Citizenship and Naturalisation for Migrants in the UK After Brexit

Abstract

While immigration has played a major role in public debate in the UK over the past twenty years, citizenship and naturalisation have received much less attention. Polling data have suggested that the UK public is broadly supportive of the idea of giving long-term migrants the opportunity to become UK citizens (British Future, 2020). The UK Home Office, in its 2019 Indicators of Integration Framework, described citizenship as an “important bedrock to the integration of any individual in a society” (Ndofor-Tah et al., 2019: 18). Indeed, there is some evidence that becoming a citizen has a positive impact on economic and social integration. For example, the OECD (2011) found that naturalisation was associated with labour market outcomes of many groups of foreign nationals in France, Germany, Sweden and the United States, particularly for the most disadvantaged. Studies from Switzerland and Germany have also shown positive social and economic impacts of naturalisation (Hainmueller et al., 2017; Gathmann & Keller, 2018; but see also Bartram, 2019); and that those who naturalise increase their attachment to British Identity (Bartram, 2021).

While immigration has played a major role in public debate in the UK over the past twenty years, citizenship and naturalisation have received much less attention. Polling data have suggested that the UK public is broadly supportive of the idea of giving long-term migrants the opportunity to become UK citizens (British Future, 2020). The UK Home Office, in its 2019 Indicators of Integration Framework, described citizenship as an “important bedrock to the integration of any individual in a society” (Ndofor-Tah et al., 2019: 18). Indeed, there is some evidence that becoming a citizen has a positive impact on economic and social integration. For example, the OECD (2011) found that naturalisation was associated with labour market outcomes of many groups of foreign nationals in France, Germany, Sweden and the United States, particularly for the most disadvantaged. Studies from Switzerland and Germany have also shown positive social and economic impacts of naturalisation (Hainmueller et al., 2017; Gathmann & Keller, 2018; but see also Bartram, 2019); and that those who naturalise increase their attachment to British Identity (Bartram, 2021).

In practice, however, there are wide variations in the extent to which different groups of migrants in the UK choose to take up UK citizenship and some migrant groups face important obstacles to naturalisation. In this chapter, we analyse these patterns and look at the facilitators of and barriers to becoming a citizen in UK post Brexit. In doing so, we examine how naturalisation propensities in the UK are conditioned by a range of factors including country of origin, age at migration, visa status at migration, and administrative barriers and costs. Finally, we also show that despite increasing numbers of EU citizens applying to become UK citizens, EU migrants are still less likely to naturalise than those from outside of the EU.

1 British Nationality Law

Migrants in the UK who are foreign nationals can acquire the right to live in the UK permanently without becoming British citizens. Non-UK citizens who have permanent residence or settlement (Indefinite Leave to Remain [ILR] or EU settled status for those who acquired their residence under the EU Settlement Scheme) have extensive rights similar to those of UK citizens. However, becoming a British citizen brings certain additional rights, such as the the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in general elections. In addition, it is much harder for the government to deport UK citizens, and citizenship cannot be lost as a result of long absences from the country.

British nationality law is complex and different rules apply depending on people’s date of birth (before 1 January 1983, between 1 January 1983 and 1 July 2006, and after 1 July 2006)¹. There are three main ways of becoming a UK citizen: automatic acquisition at birth, registration (usually for children), and naturalisation (usually for adults). Almost all migrant adults without a British parent will have to naturalise in order to become UK citizens. Adult migrants who apply for citizenship must usually have lived in the UK for at least five or six years and must already have the permanent right to live in the UK (i.e. ILR or EU settled status). They must meet an English language requirement and pass the ‘Life in the UK’ test, which is designed to evaluate their knowledge of UK institutions, history and culture. The level of English language required for adult applicants is ‘intermediate’, which is considered sufficient to have conversations about a range of familiar topics, but not necessarily enough to function fully in an English-speaking workplace. Applicants must also have ‘good character,’ which includes paying taxes and not having a recent criminal record. The ‘good character’ requirement was first introduced in 1981 and it is subject to change, as it is not defined in law but regularly revised in the Home Office guidance. In 2006, it was extended to include children aged 10 and over who register as UK citizens. Applicants must also have been physically present in the UK for most of the previous three to five years. For a more detailed overview of naturalisation requirements in the UK, see Halliday (2019) and Prabhat (2018).

Since the British Nationality Act 1981, children who are born in the UK no longer automatically acquire British citizenship in all cases. They need at least one of their parents to be either a UK national or a settled or permanent resident in order to acquire automatic British citizenship at birth. UK-born children are eligible to register for citizenship if they have lived in the UK until the age of 10 and their parents receive ILR or EU settled status. Children will need to pay a registration fee of £1012, although their parents can apply for a fee waiver if they can demonstrate that they cannot afford it. Unlike for adults, there are some circumstances in which children can become citizens without first applying for ILR; this includes certain children without legal residence status, if they meet the conditions (e.g. if they have lived in the UK for a long time).

While Brexit had a major impact on immigration policy by bringing decades of free movement to an end, it did not directly affect nationality law. Naturalisation requirements are also similar for EU and non-EU citizens, at least on paper. However, there are additional complexities for certain EU citizens as a result of how free movement rules were implemented in the UK. In particular, under free movement, some EU citizens becoming permanent residents—namely students and self-sufficient people such as non-working partners of British citizens—faced a little-known requirement to hold private health insurance. This meant that many EU citizens were rejected for permanent residence as a consequence. This requirement was removed for the EU Settlement Scheme, but citizenship applications still require caseworkers to consider whether EU citizens who were students or self-sufficient people had health insurance in the ten years prior to their application, and then consider whether to exercise discretion in their favour (Vassiliou, 2020). This means that some EU applicants may be rejected on this basis, and others may be deterred for fear of losing their substantial application fee if they are rejected.

2 Who Becomes a UK Citizen? Differences Between EU-born and Non-EU Born Migrants

There were an estimated 6.2 milion foreign citizens living in the UK in the year 2019 (authors’ calculations based on the APS 2019). Eight of the top ten foreign nationalities that year were from EU countries despite the fact that the EU-born population represented a minority (38 per cent) of the foreign born (authors’ calculation based on the Annual Population Survey [APS] 2019).² This is because EU citizens have been less likely to naturalise than non-EU citizens in the last decades. For example, in 2019, among migrants who moved to the UK at least 10 years ago, only 24 per cent of the EU born said they were UK nationals, while this percentage was 72 per cent among migrants born outside the EU (authors’ calculation based on the APS 2019).

Among the top fifteen migrant communities in the UK that year, the share of UK citizens among long-term residents (i.e. those who migrated at least 10 years ago) was particularly low for those born in Romania (14 per cent) Portugal (11 per cent), Poland (7 per cent) or Lithuania (4 per cent) (author’s calculations based on the APS 2019). By contrast, the share of British citizens was considerably higher among long-term residents from non-EU countries such as Bangladesh (84 per cent), Pakistan (78 per cent), India (78 per cent) or South Africa (73 per cent) (author’s calculations based on the APS 2019). A consequence of the difference naturalisation rates between EU and non-EU migrants is that non-EU born migrants make up the majority of the population born overseas (62 per cent or 5.8 million in 2019), but EU citizens represent the majority of foreign nationals living in the UK (61 per cent or 3.9 million).

3 Factors Affecting the Acquisition of Citizenship Among EU and Non-EU citizens, and the Role of Brexit

Both instrumental and non-instrumental factors affect migrants’ decision to become citizens of the country they have moved to. Naturalisation has instrumental value if migrants perceive that it provides them with opportunities and rights that they would otherwise lack (Bauböck, 2019: 1022), e.g. right to vote in general elections, legal certainty about their residence and work rights, exemption for immigration controls, protection from potential discrimination, or the ability to travel and spend time in the country of origin without restrictions (see e.g. Aptekar, 2016; Birkvad, 2019; Rutter et al., 2008; Sigona & Godin, 2019). Migrants may also decide to naturalise for non-instrumental reasons, such as the desire to be recognised as a full member of society or because they feel a strong sense of belonging to the country where they wish to naturalise (Bauböck, 2019). The relevance of instrumental motivations in migrants’ decision to naturalise has been linked to the increasing number of states accepting dual nationality since the 1990s (Harpaz & Mateos, 2019). In the UK, dual citizenship has been allowed since the British Nationality Act 1948).

Fig. 4.1

Relationship between country of origin GDP per capital and UK citizenship acquisition, 2019

Sources: Home Office (2020) Migrant Journey: 2019 report, table D01. World Band data 2019 (GDP per capita in constant 2010 US$)

Note: Home Office data refers to all non-EU citizens who were granted an entry visa for work, family or study between 2005and 2009. Expired visas are excluded from the count

3.1 Origin Countries

There are large disparities in naturalisation rates between EU and non-EU citizens (see Table 4.1), but also across nationals from non-EU countries, which ranged in 2019 from 5 per cent among Japanese nationals to 90 per cent among Afghans ten after their entry visa (Fig. 4.1). These disparities partially reflect the different instrumental value that the acquisition of British citizenship has for migrants depending on their nationality. For example, migrants from developing or politically unstable non-EU countries are more likely to naturalise than those from higher-income non-EU countries. As shown in Fig. 4.1, among non-EU citizens who had ILR 10 years after migrating to the UK, over 80 per cent of those from the Philippines, Russia, Somalia and Afghanistan became UK citizens, compared to less than 40 per cent of migrants from the United States, Canada or South Korea. This is consistent with trends found across other EU countries (Dronkers & Vink, 2012), and is thought to be because migrants from lower- and middle-income countries perceive the relative benefits of taking on nationality from a Western country such as the UK to be higher (Milanovic, 2013; Kochenov & Lindeboom, 2017; Harpaz & Mateos, 2019).

Table 4.1 Share of UK nationals among migrant residents born in the top 15 countries of birth, 2019

Fig. 4.2

Applications for UK Citizenship among EU and non-EU citizens, 2004–2020Source: Home Office (2021). Immigration statistics, year ending June 2021, table cit D01

As mentioned earlier, EU citizens have historically been less likely to naturalise than non-EU citizens and this is reflected in their citizenship application rates (Fig. 4.2). While the UK was part of the EU, nationals from other EU states (in addition to those from Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein and Switzerland) had fewer incentives to naturalise given that their citizenship allowed them be exempt from immigration control and enjoy the same rights as UK nationals in terms of employment, taxation or access to public services and benefits (Moreh et al., 2018). While many EU countries are wealthy and thus their citizens might be expected to have a lower naturalisation rate than citizens from some non-EU countries (as discussed above), the share of UK citizens among migrants born in high-income non-EU countries like the United States and Australia are nonetheless substantially higher than for most EU countries (Table 4.1).

Barriers in the process may have also played a role in the low naturalisation rates of EU citizens: all people applying for UK citizenship must already have proof of their permanent status, but until recently the process for most EU citizens to get such a document was quite complex (Migration Observatory, 2016). Most EU citizens will also not have had any contact with the immigration system, whereas non-EU citizens will generally have already had to submit multiple applications (e.g. for entry visas, renewals and indefinite leave to remain), making them more familiar with the process and perhaps more aware of the benefits of securing status for the long term by acquiring citizenship.

Scholars have argued that political and economic instability in the last ten years have made EU citizens living in other EU states more likely to become citizens than before (Graeber, 2016; Moreh et al., 2018; Sredanovic, 2020). Becoming British may have also been perceived as a way to ‘escape the negative stigma’ EU citizens felt was attached to being a migrant in the UK (Sigona & Godin, 2019). Concerns about immigration were an important driver of the UK public’s vote to leave the European Union in 2016, and recent studies have shown that EU citizens’ trust in UK institutions decreased after the vote (Sigona & Godin, 2019) while their perceptions of hostility increased.

After the Brexit referendum in 2016, the number of EU citizens applying for UK citizenship increased sharply from previously low levels (Fig. 4.2). From 2010 to 2014, an average of 10,800 EU citizens became UK citizens each year, and by 2020 this had increased to around 59,000. This upward trend in British citizenship acquisition among EU citizens is not surprising; naturalisations are expected to increase in response to legislative change that reduces the rights of non-citizens (Sredanovic, 2020: 3). EU citizens are thus choosing to naturalise as a way to protect their rights and avoid becoming subject to immigration control after 30 June 2021, when the Brexit transition period ended (O’Brien, 2021). Despite this trend, however, EU citizens made up only 35% of all successful applications in 2020.

Fig. 4.3

Estimated share of foreign born who are UK nationals, by age at migration and controlling for years of residency in the UK, 2019

Source: Annual Population Survey, January–December, 2019 (Office for National Statistics, Social Survey Division, 2020)

3.2 Age at Migration and Years of Residence

Age at migration and years of residence are also factors affecting the propensity to naturalise (Peters et al., 2016). People who moved to the UK as children are more likely to be British citizens, and this trend is particularly clear among the EU born (Fig. 4.3). Both EU- and non-EU-born migrants who moved to the UK when they were children, especially those who moved at age 5 or younger, are more likely to be UK citizens than people who moved later. This is partly because people who moved to the UK when they were younger are more likely to have been in the UK for longer than those who moved at older ages. This confirms previous research showing that migrants who migrate at younger ages are more likely to become citizens (Peters et al., 2016; Chiswick & Miller, 2009). Among people who moved to the UK as adults, however, the likelihood of being a UK citizen is unrelated to their age of migration.

Fig. 4.4

Successful applications for British citizenship among non-EU citizens, by entry visa category

Sources: Home Office Migrant Journey: 2019 report, table D01

3.3 Citizenship Policy in the Origin and Destination Countries: Dual Nationality Policies, Visa Type and Citizenship Fees

Citizenship policies of the origin and destination country are also thought to play a role in migrants’ propensity to naturalise. The recognition of dual nationality in both origin and destination countries, birthright citizenship, and the implementation of easy and inexpensive legal and procedural requirements to naturalise have been considered particularly important (Labussière & Vink, 2020; Solano & Huddleston, 2020). For example, destination countries with more liberal citizenship polices that facilitate citizenship acquisition tend to have a higher share of naturalised migrants (Dronkers & Vink, 2012). In the UK, dual nationality is recognised since the British Nationality Law 1948. Birthright citizenship–by which UK citizenship is acquired by being born in the UK – was restricted in the British Nationality Law 1981 and currently UK-born children are automatically British only if one of their parents was British or had permanent immigration status at the time of children’s birth. In 2019, there were an estimated 474,000 UK-born residents without UK citizenship, 90 per cent of whom were under age 18 (authors’ calculation based on the APS 2019).

The type of visa on which migrants move to the UK also conditions their path to citizenship. This is visible in data on the amount of time it takes for people who came to the UK on different visa types to become citizens, provided they are still in the UK. In particular, students (and, to some extent, work visa holders) have a much longer path to permanent status than family visa holders, and thus are likely to contribute substantially to the non-citizen population. This is because the time spent in the UK under a youth mobility visa or a student visa does not count towards the 5 year period that is usually required to apply for permanent residence (ILR or EU settled status), which is a requirement before applying for citizenship. On the other hand, migrants who naturalise as British citizens by marriage are required to have lived in the UK for at least three years. As shown in Fig. 4.4, among people granted entry visas in 2006, those on family visas tended to become UK citizens the fastest, with 56 per cent already UK citizens by the end of 2012 (i.e. after 6–7 years). International students took longer to become British citizens, but the gap narrowed significantly after 10 years since arrival—so by 2019 the overall the share of UK citizens was only slightly lower for migrants with student entry visas than for those with family entry visas (Fig. 4.4).

Citizenship fees in the UK are substantially high compared to other Western countries. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (2020), non-EU citizens in the UK who want to settle permanently or become British citizens face among the highest costs in the developed world. Since 2018, the cost of an adult citizenship application was £1330, up from £268 in 2005 (Fig. 4.5). This compares to an estimated marginal cost of £372 to process each application (Home Office, 2019a, b), and the ‘surplus’ is used to make the immigration system ‘self-funding’, e.g. covering overhead costs.

Fig. 4.5

Naturalisation fees, 2005–2020

Source: Home Office immigration and nationality Fees: 1 July 2021

Note: includes £80 citizenship ceremony fee for adults

The effect of fees on the citizenship application rate is hard to measure, although a 2019 report by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (a public appointee independent from government who is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the efficiency and effectiveness of the immigration, asylum and nationality system) documented concerns among lawyers, civil society and applicants about the impacts of high costs of citizenship registration for children in particular (ICIBI, 2019; see also Ealing Law Centre, 2014). In February 2021, the Court of Appeal ruled that children citizenship fees were unlawful and in 2022 the Home Office introduced a fee waiver for children whose families can demonstrate that they cannot afford the fee. EU citizens in the UK have cited the fee as a significant deterrent (Sigona & Godin, 2019), and evidence from the United States, where fees are lower, has found that fee subsidies significantly increased application rates (Hainmueller et al., 2018).

Previous research has identified various other barriers to becoming a UK citizen in addition to fees, including the ‘Life in the UK’ test, which was implemented in 2005 in response to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (see e.g. Valdez-Symonds, 2019; van Oers, 2014; Byrne, 2014; Monforte et al., 2018). So-called ‘civic integration’ tests such as ‘Life in the UK’ and other mandatory integration requirements have become common in Europe since the early 2000s, though there are notable variations across countries (Goodman, 2010, 2011, 2012). In the UK and other Western states, civic integration and language tests were introduced in response to public opinion concerns about the lack of integration of some migrant communities and its impact on social cohesion (Byrne, 2016). The pass rates of ‘Life in the UK’ test vary widely across nationalities; for example, in the year 2013 (the last full year on which there is available data on pass rates by applicants’ nationality), the pass rates for nationalities with at least a hundred applicants sitting the test range from above 95 per cent among Australians, New Zelanders, Irish, Singaporeans and Americans to below 60 per cent among Afghans, Albanians, Bangladeshis, Iraquis and Jamaicans (Home Office, 2014).

In total, around 6623 or 4 per cent of citizenship applications were refused in 2019, excluding withdrawn applications. The most common reason for refusal was not passing the ‘good character’ test. According to the Home Office, applicants for citizenship aged 10 or older will not be considered of good character if they have been involved in crime, have not paid their taxes, have been deliberately dishonest or deceptive in their dealings with the UK government, have breached immigration law or have been deprived of their citizenship before (Home Office, 2019a, b). In other words, refusals do not appear to be the major driver of non-citizenship in the UK. Rather, it is decisions not to apply or barriers to applying, among the eligible population and particularly among EU citizens.

4 Conclusions and Gaps in the Data

Overall, the data suggest that there are multiple barriers to becoming a UK citizen, but that differences in demand to be come a citizen also play a role. These factors are difficult to disentangle, and may affect different people in different ways. For example, it is possible that the cost of naturalisation has in the past been more of a deterrent for EU citizens who felt secure in their current citizenship and immigration status, compared to non-EU citizens who have more experience of navigating visa processes. Nonetheless, the gaps in citizenship acquisition between EU and non-EU citizens are sufficiently large that it is likely that motivation to become a citizen also plays a strong role. Holding EU citizenship appears to have been a deterrent to applying for UK citizenship; now that the rights associated with EU citizenship have been greatly reduced, this has changed to some extent. However, even despite the increase in EU citizens’ naturalisation applications, they are still underrepresented among applicants. It remains to be seen whether and how this will change over the coming years, as EU citizens adjust to life under the post-Brexit rules.