Abstract
In the ideal world, the number of seats that each region or each community gets in a representative body should be exactly proportional to the population of this region or community. However, since the number of seats allocated to each region or community is whole, we cannot maintain the exact proportionality. Not only this leads to a somewhat unfair situation, when residents of one region get more votes per person than residents of another one, it also leads to paradoxes—e.g., sometimes a region that gained the largest number of people loses a number of seats. To avoid this unfairness (and thus, to avoid the resulting paradoxes), we propose to assign, to each representative, a fractional number of votes, so that the overall number of votes allocated to a region will be exactly proportional to the region’s population. This approach resolves the fairness problem, but it raises a new problem: in a secret vote, if we—as it is usually done—disclose the overall numbers of those who voted For and those who voted Against, we may reveal who voted how. In this paper, we propose a way to avoid this disclosure.
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References
M.L. Balinski, H.P. Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man (Yale University Press, New Haven, One Vote, 1982)
M.L. Balinski, H.P. Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, One Vote, 2001)
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation grants 1623190 (A Model of Change for Preparing a New Generation for Professional Practice in Computer Science), and HRD-1834620 and HRD-2034030 (CAHSI Includes), and by the AT&T Fellowship in Information Technology.
It was also supported by the program of the development of the Scientific-Educational Mathematical Center of Volga Federal District No. 075-02-2020-1478, and by a grant from the Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI).
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Reyes, C., Kreinovich, V. (2023). How to Solve the Apportionment Paradox. In: Ceberio, M., Kreinovich, V. (eds) Uncertainty, Constraints, and Decision Making. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol 484. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36394-8_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36394-8_19
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