Keywords

Introduction

This book introduces the concept of civil society elites and examines civil society elites as an elite group alongside political and economic elites. Contributors address questions like who holds top positions in civil society, where they come from, what factors explain their power and privileged position, and by whom and on what grounds are they challenged. The book engages with established debates in civil society studies, but in an original way. The image of an inclusive and pluralistic civil society sector stands in sharp contrast with the evidence of the dominance of a small number of organisations and movements. Although we know that civil society is a highly heterogeneous field, with a broad and vast range of different types of actors, this coincides with patterns of monopolisation. For instance, calculations from the UK show that there are more than 160,000 voluntary organisations and charities, but many of them are small and only a few succeed in hoarding substantial resources (e.g. volunteers, members, donors, and money) forming so-called super-major charities (NCVO, 2022, see also Altermark et al., 2022). Although trends of professionalisation and NGOisation have been widely researched (Heylen et al., 2020; Jordan & Maloney, 2007; Skocpol, 2004) and competition and polarisation between civil society actors is increasingly observed (Graff & Korolczuk, 2021; Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2022; Johansson & Kalm, 2015; Kalm & Meeuwisse, 2020), few have addressed these phenomena as manifestations of elitisation processes in civil society. Instead, this sector has been considered unaffected due to its special mission and limited resources (see, however, Johansson & Uhlin, 2020; Lindellee & Scaramuzzino, 2020; Norén-Nilsson et al., 2023).

In this concluding chapter, we analyse the main findings in the book using a classic debate in elite research, that is, the distinction between ‘oligarchic elites’ (Michels, 1968) and a ‘power elite’ (Mills, 1956). These theories allow us to explore the paradoxical meaning of the concept of civil society elites because such elites derive their status, legitimacy, and influence from ‘standing on the shoulders’ of members, beneficiaries, and constituencies, while at the same time benefiting from being socialised into elite circles as they are integrated with other elite groups in society. We use these theories to distinguish between the elites of civil society (‘oligarchic elites’) and the elites in civil society (‘power elites’).

Oligarchs, Power Elites, and Civil Society

The theory of oligarchic elites connects with studies of professionalisation, NGOisation, and the institutionalisation of social movements (Heylen et al., 2020; Jordan & Maloney, 2007; Skocpol, 2004). Oligarchy is a well-known phenomenon regarding the relationship between individual and collective power, or even better, between those leading collective efforts and those participating in such efforts. The concept derives from Michels’ investigation of socialist parties and trade unions in which he argues that organisations committed to egalitarian ideals and democratic forms of governance also develop oligarchic modes of leadership because organisational bureaucracy inevitably leads to the domination of a small group of leaders. An organisation ‘gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy’ (Michels, 1968, p. 365). Michels argued that although leaders of socialist parties, trade unions, and social movements derive their power from leading democratic organisations working for egalitarianism, equality, and social justice, their leadership tends to raise ‘itself above the people’ (ibid., p. 75). The iron law of oligarchy thus gives birth to an organisational elite that makes it to the top through a long career within its own ranks and whose main source of power comes from being seen as a legitimate spokesperson and representative of the cause.

Mills’ (1956) theory of a power elite offers a different approach, and he defines elites as a group socially integrated at the top across societal spheres and sectors. The notion of a power elite suggests a coherent and socially integrated social group of political, corporate, and military leaders formed by their shared economic, cultural, and political interests and backgrounds. While Michels pointed to changes within organisations as mechanisms of elitisation, Mills considered control and coordination across institutions as the main factor driving elite formation. Although political, corporate, and military elites benefit from operating at the top of major institutions, the power elite also uphold their power through social reproduction and interaction across institutional domains.

The power elite thus includes people with different professions and titles, but Mills argued that they still share a common social, cultural, and ideological background. Elite integration starts at a young age because privileged groups attend similar or even the same schools, and later in life they share social networks, both professionally and privately, for instance, through membership in social clubs and cultural and artistic associations. They become socialised into common circles ‘composed of men of similar origin and education, of similar career and style of life’ (Mills, 1963, p. 29). The theory of a power elite leaves little room for civil society leaders, but Mills stressed the significance of voluntary, philanthropic, and charitable activities as a means for political, corporate, and military elites to meet and to legitimise their privileged and powerful position in other sectors.

Theories of oligarchic elites and power elites allow us to distinguish between two ideal-typical civil society elite positions: an elite of civil society and an elite in civil society. In combination with the themes outlined in this book (composition, reproduction, integration, and contestation), we can theorise on the factors that lead to the concentration of power and resources at the top. These reflections are summarised in Table 14.1.

Table 14.1 Types of civil society elites
Full size table

As explored in the introduction to this volume, composition refers to the socio-demographic characteristics of those in positions of power and influence in civil society, but the composition differs between elites of and elites in civil society because the former must at least to some extent reflect the members, while the latter is socially shaped in connection with political and business elites. Reproduction refers to the ways in which actors in positions of power and control exclude others in order to maintain their privileged roles. Reproduction is vertically shaped when the oligarchic elite exerts control over those who seek their position within the organisation, while it is horizontally shaped when the power elite seek to control the access of newcomers to the top of the power structure. Elite integration relates to principles and practices of mobility across sectors into positions of power and influence within or beyond civil society. This is an obvious feature of the power elites, because they move across sectors, while oligarchic elites tend to stay within their sectors or even within their particular organisations. Contestation refers to the ways different actors challenge civil society elites, which can happen both from inside and outside civil society.

Civil Society Elites, Members, and the Masses

This volume addresses the relationship between elites and ‘the masses’, a dichotomy that cuts through Michels’ and Mills’ writings. The idea of elites as vertically shaped in relation to the masses, for example members or citizens, comes to the fore in Michels’ writings because he considered this a key element of organisational growth, complexity, and specialisation. Mills also made similar observations and claimed that as organisations grow larger, members become less interested in participating and the ‘desire for democratic participation is lowered’ (Mills, 1948, pp. 64–65). This, among other things, leads to leaders being ‘personally remote from the rank and file’ (ibid., p. 104). Although differently conceptualised, oligarchic elites and power elites can thus be defined based on their social distance to citizens, members, and constituencies because they occupy positions ‘from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women’ (Mills, 1956, p. 3). However, while oligarchic elites need to moderate their social distance to members in order to avoid excessive gaps, and legitimacy losses, the power elite do not face similar challenges because social distance to ordinary citizens actually constitutes the foundation for their position.

The relationship between civil society elites and the general public is explored by Lee and Scaramuzzino (Chap. 3) in their study of the composition of the civil society elites. They investigate the socio-demographic characteristics of leaders of major civil society organisations (hereafter CSOs) in Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the UK, and at the EU level. Their findings point to oligarchic tendencies in European civil societies; for instance, they show that leaders tend to remain for a long time in their position, and many have been engaged in the same organisation for even longer. This is an evident feature across country contexts but is particularly apparent in countries with a corporatist legacy (e.g. Italy and Sweden).

Lee and Scaramuzzino also find that civil society elites differ from the population in general. Civil society elites are predominantly older white men (a gender balance was only seen in Sweden) and thus resemble the composition of elites in other sectors of society. They moreover find that civil society elites to a much higher degree than the general population have a university background; for instance, in Poland almost all leaders have a university degree. Studies into civil society elites in the UK similarly find that UK leaders often have an Oxbridge background, thus reflecting societal patterns of elite reproduction (Arvidson & Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2021).

These elitist patterns stand in contrast to the ideals of civil society representing its members, at least if we assume that civil society leaders gain some legitimacy from being socially similar to those they aim and/or claim to act on behalf of as a form of descriptive representation (Altermark et al., 2022). However, Lee and Scaramuzzino also find that civil society elites are more progressive than the general population in all countries surveyed. The civil society elites studied are supportive of social change and social justice. Although this book does not offer comparable data for other elite groups, it would be surprising if they came out as more progressive than the general population. This provides some insight into the value profile of civil society elites and contributes an interesting theoretical observation because elite theory posits that elites try to cling to power and maintain the status quo rather than change societies.

We gain further insight into the relationship between elites and the masses in Sevelsted and Lunding’s study of the Danish power elite (Chap. 2). Similar to Lee and Scaramuzzino, they find that civil society elites largely come from highly educated social classes, having parents with positions such as high judges, politicians, higher civil servants, leading doctors, or military leaders. However, they also find that the segment of the Danish power elite with an engagement in civil society differs from the power elite in general because it includes more women, but with fewer people born abroad. This suggests that although civil society elites might hold progressive values linked to social justice, they nonetheless tend to come from a privileged background.

Civil Society Elites and the Power Elite

The concept of a power elite draws attention to the dichotomy between insiders and outsiders because it considers the dynamic between the integrated elite recruited through the powerful institutions in society (insiders) and the leaders of subordinate societal institutions (outsiders). Mills assumed that to become an insider and a member one had to pass ‘the criteria of admission, of praise, of honor, of promotion that prevails’ (Mills, 1956, p. 281). His theory assumes that civil society plays a subordinate function by primarily providing the social glue that holds the powerful together, for instance, through philanthropic engagement or membership in exclusive clubs and associations.

Several contributions to this volume demonstrate the significance of a Millsian approach in the exploration of an elite in civil society, but they also show that civil society serves more functions than just as a sphere for the integration of business and corporate elites. Chi Lai (Chap. 7), for instance, argues that the Hong Kong power elite to a large extent originated from civil society and large charities because these have a longer history than modern political parties and constituted the social space in which societal leaders met and interacted. Charities functioned as a neutral arena for political and economic elites to socialise, recruit, and confirm each other across sectors and competences while they at the same time formed a charity that provided social stability counteracting social change.

A similar argument can be found in Voyer’s (Chap. 6) study of what wealthy New York families gain from volunteering in elementary schools. She shows that wealthy elite parents convert their economic (but also social and cultural capital) into a particular ‘do good’ capital (cf. Dean, 2020) that comes through voluntary engagement, which reinforces and reproduces status hierarchies. Social stratification based on class and wealth spillover into the sphere of civil society as elite volunteers engage in exclusionary boundary processes that ensure that non-elite parents are not given key roles or posts in the voluntary organisation. This study demonstrates that engagement in civil society serves a purpose for the power elite because volunteering legitimises elite status.

Contributions to this volume also challenge the Millsian assumptions. Sevelsted and Lunding (Chap. 2), for instance, find a structural divide within the power elite. Members of the Danish power elite who lack engagement in civil society often have a social background in the economic field (their parents are economic elites or industrialists) while those with an engagement in civil society originate from professional and political elites. This finding indicates that in a Social Democratically shaped country like Denmark, the economic elites do not need civil society to legitimise their wealth and positions of power, while professional and political elites do.

In their study of drivers and motivations related to a boundary-crossing career, Arvidson and Uhlin (Chap. 8) moreover draw attention to the fact that elite integration is not only about social networking, but is a more complex process that involves varying degrees of value congruence between elites.

Arrigoni finds that civil society provides a sphere for the formation of an alternative power elite, different from the established power elite. In her investigation of Italian banking foundations (Chap. 9), she shows that they bring together elites from a wide range of sectors but that these develop a joint political agenda and start to act as an elite alongside the power elite. Their philanthropic activities are not only driven by an ambition to legitimise personal wealth or elite status, but also by an ambition to bring about social change. Instead of primarily seeing civil society as a subordinate field for the integration of other elites, Arrigoni contends that civil society contributes to the emergence of so-called interstitial elites—operating between states, markets, civil society, and academia—who build an ethos for social change.

While these authors explore civil society elites and the power elite, others address connections between an elite of and an elite in civil society. Altermark and Johansson (Chap. 5) investigate elite integration and field separation through a study of who praises civil society elites. They find that some civil society leaders are praised by the state and gain extensive societal recognition through royal honours or presidential medals. Such recognition places them on par with political, corporate, and administrative elites because they all have done extraordinary services to the country and thus, at least in a symbolic sense, become members of a power elite despite different social and educational backgrounds. Praising through prizes differs across country contexts as leaders in Sweden are mainly praised by their peers, while they are mainly praised by the state in Italy (presidential medal), Poland (presidential medal), and the UK (royal honours). In this respect, civil society elites in Sweden are less integrated into a power elite than elites in Italy, Poland, and the UK. The latter can benefit more from the social advantages that such prizes provide them with because we know that symbolic resources can be turned into economic, political, or social gains.

Lee, Platek, and Scaramuzzino (Chap. 10) investigate elite integration within civil society through a study of interlocking boards. They find that in countries like Italy and Poland civil society elites are mainly integrated through policy areas, but that the sector is highly fragmented with no or only a few central actors. However, they find civil society elites in Sweden and the UK to be highly integrated through mutual board membership across organisational divides. Despite such similarity, elite networks in Sweden and the UK differ substantially. Civil society elites in the UK are largely integrated through the connection with the royal family because members of the royal family often act as patrons of major UK charities. In contrast, civil society elites in Sweden are integrated through membership in large umbrella associations and capacity-building organisations. While patterns of elite integration in the UK thus follow Mills’ assumptions, elite integration in Sweden is more in line with Michels’ reasoning of an oligarchic elite. Coordination mainly takes place in broad areas such as adult education or capacity building that are not directly linked to the organisation’s main mission or issue. This can result in oligarchic tendencies when organisations and their leaders come together in factions in order to become stronger while still defending their particular interests (cf. the blocs and factions pointed out by Michels).

Civil Society Elites and Counter-Elites

Elites and their challengers constitute a key theme in elite research and in this book. Civil society leaders are often seen as opposed to other elite groups, constituting a counter-elite. Michels (1968) viewed counter-elites as the newcomers who aspired to the position that the oligarchs occupied and, in his view, successfully protected. Although he recognised that oligarchs could be contested, he assumed them to be adept in handling such insider challengers. Mills (1948) rather viewed civil society leaders, especially union leaders, as a counter-elite against a power elite. He considered civil society leaders to be the ‘managers of discontent’ because they can stir up social and political unrest in order to gain influence. However, due to their inability to mobilise across blocs and factions, civil society elites are unable to gain more substantial power (partly confirmed in Chap. 10). If organisations grow and gain power, Mills asserted that leaders will become part of the power elite. When associations become ‘large enough to count’, leaders tend to see themselves not as delegates, ‘but as a member of “an elite” composed of such men as himself’ (Mills, 1948, p. 307).

This book shows that civil society elites are highly contested in several countries, which can be interpreted as a sign of their position of power and influence. The contributions in this book also show that they are challenged both as an elite of and an elite in civil society. Korolzcuk (Chap. 12) contributes a timely analysis of the strategy by the Polish right-wing political party and government to worsen the conditions for CSOs that disapprove of the government. The party’s accusations against progressive CSOs echo Mills’ characterisation of a power elite because the government favours CSOs that are loyal subjects and hence integrated into a power elite, while others are excluded and subjected to smear campaigns by the government (e.g. Korolczuk, 2022).

Kalm and Meeuwisse’s analysis of a cross-country survey among civil society elites (Chap. 11) shows variation in the targets, sources, and depths of contestation. However, in their capacity as leaders, civil society elites seem to be most often challenged by ‘their peers’. Like oligarchs, they are challenged by those seeking to replace them as leaders of the organisation they all seek to represent. Grounds for challenging individual leaders appear more professional than ideological, concerning issues such as their ideas about organisational development, their decisions, or their leadership style. The social distance to members that Michels assumed to be a defning feature of oligarchs can also be observed in connection with the contestation of elites. Especially leaders in the UK are challenged by their lack of social similarity to their constituencies and due to a lack of diversity at the top. They are accused of having a privileged and elitist profile due to their lack of representativeness from their organisations’ own members (see also Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2022). External challenges are more often directed at the leaders’organisations and are driven by competition for resources or by ideological conflicts.

Contestation over positions within the field of civil society is further explored by Landorff (Chap. 13) who examines who gets a seat at the table when EU parliamentarians consult civil society. She finds that civil society actors who occupy incumbent elite positions (oligarchs in the field and in their organisation) tend to remain in such positions of power, despite being challenged by other civil society actors who act as contenders for the position they occupy.

Civil Society Elites Across Regime Differences

This book draws on empirical studies of civil society elites in national contexts like Denmark, Hong Kong, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the UK, and the United States, and at the EU level. It is a clear observation that the concept of civil society elites makes sense in all country contexts despite differences both in terms of external regulation and funding patterns of civil society and in the governance models and types of organisations that predominate. It is far too complex a task to try to analyse how exogeneous and endogenous differences shape national civil society elites, but we nonetheless seek to offer some brief reflections.

The notion of civil society regimes is at times used to reflect endogenous differences in civil society in different countries (e.g. Arvidson et al., 2018; Salamon & Anheier, 1997, 1998). Such frameworks offer some guidance, for instance, in terms of the distinction between corporatist and liberal civil society regimes. Several chapters in this volume address Nordic civil society (e.g. Sweden and Denmark), in which we find a tradition of popular movements, large membership-based organisations, and close connection to the state based on hierarchical modes of representation. Similar corporatist structures can be found in Italy, which despite the long tradition of the Catholic Church has developed hierarchical modes of representation from the local to national levels. Civil society elites in Italy and the Scandinavian countries are also found to share similar features. They are largely reproduced and integrated as an oligarchic elite. Civil society elites in these countries are natives because they are mainly shaped by internal routes of access and advancement, and they are reproduced through internal organisational processes based on ideological alignment. In the Scandinavian countries they are neither praised by the state nor integrated with an economic elite.

Other chapters address civil society elites in liberal contexts, for example, the UK, the United States, and Hong Kong, and the patterns observed by the authors point to the significance of a Millsian civil society elite logic. Civil societies in such countries and contexts tend to be dominated by large professionalised charities that provide services and organisations with huge turnovers. Staff are recruited based on professional merit, and many civil society leaders have experience from the business and corporate sector. Civil society offers a ground for elite integration and the exchange of economic capital in return for legitimacy of acting for the common good (Ostrower, 1995, 2004). Although elite integration is observed in most countries, in liberal countries it includes civil society and economic elites, while in corporatist contexts it largely involves civil society and political elites. While Michels and Mills thus have significance for capturing the divide between liberal and corporatist contexts, countries like Poland are harder to fit in, suggesting the need for additional theoretical frameworks.

Towards a New Research Agenda

The contributions in this book show that the concept of civil society elites is meaningful both in terms of Michels’ theory of oligarchs and Mills’ theory of power elites. The analytical themes of composition, reproduction, integration, and contestation of civil society elites that structure this book have been heuristically useful, but it has often proven difficult to distinguish the themes from one to the other. Instead, they should reasonably be treated as parts of intimately intertwined relational processes that can help us interpret the rules that shape access to elite positions and the power associated with being an elite in civil society. The relationships between processes and practices of elite reproduction, integration, and contestation thus require further investigation, especially in terms of how they influence the composition of civil society elites.

Another point for further exploration is the power associated with a civil society elite. Civil society comes with the assumption of political and normative power, and there seems to be good reason to regard civil society elites as a kind of ‘moral elite’ claiming a special ‘civil society ethic’ (see, e.g., Chaps. 3 and 8). Civil society elites then have access to a specific resource that provides status (symbolic capital to exercise normative power), which can reinforce or be exchanged for other types (cf. Chap. 5). It is an important future research task to investigate how civil society elites differ from other elite groups in terms of specific resources and how these are used and to examine whether the value of their resources varies in different contexts and for different types of CSOs (e.g. across service-providing organisations and advocacy organisations).

More research is also needed on the advantages and disadvantages of different methodological approaches and on what can be gained from a multi-methodological approach. Arvidson and Uhlin (Chap. 8) illustrate how qualitative life-work history interviews provide an important complement to established quantitative approaches to the study of elite integration. Also, Scaramuzzino and Santilli’s comparison of the results of two classic methods in elite theory and in social movement theory (Chap. 4) shows that a small group of individuals ‘tick all the boxes’ regardless of methodological approach. Although this book shows that classic methodological approaches in elite research have significance also for the study of civil society, there is nonetheless a risk when adapting methods developed for the study of other sectors. While elite research and methods largely assume an institutionalised elite, the real power holders within civil society might also be informal leaders, movement icons, or social media champions who manage to gain attention without leading major organisations.

Lastly, the democratic consequences of civil society elites and elitisation require further discussions. Scholars have long observed socio-economic and demographic inequalities and entry barriers to civil societies (e.g. Eimhjellen, 2022; Hustinx et al., 2022) as well as gaps of democratic representation within CSOs (e.g. Johansson & Lee, 2014), but few have interpreted such shortcomings as due to elitisation or strategic closures on the part of those at the top. This suggests that there is still much to explore regarding the inner life of major CSOs as well as within fields of civil society with regard to how people come to and remain in positions of power and influence.