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Public-Key Encryption with Quantum Keys

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Theory of Cryptography (TCC 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14372))

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Abstract

In the framework of Impagliazzo’s five worlds, a distinction is often made between two worlds, one where public-key encryption exists (Cryptomania), and one in which only one-way functions exist (MiniCrypt). However, the boundaries between these worlds can change when quantum information is taken into account. Recent work has shown that quantum variants of oblivious transfer and multi-party computation, both primitives that are classically in Cryptomania, can be constructed from one-way functions, placing them in the realm of quantum MiniCrypt (the so-called MiniQCrypt). This naturally raises the following question: Is it possible to construct a quantum variant of public-key encryption, which is at the heart of Cryptomania, from one-way functions or potentially weaker assumptions?

In this work, we initiate the formal study of the notion of quantum public-key encryption (qPKE), i.e., public-key encryption where keys are allowed to be quantum states. We propose new definitions of security and several constructions of qPKE based on the existence of one-way functions (OWF), or even weaker assumptions, such as pseudorandom function-like states (PRFS) and pseudorandom function-like states with proof of destruction (PRFSPD). Finally, to give a tight characterization of this primitive, we show that computational assumptions are necessary to build quantum public-key encryption. That is, we give a self-contained proof that no quantum public-key encryption scheme can provide information-theoretic security.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Throughout this paper, unless explicitly specified, by IND-CCA we refer to the notion of adaptive IND-CCA2 security.

  2. 2.

    Note that PRS implies PRFS with logarithmic size inputs, but no such implication is known for super-logarithmic inputs.

  3. 3.

    Meaning that one can only encrypt once using a .

  4. 4.

    Because of this stronger security definition, here the notion of public-keys with mixed states is meaningful since there is an alternative procedure to ensure that the key is well-formed (e.g., signing the classical component).

  5. 5.

    This observation was pointed out to us by Takashi Yamakawa.

  6. 6.

    This is due to \(\varPi ^1_\textsf{dk} \) operators being rank-1 projections.

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Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Prabhanjan Ananth and Umesh Vazirani for related discussions, and Takashi Yamakawa for pointing out a simple argument to rule out the existence of information-theoretically secure qPKE. The argument is replicated here with his permission.

ABG and QHV are supported by ANR JCJC TCS-NISQ ANR-22-CE47-0004, and by the PEPR integrated project EPiQ ANR-22-PETQ-0007 part of Plan France 2030. GM was partially funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the course of the 6GEM research hub under grant number 16KISK038 and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy - EXC 2092 CASA - 390781972. OS was supported by the Israeli Science Foundation (ISF) grant No. 682/18 and 2137/19, and by the Cyber Security Research Center at Ben-Gurion University. KB and LH were supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) through the project grant 192364 on Post Quantum Cryptography. OS has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 756482). MW acknowledges support by the the European Union (ERC, SYMOPTIC, 101040907), by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy - EXC 2092 CASA - 390781972, by the BMBF through project QuBRA, and by the Dutch Research Council (NWO grant OCENW.KLEIN.267). Views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council Executive Agency. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Khashayar Barooti & Loïs Huguenin-Dumittan

  2. Sorbonne Université, CNRS, LIP6, Paris, France

    Alex B. Grilo & Quoc-Huy Vu

  3. Bocconi University, Milan, Italy

    Giulio Malavolta

  4. Max-Planck Institute in Security and Privacy, Bochum, Germany

    Giulio Malavolta

  5. Computer Science Department, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheba, Israel

    Or Sattath

  6. Faculty of Computer Science, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Michael Walter

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  1. Khashayar Barooti
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Correspondence to Quoc-Huy Vu .

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  1. Apple, Cupertino, CA, USA

    Guy Rothblum

  2. NTT Research, Sunnyvale, CA, USA

    Hoeteck Wee

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Barooti, K. et al. (2023). Public-Key Encryption with Quantum Keys. In: Rothblum, G., Wee, H. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14372. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_8

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