Keywords

1 Introduction

What mechanisms explain migration transitions? And how can we explain (quasi-)reversals of migration patterns? Do different mechanisms come into play as countries develop, or is there a continuity in the factors affecting migration? These questions tackle the core of the scholarly debate on the non-linear relation between migration and development.

This chapter addresses these questions by reviewing the Spanish migration transitions. For this, I adopt a social transformation perspective and analyze how change at the political, economic, technological, demographic, and cultural levels impacts the timing, volume, and direction of Spanish national and regionalFootnote 1 migrations (Fig. 14.1). This is relevant because research has, to a great extent, focused on low- and medium-income countries (see Berriane et al., 2021 for an analysis of Morocco, and Schewel & Legass Bahir, 2019 for Ethiopia), or they conclude in earlier decades (see Vezzoli, 2020a for an analysis of Italy until the 1970s). So, while we know that development reshapes migration in patterned ways (see MADE Research Team, 2021), we still know little about the mechanisms leading to a (quasi)reversal of migration transitions from net emigration to net immigration, and the factors triggering increasing emigration patterns, especially in high-income economies.

Fig. 14.1
A map of Spain with 6 regions. It includes Asturjas and Cantabria in the northwest, Basque country and Aragon in the northeast, Castille and Leon, Madrid, and Extremadura in the center, Catalonia and Valencian community in the east, Andalusia and Murcia in the south, and Canary Islands to the west.

Map of Spain with its regions. (Source: Own elaboration. The map was created using Microsoft Excel)

Note: The autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa are not pictured in the map

This is pertinent considering recurrent emigration patterns in consolidated immigration regions, such as Southern Europe, particularly since the 2008 economic crisis (Bartolini et al., 2016; Caro et al., 2018). In the Spanish case, emigration surpassed immigration flows in 2010, and, although the trend was reversed in 2015 (INE, 2022a), emigration levels have remained high compared to the pre-2008 crisis period (González-Ferrer & Moreno-Fuentes, 2017). On the one hand, this challenges assumptions about the interpretation of history as a sequence of improvements, and, on the other, about the deterministic nature of migration dynamics (see Skeldon, 2012).

This chapter reviews migration patterns, trends, and drivers within and from Spain since the early 1880s. By doing so, I investigate the temporality of migration drivers, and I shed light into their (dis)continuity. Inspired by previous research (see MADE Research Team, 2021), this chapter calls for further investigation on the (dis)similarity of migration drivers across time and regions, including the Mediterranean coastline.

2 Adopting a Social Transformation Approach to Understand Migration Transitions

This chapter engages with the non-linear relation between migration and development, which gained momentum with the mobility transition theory pioneered by Zelinsky (1971). According to this theory, ‘modernization’ processes initially trigger higher emigration levels and mobility overall (de Haas, 2010; Skeldon, 2014; Zelinsky, 1971) as the welfare state and capitalist structures expand, in turn jeopardizing traditional, rural livelihoods while concurrently stimulating urban employment. Over time, these transformations spur the rural exodus, increasing international migration, and, at a later stage, commuting patterns. While recent quantitative research has greatly enriched and nuanced the debate (see Clemens, 2014; de Haas & Fransen, 2018), investigations on how changes at the economic, political, cultural, demographic, and technological levels influence migration dynamics remain scarce.

In an effort to overcome this limitation, migration scholars have applied the social transformation perspective, which investigates long-term change processes that lead to fundamental societal shifts at the structural level. The framework is a meta-theoretical perspective concerning changes at the economic, political, cultural, demographic, and technological levels (de Haas et al., 2020) that uncovers patterned complexities and ramifications of migration over time (Castles, 2010). In this manner, scholars have stressed how nation-state building processes trigger a transformation from (semi-)nomadic to sedentary communities (Schewel & Legass Bahir, 2019), and how welfare state consolidation and industrialization processes affect internal and international migration patterns (Vezzoli, 2020a). The adoption of a social transformation perspective has also shown that development overall shapes migration in patterned manners, and how different transformation trajectories can affect the composition, volume, and timing of migration. For instance, as countries develop and local options to fulfill life aspirations increase, emigration patterns tend to decrease, though the transition from emigration to immigration is not inevitable (MADE Research Team, 2021). In fact, scholars have also highlighted occurrences of plateaued emigration rates as the economy improves, which contradict theoretical predictions for a decrease in emigration rates (Berriane et al., 2021). This illustrates that economic development alone is not enough to explain migration transitions.

To analyze the transition from net emigration to net immigration, and the quasi-reversal of trends, I analyze statistical data on Spanish migration and societal indicators,Footnote 2 and existing literature on Spanish social and migration history. The chapter proceeds as follows: after reviewing the Spanish internal and international migration trends, I disentangle the drivers of these migration patterns and analyze how fundamental social transformations explain the country’s migration transition. The chapter ends with a discussion and overview of the implications of these findings.

3 An Historical Overview of Spanish Migration Patterns

This chapter focuses on Spanish migration patterns since the 1880s for two reasons: (1) it is when Spanish mass emigration began (Sánchez-Alonso, 2000), and (2) annual statistical emigration reports started being published in 1888. However, the years themselves are not significant since there was migration before (see, for example, Alemán, 2003, 2019; Castelao, 2003; Cura, 1993; Fagel, 2003, or Lopo, 2003).

I emphasize four turning points in Spanish mobility patterns (Fig. 14.2). The first is between the 1880s and mid-1910s, when international emigration increased and peaked in 1912 with 245,470 departures, primarily from Northern regions and the Canary Islands towards Central and South America (DGM, 2016). Although less voluminous, this period also witnessed increasing migrations to Algeria from Spanish Southern regions (Bover & Velilla, 1999). Emigration to Morocco, though lower in number, also increased continuously since the beginning of the twentieth century, especially from Andalusia and the Canary Islands (Garrigues, 2008).

Fig. 14.2
A multi-line graph of the annual migration from 1880 to 2017, for 4 categories. Internal migrants and Spanish returnees rise exponentially post 1945 and 1993, respectively. Foreign immigrants and Spanish emigrants fluctuate with peaks between 1905 and 1917, and 1961 and 1973, respectively.

Annual migration of Spanish emigrants, returnees, foreign immigrants and internal migrants, 1880–2017 (absolute numbers). (Sources: DEMIG (2015); INE (2022b) Historical Data from 1960 onwards; Guindo et al. (2007))

Secondly, between the mid-1910s and late 1940s, when international emigration rates reduced significantly following World War I and the Spanish Civil War. The 91,616 departures in 1915 dropped to 9,831 by 1942. Internal migration also slowed down, and the rate of inter-regional migration remained stable at around 10/1,000. Moreover, during this period we observe a reverse flow from urban to rural areas, which was reverted in the late 1940s (Bover & Velilla, 1999; Silvestre, 2002).

The third turning point occurred between 1950 and the late 1970s, when the orientation of international emigration shifted. While emigration to Latin America increased again in the mid-1940s, it rapidly lost importance in the late 1950s, as Western Europe and other destinations such as Australia or Algeria became popular (Fig. 14.3). There are important regional variations in these international emigration rates: whereas Galicia and the Canary Islands presented more voluminous emigration flows, with 76/1,000 and 73/1,000 emigration rates respectively in 1950, the international emigration rates of Aragon, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura and Murcia did not reach 5/1,000 (Palazón Ferrando, 1991, p. 221). The 1950-to-mid-1970s period also experienced intense return dynamics and a rapid growth in rural-urban migrations and inter-regional flows, especially from the South and Center to the more dynamic North-East and East (Bover & Velilla, 1999).

Fig. 14.3
A multi-line graph of the annual immigration to Latin America from 1946 to 1975, for 3 categories. Emigration to, and returnees from Latin America rise and peak from 1950 to 1957 and from 1958 to 1963, respectively, and decline after. Emigration to E U has declining peaks post 1960.

Annual migration of Spanish emigrants to Latin America and Europe and Spanish returnees from Latin America, 1946–1974. (Sources: INE (2022b); Martínez Cachero (1965); Palazón Ferrando (1991))

Lastly, by the late 1970s, we observe the fourth turning point: a transition from net emigration to net immigration. This transition was questioned during the 2008 economic crisis, when immigration flows began to gradually decrease while emigration increased rapidly, ultimately peaking in 2013 with 532,303 total departuresFootnote 3 (INE, 2022a). While disaggregating emigration patterns by nationality indicates that the emigration flows of non-Spanish citizens have been more voluminous in absolute terms, the percentage increase of Spanish emigrants has been greater: Spanish emigration grew 118.86% between 2008 and 2013,Footnote 4 whereas the emigration of non-Spaniards did so by 80.04%. Additionally, given the lack of mechanisms to correct Spanish citizens’ registration figures (González-Ferrer & Moreno-Fuentes, 2017), data reliability has been contested, and González-Ferrer (2013) calculated that around 700,000 Spaniards emigrated between 2008 and 2013, which more than doubles official figures.Footnote 5 During this period, internal migrations also increased, peaking in 2007 with 1,795,353 movements, at a rate of 40/1,000 (INE, 2022a). The composition of internal migrants nonetheless changed in comparison to previous decades due to the higher mobility of both civil servants and highly educated individuals (Bover & Velilla, 1999). Moreover, while inter-regional migration decreased, intra-regional, intra-provincial and short-distance movements increased since the early 1980s, when the growth of the service industry triggered new regional employment opportunities, especially within larger cities (Bentolila, 2001).

What encouraged migration during each of these turning points? Most importantly, do we observe similarities in migration drivers over time? Or did new factors gain momentum as Spain developed? While this section has presented four turning points in Spanish mobility patterns, the following section examines Spanish migration drivers. For this, I focus on how social transformations have shaped migration within and from Spain across the twentieth century. The long-term perspective allows to map fluctuations in internal, international and non-migratory mobility, as well as the (dis)continuities behind migration drivers.

4 The Drivers of Spanish Migrations

Since the late nineteenth century, I present four periods of social transformation with distinct migration dynamics:

  • From the early 1880s to the mid-1930s, a period associated with incipient industrialization and urbanization processes and emerging social security nets. Internal migrations became more permanent and the geographical orientation of internal in-migrationFootnote 6 flows changed;

  • From the mid-1930s to the late 1950s, the Civil War, immediate post-Civil War and the initial years of Franco’s regime, when industrialization and urbanization processes and the role of the state as provider of guarantees stopped. This period implied worsening living conditions and the halt of migration patterns;

  • From the 1960s to the mid-1970s, when new socio-economic and cultural models emerged and migration diversified and increased in volume; and

  • From the mid-1970s to the present, a period associated with democratization, and economic and political expansions and contractions. In this period, international emigration and inter-regional migration patterns slowed down to rapidly increase after the 2008 crisis.

Throughout these periods, three factors explain the Spanish migration transition: (1) the consolidation and weakening of the state; (2) economic fluctuations; and (3) the uneven urbanization process. Together, these processes triggered the peripheralization of Southern and Central Spain, and important changes in migration dynamics.

4.1 Incipient Industrialization and Fragmented State Expansion, Early 1880s to Mid-1930s

Starting in the early 1880s, Spain’s productive structure experienced an emerging industrialization process (Fig. 14.4). This triggered more permanent forms of movement and changed the geographical orientation of migration. Traditionally, Southern Spain presented voluminous short-distance rural-rural migrations and inter-provincial in-migration patterns due to latifundiums (Domenech, 2013; Silvestre, 2007). In contrast, Northern Spain was typified by longer-distance, seasonal out-migrations as familial holdings were highly divided and presented fewer opportunitiesFootnote 7 (Martín, 1994). However, traditional destinations in Southern Spain lost importance in the early twentieth century, when in-migration rates (per total population) doubled in North-Eastern and Eastern regions (Silvestre, 2002, 2005, 2007), whereas in-migration rates decreased 2% in Southern Spain (Silvestre, 2007). Three factors influenced these shifts: (1) an incipient industrialization process; (2) increasing urbanization rates; and (3) state expansion.

Fig. 14.4
A grouped bar graph of the economically active population by 3 economic sector, from 1860 to 1920. Agriculture tops throughout, followed by industry in 1860, 1887, and 1920, and services in 1877, 1900, and 1910, in decreasing order.

Economically active population by economic sector, 1860–1920. (Source: Mitchell (2013))

First, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, a process of trade openness and internationalization began (Prados de la Escosura, 2017), eased by advancements in the railway system (Herranz Loncán, 2004). Important regional inequalities in infrastructure distribution shaped regional economic differences (Herranz-Loncán, 2007), and shifts in the geographic orientation of migration (Franch et al., 2013; Mojica & Martí-Henneberg, 2011). In certain areas, such as northeast Spain, Madrid, the Mediterranean coast or Western Andalusia, the railway expansion contributed to the development of emerging industrial and service activities (Franch et al., 2013; Gómez Mendoza, 1982), and increasing rural-urban migrations (Clar, 2008; Osuna, 1983). In comparison, the economic structure of other areas was strongly affected by poor integration into the national rail network, which encouraged out-migration patterns and a decline in (seasonal) in-migration in Center and Southern regions (see Alonso González & Álvarez Domínguez, 2015).

Secondly, during the 1860–1930s, the urbanization process consolidated, reinforcing the shift in the orientation of migration flows. While the traditional agricultural nuclei in Andalusia stagnated, cities along the North-Eastern and Eastern coasts grew rapidly. Industrial concentration encouraged intense rural-urban migrations (Recaño Valverde, 1996) and the development of satellite towns (Le Gallo & Chasco, 2008). Excluding Madrid, which consolidated as the capital city, central regions did not experience an urban concentration either (Cardesín Diaz & Araujo, 2017). Despite the expansion of inter-provincial in-migrations, the main destinations and the geographical orientation of out-migrants remained limited to close-by provinces (Fig. 14.5; Recaño Valverde, 1996).

Fig. 14.5
A map of Spain highlights 4 corridors of migration in 1930. Barcelona, Madrid, Seville, and Biscay are in order moving from the east to the southwest.

Main regional migration corridors in 1930. (Source: Author’s elaboration based on Silvestre (2001))

Note: The map presents the first destination for each province in 1930. The main destinations for some provinces are different (not pictured in the map): for Navarre the main destination is Gipuzkoa, for Malaga it is Cadiz, and for A Coruña it is Pontevedra

Finally, increasing rural-urban migrations were also driven by state expansion. After the Peninsular War (1807–1814) and the 1812 Spanish Constitution, efforts to consolidate a centralizing unitary state were made. Despite system fragmentation and regional and rural/urban differences (Vilar Rodríguez, 2007, p. 180), state expansion impacted migration in four manners. First, new taxes increased fiscal pressure, and impediments to accessing communal lands triggered important social unrest and protests (Da Orden, 2005). In particular, small agricultural producers and day laborers in northwestern regions experienced high unemployment, difficulties to commercialize their products and low wages, boosting emigration rates (Vallejo Pousada, 1996). Secondly, state expansion particularly benefited skilled workers and middle-class members in Castile and Andalusia, who found stable jobs in the civil administration and perceived the state as a major source of opportunities (Moreno, 2001). Relatively low out-migration dynamics in these regions, despite increasing unemployment rates and low economic productivity (Silvestre, 2005), might be due to the opportunity to rely on security nets, as they presented greater numbers of charitable foundations than Northern Spain (Table 14.1). Thirdly, efforts to regulate labor relations and protect the working class were made (de la Calle Velasco, 1997; Guillén, 1990, 1997). In the early 1930s, municipal districts implemented prohibitions on the employment of migrant laborers if local unemployed rural workers were available (Casanova, 2010, p. 44). Consequently, employment opportunities for temporary migrants in Southern regions decreased (Domenech, 2013) along with their migration (Silvestre, 2007). Finally, increasing governmental intervention also impacted international migration policies, as in the mid-1920s highly restrictive conditions to enter North Morocco were implemented.

Table 14.1 Number of active charitable foundations by region, 1915–1930

Overall, unequal industrialization and urbanization processes, together with the fragmented provision of social security nets and infrastructure networks, generated regional and class differences. These dynamics shaped migration differently across Spain and facilitated the re-orientation of in-migration dynamics from Southern to Northeastern and Eastern Spain. Unequal bargaining power between regions proves to be a distinguishing feature for comprehending the country’s social and migratory history throughout the twentieth century.

4.2 Post-Civil War and Autarchy: Rapid Deterioration of Living and Working Conditions, Mid-1930s to Late 1950s

The establishment of Franco’s dictatorship in 1939 significantly deteriorated living and working conditions. In turn, international emigration decreased 77.31% between 1931 and 1941 (DEMIG, 2015) and internal migration decelerated. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the migration capabilities of the Spanish population decreased heavily, as (1) economic structure and purchasing power experienced an impasse, (2) national-Catholicism restricted the population’s autonomy, and (3) legal barriers to migration were established.

Firstly, throughout this period, Spain was characterized by high governmental intervention, autarchy, and ration books. Social security programs shrank (Guillén, 1997), and the imposed wage levels were not modified, despite increasing living costs (Benito del Pozo, 1990). Private consumption fell and both GDP and private consumption per capita rates did not recover to their pre-war levels until 1954 and 1956, respectivelyFootnote 8 (Prados de la Escosura, 2017).

Secondly, the efforts of the Second Republic to separate state and religion were truncated (Casanova & Sanchis, 1999), as national-Catholicism became an ideological cornerstone of Franco’s regime, and a mechanism to gain hegemony over public and private life. Strict censorship was established and the public sector was purged, trigerring political and intellectual exile (Frago, 2014; Oliver, 2008). Traditional codes of conduct and values were also institutionalized and legislation to protect the family were introduced (Nicolás, 1971; Valiente Fernández, 1996). Other Republican policies and rights, including divorce, civil marriage and female full-access to the workforce, were also revoked. Furthermore, trade unionism, associationism and collective negotiations were prohibited, and labor discipline was maintained through strike repression, vertical unions and the control of cooperatives (Balfour, 1990; Igual & Vidal, 2001).

Finally, the regime aimed to control internal and international migrations. Immediately after the Civil War, emigration was de facto prohibitedFootnote 9 and decrees regulating emigrants’ repatriation were established. In the mid-1940s, this prohibition was lifted; however, restrictive provisions, including limitations on the issuance of passports and increasing military border controls, continued (Kreienbrink, 2009). Likewise, efforts to control internal migration were made: (1) internal travel documents were introduced; (2) bureaucratic hurdles, such as requiring official work visas, were established to move into the main cities; and (3) probation provincial boards spread, impeding the movement of those who opposed to the regime during the Civil War (Corbera, 2015; Díaz Sánchez, 2016; Teijeiro, 2012). This way, migration dynamics halted during the 1930s, and, due to the increasing insecurity and unemployment rates, urban-rural migrations exacerbated (Domenech, 2013). This resulted in the revival of agricultural activity at the expense of industrial production (Prados de la Escosura, 2017) and urban growth (Le Gallo & Chasco, 2008). Despite these measures, some internal movements persisted (Corbera, 2015) as internal migrants left certain regions in southwest and northwest Spain and moved towards the more industrialized provinces of Barcelona and MadridFootnote 10 (García Barbancho, 1967). Additionally, the different allocation of food quotas between rural and urban areas sparked pendular migration until more restrictive measures were introduced in the mid-1940s (Moreno Fonseret, 1993). However, mobility flows recovered in the late 1950s.

4.3 New Economic and Political Models: A Path Towards Increasing Liberties, 1960s to Mid-1970s

The economic unsustainability of Franco’s regime brought about policy shifts from the late 1950s onwards (Balfour, 1990) that began a gradual liberalization process (Fig. 14.6). Life quality and healthcare coverage expanded slightly, even though public administration remained fragmented and social policies limited.Footnote 11 In addition, by the early 1960s, the volume of internal and international migrations increased rapidly, the orientation of international migrations shifted towards closer-by destinations, and the origin of internal out-migrants diversified. These migration configurations were shaped by three important economic and social shifts: (1) the transition to an industrialized and service economy; (2) technological innovation; and (3) important shifts in migratory policy.

Fig. 14.6
A multi-line graph of the freedom of expression and political liberties in Spain from 1940 to 1975. Both plot ascending steps from 1959 and 1949, respectively.

Freedom of expression and political liberties in Spain, 1940–1975. (Source: V-DEM (2022))

First, during the 1950-to-mid-1970s period, the economy experienced its fastest growing rates: agriculture underwent a sustained contraction and industrial sectors continued their sharp increase and plateaud at around 30% of the GDP, peaking in the mid-1960s (Fig. 14.7). The service sector also experienced a continuous expansion. US Government economic aid in the mid-1950s and the 1959’s Stabilization and Liberalization Plan favored foreign investment, technological innovation, and changes in the occupation structure (Collantes, 2007a; Lieberman, 2005). Despite these economic reverberations, most urban growth and in-migration patterns were still concentrated in a small number of industrialized destinations along the northeast, Madrid, and the Mediterranean coastline (García Barbancho, 1967; Hoggart & Paniagua, 2001; Le Gallo & Chasco, 2008).

Fig. 14.7
A multi-line graph of the shares of output components in G D P, from 1850 to 1980, for 4 categories. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing declines, service activities, manufacturing, extractive, and utilities, and construction fluctuate with decreasing slopes in order.

Shares of output components in GDP (%) (current prices), 1850–1980. (Source: Prados de la Escosura (2017, p. 296–300))

Secondly, agricultural mechanization, together with growing non-agricultural employment, triggered a rural exodus (Collantes, 2007b). The volume of internal out-migrations increased from 254,011 movements in 1945 to 545,365 in 1955Footnote 12 (Guindo et al., 2007) and the geographical orientation of out-flows expanded (Fig. 14.8; Paluzie et al., 2009). While mechanization reduced the need for peasants and laborers in Southern landholdings and encouraged migrations to sub-urban and urban sites (Clar, 2008; Clar et al., 2015), the extensive irrigation systems in the Mediterranean created dynamic agricultural areas attracting migrants. Additionally, new track stretches were constructed to connect main population centers, such as Seville, Madrid or Valencia, more efficiently, easing mobility to those locations and their surrounding areas. Small municipalities connected to the national railway networks experienced significant population increases in contrast to those poorly integrated into the structure (Franch et al., 2013).

Fig. 14.8
A multi-line graph of the fluctuation of the net internal migration by 7 main regions, from 1961 to 1978. The northwest, northeast, and Canary Islands peak while east, center, south, and center without Madrid, dip, between 1961 and 1965. They decline and rise, respectively, and vary minimally after.

Net internal migration by main region, 1961–1978. (Source: INE (2022b) Historical Data, Table 3.3. Internal migration – National summary of emigrants, classified by province of origin and destination)

Finally, there was also a shift in the migratory policy. To alleviate the pressure on the labor market and obtain foreign currencies, the Spanish Emigration Institute (IEE) was created in 1956 (it remained active until 1984), which strengthened the state’s tutelary character regarding international movement. Its objective was to gather and channel overseas employment, especially in Western Europe, and match it with Spanish applicants (Sánchez Alonso, 2011). The assisted continental emigration, together with restrictive measures in Latin American countries, implied a gradual decrease on transoceanic migration flows (Kreienbrink, 2009; Valero Matas et al., 2015, p. 59–60), while continental migration increased rapidly (Fig. 14.3). Assisted emigration peaked in 1971 with 213,930 departures and the main destination countries were France, Germany, and Switzerland (INE, 2022a); emigrants were mainly low-skilled workers leaving Northwest and Southern Spain (see Fig. 14.9).Footnote 13 These mass emigration flows to European countries lasted until the petroleum crisis in the early-1970s, when state control on movement decreased (V-DEM, 2022).

Fig. 14.9
A multi-line graph of the fluctuation of international emigration by 7 regions, from 1950 to 1982. Canary Islands has a steady trend of declining peaks. Northwest, northeast, center, center without Madrid, east, and south peak between 1964 and 1972, and decline after.

International emigration by region, 1950–1982. (Source: INE (2022b) Historical Data, Table 3.3.1 – Emigrants by province of origin, gender, age, civil status, and economic activity)

While migration was affected by important social reverberations, migrants also encouraged incipient vectors of bottom-up cultural and political change. Indeed, internal migrants, who did not share the culture of traditional urban working classes (Balfour, 1990), created new spaces for organization through neighborhood associations and regional centers (Sampere, 2003). Additionally, emigration patterns to Western Europe facilitated associationism, particularly in France, where political exiles had dense pro-democratic networks that confronted migrants with better life conditions and ideas on socio-political liberties (Lillo, 2011).

4.4 Welfare State Consolidation, Economic Swings, and Shifts in the Meaning of the ‘Good Life’, Mid-1970s-Present

Since the mid-1970s, Spanish societal structures have been marked by important economic and political instability. The country began transitioning towards a democracy in 1975, and despite temporal contractions, the economy experienced spectacular growth since the mid-1990s, when the construction and the service sector took off and spread across the territory (Prados de la Escosura, 2017). This lasted, approximately, until 2008. This development was accompanied by an exponential increase in internal migration patterns and by a migration transition, as immigration surpassed emigration flows in 1988. The reduction in income differentials between Spain and Western Europe favored this transition and, as a result, the accession to the EU in 1986 was not accompanied by high emigration flows (Dustmann et al., 2003). In fact, as mentioned below, the EU accession involved positive socio-economic spillovers favoring the transition from net emigration to net immigration.

The migration configurations of the last 45 years have been shaped by: (1) fluctuations in the national economy; (2) the expansion and contraction of the welfare state; and (3) a changing meaning of the ‘good life and work’.

First, while the early-to-mid-1970s were characterized by rising inflation rates and a surge in unemployment (Prados de la Escosura, 2017), economic growth since the mid-1990s triggered slight reductions of inter-regional inequalities (Hierro et al., 2019). Apart from the spread of the service sector, the increasing foreign direct investment after joining the European Single Market provoked important positive spillovers (Barrios et al., 2004) with migration effects. Indeed, economic growth has been linked to (1) decreases on inter-provincial migrations, (2) increasing intra-provincial movements (Bentolila, 2001; Silvestre, 2002), and (3) a diversification of the geographical concentration of internal migration (Fig. 14.10; Hierro et al., 2019; Paluzie et al., 2009). Similarly, the reduction in wage differentials between Spain and main European destinations minimized aspirations to migrate internationally (Bover & Velilla, 1999). Still, the important Spanish spatial division has impacted its economic restructuring, as well as migration dynamics: The metropolitan areas of Madrid and Barcelona and key Eastern and Southern tourist enclaves are key socio-economic locations concentrating services and industries, and are thus the main destinations for migrants. In contrast, towns in the Northwest, Center and Inland South (the so-called ‘emptied Spain’) are characterized by the predominance of agricultural workers (Serra et al., 2014) and present high out-migration patterns.

Fig. 14.10
A multi-line graph of the fluctuation of the net internal migration by 7 main regions, from 1980 to 2018. Canary Islands and east peak between 1984 and 2000 and decline after. Northeast and northwest, south, center and center without Madrid, peak in 2009, 2005, 2010, respectively.

Net internal migration by main region, 1980–2018. (Source: INE (2022b). Historical Data, Table 4.1.1. Internal migration – Migrants classified by provinces of origin and destination)

Secondly, the democratic transition was accompanied by a welfare state consolidation, and decentralization and regionalization processes (Moreno, 2001). Nevertheless, these were not accompanied by an equal regional distribution of resources and social guarantees: the number of workers affiliated to social security remained below the national average in the South and Center, in contrast to the Northeast and Madrid (Guillén, 1997). As a result, informal social networks have remained important, especially in the Canary Islands and Southern Spain, and EU regional development fundsFootnote 14 have contributed to regional development, especially in Andalusia (Lima & Cardenete, 2008; Palacios, 2007). Formal and informal welfare protection mechanisms might explain low interregional migration dynamics, despite regional differences in unemployment rates and rent per capita (Bentolila, 2001).

Despite economic and political development, the 2008 economic crisis marked a turning point. Household indebtedness increased significantly and unemployment rates grew 13.16% between 2007 and 2011. Youth unemployment rates increased 28.1% during the same period, reaching 55.50% of the total labor force (ages 15–24) in 2011 and remaining around 30% since then (World Bank, 2022). As such, the economy has been characterized by job destruction, informality, the stock market collapse, and drops in the GDP annual growth rate. In addition, shifts in the political economy since 2010, including austerity measures, welfare cutbacks and fiscal tightening, have negatively affected the welfare state, triggering increasing inequality rates and growing disparities in rent distribution (Múñoz de Bustillo, 2013). The dismantlement of the welfare state together with the economic deceleration resulted in increasing international emigration (Bygnes & Flipo, 2016): the 28,091 departures in 2007 increased to 52,841 in 2011 (DEMIG, 2015), the majority being highly educated young people migrating to the UK, France and Germany (Izquierdo et al., 2015) from Madrid, Galicia and Tenerife (Ortega-Rivera et al., 2016), while emigration from Southern and Northeastern regions has been more moderate (see Fig. 14.11 for a comparison of emigration pre- and post-2008). The directionality of internal migration flows has also changed slightly, and previous spatial diversification of out- and in-migration patterns has been somewhat paused (see Fig. 14.10 for a comparison of internal migration pre- and post-2008). Overall, main metropolitan industrial cities, including Madrid and Barcelona, have received a higher share of migrants, whereas the Canary and Balearic Islands and provinces along the Mediterranean coast lost attractiveness (Hierro et al., 2019).

Fig. 14.11
A multi-line graph of the international emigration by 6 regions. Northwest, northeast, center, east, south, and Canary Islands have ascending peaks post 2001.

International emigration by region, 1990–2019. (Source: INE (2022b). Historical Data, Table 3.3.1 – Emigrants by province of origin, gender, age, civil status, and economic activity; INE (2022a))

Finally, value shifts have led to changes in understandings of a ‘good life’ and ‘good work’, also leading to internal and international migrations. Limited services in small and rural municipalities and the consideration of farming as a demanding, low-status job have contributed to growing aspirations for urban jobs (Hoggart & Paniagua, 2001). As a result, the number of agricultural workers decreased from 4,672.3 workers in 1960 to 1,842.2 workers (per thousand inhabitants) in 1981 (INE, 2022b). Despite this decline, aspirations to reside in mid-sized cities remain high, as an incipient counter-urbanization process started gaining momentum in the 1980s (Le Gallo & Chasco, 2008). Dynamic municipalities, primarily along the Mediterranean coast (Hoggart & Paniagua, 2001) and the Cantabrian range (Serra et al., 2014), remain desirable alternatives, especially for women (Navarro Yáñez, 1999) and, after the 2008 crisis, for highly-educated entrepreneurial youth (Baylina Ferré et al., 2019). In contrast, economically depressed rural areas, including Southern Galicia, parts of Aragon and the central regions, have experienced intense population de-concentration (Serra et al., 2014).

Overall, regional inequalities and corruption have led to important social concerns, including low social capital endowments (Pérez et al., 2008) and a loss of trust in public institutions, especially after 2008 (Bolancé Losilla et al., 2018). Increasing frustration with the socio-political and economic environment, and low life satisfaction (INE, 2022c) stimulated social mobilizations, political protests (Lima & Artiles, 2013), and internal and international emigration (Bygnes, 2017; González Enríquez & Martínez Romera, 2014). Internal migrants left center and, to a lesser extent, Southern regions for Madrid and Eastern Spain, and the Eastern and Central regions have experienced the highest volumes of international emigration post-2008 (INE, 2022a).

5 Concluding Insights

The social transformation framework introduces how change at the economic, political, cultural, demographic, and technological levels explains the nature of migration transitions. Recently, scholars have applied a long-term perspective to investigate how social transformation processes have impacted migration dynamics in developing countries (Berriane et al., 2021; Schewel & Legass Bahir, 2019; Schewel, 2020; Rodriguez-Pena, 2020; Osburg, 2020), although efforts to map migration patterns in high-income countries have also been made (see Wielstra, 2020 for an analysis of a Dutch village or Vezzoli, 2020a, b for Italy). Yet, little is known about the (dis)continuities of migration drivers, especially in those countries where the transition from net emigration to net immigration has been questioned. This chapter has focused on Spanish migration transitions, and presents four periods of social transformation since the 1880s. Throughout these, three factors affecting mobility are consistently raised: (1) state consolidation and weakening; (2) economic instability; and (3) unequal urbanization processes.

First, state expansion and contraction shaped migration processes during the four periods under study. While the expansion of the state generated safety nets during the first decades of the twentieth century, it also imposed taxations and employment regulations, negatively affecting temporary laborers, and concurrently encouraging emigration and immobility patterns (Vallejo Pousada, 1996; Moreno, 2001). The tutelary character of the state during the Francoist regime initially banned migration, while, later, it facilitated state-assisted migration, shifting the orientation of international flows to closer-by European destinations. Since the mid-1970s, social protection mechanisms and economic stimuli reduced migration, although poor governance and negative state perceptions have encouraged emigration post-2008 (Bygnes & Flipo, 2016). The role of the state has partially precipitated the peripheralization of Southern and Central Spain, given the unequal distribution of resources.

Second, since the 1880s, the incipient industrialization and urbanization processes caused shifts in the orientation of internal migration, and more voluminous flows. Southern agricultural destinations and urban nuclei started losing momentum in the early twentieth century, while cities along the Northeastern and Eastern coastlines accelerated. Despite the impasse experienced during the first decades of the dictatorship, inequalities in urban growth, technological innovation and the consolidation of industrialization since the early 1960s further exacerbated the dynamism of the Northeast and the Mediterranean coastline at the expense of Southern landholdings. Spain is, therefore, characterized by an important spatial division that has been further aggravated since 2008, when job destruction and informality grew, encouraging the emigration of immigrants and skilled youth and the depopulation of central regions.

Altogether, these factors led to the marginalization of Southern and Central Spain and to changes in the nature of migration flows. These factors resemble those highlighted by other researchers applying the social transformation perspective (see MADE Research Team, 2021), but they particularly feature the migration drivers pointed by Vezzoli (2020a) for the Italian case, raising questions about the similarity of drivers within regions, such as the Mediterranean. While this research supports recent literature regarding how different developmental trajectories affect migration trends, it also opens the possibility to inquire whether countries in the same region present more similarities in their migration drivers. Finally, this chapter brings together the social transformation framework and migration temporalities to show that regardless of societal change, migration drivers may remain consistent throughout time.