Verifying Nuclear Disarmament—Old Challenges, New Options

Abstract

In recent decades, verification methods, technologies and procedures have been significantly developed further, both technically and procedurally. The competence and expertise of the IAEA and the CTBTO have been considerably improved and national as well as international verification research programmes have been developed. A global verification culture with a lot of knowledge, expertise and experiences has been evolved in some areas. When it comes to the concrete reductions and the credible destruction of nuclear warheads, verification efforts today focus on delivery systems and the number of deployed warheads. Under New START, the USA and Russia are verifying their bilateral obligations until 2026 based on bilateral inspections. Transparency of the current global NWSs arsenal with regard to the exact number of warheads, their operational status, storage and production sites including the fissile material is not existing yet. More R&D is necessary to develop new verification tools. Yet, the international community is not part of the concrete dismantlement of nuclear warheads that are no longer needed or the fissile material released in the process. “Transparency and irreversibility” as well as “safety and security” and non-proliferation standards are key disarmament criteria which have to be applied to future reduction cycles. A dismantling or destruction of a nuclear warhead under the control of foreign inspectors has not yet taken place due to the proliferation concerns under der Non-Proliferation Treaty Art. II and III, which prohibit the disclosure of sensitive information, which would take place if inspectors from NNWS were involved in the dismantlement process and if they have direct insight into the design and composition of the warhead. It is therefore clear that reliable verification of the dismantlement and destruction of a warhead must be a central element of future multilateral nuclear disarmament. The NPT and the TPNW verification demands imply different scenarios, methods and requirements for such options. It is important to understand the existing verification measures and capabilities, so that reduction and elimination proposals cannot be rejected due to their alleged ineffectiveness. Additionally, it is also clear that the vision of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide will not be achieved in one big step but in a step-by-step approach and needs specific verification arrangements for multiple scenarios.

Paper for the XXII Edoardo Amaldi Conference “Nuclear Risks and Arms Control”, Rome 6–8 April 2022

1 Introduction

Although the global nuclear arsenals have numerically declined to about 13.000 warheads worldwide since their peak in 1987, the remaining nuclear weapons are still a global threat [21]. The decline of nuclear warheads based on the New-START obligations occurs mainly because the USA and Russia are dismantling retired nuclear warheads. According to a Fact Sheet from 2021, the United States dismantled 11,683 nuclear warheads between 1994 through 2020.¹ There are several historical examples of nuclear weapon removals from past deployment [14], 149. On the other side, all NWS have expensive programmes under way to modernize their nuclear arsenals. The international arms control network is permanently weakened by treaty terminations (INF Treaty, JCPOA) or blocked negotiations (New START) [17]. In all of these cases, intensified verification measures play an important role: In the case of the INF Treaty, the accusations of the United States and Russia could have been clarified through mutual inspections. The debate about a “denuclearisation of North Korea” raised some hopes, but central questions such as the disclosure of North Korea's nuclear potential by a baseline declaration and its gradual verification have not been implemented. Even far-reaching, in-depth and so far successful monitoring by the IAEA, as in the case of Iran through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), does not prevent in 2015 the Trump-Administration from terminating the Iran Agreement of 2015.

The reasons for this negative trend are more political than technical, but they illustrate how central, sensitive and important adequate nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) of agreements and treaty obligations are against the background of building confidence and the real will to cooperate in the spirit of further nuclear disarmament. This contribution explains first, what verification is and which challenges are ahead. The second section describes the core steps for future disarmament, which is the dismantlement and elimination of nuclear warheads and nuclear-related facilities. Several initiatives and studies in the last decade have produced important lessons about NDV (third section) and have raised technical important experiences. The fourth section compares the requirements for future disarmament treaties. The fifth section concludes the contribution.

2 What is Verification?

Nuclear Disarmament is the concrete and verifiable irreversible reduction, dismantlement, destruction or elimination of nuclear weapons from a national military nuclear arsenal. The current reductions and the destruction of retired nuclear warheads (NW) and their sub-components has so far been organized and executed by the NWS on their national basis [10]. In the case of far-reaching nuclear disarmament arrangements, however, the irreversible elimination of nuclear warheads, mission-critical facilities or weapons-grade material (i.e. first and foremost plutonium or highly enriched uranium) creates new technical, legal and economic challenges. An additional challenge for sustainable nuclear disarmament is also to prevent states from rearming by activating hidden arsenals or by relaunching a military nuclear programme.

In 1986, Jerome B. Wiesner observed that “understanding verification needs and capabilities is important because too often weapons reduction and elimination proposals are rejected with the argument that they cannot be adequately verified” [22, xiii].

Several remarkable functions of verification can be identified: In general, it allows state parties to assess the implementation of an agreement thus fostering trust and confidence between state parties. More concrete, “adequate” verification measures discourages non-compliance with treaty provisions and can give timely warning of violations. In sum, if working it can create confidence that a treaty regime including the verification methods is functioning as intended and that state parties are in compliance with an international agreement. This is not only in the interest of all state parties but can also be an important instrument to solve emerging issues and conflicts. Fetter and Oelrich stated in 2010 the obvious: “Most nuclear-weapon states would be willing to eliminate their nuclear weapons only if they could be confident that other countries-especially potential adversaries- had also eliminated theirs [4, 27].

Verification can be derived from the Latin “veritas facere”: In other words, it is about demonstrating that a presumed or asserted fact is “true” or accurate within a contractually defined framework. The basis for agreed verification is a treaty or an agreement that regulates the verification of the presence or absence of certain contractual items such as NWs. So far, the withdrawal of nuclear warheads from an active operational status is a dominant paradigm of nuclear disarmament.² In the future, the scope of a disarmament treaty can thus be the entire military and non-military part of the fuel cycle creating new challenges for NDV. Therefore, verification measures can be applied to the removal or storage of non-active NWs but also the dismantlement and destruction of NWs, nuclear facilities, testing ranges or other military-relevant sites of the military nuclear fuel cycle.

Depending on the involvement of the state actors, verification can be carried out unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. Unilateral verification of the destruction of a military nuclear programme occurred in the case of Iraq, where UN missions carried out the dismantling of facilities and materials after the Second Gulf War in 1991. Within the framework of the UN missions UNSCOM/UNMOVIC it became apparent that this was a years-long undertaking, involving high costs, political tensions, extensive inspections and the training of inspectors from many co-operating states. Another case is South Africa, which voluntarily abandoned its military programme from 1993. The IAEA, which accompanied the dismantling (e.g. by reviewing historical documents), was only able to confirm in 2010 that the military-relevant fissile material is now only used for “peaceful activities”. Verification in the comprehensive sense therefore requires not only a reliable mechanism, proven verification methods (inspections, personnel, technologies), but also an executive agency such as the IAEA. The IAEA, however, does not yet have an explicit disarmament mandate [16]. Verification can also be supported by the application of “National Technical Means” (NTM), i.e. national reconnaissance sources such as satellites photos or “Open Source Intelligence”, which are data openly available to civil society.

The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) describes verification as “the iterative and deliberative policy process of using collected data to assess whether a state party is in compliance with the provisions of an international treaty/agreement.” Procedures such as inspections and the use of technologies help to collect relevant data about the implementation of treaty obligations. The success of verification measures is dependent on the subject and the scope of the verification obligations, methods, tools and the skills of inspectors.

There are important verification demands based on existing principles such as Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security or Irreversibility. The NPT Art. II/III instigate that there is no release of proliferation-sensitive information to other state parties. Inspectors must be protected against any radiation release and have to accept safety and security regulation of critical facilities such as military bases or weapon assembly areas. US demands for the denuclearization of DPRK programme speaks about “verifiable, irreversible and transparent” measures. Irreversibility means the quality or state of a process so that the dismantled object (f.e. a nuclear warhead) is not being able to be reversed.

3 The Dismantlement Process: Challenges and Technologies

Until now, nuclear arms control treaties such as the INF-treaty or New START but also multilateral nuclear treaties such as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) do not explicitly define what a nuclear warhead (NW) is.³ A future disarmament treaty might include a list of identified NWs for the elimination with specific technical characteristics. It is also obvious that a NW is a military device consisting mainly of nuclear material, explosives and incendiary charges in a configuration of producing a nuclear explosion.

Mostly, NWs are smaller than their carrier systems and not easy to detect. The warhead verification and dismantlement process starts with a baseline declaration by each involved NWS about the numbers and location of all nuclear warheads earmarked for the dismantlement process. Additionally, the type and operational status of a NW might be interesting if the dismantlement process starts at an operational base. (See [4, 35ff]). Inspectors need a list of facilities to be inspected including site diagrams and safety regulations etc. Later on, periodic and updated declarations and notifications would complement the reduction process to get a snapshot of the nuclear stockpile. Basic dismantlement steps across the nuclear weapons lifecycle have been divided in the IPNDV project in 14 key steps (Fig. 20.1). Although the dismantlement of “old and dysfunctional” NW and the destruction of core components of NWs under strict national control is a practised standard procedure in NWS. As a multilateral procedure with inspection teams from multiple countries, this process organized under international control would be a very new challenge for a host state and future inspection teams.

Fig. 20.1

Fourteen steps as identified by IPNDV in the process to dismantle nuclear warheads [11, 9]

At the weapon staging area warheads have to be removed, disabled (step 1) and securely stored at the deployment site (step 2). Then the defunct NW will be transported in special containers and stored in storage bunkers. Inspectors will accompany this process and have to confirm that the warheads have been removed from the delivery system. The use of gamma detectors or neutron radiography has to be negotiated and certified earlier to support the NW authentication which is a complex technical challenge due to the fact that an inspected party does not reveal any secret information about their NWs.⁴ The next step (3) is the transport of the warhead from the deployed site to a long-term storage area. The containerized warhead might be transported on a truck in special containers which are sealed or marked by a “unique identifier”. Inspectors have to maintain the chain of custody by accompanying the transport. The warheads prior to dismantlement will be stored in long-term storages (step 4). Inspectors can exercise routinely to check the inventory, the integrity of the buildings using seals and monitoring equipment.⁵ Step 5 is the transport of the containerized warhead to a dedicated dismantlement facility in which the warheads are stored (6) and later on dismantled (7/8). Such facilities do not exist yet, but these activities can be executed in special disassembly areas close to NW maintenance site. A key objective is here that the inspectors can confirm that each accountable item was dismantled. Thermal neutron cameras or information barriers have been developed and certified to support this process. Nuclear warhead dismantlement is the process of physical separation of high explosives and other components (see Table 20.1) from a nuclear warhead pit and other nuclear materials so that it can no longer produce a nuclear yield. This is a complex technical process. A key question is here how will the inspectors be sure that the disassembled components come from the treaty-limited warhead and not from a dummy device? The warhead components have to be separated, moved (9) and stored (10) at the dismantlement facility under special safety and security regulations. Some components (f.e. High explosives) can be destroyed at the facility or sent to other locations. Other Components can be transported to monitored storages (12) or moved to special disposition facilities (13/14).

Table 20.1 Subcomponents of a typical Nuclear Warhead [23, 37]. (Materials are in bold)

Critical questions remain and the challenges for the inspections are not trivial: Inspectors will only see containers entering the facility and other containers leaving the facility all the time. They also cannot be present during the central dismantlement step. Under these assumptions, how do the inspectorate knows the warhead has been dismantled? Special technology assisted verification measures can help here to fulfil the mission steps (see Table 20.2). Verification equipment has to be tested, certified and the operators have to be trained to handle the measurements under a variety of situations and cases. Passive radiation equipment is not foolproof and methods exist to shield detection.⁶ After all, the verification has to be accepted by state parties. Fissile material, mostly Plutonium, High-Enriched Uranium in different physical forms could have classified properties and need special verification methods. Radiation portal monitoring can assist to detect the movement of radiation emitting items. Different variation of seals (adhesive, fiberoptics, active) can help to ensure no evidence of manipulation. 3D Surveillance with change detection algorithm can help to monitor sensitive areas. Shea [20] has collected and described several new candidates from R&D such as advanced information barriers, thermal neutron cameras, Zero-Knowledge protocols, verification using nuclear resonance fluorescence and muon verification. Verified dismantlement is only one aspect of a broader disarmament framework (See [6]). Special research on Fissile Material Regimes including stockpile verification is necessary (see [2]).

Table 20.2 Verification tools and techniques that require further research, development and testing [5, 116]

The full nuclear weapon life cycle consists of important sub-elements such fissile material production facilities, nuclear weapon assembly, maintenance of the stockpile, storage and disassembly sites and disposition. Four broad categories for future disarmament are possible: (1) Reductions of nuclear warheads including the removal and dismantlement of these and the destruction of warhead components. (2) Limitations of nuclear warheads including the elimination of a specified category or type of NWs and the confirmation of remaining operational warheads. (3) The elimination and abolition of a full nuclear arsenal to Zero and (4) maintaining the “zero warhead status” of a then NNWS. Here it has to be made sure that the dismantled nuclear warheads or nuclear cannot be reversed. The application of different verification technologies must have an “adequate confidence” that other NWS have eliminated a specific number of nuclear warheads or the full arsenal over time. Fetter and Oelrich [4, 27] wrote in 2010 that “adequate” means that “the residual uncertainties would be tolerable, taking into account the enforcement mechanism put into place to protect against and remediate cheating and to punish those responsible.” Uncertainties in the beginning of a dismantlement process might be acceptable for some time. At the end of such a process each of the nuclear weapon cycle must be subject to inspections or reliable monitoring measures to confirm the irreversibility of such measures. Moving closer to global Zero, uncertainties and ambiguities are no longer acceptable for state parties.

4 Recent Verification Experiences and Initiatives

Whenever the implementation of disarmament at the political level falters and reaches an impasse, the further development of verification procedures can keep the arms control agenda alive and close technological and conceptual gaps. An example of this is the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), which met for years in Geneva during the Cold War to further develop cross-bloc verification technologies until the methods were taken up by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with appropriate political support in the 1980s/90 s.

The main component of nuclear disarmament to date has been the deactivation and removal of nuclear warheads from delivery systems or active nuclear storages as part of the bilateral disarmament of the USA and Russia. Within the framework of the INF Treaty of 1987, the complete withdrawal of ground-based medium-range missiles stationed in Europe (i.e. launchers, missiles and support equipment) from NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be verified fully implemented through inspections. Not only new inspection procedures were introduced, but also the monitoring of the transport of INF missiles from the production sites was supervised. The START treaties made it possible to verify the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads between the USA and Russia through mutual inspections and the use of NTMs, especially with regard to the delivery systems relevant to the treaty [10]. The New START Treaty of 2010 introduced the determination of the exact number of deployed warheads on strategic missiles, including removal or conversion to conventional warheads [19]. Ten inspections can be carried out per year. The use of radiation detection equipment is also permitted for the first time [10].

Especially with regard to the disarmament commitment of the NWS to the NNWS under the NPT, multilateral verification is of great importance. The IAEA's safeguards system has been developed considerably after severe setbacks [16]. Established methods are material accounting, inspections (with “managed access”) or technical measures (CCTV, seals, tags etc.). Classical safeguards and inspection procedures, developed and executed by the IAEA can be a powerful tool for future dismantlement scenarios. The JCPOA includes production technologies such as centrifuges and goes far beyond the comprehensive obligations of the Additional Protocol. In addition to the IAEA, the (provisional) monitoring organisation CTBTO was established in Vienna within the framework of the CTBT, which has not yet entered into force. This organisation sets up and operates a worldwide measuring network that makes it possible to detect nuclear weapons tests and to precisely determine the explosive strength and location based on four technologies based on the measurement of seismic signals, radionuclides, infrasound and hydro acoustics. Even though some states are preventing the treaty from coming into force by refusing to ratify it, the technical progress is impressive, has reached a high international standard and has strengthened the taboo on new nuclear testing.⁷ In other arms control areas such as in the 1993 Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) and the 1990 Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) elaborated inspection protocols (f.e. on-site inspections) have been developed and executed.

4.1 Historical and Current Initiatives for NDV

In the last decade science-based studies and projects have been materialized.⁸ In the “Black Sea Experiment”, organized by NRDC and the Russian Academy of Science, scientists were allowed to conduct radiation measurements to determine whether a nuclear warhead was on board of a Soviet nuclear-armed cruiser. As early as 1996–2002, the USA and Russia, together with the IAEA, developed the “Information Barrier concept”, among other things, within the framework of the Trilateral Initiative. In 2002 a UK-US Project started to discuss and elaborate issues of reciprocity, intrusiveness and managing access for foreign personnel. In recent years, several initiatives and projects by individual states have begun to discuss and to expand the technical and procedural basis of nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) (see Table 20.3). Norway and the UK opened the cooperation of a NWS with an NNWS, showed the possibilities of deepened technical cooperation, and conducted three interesting exercises on “Managed Access” between 2008–2010. It also underlines that a NNWS can do research for identification technologies such as “tags and seals”.

Table 20.3 Major projects and exercises related to international collaboration on NDV (based on Göttsche et al. [5], 113)

In 2014, the US State Department and the Nuclear Threat Initiative initiated the “International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification” (IPNDV), in which 25 states cooperate in working groups to develop the technical foundations of nuclear disarmament verification (see for details: [9]). The scope ranges from innovative technological methods to the concrete organisation of inspections and declarations, the training standards of international inspectors and future disarmament scenarios. While in the first phase IPNDV dealt in detail with the various aspects of monitoring and verification of the 14 steps from warhead separation and dismantling to transport, the second phase focuses on practical exercises. For example, a joint exercise was conducted in 2019 and 2022 at the Jülich Research Centre, which was jointly organised by France and Germany. In the report of the 1st phase, it was agreed that “safety and security, non-proliferation and classification aspects can be successfully addressed in a future nuclear disarmament agreement” [11]. Even if IPNDV cannot solve the arms-policy deadlock, systematic technical work by the international community is needed to develop new implementable verification concepts and tools. Whether it is the verification of a limited number of warheads, a full arsenal of warheads or associated production facilities, in the international context this disarmament process must be accompanied reliably, credibly and efficiently by international inspectors. IPNDV is already contributing to confidence building between NWS and the NNWS, strengthening networking and opening up new questions that have been overlooked so far. It also clearly shows which states are interested in progress in disarmament verification. International disarmament verification also includes research groups from civil society (e.g. VERTIC or NTI) or academia (Princeton, MIT, King's College, U Hamburg, RWTH Aachen, etc.). It is desirable and necessary that more states participate in research and development. A report of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium worked out a list of recommendations which can be picked up by the European Union to strengthen NDV research and developments [5].

In 2017 a UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN-GGE) started its work based on the UN Resolution (A/RES/74/50) in Geneva to further considering verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, on a basis of equitable geographical representation.⁹ The final report A/74/90 underlines that “there is a need for a continued international examination of the issue in all its aspects, including verification”. All these activities show that, despite the reluctance of some states to disarm, there is a growing desire that credible and reliable verification of disarmament against the background of central principles such as non-proliferation, security or irreversibility requires further analytical work, in which other states, civil society and the scientific community can continue to make important contributions. Better networking of the growing community would certainly be useful. It is also clear that future disarmament treaties require different specified verification tools and procedures.

5 Requirements from the NPT and the TPNW: Different Scenarios and Challenges

Despite the global disappointment with the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and the rapidly deteriorating political climate, it is in the interest of disarmament advocates that adequate verification solutions are further developed, tested and institutionalised to achieve more confidence and certainty in the reduction and eventual elimination of today's overly large global arsenals. Feasible verification is of utmost importance for both, the classical Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), also with regard to a world without nuclear weapons. The NPT under Art VI connects verification with “a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”, which can only be reached by realistic and intrusive verification measures. The verification of existing treaty provisions starting with the usual safeguards obligations, the Additional Protocol or special inspections by the IAEA are equally necessary. A future Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) also can lay the foundation of verifying and monitoring special weapon-related fissile materials, which are released after the dismantlement. The NPT Safeguards Regime (incl. NSG etc.) and the TPNW Verification measures overlap as well as a future “Fissile Material Control Regime” (not yet existing). With regard to the TPNW, it must be ensured that a state has eliminated all its nuclear weapons, production facilities and weapons-usable material. Finally, in a world without nuclear weapons, it must be guaranteed that no state possesses clandestine stockpiles of weapons-grade material or nuclear weapons and that it maintains a state of nuclear-weapon-free status.

Whereas the NPT from 1970 and its eleven articles do not call for or regulate the destruction of NWs, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons TPNW calls in article 2 and 4 for the verifiable, time-bound, transparent and irreversible elimination of the state party’s nuclear programme. Key is article 1 which determines that “Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: (a) develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile NWs or other nuclear explosive devices”.¹⁰

If a nuclear-armed state decides to give up its nuclear programme to become a state party of the TPNW, it is committed to immediately remove their “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices “from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities.” (Art 4.2). Also, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of the Treaty for that State Party the State Party, shall submit a “plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties.” 

The TPNW says in Article 4.6: “The state parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of NWs programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear weapons-related facilities in accordance with para. 1, 2, and 3 of this article”. Such an International Authority shall report the elimination of the nuclear programme or the “irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapon related facilities to the state parties”. (Art. 4.1) The TPNW might need an independent verification regime or a new verification organization as well as inspections, protocols and technologies to achieve its goals. Tom Shea has elaborated details of such an “International Nuclear Disarmament Authority” (INDA) in details [20, 21ff].

The TPNW requires that each nuclear-armed State Party which becomes a TPNW member first has to eliminate its nuclear inventory, second eliminate, or irreversibly convert its nuclear weapon facilities to a peaceful use and then has to commit to never again produce nuclear weapons (long-term and continuous). Kütt and Mian estimate that the weapon destruction of a nuclear programme can be achieved in less than ten years “if they gave this task priority” [13, 426]. The conditions for the destruction of the military stockpile are easier for a state which gives up its nuclear weapon status in one step entirely but needs much preparation, openness and political hedging. Scenarios with step-by-step roadmaps for the dismantlement of only parts or with high numbers of warheads and limited dismantlement capability while still preserving operative nuclear weapons at military bases will need more time and efforts.

The TPNW stipulates that these undertakings will and can be verified to confirm that NWS Parties abiding by the treaty obligations which includes to maintain the NNW status. Most of the member states of the TPNW are Non-nuclear weapon states. So it is easy for them to fulfil the conditions to become a member of TPNW without any destruction requirements. They have neither nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices nor a nuclear military-related infrastructure on their territory. This can be ascertained also by their NNWS status of the NPT. Another case is the removal of non-nuclear weapon hosting states. The maintenance cycles of deployed nuclear weapons with special aircraft and transportation facilities are common practice, so that the quick removal of warheads to the nuclear possessor state can be done in a very short time. The measurement of absence of nuclear weapons would be also easier than the dismantlement under multilateral control. The capability of states for this enterprise is very varying depending on the resources, political will and technical expertise. A recent study by the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine came to the conclusion that “the United States needs a sustained and integrated monitoring, detection and verification program that stewards capabilities; meets future technology, operations, and capacity needs; and minimizes surprise.” [15, 1].

6 Conclusions

It can be concluded that Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NDV) is a complex technical and legal enterprise if the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear warheads is serious and enshrined in future nuclear reduction treaties. Key principles are non-proliferation, disarmament obligations, safety and security, irreversibility, transparency. They have to be accepted and negotiated by all member states of such a treaty. There are technologies available for different NDV steps which can help to reach the different verification objectives, f.e. to maintain the chain of custody and the managed access to sensitive areas. More R&D in the context of the civil society, science and diplomacy to assist the NDV processes under the NPT and the TPNW. A way forward for the NPT is a commitment by the P5 members to abide by Art. VI, putting a cap on the existing nuclear warheads and start working on a verification, monitoring and dismantlement regime. If a NWS state enters the TPNW there are three key phases necessary: a comprehensive baseline declaration of its nuclear inventory and a roadmap to eliminate the arsenal “under strict international control”. This includes the elimination or irreversibly conversion of its NW-related facilities to peaceful use and an accounting and storage system for the fissile material. The last criterion is commitment never being capable to produce nuclear weapons which makes inspections necessary at all locations in a country and the capability of an international authority to monitor and verify such verification objectives.

For future disarmament scenarios, regional or global verification regimes adapted to the respective object of the treaty must be designed, tested and trained. This requires technological measures, comprehensive inspections or selective methods such as suspicion inspections as well as concepts such as “social verification” or a combination of all these elements. All this can only be worked out, tested and implemented through the joint efforts of civil society, politics and science. More work is needed in the years to come to prepare future disarmament scenarios.