James and the metaphysics of experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lindley, D.V. 2006. Understanding uncertainty. Hoboken: Wiley.
Prawer, S., and A.D. Greentree. 2008. Diamond for quantum computing. Science 320: 1601.
Spekkens, R.W. 2007. Evidence for the epistemic view of quantum states: A Toy theory. Physical Review A 75: 032110.
Taylor, E., and R.H. Wozniak, eds. 1996. Pure experience: The response to William James. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
von Baeyer, H.C. 2009. Petite Leçons de Physique dans les Jardins de Paris. Paris: Dunod.
Thayer, H.S. 1981. Meaning and action: A critical history of pragmatism. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Wahl, J. 1925. The pluralist philosophies of England and America, trans. F. Rothwell. London: Open Court.
Wheeler, J.A. 1982. Bohr, Einstein, and the strange lesson of the quantum. In Mind in nature, ed. R.Q. Elvee, 1–23. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
Wild, J. 1969. The radical empiricism of William James. Garden City: Doubleday.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fuchs, C.A. (2014). Introducing QBism. In: Galavotti, M., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_26
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_26
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-04381-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-04382-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)