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Viewing the Study of Argumentation as Normative Pragmatics

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Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy

Part of the book series: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology ((PEPRPHPS,volume 1))

Abstract

In this chapter we explain that the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation involves at the same time a pragmatic and a critical treatment of argumentative discourse. Starting from the speech act dimension of pragmatics, we indicate for each of the five components of the pragma-dialectical research program what a normative pragmatic approach amounts to. First we discuss the critical conception of reasonableness developed in the philosophical component of the research program, second the model of a critical discussion designed in the theoretical component, third the resolution-oriented analysis of argumentative discourse carried out in the reconstruction component, fourth the qualitative and quantitative research of the pursuit of reasonableness and effectiveness in argumentative discourse conducted in the empirical component, and fifth the development of adequate instruments for the analysis, evaluation and production of argumentative discourse in all sorts of argumentative practices undertaken in the practical component.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, among others, Johnson and Blair (2005), Johnson (2000), and Freeman (1991).

  2. 2.

    See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004), van Eemeren et al. (1993), (2007), (2009), and van Eemeren (2010).

  3. 3.

    We confine ourselves here to a speech act perspective which starts from the standard theory developed by Searle (1969, 1971, 1979).

  4. 4.

    For the notions of problem-solving validity and conventional validity see Barth and Krabbe (1982, pp. 21–22).

  5. 5.

    To acquire conventional validity, it must be clear which speech acts should be performed when and by whom. This has been shown in our model of a critical discussion by characterizing and locating the different types of speech acts which can play a specific role in the resolution of a difference of opinion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, pp. 95–118, 151–175). In this way a dialectical approach motivated by critical rationalism combines with an utilitarian pragmatist approach to language use.

  6. 6.

    The contribution of a speech act perspective to socialization and dialectification is formulated more cautiously than its contribution to externalization and functionalization. The reason for this is that addressing another person does not necessarily imply a discussion in which both parties play an active role, since trying to convince this person does not automatically lead to the idea of resolving a difference of opinion, but from a critical-rationalist point of view both are certainly moves in the right direction. This becomes even clearer when one realizes that the subject of research is everyday argumentation: in daily life argumentation is often part of a conversational setting of a more or less discussion-like character.

  7. 7.

    The unstated parts of an argumentation can be referred to as unexpressed premises (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, pp. 60–72).

  8. 8.

    Of course, there can be other candidates: explanations, amplifications, elucidations, but certainly not argumentation.

  9. 9.

    There are also authors who, like we do, believe that besides illocutionary acts there are larger units of language use to be distinguished, but who have a rather different view of these larger units. See the discussion of the views of van Dijk and Quasthoff in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 37–39).

  10. 10.

    For practical reasons we do not go into the exact relations between sentences and propositions now. We just equate speech acts which consist of the expression of one proposition with one sentence speech acts.

  11. 11.

    See Searle's description of perlocutionary acts (1980, p. 25).

  12. 12.

    For a discussion of these views, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), pp. 23–28 and van Eemeren (2010, chapter 2).

  13. 13.

    The notion of language usage declaratives, which comprises speech acts such as defining, precizating, amplifying, explicating, and explicitizing, is introduced in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 109–110).

  14. 14.

    The distribution of the various types of speech acts in the stages of a critical discussion is discussed in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 95–118) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 62–68).

  15. 15.

    The rules of the code of conduct are discussed in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 187–196).

  16. 16.

    Cf. Hamblin (1970), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 102–106).

  17. 17.

    Having the required attitude and observing all the rules of the model do not guarantee that the participants in a discussion will actually bring their difference of opinion to a successful resolution, only that a number of preconditions for doing this have been met.

  18. 18.

    The conversational maxims are introduced in Grice (1975), the rules for turn-taking are discussed in Levinson (1983) and Edmondson (1981).

  19. 19.

    Searle does not believe that all speech act conditions are specifications of Grice's maxims, because some of them (such as the essential condition and the sincerity condition) are internal to specific kinds of speech acts (1980, pp. 22–23). We do not agree with him on this point.

  20. 20.

    Searle admits that conversation analysis may be useful to the analysis of conversations, but he also emphasizes the crucial differences between speech act theory and conversation analysis (1986, pp. 7–19).

  21. 21.

    It should be noted that “effectiveness” is not completely synonymous with “persuasiveness.” For one thing, aiming for effectiveness is not limited (as is persuasiveness) to those parts of the argumentative discourse (arguments) that can be reconstructed as belonging to the argumentation stage but applies also to the parts of the discourse that belong to the other stages (van Eemeren 2010).

  22. 22.

    Naturally, other angles of approach are also possible. A Freudian psychological analysis would undoubtedly be able to produce yet other interesting results—but there again the same sort of restriction would apply. Things that appear as relevant from one angle remain out of sight when regarded from another. However, one angle of approach need not necessarily preclude another. The same conversation can very well be examined and analyzed from different angles, though it is a good idea to make sure not to confuse the different perspectives.

  23. 23.

    For the pragma-dialectical method of reconstruction see van Eemeren (1986, 1987a), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1990), van Eemeren et al. (1993), and van Eemeren et al. (2012).

  24. 24.

    For the reconstruction of unexpressed premises see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).

  25. 25.

    For indicators of argumentative moves see van Eemeren et al. (2007).

  26. 26.

    The sentence in parentheses refers (by convention) to the unexpressed premise in the argumentation.

  27. 27.

    See Jackson (1985) and van Eemeren (1986). As a matter of fact, one of Austin's reasons to develop a theory of speech acts refers to the simplistic dichotomy between truth-functional statements (which make sense) and non-truth-functional statements (which are considered to be metaphysical) made by logical positivists. According to Austin, performative utterances (“I hereby declare…,” et cetera) are both non-truth-functional and non-metaphysical. Of course, it would be a serious philosophical setback to return to the age of hard-boiled positivism.

  28. 28.

    The Interaction Principle reflects in its formulation Sperber and Wilson's Principle of Relevance: “Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance” (1986, p. 158). There are important differences, however. Firstly, the Interaction Principle is more general than the Principle of Relevance, secondly, it is formulated in terms of speech act theory, whereas Sperber and Wilson reject speech act theory completely (1986, pp. 243–254).

  29. 29.

    In the pragma-dialectical emprical research it has to be made sure that the preliminary ‘higher order’ conditions for conducting a critical discussion have been fulfilled, so that the psychological state of the arguers, socio-political power relations between them etc. do not allow for alternative explanations of the research results. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 189–190).

  30. 30.

    See van Eemeren et al. (1989).

  31. 31.

    For the differences between effectiveness and persuasiveness see van Eemeren (2010), p. 39.

  32. 32.

    See Hamblin (1970), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987), Grootendorst (1987), and van Eemeren et al. (2011).

  33. 33.

    In case of irresolvable doubt, the ‘strategy of maximal reasonable interpretation’ is recommended (van Eemeren 1987a). Fortunately, taking the strategic maneuvering into account makes it often unnecessary to take refuse to such a ‘maximal’ strategy because including the strategic maneuvering that takes place in the considerations leads to a definitive solution.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Amsterdam and ILIAS, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Frans H. van Eemeren & Bart Garssen

Authors
  1. Frans H. van Eemeren
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  2. Bart Garssen
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Correspondence to Frans H. van Eemeren .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Barcellona PG ME, Italy

    Alessandro Capone

  2. University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Franco Lo Piparo

  3. University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Marco Carapezza

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van Eemeren, F.H., Garssen, B. (2013). Viewing the Study of Argumentation as Normative Pragmatics. In: Capone, A., Lo Piparo, F., Carapezza, M. (eds) Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01011-3_24

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