Abstract
This paper basically presents an analysis of a practical case. It addresses the study of social choice theory in relation to scientific realism. In line with the positions defended by scholars such as U. Mäki or H. Kincaid, the question of realism is considered a local rather than a universal theory, which requires a case-by-case response, that is, theory-by-theory. The analysis focuses more on the existence of the entities postulated by the theory, ontological realism, than on the truth or approximate truth of its statements. Given that the theory is characterised by the interweaving of economic, political and moral aspects, the question about realism is posed within each sphere. Furthermore, the issue of realism helps to clarify the theoretical status of social choice theory. The conclusion reveals that the valorative neutrality of the theory and its high level of idealisation render it impossible to maintain a realist stance towards it.
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Notes
- 1.
The four basic differences whereby the defence of realism in terms of physics is inapplicable to economics are as follows: the non-philosophical usage of the term realism among economists, the fact the ontology of economic theories does not adjust to the independent existence of the mind that is typical of the formulations of scientific realism, the question of theoretical terms and the impossibility of proving existence and truth in economics by invoking manipulability or success (Mäki 1996).
- 2.
The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare defines the theory’s domain as follows: “Social choice theory is concerned with the evaluation of alternative methods of collective decision-making, as well as with the logical foundations of welfare economics” (Arrow et al. 2002, p. 1).
- 3.
The conditions are the independence of irrelevant alternatives, a weak version of the Pareto principle, unrestricted domain and non-dictatorship.
- 4.
For a characterisation of the axiomatic method, see García Bermejo (2002).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
The same occurs with the necessary requisite of additive separability when we introduce the principle of personal good. Egalitarian distributions do not comply with separability, but when they do, it is at the price of renouncing equality.
- 8.
The questionnaire is reprinted in full in the appendix to the paper.
- 9.
Even though anonymity may seem trivial, it is incompatible with the different rights individuals may have.
- 10.
U. Mäki propounds a notion of existence other than the notion of the independent existence of the mind that is typical of realism. This would be the notion of objective existence defined as: “X exists objectively relative to a given representation if it exists unconstituted by that particular representation (both material, social, and mental entities may exist objectively)” (Mäki 1996, p. 433).
- 11.
According to the author, the assumption of maximisation and transitive preferences is an exaggeration.
- 12.
In the sense of not being a true picture of reality.
- 13.
I have taken the idea of using Ellis’ theory from U. Mäki (1992a), who uses it in his analysis of Austrian theory.
- 14.
This is not a new idea, as many consider the theory of rational choice that underpins microeconomic theory and SCT to be a normative theory.
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This work has been possible thanks to the funding provided by Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (FFI2012-33998).
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González, O.T. (2014). Local Realism: An Analysis of Social Choice Theory. In: Galavotti, M., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_23
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