Abstract
This paper focuses on the ability of the platform's pricing and wage strategies to regulate both supply and demand in the market, especially when consumer demand is surging, and we find that the optimal pricing and wage strategies increase with the market size. In addition, we also take into account the heterogeneity of consumer waiting costs in the general model, and consider the service strategies of the ride-hailing platform based on the heterogeneity of consumer waiting costs. Similarly, we also find that the optimal pricing and wage strategies increase with market size in the general model. Last but not least, we find that despite the fact that consumers suffer from some waiting costs, the pricing model chosen by the platform is well suited to meet consumer demand, maximizing the profitability of the platform, and give drivers as much profit as possible, thus achieving a win-win-win outcome.
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Xu, X., Wang, H. (2023). Pricing and Wage Strategies for Ride-Hailing Platform with Riders’ Heterogeneous Waiting Costs. In: Gupta, R., Bartolucci, F., Katsikis, V.N., Patnaik, S. (eds) Recent Advancements in Computational Finance and Business Analytics. CFBA 2023. Learning and Analytics in Intelligent Systems, vol 32. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38074-7_45
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38074-7_45
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