The Admission of Foreign Workers to Italy: Closing the “Gap” with Northern Europe

Abstract

A common perspective in migration studies is that of a North-South divide in European labour migration governance, with Southern European countries exhibiting a distinct – and generally less efficient – approach to the admission of migrants. Southern European states are known for their use of quotas, regularisations and the lack of emphasis on attracting highly skilled labour immigrants from outside of the European Union (EU). This chapter explores Italian labour immigration policy to assess whether its admission policy and practice has traditionally diverged from the Northern European approach and, if this has been the case, whether it has remained dissimilar since the disruption of the international financial crisis of 2008. I find similarities and differences between the Italian regime and labour immigration regimes in Northern Europe between the late 1990s and 2008. While the regulatory instruments (apart from general numerical limits on labour immigration) were like those used in Northern Europe, the Italian system was more open to permanent low and medium skilled labour immigration from outside the EU and had a more significant gap between its façade (laws) and practice than its neighbours in the North. The similarities with Northern European regimes have increased since 2008, as the system has become more selective, emphasising seasonal and occupational/sectoral permits, along with a stronger reliance on free movement and non-economic forms of immigration.

1 Introduction

A common perspective in labour migration studies is that of a North-South divide in European labour migration governance, with Southern European countries exhibiting a distinct – and generally less effective – approach to the admission of migrants. In particular, Southern European systems are known for their immigrant quotas, permanent low-skilled labour immigration, high levels of irregular immigration and cyclical amnesties, while Northern European regimes tend to facilitate the entry of highly skilled labour immigrants, restrict the low-skilled to temporary programmes and oppose mass regularisations of irregular migrant workers (Baldwin Edwards, 1998; Castles, 2006; Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009; Sciortino, 2009; Pastore, 2010; Salis, 2012; Bonizzoni, 2018; Boucher & Gest, 2018; Colombo & Dalla-Zuanna, 2019; Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020).

This chapter explores the Italian labour immigration regime to assess whether and to what extent its admission policy and practice has traditionally diverged from the most common features of Northern European systems. I furthermore investigate whether, if it has been distinctive, it has remained so since the disruption of the international financial crisis of 2008 (the “Great Recession”). The study is based on an analysis of secondary literature on Italian and other West European labour migration regimes, along with OECD and EUROSTAT migration and employment statistics and Italian ministerial data on quotas (provided by the Ministry for Work and Social Policies) and Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) data on residency and citizenship. I find similarities and differences between the Italian regime and labour immigration regimes in Northern Europe between the late 1990s and 2008. The similarities with Northern European regimes have increased since the Great Recession, with, for example, a more restrictive approach to inflows of non-seasonal workers from outside of the European Union (EU) and a stronger reliance on the free movement of workers from Romania and various non-EU immigrant channels outside of work for low-medium skilled labour needs.

It is important to clarify at this point what is understood by a labour immigration regime. In the context of the EU, labour immigration policy generally refers to the regulation of immigration for purposes of work from outside of the EU. I use this definition, however, in line with the broader regime concept used in this volume, rather than limit the analysis to laws and policy, I also discuss practices, for example, the practice of regularising undocumented migrants within annual quotas for the admission of migrants to Italy, in order to provide a more holistic understanding of the functioning of systems. Indeed, de facto labour migration regimes combine formal laws and policy with informal norms and practices, reflecting socio-economic and administrative interests and logics. I also discuss policy on free movement, particularly after the Eastern enlargements (2004 and 2007), given that European policymakers view intra-EU East-West mobility as an alternative to non-EU labour immigration, particularly for low skilled occupations. Other types of migration for non-work purposes, including family, humanitarian and student migration, are also, to some extent, viewed as de facto labour immigration, as many of the migrants using these channels subsequently work in receiving countries. However, unlike East-West intra-EU mobility, these migratory forms are not always primarily work-oriented. While I do not explore policy on these types of immigration, I discuss them with regards to their role as substitutes for labour immigrants.

The chapter will be organized as follows. First, I briefly outline some common Northern European labour immigration management tools and the channels through which foreigners have entered those labour markets over recent decades. Second, I describe the Italian labour immigration regime, including the management of EU mobility, prior to and after the Great Recession. These descriptions will include the policy and, as noted above, the practice of the regime(s), as the big “gap” with regards to Italian immigration policy has been a huge disjuncture between law/policy and practice. Third, I highlight differences and similarities between the Italian regime and Northern European regimes prior to and after 2008. The Chapter will end with a brief conclusion.

2 Northern European Labour Immigration Regimes

Over the past decade, Northern European labour migration regimes have shared key management tools, however, they also differ from each other in terms of the proportion of migrants gaining admittance through various labour and non-labour migration channels. There has been a general evolution towards a more selective approach to labour immigration (de Haas et al., 2014), with, a notable facilitation of the entry of highly skilled non-EU workers. The latter play a crucial role in many European welfare states, particularly health systems (Bobek & Devitt, 2017), are viewed as harbingers of innovation and economic growth in competitive knowledge based economies and are also judged to be easier to integrate than low skilled migrants. The admission of the highly skilled is facilitated by reducing work permit processing times and providing them with stronger welfare and residency rights (Paul, 2012b; Ruhs, 2013; Devitt, 2014; Bonizzoni, 2018). While many European countries introduced points based systems in the first decade of the twenty-first century for the admission of highly skilled non-EU workers on the basis of their skills and experience, these channels have never been as significant, in terms of numbers of immigrants admitted, as demand based systems, where workers gain admission on the basis of a job offer (Chaloff & Lemaitre, 2009; de Haas et al., 2014).

However, despite a policy emphasis on attracting highly skilled immigrants, the migration of highly-skilled non-EU migrants to Northern Europe was limited, apart from to the UK and Ireland, during the first decade of the twenty-first century (OECD, 2009c). Subsequently, data on Blue Card approvals in continental Europe show the small number of non-EU highly skilled migrants availing of this channel into Europe over the past decade. The Blue Card is an EU wide work permit for highly qualified employment, introduced in 2009, and recognised in 25 EU Member States. In order to apply for a Blue Card, the migrant must have a binding job offer or valid employment contract for at least a year, along with qualification certificates and verifiable work experience. In 2016, there were 20,979 blue card approvals across the 25 Member States, with the highest number issued in Germany (17,630) and France (750) (Burmann et al., 2018).

With regards to managing the admission of non-EU workers with specific job offers, governments first generally seek to ensure that resident or EU workers are not available for the jobs. This is done through labour market tests, where the jobs need to be advertised locally and in the EU for a specific period of time to make sure that no suitable candidates are found within the EU. The other approach is the use of shortage occupation lists; governments produce lists of occupations, which are deemed in shortage on the basis of labour market analysis, for which work permits for non-EU workers can be requested by employers, without the necessity of passing a labour market test (Chaloff & Lemaitre, 2009).

While entry rights for low skilled migrants have been expanded since the mid-1990s, following circa 20 years of restriction, they tend to gain entry on time limited visas e.g., seasonal permits and working holiday visas (de Haas et al., 2014). Indeed, one of the main immigration trends worldwide over recent years has been an increase in temporary migration (Boucher & Gest, 2018). In the European context, this is due to concern regarding the integration of low-skilled non-EU migrants, based on perceived failures in successfully incorporating some non-EU origin communities, settled in Northern Europe following a period of large-scale low-skilled labour immigration in the post-war era (Castles, 2006).

Apart from skills and occupations, national origin plays an important role in non-EU labour immigration management, beyond the preference given to nationals of EU Member States. Indeed, various European countries manage non-EU immigration within the framework of bilateral agreements, which give preferential treatment to labour migrants coming from particular countries (de Haas et al., 2014; Paul, 2015). General caps or numerical limits on labour immigration have traditionally not been used in Northern Europe (with some exceptions such as in Switzerland, Alfonso, 2004), though they have been used in particular schemes for low skilled and high skilled non-EU migrants. Regarding the former, most OECD countries apply caps, quotas or targets for the admission of low skilled migrant workers (OECD, 2009a, c).

Since the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, some European countries have managed to fill low skilled labour gaps with mobile Eastern Europeans, thereby allowing for continuing/new restrictions on low skilled non-EU labour immigration (Paul, 2012a). Indeed, countries with large levels of free movement such as Norway, Austria, Germany and Netherlands tend to have low levels of non-EU permanent economic immigration (de Haas et al., 2014; Boucher & Gest, 2018). The labour market participation of family, humanitarian and student migrants also partially substitutes non-EU low-skilled labour immigrants (Finotelli, 2009; Devitt, 2014).

There have, nonetheless, been significant differences between Northern European countries with regards to the proportion of temporary versus permanent non-EU immigration and levels of free movement and other non-economic immigration. For example, taking the cases of Germany and France, prior to the 2004 enlargement Germany received a particularly high proportion of temporary non-EU migration, as opposed to France, where permanent non-EU labour immigration has been more significant proportionally. More recently, Germany has a much higher proportion of EU free movement in terms of overall permanent immigration than France. Finally, while asylum has been a significant channel of migration to Germany, family reunification has been more prominent in France, since the stop to labour immigration imposed in both countries in the early 1970s (Finotelli, 2009; Pastore, 2010; Boucher & Gest, 2018; OECD, 2020).

With regards to undocumented migrants, various Northern European countries, in particular the UK and Germany, are estimated to have large numbers (over a minimum estimate of 196,000 in 2008), which are comparable with the estimates for Italy and Spain (Clandestino, 2009). Time limited regularisations programmes have been recurrently used to legalise their position in various Northern European countries, including France, Germany and the Netherlands, with substantial numbers regularised in France and Germany. These regularisations are primarily granted on humanitarian grounds and are often associated with rejected asylum seekers (de Haas et al., 2014; Kraler, 2019). While governments carry out these humanitarian regularisations, such as the Duldung in Germany, because of difficulties returning the people to their origin countries, the regularized migrants are, in fact, functional equivalents to labour migrants.

3 The Italian Labour Immigration Regime

3.1 Italian Labour Immigration Regime Mid 1990s – 2008

3.1.1 Entry Mechanisms: Annual Quotas and Recruitment from Abroad

Since 1995, the admission of non-EU workers to Italy is largely subject to annual quantitative ceilings or quotas. Based on the Turco-Napolitano law of 1998, the quota is issued by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers following an examination of labour demand and supply data and the country’s integration capacity, as well as consultations with relevant ministries, representatives from local authorities and social partners (Salis, 2012; Bonizzoni, 2018). However, despite comparatively high levels of labour immigration in the 2000s in the European context, with quotas reaching over 150,000 slots from 2005 (Sciortino, 2009; Devitt, 2011), the system was generally argued to have provided inadequate numbers of places to meet employers’ demand for migrants, amongst other failings.

One of the main sources of data on potential labour demand has been the Excelsior survey of private sector firms, carried out by the Union of Chambers of Commerce since 1997. This survey has underestimated demand, as it does not cover agricultural firms or private households, which are significant employers of migrants. Moreover, scholars have highlighted the difficulties Italian businesses have in forecasting their needs (Sciortino, 2009; Salis, 2012; Colombo & Dalla-Zuanna, 2019). The setting of the quota is above all a political choice, largely determined by public opinion on immigration, which is negative compared to the rest of the EU (Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020). This explains why, until the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, quotas were set below Excelsior estimates and 50% lower than the number of work permit applications made (apart from in 2006). Nonetheless, the number of applications for work permits is not a valid indicator of labour demand in Italy. Indeed, the quota system has also been used as a channel for family reunification and other forms of chain migration and, as I explain below, as a de facto mass regularisation of undocumented migrant workers already working in Italy (Salis, 2012). There have furthermore often been delays in issuing the quota decrees (they have been released a few days before the end of the year they were supposed to regulate) and in issuing work permits (it can take more than a year for a residence permit to be issued) (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009; Salis, 2012).

On the other hand, the quota system has been quite liberal with regards to conditions surrounding the issuing of permits and the rights to gain permanency in Italy. While labour market tests are conducted, the applicant employer can confirm the request for a non-EU worker even when European workers are available (Salis, 2012). Non-seasonal labour migrants can change employers and sectors and extend their permits, achieving the possibility of long-term residency status after 5 years (Bonizzoni, 2018). The Italian quota system thus facilitated permanent low-medium skilled labour immigration in those years, as did the recurrent regularisations of undocumented workers, which I discuss below.

The quotas can include sub-quotas for particular occupations/sectors, as well as for specific national groups and the self-employed. These shortage occupations/sectors have generally not required a high level of education, and have included domestic and care work, fisheries, construction and truck drivers (Sciortino, 2009). From 2005, domestic/care workers increased their share of the general quotas for non-seasonal workers, taking up the entire quota for non-seasonal work of 2008 (Salis, 2012; Bonizzoni, 2018). The nationality-based quotas are based on international agreements concluded with sending countries, which aim to provide countries with labour immigration quotas in exchange for active collaboration on border control and readmission.

The quota system has not prioritised highly skilled workers, apart from in 2001, when 2000 entry slots were reserved for professional nurses and between 2003 and 2007, when between 500–1000 slots were reserved annually for IT professionals (Sciortino, 2009). There is also a quota channel for those with specific pre-departure training in their countries of origin, however, permits provided on this basis have been quantitatively negligible. Moreover, in this period, specific categories of skilled workers (including intra-company transferees, academic researchers and professional nurses) could gain admission outside the quotas due to the specialized nature of their work or the limited time to be spent in Italy e.g., posted workers or seconded executives. Most had time limited permits and were restricted with regards to changing employer and sector (Salis, 2012; Bonizzoni, 2018). However, while the quota system generally does not give preferential treatment to skilled migrants, it became increasing selective from 2000 onwards (with minor fluctuations and excluding 2006, when a large unselective quota for non-seasonal workers was issued), allocating most slots on the basis of nationality, seasonal work and occupation/sector (Bonizzoni, 2018).

Apart from the problems inherent in forecasting demand and the gap between forecasted demand and the size of the annual quotas, another much maligned issue with the Italian labour immigration system is the requirement of nominal recruitment from abroad. This means that employers must request authorisation to hire a foreign worker living abroad before s/he has come to Italy. In reality, as is well understood by Italian policymakers (Salis, 2012), immigrants arrived irregularly or more commonly overstayed their tourist visas, found employment and then sought regularization via the quota system- going home temporarily in order to do so – or a mass regularization.

3.1.2 Regularisations

While the quotas have partly functioned as de facto mass regularisations, the Italian state also carried out 5 explicit regularization programmes for undocumented migrants between 1986 and 2002. Indeed, more than a third of foreigners legally resident in Italy received their last residence permit in a regularization (Colombo & Dalla-Zuanna, 2019). Moreover, both left and right wing coalition governments have carried out these programmes; indeed, the largest ever regularization was carried out by a centre right government in 2002. A common EU visa policy, recurring mass regularisations, the use of the quota system as a regularization of existing immigrants, the lack of internal controls, a large informal economy and the difficulty of expulsion are all argued to incentivize overstaying and irregular entry (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009; Colombo & Dalla-Zuanna, 2019). It is, however, notable that the majority of migrants gaining residency within a regularization scheme maintain their legal status thereafter, which demonstrates their capacity to retain employment status (Finotelli, 2009). Indeed, the employment rate amongst the foreign born has been higher than the rate amongst the Italian born, as opposed to the situation in Northern Europe (OECD, 2018), arguably demonstrating the efficacy of the system of de facto free movement and ex-post regularisation. The unemployment rate among foreigners has, however, been higher than the rate among natives since the Great Recession (Perna, 2019).

3.1.3 Mobile EU Citizens: Functional Equivalents of Non-EU Labour Immigrants

During the 2000s, prior to the Great Recession, Eastern European migration to Italy grew significantly. The European enlargements to 10 new Member States in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean in 2004 and to Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 were not, however, equally significant with regards to migration to Italy. Transitional arrangements were introduced after both enlargements restricting the access of nationals from these countries (excluding Malta and Cyprus) to the Italian labour market. However, the level of movement from the A8 (eight eastern European accession countries of 2004) was low; indeed, the quota slots available to nationals from these countries between 2004–6 were not all used and the share of A8 nationals in the total foreign resident population increased by just 0.5% during those years (Salis, 2012). On the other hand, Romanian migration to Italy started to grow before the enlargement. In fact, while Romanians migrated in large numbers to Germany in the asylum channel up to the early 1990s, democratization in Romania and a more restrictive asylum policy in Germany channeled Romanian would-be-migrants towards the Italian informal economy (Finotelli, 2009). Very limited restrictions were imposed on their access to the labour market between 2007 and 2012. There were no quotas or restrictions on their employment in highly skilled professional activities or in the main sectors where they were already employed: agriculture, tourism, construction, domestic or care services and the metal industry. By the end of the decade Romanians were the first foreign community in Italy (Salis, 2012, Fig. 10.1).

Fig. 10.1

Growth of principal foreign communities in Italy 1991–2014. (Source: Author’s elaboration based on ISTAT data on residents by citizenship)

3.2 Italian Labour Immigration Regime 2008–2020

3.2.1 Drivers of Policy Change: Economic and Humanitarian Crises and Alternative Sources of Labour

Unlike in Spain, which had a very similar system to the Italian one until 2004, the legislative framework for non-EU labour immigration to Italy has not changed since 2002 and there has been very little public debate regarding a reform of the system (Salis, 2012; Finotelli & Echeverrıa, 2017). However, the regime has evolved in a restrictive orientation within its current parameters over the past decade, in response to the economic and refugee crises, developments with regards to various migrant inflows and European directives.

The Great Recession and subsequent, ongoing economic crisis, which began in 2011, had a significant and long-lasting negative impact on the Italian economy. Indeed, between 2008–2017, Italian GDP grew less or declined more than average EU levels (Colombo & Dalla-Zuanna, 2019). Labour demand fell, leading to a rise in migrant unemployment, higher than that among natives (while the overall unemployment rate reached 12% in 2013, the rate was 17.9% for foreigners). Along with the refugee crisis, which started in 2011 and peaked in 2016, the economic crises made a restrictive approach to immigration economically and politically expedient (Einaudi, 2018; Colombo & Dalla-Zuanna, 2019; Perna, 2019).

Furthermore, in 2011 senior officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies maintained that, based on a more in-depth analysis of labour demand and supply, there would be less need for non-EU labour migrants than before. As a senior official maintained in July 2011, “We will no longer need great numbers: family reunifications, intra-EU mobility and second generations will naturally compensate the labour mismatch that is currently tackled through labour migration from third countries” (Salis, 2012, p. 34). Indeed, as we saw above, Romanian migration to Italy has been significant over the past 20 years. Also, family migration became more substantial in the twenty-first century, representing the second largest component of stocks and inflows in the first decade of the century and the most significant inflow since 2011 (Salis, 2012; Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020). In the context of the European refugee crisis, asylum seekers have also represented another functional alternative to labour immigration. In 2007 more than half of new residence permits were issued for working reasons, compared to 32.3% for family reunification and 4.3% for humanitarian/asylum protection. By 2017, however, residence permits for working reasons represented only 4.6% of new permits issued, while family reunification represented 43.2% and humanitarian/asylum protection 38.4% of new permits (Perna, 2019).

3.2.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Changes in Annual Quotas

Between 2008 and 2009, the quota total dropped from 230,000 to 80,000 slots and the 2009 quota was only for seasonal workers. In 2010, the quota was more generous (184,080 slots), based on a belief that the economy was coming back on track (Pastore, 2016). However, between 2011 and 2020, less than 60,000 places have been available with around 30,000 available since 2015, under technical, centre-left, populist and populist centre-left coalition governments. Since 2009, most entries have been for seasonal migrants (which have come to dominate entries), people with stay permits in Italy who apply to convert them to work permits and applicants for self-employment permits. Indeed, while the level of overall migration to Italy in 2008 (around half a million a year) was comparable with inflows into other large EU migrant destinations (Germany, Spain and the UK), between 2008 and 2018 inflows declined by nearly 50% into Italy, while they increased substantially into Germany and stayed more or less the same in the UK and Spain (OECD, 2020) Figs. 10.2 and 10.3.

Fig. 10.2

Non-EU labour migrant quota totals 1996–2020. (Source: Author’s elaboration on basis of data from the Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali)

Fig. 10.3

Non-EU labour migrant quota composition 1996–2020. (Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from the Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, cross-checked with Callia et al. (2012) and Perna (2019))

3.2.3 Regularisations

Nevertheless, the number of irregular migrants in Italy has remained high, partly due to continuing informal work opportunities in sectors such as domestic work and agriculture and partly as a result of the abolition of humanitarian protection in 2018 (which was subsequently overturned in 2020). Two regularisation programmes were carried out in 2009 and 2012, the first solely aimed at domestic and care workers (Bonizzoni, 2018; Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020). Italian governments desisted from carrying out regularisations for 8 years, which represents the longest gap between regularisations since the first one in 1986. However, the number of undocumented migrants was estimated at 533,000 thousand in early 2018 (Colombo & Dalla-Zuanna, 2019; Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020) and in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, the centre left-populist government agreed to carry out a rather contentious regularization. If an undocumented migrant could prove that s/he was working in agriculture or domestic and care work, they could apply for 1–2 year permit and if they had could prove that they had been working in those sectors recently they could apply for a 6-month permit to look for a job. This was largely motivated by the need to provide workers for the agricultural sector in the context of pandemic related travel restrictions and to control the spread of Covid-19 and, unlike previous regularizations, was not opposed by the EU and Northern European countries (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In sum, over the past decade, regularisations have been fewer and more selective in terms of occupational sector.

3.2.4 The Facilitation of Highly Skilled Non-EU Labour Immigrants

Finally, the admission of highly skilled non-EU individuals for the purposes of self−/employment has been facilitated by the Italian state since 2007 due to European policy transfer and the development of a competition state logic, where states base their economic development strategy on skill-based innovation (Bonizzoni, 2018). However, the number of highly skilled migrants arriving in Italy remains small.

The self-employment channel within the general quota has become more selective with regards to skills and admits the following profiles: entrepreneurs intending to invest at least 500,000 euros and expected to hire at least 3 workers; well-recognized artists with “high professional qualifications”; corporate officers of firms registered in Italy; acknowledged professionals; and, since 2013, foreign citizens establishing (or taking part in) “innovative start-ups”. Furthermore, like in other EU states, a start-up visa programme was launched by the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2014, which aims to attract innovative non-EU entrepreneurs to Italy by providing a simplified online procedure in English (http://italiastartupvisa.mise.gov.it/). However, between 2014 and the start of 2019, only 230 out of 434 applications had been successful and the number of applications fell over the 5 years (Nesheim, 2019).

Highly skilled non-EU labour immigration has also been facilitated following the implementation of four European Directives between 2007 and 2016, which introduced an EU visa for scientific researchers, intra-company transfers and trainees, as well as highly qualified workers (the so-called “Blue-Card workers”). Blue Card workers who have completed a post-secondary training course of at least 3 years can work in specific sectors as long as they are earning a salary of at least 24,789 euros per year (Salis, 2012; Bonizzoni, 2018). Between 2013–5, the number of blue card visas issued nearly trebled but the numbers remained small – 348 in 2015 – and subsequently fell; Italy issued 254 in 2016 (Bonizzoni, 2018; Burmann et al., 2018).

4 Differences and Similarities Between the Italian and Northern European Regimes

With regards to the differences and similarities between the Italian regime, prior to and after 2008, and Northern European systems, it is worth reiterating that there is quite a lot of divergence in immigration systems in the North, for example with regards to the emphasis placed on permanent as opposed to temporary migration and the use of different functional equivalents of labour immigration (e.g. asylum, student, family migration) in different states. However, they share basic labour immigration management tools and strategies in response to demand for foreign labour. Furthermore, they all face the challenge of responding to employers demands for migrant labour, while giving the impression of control over the admission of foreign workers, in the context of high levels of politicisation and public concerns regarding immigration.

4.1 Differences

4.1.1 Admission of Low and Medium Skilled Non-EU Migrant Workers

A significant difference between the Italian labour immigration system between the late 1990s and the Great Recession and those in Northern Europe was the emphasis of the former on admitting immigrants for low and medium skilled work and at times providing most of them with a route to permanent residency. Northern European countries also require foreign labour for low and medium skilled work. However, they rely on free movement, non-economic migration channels and temporary labour programmes for non-EU nationals, as, for historic reasons, they have a negative view of permanent low-skilled non-EU labour immigration and they have long received significant non-economic inflows, which can partially substitute labour immigration.

The Italian system was consequently more explicitly receptive to non-EU workers in low and medium skilled jobs during this period as workers were provided with work permits, many of which provided a route to permanent residency, rather than other types of permits. The higher demand for low-skilled foreign labour in Italy, compared to Northern Europe, in the context of low levels of economic growth and low levels of employment during the period of interest is explained by an ageing population and rising education levels, but also welfare and labour market institutions which have the effect of constraining the labour supply and producing low quality jobs. For example, with regards to the latter, the welfare state provides insufficient elder care and childcare, resulting in demand for foreign care workers in the informal economy, while low levels of labour market control enable a large informal economy (Devitt, 2018). Despite low levels of employment in Italy, throughout its history of immigration, and higher unemployment amongst the low skilled (EUROSTAT, 2020), there was a pervasive view among policymakers until the Great Recession, at least, that Italians no longer wanted to do the jobs migrants do (Einaudi, 2007; Devitt, 2010; Einaudi, 2018).

4.1.2 Inflexibility

Like the Spanish system, the Italian one has often been distinguished from Northern European systems based on its use of quotas. As noted above, while quotas have been used in the North, they generally have not dominated systems. The Italian quota system is very rigid as not only does it put a numerical limit on immigration, but it does not allow applications all year round, as the need arises, and instead specifies a time when applications for the next year must be submitted. This inflexibility, while politically (to some extent) and administratively functional, is impractical for employers and immigrants. Moreover, with regards to political benefits, while the Italian quota system provides a clear element of public control in its annual cap on numbers of “incoming” immigrants, this annual numerical limit makes it easier for the public to gauge the openness of each government to immigration than in Northern European systems, which, without an overall cap and with a plethora of channels, are not so easy to evaluate with regards to openness.

The development of the rigid quota system and its maintenance is in part accounted for by the politicisation of immigration within the fragmented party system in Italy in the 1990s. Notably, the Lega Nord populist party associated immigration with irregularity and crime and influenced centre-right coalition governments, in which it was a member, in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Einaudi, 2007; Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009; Salis, 2012). The preferential treatment accorded to domestic and care workers in Italian quota decrees and regularisation processes is not only explained by the fact that there is a significant reliance on foreign workers in this sector. These foreign workers are also more socially and politically acceptable due to the fact that many of them are middle-aged women and most of them come from Eastern Europe or Latin America (and are therefore Christians) (Salis, 2012). More recently, opposition to immigration was the main factor explaining the rise of the revitalised Lega under Matteo Salvini to become the dominant political party in Italy in 2019 (Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020). Indeed, public opinion is on average more negative about immigration in Italy than in the rest of the EU (Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020), which may be partly due to the influence of xenophobic rhetoric from politicians and partly due to the fact that inflows of foreigners grew significantly in the context of economic stagnation from the 1970s onwards (Devitt, 2018; Geddes & Pettrachin, 2020).

4.1.3 Implementation Gaps

The Italian labour immigration policy is seen to have failed by scholars as there is a significant gap between law and practice. While it ostensibly aims to manage the inflow from abroad of legal migrant workers with employment offers in Italy, the system has largely functioned as an ex-post regularisation of migrants, who come to Italy on their own initiative, without a job offer or permit, in a de facto free movement regime. While there is commonly a gap between explicit policy goals and outcomes in the area of immigration, the gap between law and practice in the Italian immigration system is particularly large. Most systems in Northern Europe fail to stem irregular migration and many find ways of regularising this population, however, the Italian system appears to have largely involved ex-post regularisation. Indeed, more mass regularisations of irregular migrant workers have taken place in Southern Europe than in Northern Europe.

The Italian system displays an extremely low level of ex-ante management. International recruitment is comparatively insignificant, also in comparison with Spain, which has attempted to develop this since 2005. The bureaucratic issuing of permits is so delayed that they can only work as a regularisation as opposed to managing urgent business needs. For example, in 2006 an average time of 484 days was needed to remit a work permit. Moreover, as a result of the duration of the administrative procedures, a significant share of the available quota has usually remained unused (Salis, 2012). These delays are partly due to a comparatively inefficient bureaucracy (Della Sala, 2004; OECD, 2009b). Indeed, weak bureaucracies can have a negative effect on the enforcement of even well-designed labour immigration policies (Pastore et al., 2013; Finotelli & Echeverrıa, 2017).

Furthermore, while governments in Northern Europe turn a blind eye to a certain level of rule circumvention and irregular migration, the level of subterfuge – an open secret amongst Italian officials and scholars – in the Italian immigration system appears (though in-depth comparative empirical analysis would be required to ascertain the veracity of this) particularly high. There is evidence that sub-quotas for domestic workers and recent regularisations limited to domestic workers – who are the most socially accepted migrant workers – have been used to legalise people outside of domestic work as well. Indeed, migration businesses often provide immigrants with fake contracts so they can apply for a residence permit (Salis, 2012; Finotelli & Echeverrıa, 2017). Moreover, the acceptance of illegal practices and use of amnesties is not exclusive to migration in Italy; the latter are commonly used in other areas such as tax evasion and illegal building (Finotelli, 2009).

4.2 Similarities

4.2.1 Entry Mechanisms and Skills

Italy has long shared labour immigration entry mechanisms with Northern Europe including labour market tests, admission from abroad on the basis of a job offer, preferential access into shortage occupations and on the basis of national origin and the use of regularisations (which can be described as de facto regularisations in Northern Europe, such as the Duldung in Germany).

Furthermore, while Northern European regimes prioritise highly skilled non-EU immigration, inflows of these migrants remain limited, though higher in some cases than levels to Italy. The fact that the quota system is not very targeted with regards to skills does not mean that medium skilled and highly skilled migrants cannot and do not arrive via the quota system. The level of tertiary education amongst the foreign born in Italy is, however, comparatively low (as it is amongst working age Italians) (Eurostat, 2019), which is partly explained by the fact that most of the demand for foreign workers is in low and medium skilled work. It is, however, notable that, while the literature tends to emphasise demand for migrants in low skilled jobs in the Italian labour market, like in Northern Europe (apart from the UK), about half of the foreign-born in Italy are employed in medium skilled jobs (OECD, 2015).

4.2.2 Inflexibility and Implementation Gaps

While the Italian quota system is particularly inflexible, resulting in significant numbers of undocumented migrant workers, this relationship between inflexible, restrictive immigration policies and irregularity (i.e. implementation gaps) can, as noted above, be seen across Northern Europe. Indeed, I contend that the difference is one of degrees. Northern European governments’ concerns with demonstrating control over immigration often result in immigration policies, which are more restrictive than labour market needs, with the resulting necessity of turning a blind eye to or legalising the status of immigrants who have circumvented the rules in order to provide labour for employers (Cornelius et al., 1994; Joppke, 1998; Duvell, 2006; Messina, 2007). This is exemplified in Germany, where permanent low skilled labour immigration is strictly curtailed and domestic care work is often carried out by Eastern European women who overstay tourist visas (Finotelli, 2009). Indeed, the quota system was initially established and evolved in response to a burgeoning politicization of immigration and, significantly, European pressures to protect the common European border (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009; Paoli, 2018).

4.2.3 Free Movement and Functional Equivalents to Non-EU Labour Migrants

It could, furthermore, be argued that Italian policy on non-EU labour migration has been rather like a free movement approach where people move on their own initiative without a job offer and then register. Free movement and non-EU immigration channels, such as those for students and family migrants, all provide labour in Northern Europe. Indeed, offshore recruiting for low skilled labour is not just a challenge in Italy. Small businesses with low skilled labour needs, from cafes to building firms, across Europe, would be hard tasked to find workers abroad, beyond utilizing employees’ networks. Indeed, during the period of mass labour immigration in post-war Northern Europe, when migrant workers were generally in demand in low skilled jobs, while there was some recruitment of foreign workers abroad by public employment services, many migrants came over on tourist visas, found work and then were regularised on case to case basis (OECD, 2009c).

Public concerns regarding immigration and a pervasive belief among policymakers that Europeans are easier to integrate than non-Europeans has led to a preference for intra-EU mobility as a form of labour immigration in most Northern European states following the Eastern enlargements. Intra-EU mobility is preferred by Italian policymakers as well. However, they have only been able to source substantial numbers of mobile European workers, willing to work in low-medium skilled jobs, since the enlargement to Romania (and Bulgaria) in 2007, as levels of mobility to Italy from the A8 was low. The growth in migration from Romania has contributed to allowing the Italian government to reduce inflows from outside of the EU after the Great Recession, similarly to Northern European countries, such as Ireland, which curtailed low-skilled non-EU labour immigration in 2003, due to expected inflows of mobile Eastern Europeans following the enlargement of 2004 (Devitt, 2016). Indeed, the Italian system has moved from a strong emphasis on permanent low skilled labour immigration to using the functional equivalents of family reunification, EU mobility and more recently humanitarian migrants, with some facilitation of highly skilled immigration as well. The quotas have become more selective over time and governments demonstrate a preference for seasonal low skilled labour migrants, much like in Northern Europe.

5 Conclusion

Overall, the Italian labour immigration regime in vigour between the late 1990s and 2008 shared much with Northern European systems. The management tools, beyond the use of all-encompassing numerical caps, were the same and the differences in policy and implementation were largely a question of semantics and degrees. The Italian system was more open about admitting permanent low and medium skilled labour immigration from outside the EU, as opposed to Northern European systems which have tended to use free movement and non-economic forms of non-EU migration for labour needs. The Italian system also had a more significant gap between its façade (laws) and practice than its neighbours in the North. While the Italian system largely involved ex-post regularisation, this approach, while used, does not dominate the Northern systems of managing labour immigration due to their longer standing access to functional equivalents to low skilled labour migration, which do not require recruitment from abroad.

The Italian system post 2008 has moved in the direction of the more selective labour immigration systems of Northern Europe, emphasising seasonal and occupational/sectoral permits, along with a stronger reliance on free movement and non-economic forms of immigration, primarily family and humanitarian migration. This more restrictive approach, in the context of a large informal economy, will continue to result in irregular immigration and the need to intermittently regularise the undocumented population. This situation will remain in the absence of employer sanctions, strong, sustained and costly efforts to tackle the informal economy, more developed public elder and child care services, supports for new business ventures in place of unprofitable ones and concerted efforts to recruit overseas in sectors with predictable needs such as agriculture.

Furthermore, the ability of Western European economies to rely on free movement for low skilled labour needs is time limited, due to economic development in Eastern European Member States. Indeed, there are already signs that this source of labour is reducing and European countries are starting to source labour from outside the EU again (OECD, 2020). Italian governments will soon once again find themselves opening up to more significant levels of non-EU labour immigration. It remains unclear whether policymakers will maintain the longstanding approach of ex-post regularisation within the quota system or attempt an institutional reform, but with the current financial constraints, a move towards a new, more costly system is unlikely.