Potentials of Pathogen Research Through the Lens of Cyberbiosecurity, or What Threat Actors Can Learn from the Covid-19 Pandemic

Abstract

After 3⁺ years of investigation, the origin of SARS-CoV-2 remains unclear, and both a spillover event from nature and a lab accident are heavily debated. As the Covid pandemic has caused unprecedented loss and damage affecting everyone worldwide, there is no sound rationale that the virus had been deliberately released. While the catastrophic effects of the pandemic remain to be resolved, it is of paramount importance to safeguard the future so that similarly tragic events could be prevented. Many of the discussions surrounding the origin of the virus have centered on dangerous (“gain-of-function”) research, noting that the technology to generate pathogens with pandemic potentials is readily in place. Yet, an additional factor that causes concern has not received much attention—the intended weaponization of pathogens via a computer interface.

This work analyzes possible gaps fostered by the computerization and automation of related biotechnologies, taking the pandemic as an example to scrutinize any possible vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malicious actors. In addition to questions about the origin of SARS-CoV-2, actual challenges during the pandemic will be discussed from an adversarial perspective, revealing a disturbing gap between an actual biological/clinical entity in question and their digital information, which is difficult to close even in a well-intended context.

The cyberbiosecurity gaps identified both during the emergence of the pandemic as well as during its unfolding are not meant as judgments of past events, but to demonstrate the reality of these dangers. The potential for intended exploitation in a related situation can be enormous, leading to vulnerabilities related to attribution as well as the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of genetic information, molecular assays, devices, and the interpretation of computerized processes and tools used throughout the public health sector. It is argued here that the inherent dangers stemming from (“dual-use research”) get highly exacerbated by cyber interfaces, allowing bad actors to exploit “dual-appearance” gaps that effectively can camouflage the most dangerous research projects and enable the generation and release of more dangerous bioweapons than ever seen before.