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An Efficient Approach to Resolve Social Dilemma in P2P Networks

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Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems ((LNNS,volume 661))

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Abstract

The premise of a peer-to-peer (P2P) system is based on the voluntary contribution of peers. However, an inherent conflict between individual rationality and social welfare engenders a new situation called the free-rider problem, in which some peers consume the resource without contributing to return. The tendency of free-riding in a P2P system is a critical issue, as it threatens the viability of the whole system. This can be reduced by employing an effective mechanism that deters the free-riding by incentivizing peers to contribute to the system. In this paper, we consider a social planner that acts as a decision-maker among individual agents. We cast the problem as a constrained optimization problem. A metaheuristic algorithm called the artificial bee colony algorithm is used to solve the problem. The empirical results show that each peer contributes to its full capacity and receives a fair (equal) profit share.

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Acknowledgements

The second author was in part supported by a research grant from Google.

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Correspondence to Avadh Kishor .

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Kishor, A., Niyogi, R. (2023). An Efficient Approach to Resolve Social Dilemma in P2P Networks. In: Barolli, L. (eds) Advanced Information Networking and Applications. AINA 2023. Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, vol 661. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29056-5_28

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