Abstract
Colombia is a Latin American outlier in that it has traditionally been a very violent country, yet at the same time remarkably democratic. This chapter explores Colombia’s puzzle from a political economy perspective, shedding light on the broader relationship between democracy and violence. The chapter studies some of the most important democratization reforms since Colombia’s independence 200 years ago. It argues that the reforms often failed to curb violence and sometimes even actively, though perhaps unintendedly, exacerbated violent political strife. Democratic reforms were unable to set the ground for genuine power-sharing. They were often implemented amidst a weak institutional environment that allowed powerful elites, the reforms’ ex-ante political losers, to capture the State and offset the benefits of the reforms for the broader society. We conclude by highlighting the implications of the argument for other countries facing democratic reforms, as well as for Colombia’s current peace-building efforts.
Prepared for the book “Roots of Underdevelopment: A New Economic (and Political) History of Latin America and the Caribbean” edited by Felipe Valencia. We thank Sandra Botero, Francisco Eslava, Mateo Uribe-Castro and Felipe Valencia for useful comments and discussion. Jairo Gudiño provided research assistance.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Note that the figure reports regional averages. Specifically, not all LAC countries were democratic by the 1980s and strong dictatorships were still in place in Chile, Cuba, and Paraguay.
- 2.
Since the defeat of the Shining Path insurgency in Peru in 2000, the only intra-state conflict still ongoing in LAC is the Colombian Civil War. However, Latin America is today the most violent region of the world according to the homicide rate. 42 of the 50 most violent world cities are in LAC (see https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-43318108, last accessed 08/07/2021).
- 3.
This paradox has been amply studied by prominent scholars from disciplines other than economics. For instance, sociologist Daniel Pecaut (2012) was one of the first to note the coexistence of a civil democracy and a persistent violence. Focusing on the twentieth century, political scientist Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín (2014) also studied this “anomaly.” Philosopher Fernán González (2014) studies the role of violence in the construction of the Colombian state from a historical perspective. Historian Marco Palacios (2003) overviews the historical struggles to modernize Colombia and consolidate a legitimate state amidst continued violence and disorder. More recently, political scientist Gustavo Duncan (2018) has also asked why Colombia’s consolidated democracy has failed to curb the misbehavior of politically powerful groups. In this chapter, we build on the ideas and arguments of these and other authors, as well as on own research, to offer a political economy perspective on the seemingly puzzling coexistence of democracy and violence in Colombia.
- 4.
At the core of the distinction between horizontal and vertical political conflicts lies an underlying definition of who constitutes the “elite.” Broadly speaking, elites are groups that can mobilize for a common political purpose. Under this definition, that encompasses peasant leaders, union leaders, guerrilla commanders, etc., even vertical (class) conflicts can be understood as within-elite conflicts. We thus take a narrower definition of the elite and emphasize the role of the traditional urban and rural oligarchy, with access to legal but exclusive forms of political power.
- 5.
Esteban and Ray (2008) make a similar point in a theoretical model motivated by the observation that since the late twentieth century most conflicts were horizontal in nature, driven by antagonisms along non-economic markers. While their narrative focuses on the salience of ethnic conflicts in Africa, their argument may apply to partisan conflicts in Latin America. Their focus is on how economic inequality within ethnic groups makes ethnic conflict more salient, mainly because it allows members of the ethnic groups to specialize with some providing resources, and others labor, for conflict. It is possible that a similar mechanism arises along political-partisan lines (with rich members of a partisan coalition providing resources and poorer members labor) and that these tensions overshadow vertical conflict between economic classes.
- 6.
Colombia’s previous constitution, the 1843 Political Constitution of the New Granada Republic, restricted the franchise to free men who were literate and owned real estate or had sufficient annual rents.
- 7.
For its construction we rely on the comprehensive historical account of Riascos Grueso (1949), which records all the violent political confrontations that took place in each Colombian municipality.
- 8.
More precisely, we estimate, for each decade, a linear regression of the probability of a violent confrontation on the census-based measure of enfranchised voters and plot the point estimates together with a 95% confidence interval.
- 9.
Later in the chapter, we will return to the 1986 political reform that introduced competitive elections of both governors and mayors.
- 10.
According to Gutiérrez-Sanín (2017) these reforms, that recognized the legitimacy of the Liberal party, paved the road for its eventual return to power in the Liberal Republic (1930–1946).
- 11.
The chapter by Kronick and Rodríguez (2021) in this volume also illustrates, for the case of neighboring Venezuela, the potential and limits of power-sharing agreements to avoid political conflict.
- 12.
Consistent with their theoretical argument, Chacón et al. (2011) found that, during La Violencia, conflict occurred in the places in which the electoral support of both parties in the 1946 elections was more balanced. Instead, in areas where one of the parties had a large electoral edge no fighting took place.
- 13.
Karl (2017) provides a detailed historical account of the creation of FARC and the role played by the National Front and other contemporaneous political reforms.
- 14.
Gutiérrez-Sanín (2019) analyzes the symbiotic long-term relationship between paramilitary groups and the Colombian State and argues that, at its core, the latter’s highly clientelist nature and indirect rule shapes the nature of the central government and the country’s periphery.
References
Acemoglu, D., Fergusson, L., Robinson, J., Romero, D., and Vargas, J.F. 2020. The perils of high-powered incentives: evidence from Colombia’s false positives. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12(3), pp. 1–43.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. 2002. Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), pp. 1231–1294.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. 2000. Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), pp. 1167–1199.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. 2001. A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review, 91(4), pp. 938–963.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. 2006. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acemoglu, D.aron, James A. Robinson, J.A. and Rafael J. Santos, R.J. 2013. The monopoly of violence: Evidence from Colombia. Journal of the European Economic Association 11, pp. 5–44.
Acemoglu, D., Verdier, T. and Robinson, J.A. 2004. Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule: A model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2-3), pp. 162-192.
Alvarez Villa, D. 2013. Political Inequality and the Origins of Distrust: Evidence for Colombia. Munich Discussion Paper No. 2013–14.
Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal. 2015. “Clientelism in Indian Villages.” American Economic Review 105(6), pp. 1780–1816.
Baland, Jean-Marie and James A. Robinson. 2008. “Land and power: Theory and evidence from chile.” American Economic Review 98(5), pp. 1737–65.
Bruce, Raphael and Rudi Rocha. 2015. “The reaction of elites in a democratization process: Evidence from Brazil.” Revista de Economia Politica 35(3).
Bushnell, D. 1984 Politics and violence in nineteenth-century Colombia. In R. P. naranda & G. Sanchez (Eds.), Violence in Colombia: The contemporary crisis in historical perspective. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Books.
Casper, G., and Taylor, M.M. 1996. Negotiating democracy: transitions from authoritarian rule. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Centeno, M. A. 1997. Blood and debt: War and taxation in nineteenth-century Latin America. American Journal of Sociology, 102(6), pp. 1565–1605.
Chacon, M., Robinson, J. A., & Torvik, R. 2011. When is democracy an equilibrium? Theory and evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(3), pp. 366–396.
Chaves, I., Fergusson, L. and Robinson, J.A. 2015. He who counts elects: Economic elites, political elites, and electoral fraud. Economics & Politics, 27(1), pp. 124-159.
Davenport, Christian. 2007. “State Repression and Political Order.” Annual Review of Political Science 10:1–23.
Deas, Malcolm. 1993. “Algunas notas sobre el caciquismo en Colombia,” In Del poder y la gramática y otros ensayos sobre historia, política y literatura colombianas, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
Deas, M. 1996. The role of the church, the army and the police in Colombian elections, c. 1850–1930. In Elections before democracy: The history of elections in Europe and Latin America, pp. 163–180.
Dudley, Steven S. 2004. Walking ghosts: murder and guerilla politics in Colombia. New York, London: New York, London: Routledge.
Duncan, Gustavo, 2018. Democracia feroz:¿ por qué la sociedad en Colombia no es capaz de controlar a su clase política?. Debate.
Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray. 2008. “On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict.” American Economic Review, 98(5), pp. 2185–2202.
Fergusson, Leopoldo, 2019. Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia. Cuadernos de Economía, 38(spe78), pp. 671–700.
Fergusson, Leopoldo, Querubin, Pablo, Ruiz, Nelson and Vargas, Juan F. 2021. The real winner’s curse. American Journal of Political Science, 65(1), pp. 52–68.
Fergusson, L., Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R. and Vargas, J.F., 2016. The need for enemies. The Economic Journal, 126(593), pp. 1018–1054.
Fergusson, L. and Vargas, J.F. 2021. Don’t make war, make elections. Unpublished manuscript.
Gennaioli, N. and Voth, H.J. 2015. State capacity and military conflict. The Review of Economic Studies, 82(4), pp. 1409–1448.
González, F. 2014. Poder y violencia en Colombia. Edtitorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2014. El orangután con sacoleva: Cien años de democracia y represión en Colombia (1910–2010), Editorial: Debate.
Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. (2017). La destrucción de una república. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia-Taurus.
Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2019. Clientelistic warfare: Paramilitaries and the state in Colombia (1982–2007). Peter Lang.
Hartlyn, J. 1988. The politics of coalition rule in Colombia. Cambridge University Press.
Horowitz, D. 1993. Democracy in divided societies. Journal of Democracy (4), pp. 18–38.
Huntington, S. P. 1991. The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press.
Karl, R.A. 2017. Forgotten peace. University of California Press.
Kronick, D. and Rodríguez, F. 2021. Political Conflict and Economic Growth in Post-Independence Venezuela, This volume...
Marshall, M., Gurr, T., and Jaggers, K. 2016. POLITY™ IV PROJECT Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015 Dataset users’ manual. 1st ed. Centre for Systemic Peace.
Mazzuca, S. and Robinson, J.A. 2009. Political conflict and power sharing in the origins of modern Colombia. Hispanic American Historical Review, 89(2), pp. 285-321.
Meisel Roca, Adolfo; Romero Prieto, Julio E. 2017, March. La mortalidad de la Guerra de los Mil Días, 1899–1902». Banco de La República. Consultado el 7 de abril de 2020.
Morales, Juan S. 2021. “Legislating During War: Conflict and Politics in Colombia,” Journal of Public Economics, 193, 104325.
Navarro, Pedro Juan. 1935) El Parlamento en Pijama. Este libro tambien podría llamarse Aguafuerte del Partido Conservador, Bogota: Mundo al Día.
Naidu, S., 2012. Suffrage, schooling, and sorting in the post-bellum US South (No. w18129). National Bureau of Economic Research.
North, D., Wallis, J., & Weingast, B. (2009). Frontmatter. In Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history (pp. I-Vi). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Palacios Rozo, M.A., 2003. Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia 1875–1994. Editorial Norma.
Pécaut, D., 2012. Orden y violencia: Colombia 1930–1953. Universidad EAFIT.
Posada-Carbó, Eduardo. May 1997, May. “Limits of Power: Elections Under the Conservative Hegemony in Colombia, 1886–1930”. The Hispanic American Historical Review. 77(2), p. 252
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the market. Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, A. 1995. Sustainable democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Riascos Grueso, E. 1949. Geografía guerrera de Colombia. Impr. Bolivariana. Sahin, Y., & Linz, J. J. 1995. Between states: Interim governments and democratic transitions. Cambridge University Press.
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman. 2010. Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press.
Snyder, J. 2000. From voting to violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict. W.W. Norton & Company.
Steele, A. 2017. Democracy and displacement in Colombia’s civil war. Cornell University Press.
Steele, A. and Schubiger, L.I. 2018. Democracy and civil war: The case of Colombia. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35(6), pp. 587–600.
Tilly, C., et al. 1992. Coercion, capital, and European states, ad 990–1992. Blackwell Oxford.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Fergusson, L., Vargas, J.F. (2023). Colombia: Democratic but Violent?. In: Valencia Caicedo, F. (eds) Roots of Underdevelopment. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38723-4_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38723-4_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-38722-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-38723-4
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)