Abstract
Mencius’s theory of the gongfu (or art) to be human and live a human life is not just a part of his philosophy, but an overall approach of his philosophy. That is, the primary purpose of his philosophy is to guide people along the right path of life rather than to offer a truth-telling account of reality. Understanding this fact has implications on how Mencius should be interpreted. It resolves puzzling purported logical fallacies in the text of Mencius, and makes Mencius more coherent, intelligent, and plausible. It also implies that, although Mencius’s normative theory shares some features with other normative theories familiar to the West, such as utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and virtue ethics, it should not be forced into any of these frameworks. The theory is distinct enough to be called a “gongfu ethics.”
The main points of this chapter have been presented in various ways in Ni 2003, 2009, 2018, 2020, and 2021.
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Notes
- 1.
Arthur Waley, for instance, has famously put it bluntly, “As a controversialist he [Mencius] is nugatory. The whole discussion (Book VI) about whether Goodness and Duty are internal or external is a mass of irrelevant analogies, most of which could equally well be used to disprove what they are intended to prove” (Waley 1956: 145). Waley’s view has been echoed by some (such as Hansen 1992: 188–193) as well as rebutted by others (such as Lau 1970: 235–263 and Graham 1989: 119–123). Refer to Han 2014 for a summary of the controversy.
- 2.
See Huang Junjie 黃俊傑’s summary of the scholarship on Mencius in Huang 2004: Chap. 1. Although the book was written about 20 years ago, it is still a valuable overview of the mainstream in Mencius studies.
- 3.
Chad Hansen raised the issue eloquently. See Hansen 1992: 180–181.
- 4.
I owe this example to Roger T. Ames.
- 5.
Others who have shown the similar awareness include David Nivison, in his brief articulation of Mencius 7B24: “The operation of moral norms in human relationships should be thought of as xing 性, what is natural for us, not as ming 命, something demanded of us” (Nivison 2002: 284), and Steven F. Geisz, in his lengthy discussion of 7B24 as an example of Mencius’s “strategic-pragmatic” use of language (Geisz 2008: 199–201), and in the conclusion he draws from this: “I prefer to think of the proposed reading as attributing to Mengzi a conception of philosophy as therapy. Philosophical activity aims not primarily at truth-telling, but rather at leading people to better lives” (Geisz 2008: 213). In addition, Chen Lai 陳來also notices that there are “two perspectives in Mencius’s theory of human nature, one is about reality and the other is about gongfu; or one is about existence and the other about practice. Only when these two perspectives are applied together can we grasp Mencius’ view and attitude toward human nature in its entirety” (Chen 2017: 115).
- 6.
- 7.
See 1.3, 5.5, 5.25, 15.27, and 17.17 for the Master’s aversion to a glib tongue and 4.24, 12.3, 13.27 for his preference for reticence.
- 8.
The view that Chinese language has the feature of seeking to achieve practical effect rather than intellectual apprehension of ideas or argumentative agreement was initiated by I. A. Richards in his book Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definition (Richards 1930) and French sinologist Marcel Granet, in his book La pensée chinoise (Granet 1934). Hansen’s formulation of the view is apparently developed independently of these two, but with inspiration from his mentor Donald Munro, on a much more elaborate philosophical basis. This view is shared by many others also, whether out of their own study or being inspired by Hansen. Hans-Georg Moeller, for instance, says that language for ancient Chinese thinkers is “not yet medial, not communicative, and not an expression of thought,” but for the “suggestive control of behavior” (Moeller 1999: 494). German sinologist Rolf Trauzettel argues that the characteristic of the Chinese language lies in its “prescriptive” rather than “descriptive” function. Language is not seen as a “medium” but as “a thing among other things” (Trauzettel 1997: 11). French sinologist François Julien shares the same observation as well. He argues that Chinese philosophers are more concerned about how to deal with practical issues than merely trying to describe the truth. They use words to mobilize energies, to adjust relationships, or put in general, to do things (Julien 1995: Chap. 1). Steven Geisz, in particular, dedicated an entire article on Mencius’ strategic-pragmatic use of language. He says, “In key passages, the Mengzi described in the text is not primarily concerned either with straightforwardly stating philosophical truths or with offering up and defending a philosophical theory. Rather, he is using language primarily to mold people according to the Confucian dao, and he does so under the self-imposed constraint of having to exemplify this dao that he is advocating” (Geisz 2008: 190).
- 9.
By which Mencius means to “win the confidence of one’s superiors, win the trust of one’s friends, and please one’s parents, etc.” See Zhu 2012: 287.
- 10.
“The will is commander over the qi (vital energy) while the qi is that which fills the body. The qi follows where the will goes. Hence it is said, ‘Take hold of your will and do not abuse your qi’” (Mencius: 2A2).
- 11.
Just like a mountain may become bald if it is constantly exposed to lopping axes and grazing cattle and sheep, one must not allow dissipation to corrupt one’s incipient good tendencies on a daily basis (Mencius: 6A8). “Whenever one acts in a way that falls below the standard of the original heart, the qi will collapse” (Mencius: 2A2).
- 12.
Knowing that people often find excuses for their wrong doings, Mencius repeatedly warns people how harmful it is to oneself to let one’s heart-mind go astray. Going after the strayed heart means to retrieve the “four-hearts,” like finding one’s way back home. “The sole concern of learning is to go after this strayed heart. That is all” (Mencius: 6A11).
- 13.
The “four hearts” are merely incipient tendencies and they need nurturing to develop.
- 14.
“The qi is born of accumulated rightness and cannot be appropriated by anyone through a sporadic show of rightness” (Mencius: 2A2).
- 15.
Chad Hansen explains the deliberate tug “to be a figurative analogy to the study of moral philosophy. In doing that one tries to devise, decide on, and then impose an outside linguistic standard” (Hansen 1992: 176).
- 16.
Mencius’s use of the term renshu is in the context of encouraging a ruler to extend his heart of compassion toward what is immediately nearby to his people. He calls putting ren (human-heartedness) into effect through its transforming influence “wangdao,” the way of a king, and calls using of force to bring order the way of a “ba,” hegemon (Mencius: 1A2, 2A3, 7A13).
- 17.
Others who maintain Mencius’ theory to be utilitarianism include Manyul Im (Im 2011).
- 18.
Mencius said, “Fish is what I want; bear’s palm is also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would rather take bear’s palm than fish. Life is what I want; yi (rightness and appropriateness) is also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would rather take yi than life” (Mencius: 6A10).
- 19.
See Huang 2004: 12–18 for an overview of their interpretations.
- 20.
Li Zehou 李澤厚 calls this “jingyan bian xianyan 經驗變先驗,” or what is empirical becomes, through historical accumulation (jidian 積澱), pre-suppositions of a culture (Li 2005: 11–14). Following the same path, Yang Zebo 楊澤波 calls the result of this historical accumulation lunli xinjing 倫理心境, “ethical mentality,” and applies this directly to his interpretation of Mencius (see Yang 1995). This cultural anthropology approach, though inspiring, would not be able to account for the deliberate gongfa choice by Mencius and other early Confucians.
- 21.
Scholars who maintain this view include Lee Yearly, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Bryan Van Norden, Stephen Angle, May Sim, and Yu Jiyuan, and many others.
- 22.
Nichols is not entirely clear on this. In the “abstract” of the paper, he lists “pragmatism” as one of the “round holes” that the early Confucian square pegs do not fit, but in the main body of the paper, he shows that what he means was Roger Ames’s version of pragmatism, which he believes to represent neither pragmatism nor Confucianism. The fact that he calls Confucius “the arch-pragmatist” (Nichols 2015: 513) seems to suggest that he believes the early Confucians real pragmatists, but not “Amesian” pragmatists. Geisz is more focused on Mencius’s “strategic-pragmatic” use of language that has been overlooked, which he believes to have far-reaching implications (see Geisz 2008: 215–216, note 9 for details).
- 23.
I say “questionable” because it can be contended. See Hugh LaFollette 2000, for example.
- 24.
This crude version is definitely not what most distinguished American pragmatist philosophers such as Pierce, Dewey, and James advocate, but it is nevertheless a popular conception of the theory.
References
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Ni, P. (2023). Mencius’s Theory as a System of the Gongfu to Be Human and to Live a Good Human Life. In: Xiao, Y., Chong, Kc. (eds) Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27620-0_24
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