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Computing the Price of Anarchy in Atomic Network Congestion Games (Invited Talk)

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Formal Modeling and Analysis of Timed Systems (FORMATS 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14138))

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Abstract

Network congestion games are a simple model for reasoning about routing problems in a network. They are a very popular topic in algorithmic game theory, and a huge amount of results about existence and (in)efficiency of equilibrium strategy profiles in those games have been obtained over the last 20  years.

In particular, the price of anarchy has been defined as an important notion for measuring the inefficiency of Nash equilibria. Generic bounds have been obtained for the price of anarchy over various classes of networks, but little attention has been put on the effective computation of this value for a given network. This talk presents recent results on this problem in different settings.

This paper is based on joint works with Nathalie Bertrand, Aline Goeminne, Suman Sadhukhan, Ocan Sankur, and benefited from discussions with Arthur Dumas and Stéphane Le Roux. These works have received fundings from ANR projects TickTac and BisoUS.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IRISA, CNRS & Inria & Univ. Rennes, Rennes, France

    Nicolas Markey

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Correspondence to Nicolas Markey .

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  1. Université Sorbonne Paris Nord, Villetaneuse, France

    Laure Petrucci

  2. University of Turin, Turin, Italy

    Jeremy Sproston

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Markey, N. (2023). Computing the Price of Anarchy in Atomic Network Congestion Games (Invited Talk). In: Petrucci, L., Sproston, J. (eds) Formal Modeling and Analysis of Timed Systems. FORMATS 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14138. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42626-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42626-1_1

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