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Decentral Implementation of EU Investment Policy: Convergence, Divergence and EU-Plus

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New Frontiers for EU Investment Policy (NFEIP 2022)

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((Spec. Issue))

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Abstract

The legal protection of investments around the globe is mainly influenced by a broad variety of international agreements, such as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters, specific Investment Protection Agreements (IPAs) as well as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). Within the EU, the past decades have shown fundamental changes in the way that negotiations and the conclusion of such agreements are carried out. The central approach with negotiations on an EU level has faced several problems, especially in light of the need for ratification by the Member States. Therefore, more room is given to a new decentral approach with negotiations of BITs by individual Member States being authorised by the European Commission. This calls for a comparison of EU agreements and Member States’ BITs with regard to procedural and substantive investment protection standards. As this comparative exercise will show, new Member States’ BITs are largely convergent with the EU’s international investment policy, but also leave limited room for divergence (following the old European gold standard) and an EU-plus approach.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries, OJ L 251/40.

  2. 2.

    European Commission (2010), p. 11.

  3. 3.

    See Council Decision (EU) 2017/38 of 28 October 2016 on the provisional application of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, OJ L 11/1080.

  4. 4.

    See Council Decision (EU) 2018/1676 of 15 October 2018 on the signing on behalf of the EU of the Investment Protection Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the other part, OJ L 279/1.

  5. 5.

    See Council Decision (EU) 2019/1096 of 25 June 2018 on the signing on behalf of the EU of the Investment Protection Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, of the other part, OJ L 175/1.

  6. 6.

    On this, see Bungenberg (2022), pp. 907–976; Rosas (2021), pp. 27–46; Stifter (2022), Art. 8.44, paras. 24 ff.; Griller (2020), pp. 41 ff.; Cremona (2018), pp. 235 ff.

  7. 7.

    See European Commission (2020).

  8. 8.

    Ibid, p. 5. More details on the numbers provided in the Commission’s Report can be found in Bungenberg and Böhme (2022), pp. 631 f.

  9. 9.

    The list can be found at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/ searching for “bilateral investment agreements” (last accessed 20 February 2023).

  10. 10.

    Commission Implementing Decision C(2022)7177 of 13 October 2022.

  11. 11.

    Bungenberg and Böhme (2022), pp. 633 ff.

  12. 12.

    All referenced (Model) BITs can be found through the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub’s International Investment Agreements Navigator, available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements (last accessed 15 March 2023). The given analysis covers the period from 2016 to March 2023, including the following: Czech Model BIT (2016), adopted 28/12/2016; Slovak Model BIT (2019); Dutch Model BIT (2019), adopted 22/3/2019; Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019), adopted 28/3/2019; Italian Model BIT (2022), adopted August 2022; Austria-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016), in force since 1/10/2017; Cambodia-Hungary BIT (2016), in force since 30/8/2017; Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016), in force since 5/2/2018; Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016), in force since 30/8/2017; Hungary-Iran BIT (2018), in force since 23/3/2022; Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017), in force since 4/11/2018; Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018), signed 28/8/2018 but not yet in force; Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019), in force since 28/9/2019; Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019), signed 13/6/2019 but not yet in force; Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019), in force since 2/5/2020; Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020), in force since 10/4/2022; Hungary-UAE BIT (2021), in force since 10/4/2022; Hungary-Oman BIT (2022), signed 2/2/2022 but not yet in force; Hungary-San Marino BIT (2022), signed 21/9/2022 but not yet in force.

  13. 13.

    See also Art. 2(4) EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement and Art. 2(5) EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement.

  14. 14.

    Titi defines the European gold standard as synonymous with the “highest levels of investment protection“. See Titi (2015), p. 649.

  15. 15.

    Signed on 22 April 2016 and entered into force on 1 October 2017, available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5500/download.

  16. 16.

    Signed on 14 January 2016 and entered into force on 30 August 2017, available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5988/download.

  17. 17.

    See Art. 2(3) the Hungary-Iran BIT (2017); Art. 2(3) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 2(3) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 2(3) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 2(3) Hungary-United Arab Emirates BIT (2022); and Art. 2(3) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022). The Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017) constitutes an exception to this trend. Art. 2(2) thereof follows the old gold standard by including an unqualified FET and FPS standard.

  18. 18.

    See Art. 3(2) Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 5(2) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 5(2) Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019).

  19. 19.

    Art. 5(2) Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 9(2) Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 4(3) Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 4(2) Italian Model BIT (2022).

  20. 20.

    As noted by Dumberry, Art. 3.1 of the 2016 Indian Model BIT is particularly notable for dispensing with the term “fair and equitable”, simply referring to a “violation of customary international law”, which is then linked to a similar closed list as in the CETA. See Dumberry (2022), p. 260.

  21. 21.

    On the CETA standard for expropriation, see Kriebaum (2022a), pp. 297 ff.; on the interplay between expropriation and the rule of law, see Bungenberg (2023), pp. 61 ff.

  22. 22.

    Art. 8.1 and 8.2 CETA; Ch. 1 EU-Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement; Ch. 1 EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement; Art. 1 Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 1 and 2 Slovakia Model BIT (2019); Art. 1 and 2 Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 1–3 Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 1–3 Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 1 Austria-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016); Art. 1 Cambodia-Hungary BIT (2016); Art. 1 and 2 Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016); Art. 1 and 2 Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 1 Hungary-Iran BIT (2018); Art. 1 Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017); Art. 1 and 2 Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 1 Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 1–3 Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 1 Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 1 Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 1 Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 1 Hungary-Oman BIT (2022). Notable exceptions are some of the Member States’ earlier (Model) BITs, such as: Czech Model BIT (2016); Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Austria-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016); Cambodia-Hungary BIT (2016); Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016); Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017).

  23. 23.

    Art. 8.9(4) CETA; Art. 2.2 EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement; Art. 4(4) Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 2(4) Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 6(4) Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 4(4) Hungary-Iran BIT (2018); Art. 3(4) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 3(3) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 6(5) Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 3(3) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 3(3) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 3(2) Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 3(4) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  24. 24.

    Bungenberg and Reinisch (2021), pp. 464 f.

  25. 25.

    See Commission Implementing Decision of 13 October 2022 authorising Hungary to open formal negotiations to amend its bilateral investment agreement with, respectively, the Republic of Albania, the Argentine Republic, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Paraguay, the Swiss Confederation, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, the Republic of Turkey, and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

  26. 26.

    See Art. 3(3) Hungary-Iran BIT (2017); Art. 4(3) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 8(2) Cote d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 4(3) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 4(3) Hungary Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 4(3) Hungary-United Arab Emirates BIT (2021); Art. 4(4) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  27. 27.

    Art. 8.7(3) CETA; At the decentral level, this exception can only be found in Art. 5(3) lit. c Italian Model BIT (2022).

  28. 28.

    Art. 3(5) and (6) Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 3(5) and (6) Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 5(3) Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 3(4) Austria-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016); Art. 3(5) Cambodia-Hungary BIT (2016); Art. 3(5) Hungary-Iran BIT (2018); Art. 3(3) and (5) Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017); Art. 5(8) lit. b Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 4(4) and (6) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 9 Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 4(4) and (6) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 4(4) and (6) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 4(4) and (6) Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 4(5) and (7) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  29. 29.

    Reinisch (2022), mn. 34.

  30. 30.

    Reinisch (2022), mn. 37 f.

  31. 31.

    On the idea of a plurilateral re-negotiation, see Bungenberg and Böhme (2022), p. 639; Griebel (2010), p. 213.

  32. 32.

    The existence of procedural convergence becomes apparent when analysing certain similarities between CETA, the EU-Singapore IPA and almost all of the Member States’ (Model) BITs. It is noteworthy, however, that those similarities do not exist with regard to the EU-Viet Nam IPA. This could simply be reflective of the nature of bipolar negotiations, highlighting that the EU can only streamline its investment policy to the extent that international partners are willing to agree to.

  33. 33.

    Art. 8.36 CETA; Art. 3.16 and Annex 8 EU-Singapore IPA; Art. 8.5 Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 15.7 Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 20(13) Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 19(O.1) Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 25(1) Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 14(3) Austria-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016); Art. 22(2) Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016); Art. 14(4) Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 14(13) Hungary-Iran BIT (2018); Art. 12(15) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 11(2) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 20(12) Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 11 Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 11 Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 18 Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 12 Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  34. 34.

    Art. 8.29 CETA; Art. 3.12 EU-Singapore IPA; Art. 8(17) Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 28(4) Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 15(1) Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 21(2) Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 24(6) Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 24(4) Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 14(14) Hungary-Iran BIT (2018); Art. 19(5) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 9(11) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 25(1) Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 9(11) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 9(11) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 24(6) Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 10(11) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  35. 35.

    Art. 8.31 CETA; Art. 3.13(2) EU-Singapore IPA; Art. 8(14) Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 19(2) Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 20(12) Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 26 Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 18(2) Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016); Art. 14(10) Hungary-Iran BIT (2018); Art. 12(13) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 9(8) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 18(2) Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 9(8) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 9(8) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 11(2) Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 10(8) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  36. 36.

    Art. 8.30 CETA; Art. 3.11 EU-Singapore IPA; Art. 8(2) lit. c Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 18(4) Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 20(6) Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 19(G.5) Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 27 Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 14(1) lit. c (iii) Austria-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016); Art. 8(3) lit. c Cambodia-Hungary BIT (2016); Art. 19(8) Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016); Art. 18(5) Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 14(7) Hungary-Iran BIT (2018); Art. 8(2) lit. c Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017); Art. 12(8) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 9(9) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 23 Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 9(9) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 9(9) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 14 Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 10(9) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  37. 37.

    Schill (2009), p. 65.

  38. 38.

    On this, see Gaffney and Akçay (2015), pp. 186 ff.

  39. 39.

    Art. 8(17) Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 28(4) Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 15(1) Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 21(2) Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 24(6) Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 24(4) Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 14(14) Hungary-Iran BIT (2018); Art. 19(5) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 9(11) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 25(1) Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 9(11) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 9(11) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 24(6) Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 10(11) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  40. 40.

    See supra Sect. 2.1.

  41. 41.

    Shan and Zhang (2014), pp. 439 f.; de Mestral and Vanhonnaeker (2022), p. 169; Bungenberg and Blandfort (2020), p. 161.

  42. 42.

    De Mestral and Vanhonnaeker (2022), pp. 162, 169.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., pp. 169 f.

  44. 44.

    Bungenberg and Reinisch (2021), p. 461.

  45. 45.

    See Gómez Palacio and Muchlinski (2008), pp. 228 f.

  46. 46.

    De Mestral and Vanhonnaeker (2022), p. 172.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Bungenberg and Reinisch (2021), p. 461.

  49. 49.

    See also other Member States’ BITs: Art. 2(1) Austria-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2016); Art. 2(1) Cambodia-Hungary BIT (2016); Art. 2(1) and (2) Slovakia-United Arab Emirates BIT (2016); Art. 2(5) Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 12(2) Hungary-Iran BIT (2017); Art. 2(1) Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017); Art. 2(4) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 2(1) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 4(1) Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 2(1) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT; Art. 2(1) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 2(1) Hungary-United Arab Emirates BIT (2021); and Art. 2(1) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  50. 50.

    See also other Model BITs: Art. 2(1) of the Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 3(1) of the Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 3(1) and (2) Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 4(1) Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); and Art. 3 Italian Model BIT (2022).

  51. 51.

    Shan and Zhang (2010), pp. 1049 ff.; Herrmann and Müller-Ibold (2016), pp. 646 f.; Bungenberg (2010), p. 143.

  52. 52.

    Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union.

  53. 53.

    Bungenberg and Blandfort (2020), p. 171.

  54. 54.

    See amongst others Nowrot (2014), pp. 612–644; Chi (2017).

  55. 55.

    Art. 8.9 CETA, para. 1.

  56. 56.

    Schacherer (2022), p. 243.

  57. 57.

    CETA Preamble, Recitals 6 and 8.

  58. 58.

    CETA Preamble, Recital 11.

  59. 59.

    CETA Preamble, Recital 9.

  60. 60.

    CETA Preamble, Recital 4.

  61. 61.

    CETA Preamble, Recital 10.

  62. 62.

    Art. 23.2 and Art. 24.3 CETA.

  63. 63.

    Art. 23.3 and Art. 24.5 CETA.

  64. 64.

    Titi (2019), p. 162; Schacherer (2022), p. 240.

  65. 65.

    Bartels (2017), p. 4.

  66. 66.

    Art. 22.2 CETA.

  67. 67.

    Schacherer (2019), p. 236.

  68. 68.

    Overduin (2021), para. 15.61.

  69. 69.

    Art. 13 Cambodia-Hungary BIT (2016); Art. 13 Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016); Art. 11 Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 13 Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017); Art. 16 Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 16 Hungary-San Marino BIT (2022).

  70. 70.

    Art. 12 Czech Model BIT (2016); Art. 4 Slovak Model BIT (2019); Art. 2 Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 17 Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 6 Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 4 Hungary-Iran BIT (2017); Art. 3 Lithuania-Turkey BIT; Art. 6 Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 3 Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 3 Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 3 Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 3 Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  71. 71.

    Art. 6 Dutch Model BIT (2019); Art. 15 Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Union Model BIT (2019); Art. 20 and 22 Italian Model BIT (2022); Art. 2(3) Cambodia-Hungary BIT (2016); Art. 12(1) and (2) Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016); Art. 10(1) and (2) Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 2(6) Hungary-Iran BIT (2017); Art. 2(3) Hungary-Tajikistan BIT (2017); Art. 17(1) and (2) Lithuania-Turkey BIT; Art. 2(7) Belarus-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 16 Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019); Art. 2 (8) Cabo Verde-Hungary BIT (2019); Art. 2(7) Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT (2020); Art. 2(7) Hungary-UAE BIT (2021); Art. 2(7) Hungary-Oman BIT (2022).

  72. 72.

    See Commission Implementing Decision C(2022)7177 of 13 October 2022, Art. 2(1)(h).

  73. 73.

    Kriebaum (2022b), pp. 8 f.; Böhme (2022), pp. 256 f.

  74. 74.

    For a detailed analysis on how the presence of sustainable development aspects within CETA’s treaty body and connected instruments impacts the interpretation of CETA, see Schacherer (2019), pp. 207–238.

  75. 75.

    Art. 2.2(1) EU-Singapore IPA and Art. 2.2(1) EU-Viet Nam IPA.

  76. 76.

    Art. 10(3) Iran-Slovakia BIT (2016); Art. 17(3) Lithuania-Turkey BIT (2018); Art. 12(3) Slovakia-UAE BIT (2016) contains the first sentence of the quoted clause. Art. 17 Côte d’Ivoire-Portugal BIT (2019) contains a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) clause with slightly softer wording, obliging the Contracting Parties to “encourage investors […] to voluntarily incorporate in their activities internationally recognized corporate social responsibility standards, such as the OECD […] Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”.

  77. 77.

    Böhme (2022), p. 259.

  78. 78.

    Kriebaum (2018), p. 36.

  79. 79.

    Art. 7(4) of the 2019 Dutch Model BIT reads: “[i]nvestors shall be liable in accordance with the rules concerning jurisdiction of their home State for the acts or decisions made in relation to the investment where such acts or decisions lead to significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the host state”.

  80. 80.

    Böhme (2022), p. 260.

  81. 81.

    As noted by Abel, it is notable how Art. 23 of the Dutch Model BIT provides legally non-binding CSR norms with legal effect allowing tribunals to modify the calculation method of damages after evaluating investors’ behaviour towards human rights. See Abel (2021), p. 227.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Europa-Institut, Saarland University, Saarbrucken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg, Bianca Böhme & Lars Ruf

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  1. Marc Bungenberg
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  2. Bianca Böhme
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  3. Lars Ruf
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Correspondence to Bianca Böhme .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Europa-Institut, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  2. University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

    August Reinisch

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Bungenberg, M., Böhme, B., Ruf, L. (2023). Decentral Implementation of EU Investment Policy: Convergence, Divergence and EU-Plus. In: Bungenberg, M., Reinisch, A. (eds) New Frontiers for EU Investment Policy. NFEIP 2022. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41977-5_3

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