Abstract
This chapter explores the relevance of insights drawn from the Continental tradition of Phenomenology for the solution of the long-standing “species problem” in the philosophy of biology. Returning to the roots of Continental Phenomenology in the work of Edmund Husserl, rather than to its later developments, the paper situates the discussion of the species concept in relation to the concepts of “intentionality” and the “life-world” as developed by Husserl. Current conflicts surrounding the interpretation of the meaning of “species” in biological discourse are described in terms of two different intentional “thematizings” of the life-world, both of which satisfy theoretical scientific interests. One of these deals with the interest in the synchronic classification of the world. The other concerns the diachronic historical development of life. It is argued that this Phenomenological analysis give a more satisfactory interpretation of the species problem than that which has been generated by conflicts between advocates of “individualist” and “class” conceptions of natural species. The larger goal of this chapter is to highlight the importance of Jean Gayon’s work in developing a dialogue between Continental and Analytic approaches to the philosophy of biology.
Adapted from Sloan (2018).
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Notes
- 1.
See the useful collection in Gutting (2005).
- 2.
- 3.
On change from the original “semantic” physicalism of Schlick, Neurath, Carnap, Hempel, and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, to the ontological reductionism manifest in identity theory and emergentism, see the overview by Ansgar Beckermann (1992).
- 4.
See Méthot, Brenner, and Duchesneau, this volume. To be sure, Biology and Philosophy now deals with an expanded range of issues.
- 5.
For a clear, uncomplicated, and incisive introduction to phenomenology, I recommend Robert Sokolowski’s overview (Sokolowski, 2000).
- 6.
- 7.
On the negative reception of Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge by the philosophical community, see Nye (2014), Chap. 8. Marjorie Grene’s philosophical contributions to the philosophy of science, and specifically the philosophy of biology, have been more favorably assessed, but have often generated controversy. See Auxier and Hahn (2002), Part 2; and Gayon and Burian (2007). I have been unable to locate any literature that directly engages the similarities and differences between the discussions within the Phenomenological literature and the arguments of Polanyi and Grene. The extensive effort to develop a more creative interface between phenomenology and life science, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Tymieniecka, 1999), has no index entry to either name. Documented readings by Polanyi of Husserl’s works seem to date only from late in Polanyi’s career although more research is needed. There are two pages of notes on what seems to be Husserl’s “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” dated August 5, 1963 in the Polanyi Archives at the University of Chicago. In these comments he criticizes Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers, for failing to recognize “non-conceptual” knowledge. He also critiques Husserl for his failure to include a concept of “effort or commitment” in his understanding of intentionality (University of Chicago Michael Polanyi archives, Box 23, folders 4, 16, fol. 1, cited with permission of the University of Chicago Library). I thank Professor Mary Jo Nye for this valuable lead (personal communication), and Dr. Xiaoxing Jin for assistance in obtaining this material. In one text composed a year after the date of this document, Polanyi speaks of his concept of “indwelling” as “being-in-the-world,” and that this has been studied by “Existentialism and phenomenology…under other names.” He then comments that “we must re-interpret such observations now in terms of the more concrete structure of tacit knowing” (Polanyi, 1964, “Preface,” p. xi).
- 8.
Searle commented earlier that he simply ignored the rich tradition of prior discussion, “partly out of ignorance of most of the traditional writings on Intentionality...in the relentless pursuit of my own investigations” (Searle, 1983, p. ix). His notion of intentionality, although much richer than that found in Dennett, for example, still does not address the more comprehensive set of issues dealt with by Husserl from the date of the composition of Logical Investigations and beyond. For Husserl, the intentionality assumed by Dennett, and to a large degree by Searle, would only be an intentionality of the “natural attitude,” and does not bear on the primary intentionality of consciousness. On this distinction see Husserl (1970a [1913], II, V: paras. 16–20, pp. 576–86). For remarks on Husserl and Searle, see Smith and McIntyre (1982, p. 225) where it is concluded that there are broad points of agreement. Where I would see a primary difference is in Searle’s assumption of the primacy of scientific materialism. Husserl’s primary analysis of intentionality requires suspending such assumptions in the “bracketing” of the natural attitude.
- 9.
See the collection in Beckermann et al. (1992). It is indicative of the lack of dialogue between traditions that there is no mention of Husserl or Continental discussions in this entire series of essays. More comprehensive is the collection by Salice (2012a). This is framed by Searle’s introductory essay (pp. 9–22), which continues to develop the theme of intentionality in relation to a consensus scientific materialism. But the volume also has the important discussions by Salice (2012b) and Besoli (2012) that develop the phenomenological themes in dialogue with analytic philosophy.
- 10.
As Sokolowski summarizes this point: “What happens in categorial intentions is that the things we perceive become elevated into the space of reasons, the domain of logic, argument, and rational thinking” (2000, p. 94).
- 11.
I am indebted for this clarification to Philippe Huneman. The important discussion of Ideas I, Chap. 9 deals with this distinction.
- 12.
This does not mean that Husserl denies causality, but that empirical causal relations are part of the “bracketing” in the phenomenological reduction. I thank my colleague Karl Ameriks for this clarification.
- 13.
- 14.
It is generally concluded that this development was in response to Heidegger’s discussions set forth in Sein und Zeit of 1927, especially the discussion of Dasein and his concept of Being-in-the-World (Heidegger, 1962 [1927], Pt. I, ii. 78 ff). David Carr (Husserl, 1970b, “Introduction,”) instead puts more emphasis on the importance of Wilhelm Dilthey for generating this new concern. There is no mention of Heidegger in the entire text of the Crisis although there are several to Dilthey. I will not attempt to deal with this issue here. On Husserl and Dilthey, see Tillman (1976).
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
As an autobiographical note, I spent several years doing this kind of taxonomic work. I should emphasize that this is an example from vertebrate taxonomy and issues in the classification of many invertebrates, bacteria, viruses and plants raise additional complicating questions that I will not attempt to address in this essay.
- 18.
- 19.
I thank Phillip Honenberger for important comments on this point. Of course, even to do such genetic analyses implies a prior recognition of the forms to be so analyzed.
- 20.
For comments on the needless and related “monist” and “pluralist” dispute see Kitcher (1987).
- 21.
I find Michael Polanyi’s distinction of “focal” and “subsidiary” awareness a useful way to understand these relations between the objects of directed attention and the accepted background assumptions of the life-world in a way that Husserl does not explore (Polanyi, 1964, Chap. 4).
- 22.
For complexities in this see Siewert (2016), Sect. 3.
- 23.
I am developing on this analogy with revisions as employed by Sokolowski (2000, pp. 118–119).
- 24.
I see this to be the point that Michael Polanyi, with an imperfect and often inadequate vocabulary, was trying to articulate with his concept of “personal” knowledge.
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
In his June 10, 1931 Berlin lecture, Husserl directly criticized “philosophical anthropology” as “psychologistic,” and specifically identified Wilhelm Dilthey as its main proponent, without mention of Scheler, Plessner and others (Husserl, 1941, trans. McCormick and Elliston, 1981, pp. 315–323). On the Husserl-Dilthey relationship see Tillman (1976).
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Acknowledgements
For this revision I am indebted to comments by David Depew, Phillip Honenberger, Vittorio Hösle, Lenny Moss, Dylan Belton, Karl Ameriks, M. Katherine Tillman, and members of the Philosophy of Biology Circle at the University Texas, hosted by Sahotra Sarkar. Responsibility for interpretations is my own.
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Sloan, P.R. (2023). Phenomenology and the Species Problem: The Need for Dialogue Between Traditions. In: Méthot, PO. (eds) Philosophy, History and Biology: Essays in Honour of Jean Gayon. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28157-0_12
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