Nordic Media Systems

Abstract

The present chapter reviews the structures and developments that characterise the Nordic media landscape. The Nordic countries are marked by various commonalities, in support of consensus-making and managing conflict, which have become associated with “corporatism”. Partly drawing on that context, they have commonly been depicted as belonging to a special “Nordic” media model. After taking note of the stylised key dimensions of such a model, we examine the actual features of the Nordic media systems and how they have evolved over time. In this, additionally, we compare the media systems of the Nordic countries with those of each other while also making international comparisons. Through the recent phase, associated with digitalisation, commercialisation, and populism, the Nordic countries have continued to display a special media model, although with a shift away from defensive and rigid sentiments towards becoming more conducive to adaptation and renewal. As the media landscape has become more complex and multifaceted, however, tensions building at the intersection of changed conditions for journalism, unruly media content, and polarising politics, pose serious questions for the road ahead.

1 Introduction

The author is grateful for the contributions of Laura Ohler, Ingrid Andersson and Emma Björner to underlying background reports and to Qammar Abbas for extensive support in preparing the statistical data.

The Nordic countries, consisting of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, are typically viewed as located in the periphery of Europe, enduring a harsh climate and with a relatively sparse population (cf. Fig. 1). While violence and autocracy marked their earlier history, cross-border relations have been largely peaceful since World War II. From the late 1800s onwards, the region developed strongly both in terms of economic growth and social cohesion. Although the resulting “welfare regime” displays commonalities with market-oriented democracies more broadly, the Nordic model is marked by specific features.

Fig. 1

Study scope in the Nordics

A common label for the way that institutions work in the Nordic countries is that of corporatism (Heckscher, 1957). ¹ Norway and Sweden are generally ranked as the most corporatist societies worldwide, with Denmark also in the top five and Finland slightly behind (Armingeon, 2002; Christiansen et al., 2010; Lijphart, 1999; Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991; Rokkan, 1966; Siaroff, 1999). In the realm of media, Hallin and Mancini (2004) argued that the application of corporatism translated into a particular Nordic media model marked by high circulation of written press tightly linked to political parties, journalistic professionalism and self-regulation, and high financial dependency on the state along with influential public broadcasting.

This chapter examines structures and developments that characterise the Nordic media landscape as distinguished from media elsewhere. While taking note of corporatism and the dimensions covered by Hallin and Mancini (2004), the purpose is not to determine the validity of any particular alleged model for the Nordic countries. We observe, however, that their media sector reflects broader societal features shared by the Nordic countries, while also continuing to be strongly influenced by common undercurrents such as those propelled by the information society, commercialism, and populism.

Considerable emphasis is placed on examining variations within the region and to what degree those cast doubt on the notion of a single Nordic model. While studying national features in-depth, most attention is devoted to Sweden, being the largest of the Nordic countries. Conversely, least attention is paid to Iceland, partly due to less availability of comparable statistics and partly as it is the smallest country in the group. Comparisons with media in other regions take note particularly of the liberal model and, to a lesser extent, that of Southern Europe.

2 An Evolving Institutional Model in the Nordics

Historically, the Nordic countries’ governance model was autocratic with national authorities wielding strong centralist powers. Dominance by the monarchy, the upper classes and the church, was paralleled by the absence of an urban middle class, a predominantly rural population and the constant pressures of external conflict. The traditional fabric was gradually contested, however, along with its rigid separation of the social classes (Østerud, 1978). In its place, an independent agricultural class arose, income differences diminished (Ringen & Hannu, 1992), and “constructive” social relations took shape, linked to participatory governance (Kuhlne, 2016).

Drawing on educational reforms, infrastructure investment and the rise of entrepreneurship, between the mid-nineteenth century and 1970s, the Nordic countries combined high economic growth with a tilt towards social cohesion, known as the “Nordic” or “welfare regime” model (Alestalo et al., 2009). With “big government” at the helm, social innovation transitioned beyond traditional charity, complementing gaps in existing policy to diminish poverty by engaging underprivileged classes in support of general well-being.

To regulate procedures for industrial conflict, following the early lead of Denmark, representatives of employers and trade unions across Norway, Sweden and Finland initiated central agreements in the 1930s. Collective bargaining, indirectly coached by government, arose as a vehicle for achieving compromise and maintaining stability. The term corporatist model was invoked, interwoven with mechanisms to formalise a culture of consensus. These included general acceptance of solidaristic principles for wage policy, as embedded in the Saltsjöbaden agreement of 1938.

Along these lines, Nordic governments generally have come to lean on discrete links with relevant organisations for exerting influence. Laws tend to encourage self-regulation, not just in workplace co-determination. Systematic webs comprising interest groups, civil servants and other powerful insiders and influencers have been found to operate broadly across key sectors and organisations.

The corporatist approach appeared challenged when Denmark let go of centralised wage-setting in the 1980s, along with other reforms in the subsequent years to induce more flexible labour markets. Although the Swedish Employers’ Confederation withdrew from centralised wage-setting a few years later, the Swedish government, along with the industrial parties, continued to embrace coordinated agreements. The strategies and practices pursued by the Nordic countries had started to display some sharpening contrasts.

Pronounced Nordic similarities nevertheless remain. A common Nordic labour market has been in place since 1954. ² A belief in the virtues of research, new technologies and innovation as a source of increased productivity and prosperity has co-existed with high union density, extensive worker representation in corporate strategy, high protection for social and family life and common belief in the virtues of managing a work-life balance. Parallel multilevel combinations of centralised coordination and decentralised negotiations favour a holistic approach to restructuring, training and productivity (Dølvik, 2008).

Social mobility is generally high; competence development combines with restructuring and transition to new employment—so-called flexicurity. In Sweden, major unions are considering ways to accommodate the rise of a so-called gig or “platform” economy (Andersson, 2017). In recent years, the Finnish government and industrial parties collaborated in experimenting with basic salary for citizens.

Although the mechanisms have evolved, influences of state and stakeholders remain intertwined. Official consultation processes maintain a kind of consensus-building before formal decisions are made. The scope of informal contacts has in fact broadened in some respects, inviting the engagement of “new” actors such as representatives of civil society (Schelin et al., 2017). Key institutional bodies and individuals thus continue hammering out joint strategies and agreements behind the scenes. Corporatism, or neo-corporatism, initially associated within industrial relations, stays relevant in numerous sectors. Other labels (e.g., “negotiating economy”, “mixed economy” or “mixed administration”) are sometimes used to depict the basic practices of Sweden and the Nordics (Christiansen et al., 2010; Öberg et al., 2013).

In terms of political structure, the trend has led towards establishing competing power circles, in each of the Nordic countries. For long, the structure was stable with opposing centres of gravity along the lines of bi-partite corporatism, linked with leading trade unions vs. employer organisations, respectively (Allern et al., 2007). Gradually, the political landscape has become volatile, however, involving green and populist movements, the breaking up of old alliances and formation of new ones.

3 The Media Landscape of the Nordics

The media sector naturally forms part of the broader institutional landscape, although it is also marked by its own features and developments. Sweden and the Nordic countries have long been associated with a well-established and stable newspaper sector (press), influential public broadcasting, a high degree of professionalisation in journalism, close links between newspapers and political parties and strong influence by the state (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Below we review each of these main dimensions of the Nordic media landscape.

3.1 The Newspaper Market

In Sweden, diffusing information to the public gained attention in the 1700s, reflecting a weakening of royal autocracy, the spreading idea of human or citizens’ rights and the rise of political parties. The first proper daily paper, Aftonbladet, was launched in the 1830s. It drew on an explicit ambition to present proper “news”, in contrast to the previous dominance of “campaigning” (Weibull & Wadbring, 2014).

A high level of subscription to local morning papers, marked by close and highly transparent links to political parties, took shape in the 1800s. As indicated by Fig. 2, the newspaper circulation has been decreasing regularly since 2000. While consistently at the lowest level in Denmark, all the Nordic countries actually retain a relatively high level of press circulation, compared to most other parts of the world. Norway displays a level hardly seen anywhere else (Hatcher & Haavik, 2014). Demand in Norway, moreover, supports a high number of newspapers per capita. The embeddedness of locally rooted press reflects high autonomy for regions and a highly active regional policy, especially compared to Denmark or Finland.

Fig. 2

Nordic press circulation per thousand inhabitants 2000–2017. Source: Harrie (2017)

The leading tabloids in Sweden, Aftonbladet and Expressen, perform well in online advertising, key to their ability to keep expanding their audiences. Similarly, the leading quality-oriented morning newspapers, Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet, dominate online newspaper subscriptions. The leading Danish newspapers, Berlingske, Politiken, Weekendavisen and Ekstrabladet, also perform well, as do the top-selling Norwegian newspapers, Aftenposten, Adresseavisen, Agderposten, Bondebladet, Dagbladet and Firda. Local press, by contrast, is generally weakening and more stagnant in approach. This plays a part in shaping new social gaps, which bear on discrepancy in access to news, including between urban and rural areas. This is similar to the situation in the USA, the UK and many other countries.

A major disruption of the established “rules of the game” occurred in 1995 with the launch of Metro. A daily paper that was circulated free of charge for users, Metro was funded by advertising and an agreement with local transport companies. Behind it was a Swedish entrepreneur, Jan Stenbeck, founder of MTG (Modern Times Group). Metro went on to become not only the newspaper with the largest circulation in Sweden, but the success spread to 18 other countries. By 2011, Metro was the leading circulated free daily newspaper in the USA, for instance. ³ Neither Metro nor other free newspapers were ever introduced in Norway, however. In the end, the “free-of-charge” newspaper industry ran out of steam. Metro itself closed in 2019, after 24 years, and other free newspapers struggle, if existing at all. Yet, their impact has lingered and probably more in Sweden than anywhere else. Attaining first-move advantages by radical innovation had proven itself capable of bringing public monopoly to an end, and enforcing changes in regulation as well as in other respects, as will be returned to.

3.2 Broadcasting

The decrease in the number of subscribers to printed media has been paralleled by the rise of broadcasting services. Strong new service developments surround audio listening, making it accessible via both radio and TV. While public television stagnated following the emergence of the Internet, broadcasting has taken on new dimensions and reached an unprecedented audience.

As shown by Fig. 3, the daily reach of public television has been on the decline across the Nordic countries since around 2010. This applies especially to Sweden, where the downturn started already in the preceding decade. Denmark and Norway followed suite, while Finland has seen a smaller decline. That Norway pursue considerably higher investment than the other Nordic countries in its public service provision of news (via NRK1) and, along with Iceland (broadcasting via RÚV) has the most dominating individual such provider (Ohlsson, 2015), does not seem to made any major difference. Compared with other regions, the share of viewers using public TV still remains fairly high in the Nordics.

Fig. 3

Daily reach of public television, in % of population. Source: Nordicom (2021)

Figure 4 compares TV viewing time, in terms of average minutes per day spent across different age groups in the Nordic countries. Between 2005 and 2010, time spent watching TV increased in most age groups across each of the Nordic countries (only young adults in Finland and Sweden went against the trend). In the years since then, however, average viewing time has declined markedly. The age group (4–9) peaked in 2010 throughout, after which its viewing time fell sharply, staying relatively unchanged only in the case of Finland. The age pattern in Finland differs somewhat from the others in the way that young adults diminished their viewing time more dramatically after 2010, even for the eldest age group, where the tendency to watch TV has kept increasing more than in the other Nordics. Across all the Nordic countries, however, the viewing time of young adults declined by 2020 to only some 25–40 min, while the 60+ group watched TV more than 250 minutes on average, and even above 300 in Finland. All countries display a lower average viewing time in 2020 compared to either 2015 or 2005, although the elderly viewers have gone the other way.

Fig. 4

Average TV viewing time across age groups. Source: Nordicom (2021)

As for radio, the population listening daily is at a high level in the Nordic countries, at up to eight in ten on average, although with Finland at a lower level. Three quarters of radio listeners tune to public radio, which starkly contrasts with most other countries, including in southern Europe where public providers are in a weak position (and the share of the population listening to radio tends to hover around only two out of ten) (Harrie, 2013). Radio listening time has nevertheless decreased consistently in the Nordic countries since 2000, especially in Denmark. Meanwhile, the number of public as well as commercial radio broadcasters declined in Norway and Denmark while holding up better in Finland and Sweden. Finland, where listening time fell the least, was marked by fewer private broadcasters but higher market concentration (Eurostat, 2021). Public radio maintained a dominating position over the past two decades in all the Nordic countries except Finland, where public radio held an equally strong position at the turn of the millennium but has since been matched by private radio (Nordicom, 2021).

3.3 Journalistic Professionalism

Another hallmark of the alleged Nordic model is a high degree of journalistic professionalism and self-regulation across the media landscape, associated with ethical norms stressing journalistic objectivity. A high degree of autonomy and a strong public service orientation are related, traditionally recognised features (Petersson et al., 2006). The function of journalists is broadly viewed as a critical voice and third estate in society (Ohlsson, 2016).

Similar to many other parts of the world, journalists in the Nordic countries operated from the start without special training or education. Since the late 1950s, however, the educational systems expanded across the Nordic countries while also reorienting towards mass education, a development that partly encompassed journalism education (Gardeström, 2011). In Sweden, a specialised tertiary education in journalism arose, moving swiftly into a position as one of the most well-regarded high-quality programmes in higher education.

Most Nordic journalists are educated in their home countries. Across all of them, media education evolved more or less through the following stages:

• 1. Apprentice system plus short courses arranged by press organisations or other interests (the initial situation in all the Nordic countries)

• 2. Apprentice system, combined with 3- to 10-month courses at independent schools founded by press organisations themselves (Norway, Sweden) or in cooperation with universities (Denmark) or at semi-academic institutions (Finland)

• 3. Nationalisation or major state funding of journalism education, 2- to 4-year journalism programmes (all Nordic countries)

• 4. Integration into universities (Finland 1960, Sweden 1977, Iceland 1987, Norway 1994)

With the recent advance of digitalisation and social media, technological innovation has been accompanied by a tilt towards commercialisation and rapidly changing skills requirements in journalism. As another aspect, editorial professionals have become exposed to new kinds of raw material, emanating from non-conventional sources. A surge in user-generated material has led to a blended, so-called popular, journalism (Hujanen, 2004). Vastly expanded service offerings have caused a push-back of conventional news, while journalists have had to cope with less patient and more volatile audiences. Interestingly, women are more strongly represented in the reporting of news online, compared to traditional media. On average, the share of stories on news websites reported by women in 2015 was about five percentage points higher than the share of traditional news reported by women (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017). Separately, as will be returned to, an increasing tendency has appeared for political action to be expressed by way of opinions and understood as provoked by emotions rather than based on factual observations (Nord, 2008; Kassab, 2016). In this context, journalistic norms of objectivity, impartiality and accuracy, hallmarks of the Nordic model, meet with new challenges, as do traditional mechanisms of quality control. The issues are particularly pronounced in social media channels such as Twitter and Facebook. An increased scope for manipulation by vested interests has gone hand-in-hand with waning trust and more polarised politics.

3.4 Links Between the Media and Political Parties

Political parties and the press used to have a close relationship, another presumed pillar of the Nordic model. From early on, liberal and conservative newspapers dominated. Social democratic and Agricultural Centre Party newspapers profiled themselves already at the end of the nineteenth century, however. In all the Nordics, the socialist press related closely to the party organisation, with this practice spreading from the capital to smaller towns. Links between political parties and journalism arguably grew the strongest in Norway, although the party press was also important in Denmark where Socialdemocraten, a Labour Party newspaper, achieved the highest circulation of any daily paper in the early twentieth century (Høyer, 1998).

At the end of the 1970s, party newspapers remained the dominant form in the Nordic countries, accounting for 92% in Denmark, 57% in Finland, 69% in Norway and 50% in Sweden (Syvertsen et al., 2014). By then change had started to set in, however. The leading Swedish daily paper, Dagens Nyheter, declared itself independent from party affiliation in 1974. Twenty years later, only 30% of the Finnish language press and fewer than 40% of Norwegian newspapers had formal ties to political parties. The party press dissolved consistently under the influence of both internal and external factors (Allern & Blach-Ørsten, 2011). The rise of television coupled with changing ethics in journalism were contributing factors (Høyer et al., 1975).

Additionally, the loosening association between newspapers and political parties is due to the party system itself. While the standing of the political parties used to be relatively static, and was reflected in the stability of voter sentiments, a stage of fluidity has taken hold. Not only can more voters be seen to shift loyalties, but parties have become more volatile in their positioning, with the left-right wing scale attaining reduced relevance for explaining their position (Bäck et al., 2015; Bäck & Hellström, 2018). Rather than ideologically determined, the success of political parties has become more dependent on building viable coalitions and compromise. Volatility has, moreover, increased due to the rise of new parties. Finally, voters have become more prone to split their votes between national, regional and local levels (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016).

Another explanation has to do with changes in finance. Political parties used to represent important sources of financial support for media. Press subsidy systems were introduced in all the Nordics from the 1950s, however, in order to ensure political diversity of the newspaper landscape. As a result, funding by political parties became less important. Adding to that, the perceptions of political influence in media have changed (Nord & Grusell, 2021). Increased scrutiny of financial books and motives created new risks and could turn dependency on funding from political parties into a liability, undercutting trust and also the morale and reputation of journalists and other professionals.

The above factors all contributed to lessening the reliance of media outlets on stable long-term relations. In the past, the affiliation of newspapers in Sweden to political parties used to be mirrored in circles of readership, the political disposition of journalists and the content of news articles. Some of this continues to play out. In particular, some local newspapers are owned by self-governing foundations indirectly linked to politics (Ohlsson, 2016). Also, although the presence of institutional links has weakened, parallelism remains to some degree by way of content (Allern & Blach-Ørsten, 2011). Some owners retain mission statements that reflect ideological and political roots.

3.5 The Role of the State: Government Influence

State subsidies have been offered since the early 1970s to enable the survival of economically weak newspapers, many of them dependent on limited local audiences (Ohlsson, 2015). Gradually, these support schemes grew in scope and reach, leading to the rise of a sizeable, subsidised public service sector, along with far-reaching offerings of special funding for private news media.

In recent years, the subject of media subsidies has become highly politicised. While the overall support levels declined (Ots et al., 2016), the Nordic countries nevertheless continue to shore up the sector through various mechanisms. Although similar efforts prevail elsewhere in Europe, together with Austria, France and the Netherlands, the Nordic countries arguably run the most efficient support system (Lund et al., 2011). Reduced VAT, which applies in all Nordic countries, is more important financially than direct subsidies. Overall, public support structures have served to maintain an ecology of geographically disbursed papers, particularly in Norway and Finland, which goes well beyond what can be found in most other countries, where national newspapers are more dominating. ⁴

In contrast to the market for newspapers, radio was dominated from the start, in each Nordic country, by a single public provider and network, handling both national and regional coverage. While multiple competing providers were gradually allowed, private entries naturally focused on entertainment. No competition arose in regard to news or in terms of national commercial radio either. The development of digital radio, initially attempted, was halted in 2006, in the face of weak demand. New listeners have instead been reached by streamed radio or radio-on-demand. Innovations have targeted niche groups, particularly among younger cohorts, but news over radio in the Nordics remains singlehandedly provided by the national public service channels.

Both radio and TV are widely viewed in the Nordics as closely associated with communication services as a public good, a cultural policy extended to media. Unlimited reach of commercialisation has been resisted energetically, and editorial freedom is taken seriously. Along with the UK’s BBC, Denmark’s DR1, Yle in Finland, RÚV in Iceland, NRK in Norway and SVT/SR in Sweden keep evolving with a universal orientation.

As for broadcasting, all Nordic countries pursued single public channels starting in the 1950s and 1960s, with Finnish Yle and Swedish SVT the first to proceed with additional ones at the start of the new millennium. These countries similarly were first out with conversion to digital terrestrial distribution, with Denmark and Norway following suit in 2007–2009.

Commercial television and radio were banned for relatively long in the Nordic countries, however. Southern Europe deregulated in the 1970s already, when satellite technology arrived. In the Nordics, the public broadcasting monopolies tried to maintain the old order, backed by determined national policymakers (Nord, 2011). The decisive game changer came with the launch of TV3, the first commercial channel broadcasted in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, by Kinnevik and its CEO Jan Stenbeck. In order to circumvent legislation prohibiting advertising in Swedish television, its launch of TV3 was broadcast out of London.

Competition remained restrained until satellite and cable TV became widely accessible, in effect making the public stance untenable. Around the turn of the millennium, Swedish fast-tracked digital terrestrial television (DTT), from 2007 nationwide on a government-owned network.

The offerings of Nordic public service channels have nationwide penetration, with domestic programmes accounting for more than half of their transmission time (Harrie, 2013). This is in line with responsibilities to maintain public information and cherish domestic culture, including language. Foreign programmes are normally broadcast with subtitles. On the other hand, the established practice in the Nordic countries is to abstain from language dubbing, except in children’s programmes, which is widely judged to help underpin foreign language skills. In line with European legislation, broadcasters are similarly obliged to ensure that most transmission time is devoted to programmes produced in Europe. ⁵ In reality, the European share of Nordic public service companies is fairly stable at around 80%.

The requirement of Europen dominance in broadcasting has implications for content production. In most Nordic countries, the majority of public service programming, public affairs as well as drama, consists of domestic productions (Hujanen et al., 2013). The output is characterised not only by domestically produced programmes but also by an extensive share of public service companies’ own productions. ⁶ The balance between the companies’ own productions and acquisitions is exemplified by the content of DR1, Yle TV1, NRK1 and SVT1 (the Nordic public service channels with the highest viewing share in each country). These channels’ own production accounts for an average of more than two-thirds of first transmissions. Less than a third is acquired programming.

Public service providers display relatively diverse offerings compared to their commercial competitors, applying to both information and entertainment. ⁷ SVT’s main channels, SVT1 and SVT2, lead in both respects. Yet, the difference is much greater in information than entertainment. Several of the commercial channels are almost as diverse as the public providers when it comes to entertainment, while way behind in information. Meanwhile, Kunskapskanalen (SVT’s theme channel for culture and science) provides an alternative for viewers, offering broad factual scope without entertainment. SVT24, which broadcasts news and repeats, is in the middle range. TV4, meanwhile, exemplifies a generalist commercial alternative that offers diversity in entertainment coupled with narrow coverage of information (Harrie, 2013).

4 Nordic Media Transformation

The above sections demonstrate the presence of major changes in all the areas which in the past were associated with a special Nordic media model, in turn commonly linked to corporatism. That may come as no surprise, since the presence of corporatism itself has become less pronounced in the Nordic countries, at any rate changed face (Rommetvedt et al., 2013). Nevertheless, a host of special Nordic traits persists. In this chapter we take a closer look at key aspect of the recent transformation of the Nordic media landscape.

4.1 Changing Consumer Behaviours

Under way is a major shift in news consumption, away from public media and the press to the Internet and social media. Further, changing preferences show up as a shift in the time devoted to consuming news towards locating desired information through other means and entertainment. The global penetration of social media reached some 54% in 2020. ⁸ In parallel, the attention span of customers/citizens has famously declined, so that humans have been found now to have a more limited attention span, down from some 20 seconds on average a few decades ago to only 8, which has been found to be less than that of a goldfish (9 seconds). ⁹

While it has become possible to connect and interact with readers anywhere, anytime, priority would in many cases be placed on packaging that is fitting for such circulation, short messages, photos, attention to events and individuals suitable for immediate recognition. In this context, many observers have pointed to a recurrent crisis for journalism. The number and size of news organisations around the world have been subjected to massive rationalisation (spanning printed press as well as broadcasting), accompanied by a loss as well as a transformation of jobs and downward pressure on salaries. While many professional journalists have been laid off in areas that used to be dedicated to news in the traditional sense, other lines of business have proven capable of offering lucrative career paths. A case in point is the media landscape of the USA, where a combination of technological, economic and political upheavals is at play (Kamarck & Gabriele, 2015; Siles & Boczkowski, 2012). The consequences for the journalistic profession have arguably been dramatic. Williams (2017) found that the salary of journalists relative to PR specialists was virtually collapsing in the USA between 2004 and 2013.

Various developments have brought about significant adjustments to the mechanisms underpinning fundamental institutional structures as well as social relations. In the Nordic countries, this includes a revamping of industrial relations and their links to social cohesion as well as the plurality of civil society associations. Meanwhile, compared to other regions, unions in the Nordic countries have a greater say in the management of companies. While partly backed by law, they tend to be relatively accepting of labour market flexibility. Today, some champion new avenues for advancing employee interests and protect the security of employees. The largest union in Sweden, Unionen, has rethought some of its previously entrenched positions with regard to the “gig economy”.

Social innovation, while a broad concept that assumes many shapes and which served important purposes in the Nordic countries for many years, is similarly on the rise. Generally emanating from initiatives by individuals, or a group of individuals, social innovations may fill the gaps of public policy in realizing locally rooted solutions to outstanding problems and issues (Andersson et al., 2015).

4.2 A Corporatist Model and the Role of Citizens

The Nordic countries took pride from early on in combining public infrastructure and institutions with an emphasis on research and innovation in support of private sector development and increased productivity in relatively small societies that were open to globalisation and cross-border exchanges (Andersson, 2014). Another tenet of modern knowledge-based societies centres on the scope for citizen engagement and initiative in driving demand for new solutions, forming part of “smart” solutions at city and local level, and also for societal progress. While the Nordics have generally been viewed as well placed in this respect too, other observations indicate the presence of a more mixed bag, with especially Sweden at times depicted as systematically controlling of citizens (Huntford, 1972) and also increasingly associated with challenges in education (Kools, 2015). On the other hand, all the Nordic countries mostly keep shining in mainstream indices and benchmarking measuring the standard of living, happiness, innovativeness, experience-industry, etc.

During the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, Iceland shocked mainstream political pundits around the world by refusing to shift the debts accumulated by reckless bankers onto the shoulders of taxpayers. In effect, this outcome was enabled by the normally powerless president refusing to sign the deal worked out by politicians, thereby by default passing the judgement to a series of pools engaging the public. The latter, in turn, resoundingly refuted bailing out the financial sector debt. ¹⁰ As a consequence, mainstream policymakers, international organisations, economists and journalists, even in the other Nordic countries, treated Iceland as a “pariah” state, until the country won out in international courts.

Likewise, Sweden shocked the frenetic crowds of mainstream media and multilateral organisations by refusing to dictate to its citizens what protective measures to adopt in response to COVID-19, but rather insisted on letting citizens assume responsibility themselves. Subjected to significant pressure to relent and impose restrictions and lock-downs similar to other countries, the social democratic government in effect assumed a strategy of claiming that it had neither the expertise nor the mandate to tell citizens what to do. Meanwhile, they deferred the responsibility to an expert authority, Folkhälsomyndigheten, and Sweden’s state epidemiologist, Tegnell, who kept insisting on advisory rather than coercive measures.

Thus, whatever downsides corporatism may have had, at the time of severe crisis, individual Nordic counties have proved remarkably capable of going against the flow, placing far greater credence on the judgement of their citizens than so-called liberal democracies such as the USA or the UK, or Continental Europe for that matter.

4.3 Digitalisation

The arrival of digitalisation exerted a fundamental impact on the media landscape over the past two decades. The boundaries between different media channels have become blurred. Many media outlets operate on several platforms. The vastly increased media flow has led to sharply increased competition for the attention of users, whose use of time has come under pressure and become more volatile. Commercialisation including advertising has evolved and become more differentiated and also targeted. The development of social media has brought additional dimensions, opening for more diverse and non-conventional channels for the creation, diffusion and exchange of information (Weibull & Wadbring, 2014).

In Nordic television, the impact of digitalisation expanded the portfolio of niche channels around the turn of the millennium. That development was mostly coordinated and controlled for the purpose of enabling a gradual transformation of the main public service broadcasters (Nord, 2011). The journey from analogue to digital media publishing took some special routes in the Nordics. Under the influence of bureaucratic hurdles, for instance, the TV channels opted to exploit a window in the regulatory shield to change by making news-feed available on Text-TV.

Basically, all the main players introduced similar new services online and adopted far-reaching changes to both diffusion and content. The concept of “public service broadcasting” has since been applied as an umbrella term that spans television and radio as well as online services (Syvertsen et al., 2014).

Selected patterns and trends in the use of media outlets across Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the EU28 countries combined are outlined in Fig. 5. Most Nordic citizens, some 80% in Finland and above 90% in Sweden, access media content each day using the Internet. Across EU28, almost 80% watch TV on a TV set, which is considerably higher than for the Nordic countries. On the other hand, there is a lower tendency across EU28 to watch TV via the Internet, use the Internet for information and entertainment purposes, or use online social networks. Interestingly, some 59% of the population in Sweden and Finland still read written press daily, which is more than twice the average share in EU28.

Fig. 5

Share of the population aged 15+ who uses different media every day/almost every day. Source: Eurobarometer (2021)

Figure 6 illustrates the pervasive, consistent shift in news consumption, away from reading physical newspapers towards accessing information online that took place in just a single year (from 2019 to 2020).

Fig. 6

The share of online news that is paid across countries. Source: Nordicom (2021)

In the media industry, digitalisation has brought new practices mainly along two trajectories: i) in regard to the redistribution of programmes and ii) the production of a diverse range of original online content ranging from digital games to weather forecasts. Through both channels, digitalisation exerts major impetus towards far-reaching re-organisation as well as an alternation of outputs, including content. These include what is published, how it is portrayed, how it is sourced, etc. The impact is interlinked with changing dynamics in the case of funding, competition, and commercialisation, as well as political and social movements.

In taking on digitalisation, the Nordic countries share features of developments mainly in the liberal media model, where the lead came from across the Atlantic. As we have already seen, the main newspapers acted decisively on digitalisation to build their own successful strategies for improving reach and service to customers online. The process involved polarisation with the local and regional press, which has lost ground, although much of it remains in business, as far as the Nordic countries go, in part due to public support.

4.4 Changing Content

The mentioned emergence of daily newspapers available for free, set off with the launch of Metro in the mid-1990s, played its part in driving a shift in news publishing content with shorter articles focusing on reaching as many readers as possible, motivated by increasing advertising revenue rather than bothering about numbers of subscribers.

The readership became used to an abundance of news for free, easy to access and digest. This paved the way for the online news model, which in its infancy obtained content by recycling editorial material from printed newspapers. Gradually, journalism and content generation adopted special features of online news production. The following elements are at play: i) unlimited space and continuous publication, in many cases referred to as a specific form of online journalism (Syvertsen et al., 2014); ii) continuous publication, with content going live at any time; iii) interactivity, not only did immediate feedback from readers become possible, but readers would let their views be known and further add to the material, which may continue to evolve; iv) limits to duplication and repetition evaporated, material already published could reappear, and appear again, replacing the production of new content; and v) social media opened up for an endless flow of new expressions creating and sharing observations, feelings, ideas and opinions shared among the likeminded with virtual communities.

As for related concrete impacts, various observations point to digitalisation reducing the depth in coverage of politics and public affairs (Petersson et al., 2006). Comparing coverage of politics over time by media in Sweden, Strömbäck and Nord (2016) observed a shift towards more emotional and personal journalism while refuting a notion of any significant change in coverage. Negative messages consistently dominate positive by approximately 6:1. In the case of news specifically prepared for publication online, some observations regarding source are worth highlighting. As already indicated, the traditional male dominance in Nordic news reporting, (compare as well in Chapter “On Western and Eastern Media Systems: Continuities and Discontinuities”), is less present. While hard data is not available, in news prepared for digital publishing, the share of women appears to approach 50%. On a separate note, the available evidence suggests that digital news is more impacted by political partisanship. In material prepared specifically for digital publishing, both the ways in which an issue is framed and the way a publisher interprets or approaches it appear more affected by a news organisation’s political history and traditions (Allern & Blach-Ørsten, 2011). A possible interpretation is that news organisations leave more scope for variation in what goes online. More research is required in this regard, however, including differences between platforms. There is also the question to what extent such patterns and trends apply to the Nordic countries specifically or are also more generally valid.

A related factor is the role played by the ongoing shift towards increased commercialisation, which links to more streamlined content. As publishing actors become more financially dependent upon advertising, and the means to attract advertising revenue are strongly connected to the number of readers as well as numbers of targeted reader groups, there is a tendency for news content to be shaped to suit the mainstream. Hence, language will be more informal, sentences shorter, and vocabulary less varied. Meanwhile, international observers have concluded on this combination leading to increased participation in media publishing and content development (Carpentier et al., 2013). Regulation—or the absence of it—is a factor, especially since the production of digital news content is subjected to other (less stringent) rules than applied to analogue publishing. The greater reliance on self-regulation for the former has clearly been less limiting (Hulin & Stone, 2013).

As the established actors in the traditional news media understood that online news channels had come to stay, they adapted their strategies and service offerings accordingly. At the same time, their mandates and policies partly tied them to making the same content available on their various platforms, in ways that enable as many people as possible to access and benefit from their programmes and services. The public services offered online are generally fully on par with what can be found on their radio and TV platforms, including news. Content is offered as both streamed real-time radio or TV and on the spectrum of on-demand web and social media services. A corresponding overriding trend towards convergence of content can be observed across various media platforms.

The associated changes in media organisation observed in the Nordic countries have, however, influenced journalism and its linkages to professionalism in various ways. In the case of “arts journalism”, which used to cover “high” arts in contrast to “popular” arts, a paradigm shift had been documented, with arts journalism shifting from an aesthetic to a journalistic paradigm, leading to less scope for specialisation and autonomy (Sarrimo, 2016). The combination of digitalisation and enhanced concern with commercialisation is at play. Meanwhile, the focus on a narrow already pre-defined elite has given way to the effort of expanding the readership and a broadening of the concept of culture (Jaakkola, 2014).

Interesting media content research in the Nordic countries has weighed impacts of digital transformation vs. other explanations, such as urbanisation, demographic development, changes in education or other socio-economic factors. Political news, while intensifying in each of the capital regions, has thinned in other regions where it has also become less substantive and instead more personal and emotional (Allern & Pollack, 2012). Politics is still the content type which takes up most space in media publishing. The media coverage of criminal acts, meanwhile, has been given less space and particularly in urban areas (Karlsson et al., 2016; Weibull et al., 2018).

Media coverage of incidents with a short time span such as accidents and abrupt conflicts has a given place in tabloid press but less so in daily newspaper and public broadcasting. The same pattern prevails for sports and entertainment news. Radio remains the key media channel for sports news and coverage of sports events. Weather reporting has come to attain not just more space but also more in-depth analysis and links to politics, which may reflect increased interest in climate change and governance. Coverage of sports has gained in prominence for commercial channels. Attention to crime has diminished across all media channels. Broadly speaking, the magnitude of changes in content has been greater and faster online compared to traditional media (Karlsson et al., 2016).

The number of articles in mainstream Swedish newspapers that display visual images more than doubled between 1990 and 2010 (Andersson, 2013). In their web material, instantly produced videos increased sharply, a change which has been demonstrated in other countries as well. Freely available press, such as Metro, picked up use of images online to a particularly high degree. In radio, it hardly existed before 2007 but was found in two-thirds of their online (social medias and websites) material by 2014 (Nilsson et al., 2016).

4.5 Commercialisation and Advertising

With the ICT revolution, the rise of new media channels and news outlets brought about a vastly enhanced scope for interactivity, with diffusion not just of information but also of new services and goods as well, as has gradually become associated with electronic commerce. The cross-border nature of online communication and exchanges means that national regulation becomes less relevant. The scope for mass distribution becomes particularly dramatic for services and intangible assets, whose distribution has come to require scanty transport and traditional logistics costs.

Although the Nordic countries were late in opening for digitalisation of the media, they unleashed a wave of disruptive innovation and entrepreneurial talent highly focused on realising the new opportunities at hand, by creating scalable immaterial services and niche markets in the realms of communication, music, entertainment and so forth. The legacy of some of these continues to evolve and prosper to this day, whether popularly associated with Sweden or not, as exemplified by Skype and Spotify. Some of the traditional media conglomerates embraced this innovative wave, developing powerful outlets for news online, while a range of new players arose and expanded swiftly in the realm of social media.

Printed newspapers as such have lost ground to broadcasting, however, and notably to communication online. Revenue for the newspaper industry has similarly declined alongside a trend towards enhanced market concentration. This development mirrors changes in the composition of advertising/marketing expenditures across media channels. Figure 7 depicts the level of expenses in relation to the population across main media channels and, totally, for four Nordic countries and compared with selected other European countries, from 2005 to 2019.

Fig. 7

Advertising expenditures in a) newspaper sector; b) magazines; c) TV; d) Internet; e) total advertising expenditures in the media sector. Source: Ascential Events (2021)

Expenditures on advertising in the newspaper sector (Fig. 7a) fell markedly between 2005 and 2019. The level in the Nordic countries was relatively high to start with. Moreover, it held up more here than elsewhere, especially in Finland. The pattern was similar for magazines (5.7b), although the decline in the Nordic countries was comparable to that in the UK and France (most other European countries experienced a greater contraction). By contrast, expenditures allocated to advertising in television (7c) have been relatively stable, with Norway at the highest level in the Nordics, comparable to the UK. Financially strong companies, in any market, continue to see value in reaching selected consumer segments by advertising through commercial TV programme breaks. Marketing expenditures online (7d), is a different story, with steep increases across the board. The Nordics, together with the UK, are ahead of other European countries in this case, experiencing significantly larger investment in digital advertising per capita.

Adding up expenditures across the various media channels, the total (7e) can be seen to have been consistently high in the Nordics and also on an upward trend. The picture is similar in the UK, while expenditures are significantly lower in most other European countries. An exception is Portugal, which displayed an exceptional surge in advertising expenses on TV specifically. Overall, advertising online has overtaken that spent on traditional media channels. The onset of COVID-19 with associated lockdowns further exacerbated this shift.

The resulting financial pressures have been accompanied by intense debate on the need of public subsidies, to compensate for the decline in commercial revenue across traditional media. In all the Nordic countries, however, the government stepped up support during COVID-19, resulting in a new wave of disparities. At the peak of “pandemic” media funding, private news media received about ten times more public support per capita in Sweden and Denmark than was the case in Finland. As that phase came to a close in 2022, basically all the Nordic countries initiated plans for modernising media support ahead. With the exception of Iceland, which previously had not applied subsidies but merely introduced temporary support during the pandemic, the Nordic countries are planning to redistribute support in favour of local media amd journalism, as well as shift support from text-based to audio-and video-based media. The modernisation of subsidies under way further aims to define quality-enhancing functional and transparency criteria as a basis for public subsidies.

5 Trust in the Media

To what extent content, or a message, can be conveyed from a source to a recipient hinges on a range of factors such as language, format, syntax and also the nature of the relationship between sender and recipient. Such factors influence to what extent a message is understood and how it is interpreted. Cultural factors play a role as well.

5.1 Varying Levels of Trust

The Nordic countries have been relatively homogeneous through history and are widely known to represent “high-trust” societies, in comparison with many others. Generally, trust is defined as a personal perception regarding the reliability that can be placed in other people or in organisations. For trust-building, regulatory conditions and actual behaviour matter, as does perception.

Which institutions enjoy trust varies between societies. In many, the highest trust levels are enjoyed by police and military and possibly the courts. Radio and TV belong to those that tend to follow next, whereas social media usually rank lower, with political power near or at the bottom (EBU, 2020).

In the context of this report, prime consideration in regard to trust centres on the extent to which citizens “trust” various forms of media, how they compare with others in this regard and what changes are under way. A relatively high reliance on public television for news, and on newspapers for public information, implies that political actors meet with high requirements to handle direct exposure to, and communication with, the electorate. Since paid political advertising is banned in the mainstream media, political actors have few other means to reach out than attaining relevant news management skills.

With the rise of modern media in western societies, trust stood out as a key differentiator from the propaganda machines of the past or of contemporary autocratic regimes. As already noted, this applied strongly to the Nordic countries, where the creation of independent newspapers was interwoven with a weakening stance of the monarchies as well as the church, the decline of traditional class society and the quest for educational reform. A kind of ethical code arose, making it essential for news to be transmitted with a sense of impartiality, credibility, and authenticity.

Gradually, regulations were nailed down, pertaining to the so-called legacy media (print, radio and TV), under the broad terms stipulated by international law. Registration as “media” was mandatory for recognition under the supervision of a governmental agency devised for the purpose. Media companies were required to hire only licensed journalists to handle “journalistic” activity. The objective was civil and penal responsibility for the media. In some EU countries, the material scope was limited to audio-visual media services defined by the AVMS Directive, while for others specific media laws established particular administrative obligations, e.g. to enter a public register or subject to specific content regulation.

The Nordic countries are regularly rated high in benchmarking viewed as key for a knowledge society, e.g. in the areas of innovation, happiness and governance. At the same time, trust in radio and TV is at a high level. The OECD, the EU, the World Economic Forum, EBU’s Media Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) rank the Nordic countries as consistent top performers. The Netherlands generally presents the closest profile, with Germany, Switzerland and Estonia similar in specific respects.

The following are some of the main trends in regard to trust in media channels that apply for the Nordics as well as, to a varying extent, more generally/for other regions:

• Trust in written press, particularly the mainstream daily papers, maintains a strong position

• Trust in public service television is also relatively high, although less than for printed papers (more so in the Nordic countries than elsewhere)

• Trust in the Internet is weak, including social networks (particularly in the Nordic countries)

Further, most Swedes consider the state-owned SR—“Sweden Radio”—as the most impartial and credible news channel, followed by other publicly owned ones. The other Nordic countries, and the EU as a whole, largely display the same order of things, although mostly with the highest trust placed in public media institutions followed by written press. Finns have the highest trust levels and Danes the lowest among the Nordics. Basically, all express the least trust in the news broadcast on the Internet and social media, but the Nordics make a bigger distinction in this respect, compared to the European average. Figure 8 compares the trust profiles of the three Nordic countries referred to and the average for EU28.

Fig. 8

The share of the population that express trust in the Media. Source: EBU (2020)

Trust in social media (SoMe) platforms is on the decline across Europe. A recent survey found radio to be the most trusted medium, scoring highest in 24 out of 33 countries (Reuters Institute, 2021). The Nordic countries demonstrate relatively high trust in national media, with more than 50% of citizens agreeing with the statement that their national media provides trustworthy information. ¹¹ This stands in sharp contrast to three of the biggest markets in Europe—Spain, the UK and France—where a low level of trust was found.

5.2 Fake News and the Media

A common technique of distorting reality is the usage of propaganda methods (Soules, 2015), such as media manipulation and the spreading of “Fake News”, i.e. distorted truths or lies. Fake news has been constantly invented and propagated as long as humans have walked the planet (Harari, 2011). The term itself is “new”, however, coined by Hillary Clinton in a 2016 speech with reference to false propaganda flooding social media and then turned on its head by Donald Trump on the campaign trail when he used it against CNN a month later (Wendling, 2018).

From there on, not just populists and extremists but also bonafide politicians have taken advantage in the pursuit of delegitimizing opposing opinions (Dausend et al., 2017; Ginsburgh et al., 2020). In the Nordic countries, its active use has been documented both in attacks on media itself and on political opponents (Kalsnes et al., 2021). In the age of Internet and social media, with chatbots and AI integrating data sources while utilising channels of mass communication coupled with personal targeting, manipulation of “news” attains an industrial scale. Proving legitimacy and demonstrating validity of facts meet with formidable challenges at one end, while “anything goes” at the other (UNESCO, 2020).

The following conditions are viewed as underpinning the ability of the Nordics to counter the challenges of fake news, in support of trust in societal institutions and public media:

• Limited size combined with communication channels with high reach, relating to relatively homogenous societies which, at the same time, have an inclination to social cohesion as well as openness

• Strong traditions of reading coupled with public services related to education, libraries, etc.

Further, the Nordics rank consistently high or near the top of indices such as press freedom, transparency, gender equality, innovation and education. When opposition parties have insinuated that fake news is spread by government-controlled media platforms, most citizens have kept regarding them as the offspring of populist parties aiming to sow division and distrust (Wodak, 2015).

Those advancing fake news, however, some typical features of the Nordic model, open borders and cultural aspects, e.g. a certain naiveté, have been exploited. Disinformation further advanced “under cover”, targeting particular regions, groups and individuals for the purpose of undermining confidence in established institutions within specific communities. This, in effect, has contributed to creating a more volatile political landscape. Playing on and intensifying tensions around the greatly expanded flow of refugees has served as a particularly effective vehicle for the populist parties of the Nordic countries to promote their own legitimacy and ideas (EUMEPLAT, 2023).

In Denmark and to some extent Finland, anti-immigration policies moved into the political mainstream already years ago (Damon & Hume, 2016). In Norway and Iceland, there have been less of an issue due to their more remote geographical location. In Sweden, a generally international outlook held up for long. The lead-up to the latest national poll, however, saw a massive increase in social media traffic, particularly on Twitter, clearly manipulative and politically driven (EUMEPLAT, 2023; Sandberg et al., 2022). The party on the extreme right, Sverigedemokraterna, turned out the second largest and with direct, substantive influence on the new centre-right government formed after the 2022 parliamentary elections.

In the wake of the magnification and diffusion of fake news happening internationally, a countervailing industry has evolved, checking and publishing data on the number of “facts violation”, overseen by an external institution in support of validity. For many users, the numbers of “likes” on social media platforms count as indicators of their truthfulness (Dausend et al., 2017). Despite the presence of various countermeasures, the regulatory response has been largely ineffective, and the situation remains dire (Alemanno, 2018). Wodak (2015) complains about the hopelessness of having a constructive discussion about the validity of facts if every shared argument is accused of being false. The effort and challenge of finding the “real” truth may thus sometimes in itself prove of little meaning.

How then muster backing of quality journalism and cultivate healthy sources of criticism? A number of fact-checking initiatives have appeared in the Nordic countries. The resulting efforts have cast light on established media as well, which at times serve as an amplification and reverberation channel for fake news narratives. Swedish public television, for instance, faced severe criticism over its coverage of the 2020 US presidential election. In some sort of effort to appear “neutral”, in effect it came out whitewashing Donald Trump’s attack on democracy and with that domestic populist anti-immigrant parties in Sweden.

What kind of corrections work best and why remains to be seen. Calls have been framed based on evaluation of the ongoing development in the three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark), for new methods to screen, verify and counter online news and to enhance media literacy, partly to disclose information manipulation appearing in various shapes, spanning text, icons, images and video. Given the shift in the power balance that has already occurred, however, crafting and implementing any roll-back has not become any easier.

6 Nordic Media Patterns in Perspective

This chapter has reviewed various aspects of Nordic societies with particular focus on the media landscape. Some of the observed developments reflect external factors such as technological change and international trends. In other respects, the Nordic model has evolved along trajectories shaped by internal conditions. So, to what extent does it make sense to keep associating the Nordic countries with corporatism or a particular Nordic media model?

Relating to past positions in the literature, Hallin and Mancini (2004) predicted that the Nordic model would gravitate towards the Liberal one. Ohlsson (2015) argued such convergence has happened. Others, such as Nord (2008) and Sapiezynska (2018), speak of a hybrid model taking shape, a liberalised version of the corporatist model. Hallin and Mancini (2017) refer to the rise of various novel sub-systems.

Synthesising conclusions from the present report, below we characterise key similarities vs. dissimilarities of the Nordic media model compared with other regions:

• Nordic consumption patterns are similar to continental (north-western) Europe when it comes to ranking of press freedom.

• In many ways, the Nordic structures of public service broadcasting are similar to those of the UK and Japan.

• The Nordic countries have much in common with similarly wealthy Western societies but have more in common with each other (Andersen et al., 2007).

• In international comparison, Nordic countries cluster on indicators related to social outcomes—such as happiness, social trust, freedom of speech, leverage of information and communication technologies and patterns of media use. This stands out as a distinct pattern when the Nordics are compared with other regions.

• Newspaper readership is marked by relatively small gender differences in the Nordic countries. Southern Europe has the opposite. While gender gaps range from a 35% difference between male and female readership in Portugal, they may not exceed a few percent in Sweden. Historically rooted explanations include differences in literacy rates and a greater separation between men and women in social life (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In this domain, other regions are most likely gravitating to a situation more similar to that of the Nordics.

• Radio and TV exhibit relatively high viewer numbers, with radio predominantly public in nature, while commercialisation and alternative news are weakly present. Television similarly displays continuously high numbers of viewers as do the public media parts, although private channels advance their standing in this case. Viewer numbers are relatively high for children and, in particular, the elderly in all the Nordic countries, while adolescents and young adults show a marked decline in time devoted to watching television.

• External relations and influences lead in various directions. With Sweden the most centrally located and largest of the Nordic countries, the surrounding Nordics have strong links to Sweden, although Iceland less so. At the same time, the largest Nordic countries are looking west rather than east. While Finland has been particularly oriented toward Sweden in the past, all the Nordics have been influenced by Anglo-Saxon media systems. French and German influences have been tangible too and somewhat further reinvigorated in recent years. The impact of liberal systems has conversely waned to some degree, in favour of continental Europe. Iceland’s media system, finally, used to be strongly US-oriented, but, in recent years, a noteworthy diversification appears to have made Iceland more similar to the other Nordic countries, as well as “more European”.

• Broadcasting has declined significantly in all Nordic countries, although to a varying degree. As public policy favoured public broadcasting, commercial television evolved fairly late. Today, the Nordics are amongst the front-runners when it comes to fast Internet access and digitalisation, while traditional newspapers and public media are still going strong.

• Trust in written press remains high in the Nordics and even gained in importance with the rise of fake news. Although the daily watching time of public television has declined, trust levels have stayed relatively high.

Table 1 further sums up how the developments of the Nordic model compared with the Liberal model, referring to the stylised traditional interpretation of differences. On balance, the Nordic model maintains strong features of its own (observations made in parentheses, second column). That is not to say that it remains the same as in the past. The influence of political association is mostly gone, public media retain government support but has adapted to navigating new technologies along with more open and competitive markets. As for the direction of change in individual countries, the transformation of the Icelandic media and political system, while not extensively covered in this report, may serve as illustration of the particularities at play. In various ways, Iceland’s media system has long differed from those in the other Nordic countries. In brief, corporatism is less prevalent in Iceland, as is journalistic professionalism, and remnants of political parallelism have carried over to what has become a highly commercial media system. This has long operated without the public service requirements or support for private media that characterise the other Nordic countries. Along the way, however, Iceland was particularly impacted by the 2008 financial crisis, and the ensuing years have brought quite systemic change to media and politics. After a temporary cooling of relations, Nordic cooperation involving Iceland has intensified. On regulatory matters as well as structural change, the Icelandic media system now seems in a stage of transformation that makes it more similar to the other Nordic countries, not less, and more different from the liberal model than it used to be (Harrie, 2017).

Table 1 Stylized comparison between Nordic and Liberal media models

The rise of the information society has been accompanied by greater fluidity and diversity, as well as with issues such as misuse of personal data and cybercrime. Social media but also established media have been strongly affected by the fabrication of news and targeted misinformation sowing discord among particularly vulnerable groups. Although bestowed with features and capacity of use for countering the threat of fake news, it appears that the Nordic model, with strive for consensus while smoothing over conflict, has been ill-equipped to respond. The migrant issues arising from the start of the refugee crisis in 2015 soon became contentious and a prime target of misinformation and populisma, applying to the wider European context as well as the Nordic countries (Duxbury, 2018; Kelly, 2018).

Compared to other regions, thus far the Nordics demonstrate a greater scope for combining taking advantage of new technologies and media markets with continued demand for robust public media offerings, while less faith is placed in social media. As in so many other places, however, substantive variations appear on the ground, between centre and periphery, urban and rural and those that are better educated versus those that are not (Brake, 2013).

To conclude, the Nordic media systems hardly comply any more with the conventional assumptions of a corporatist model. Yet, thus far they kept evolving under the influence of a special Nordic media model. A privileged standing for public media was upheld for many years on terms that accounted for rigidity and risk of stagnation. Innovators and entrepreneurs taking advantage of technical progress made change inevitable. The public media sector has come a long way since then, contributing to new solutions as well as enjoying relatively strong public support and trust. In the more complex media landscape taking shape, however, changed conditions for journalism along with the proliferation of unruly content development are interwoven with more volatile and polarised politics. How to cope with these dynamics pose serious questions for the road ahead.