The EU’s Peace Work in Colombia: Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Future Prospects

Abstract

This chapter takes up some of the transversal ideas addressed throughout the book. In the first place, it formulates some conclusions on the support given by the EU to the peace process in Colombia over two decades and, in particular, to the implementation of the Havana Peace Agreement. It considers that a hybrid model of peacebuilding has been shaped, with objectives and principles of liberal peace, but with some innovative elements that go beyond the latter, above all in three fields: the commitment to strengthening civil society, the defence of human rights and the adoption of a territorial approach. In the second place, we extract some lessons from the accumulated European experiences and activities in the country that could enrich the EU’s normative framework and repertoire of peacebuilding instruments in the world. Finally, we reflect on the growing space and the opportunities that Gustavo Petro’s election as president in August 2022 has opened for the EU to continue acting as a firm supporter of the Peace Agreement. The chapter is based on a documentary analysis and interviews conducted with several actors.

1 Introduction

During its 20-year presence in Colombia, the EU stands out for having maintained, throughout different stages and political contexts, a standpoint geared towards peacebuilding and a negotiated agreement that would tackle the root causes of the conflict. It defended these positions from the beginning, even when Álvaro Uribe’s government (2002–2010) rejected dialogue and framed the conflict as a mere problem of terrorism, internal security and territorial control. Through its Peace Laboratories and other programmes to support local peace and development initiatives, the EU became a forerunner, together with much of civil society, of an approach to dialogue and peacebuilding that would eventually be enshrined in the 2016 Havana Agreement. Subsequently, the EU accompanied the negotiations that resulted in the signed Agreement, and since then it has been one of the international actors that has provided the most political, technical and financial support to bring about its implementation, which is all the more remarkable considering the reluctance shown by the Duque government (2018–2022).

The EU’s long history of commitment to building peace through dialogue has earned it considerable recognition among various institutional and social actors in Colombia, which it has successfully capitalised on in the period after the Agreement was signed, and which is an important asset for its involvement in the new era that has opened up in the country since President Petro was elected.

These two decades coincide precisely with the period in which the EU has developed its common foreign policy, including its conflict prevention policy, which has been nourished in part by its experiences in Colombia. This has helped the EU to consolidate its own positions that are distinct from those of the US: to envisage itself as a normative and peace-making power and to configure a European model of development cooperation at the service of local peacebuilding in the midst of conflict, in partnership with civil society.

The experiences that the EU has garnered in Colombia provide lessons that have great potential to enrich the normative framework and repertoire of tools for its policy for global peacebuilding. As we shall see, the EU seems to have been more prepared to experiment with new approaches and operational instruments in Colombia. This may have been due, among other factors, to the fact that the Colombian conflict is relatively far-off and has not posed a threat to the EU’s strategic interests.

The focus of the EU’s actions in Colombia has been based on their continuity and consistency over time, since it has followed the same premises in different contexts and phases, as shown by documents and interviews with actors from different backgrounds. The EU’s assumptions have had three main characteristics:

• a. Advocating a negotiated solution to the conflict, considering that it could not be ended by military means. The EU has always maintained a clear position that ‘only a negotiated solution can provide the basis for lasting peace in Colombia’ (EEAS, 2012), and has therefore supported negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).

• b. Arguing that building durable peace means addressing not only the consequences but also the root causes of the conflict, such as deep socio-economic inequalities, human rights violations and illegal activities. As defined in its Colombia Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013, the EU has tackled the various components of the conflict through areas of activity with different timeframes: bringing short-term relief by providing aid for victims of the conflict; promoting peace at local and national level in order to contribute to a settlement in the medium term; and endeavouring to attack the root causes of the conflict by promoting development for all (European Commission, 2007: 6).

  The European approach thus goes beyond the mere absence of violent conflict and is based on a broad scheme of human security (Kurtenbach, 2014: 497). It forms a ‘holistic and multidimensional’ perspective, which seeks to build peace linked to the concepts of positive peace and human security, and which incorporates various dimensions related to social justice, the fight against socio-economic exclusion and poverty, human rights, stronger institutions, and the culture of peace (Barreto et al., 2015: 14–15).

• c. Making a commitment to building ‘peace from below’ through European cooperation, assigning a key role to civil society and communities in both formulating and implementing its initiatives. Thus, from the time of the Peace Laboratories to the present day, the EU has advocated for a stronger civil society and support for its peacebuilding processes, even in the midst of armed conflict.

It should be noted that this European approach to peace has differed from that of the two Colombian governments mentioned above: President Uribe, with his policy of democratic security, aimed at achieving the military defeat of the guerrilla groups classed as terrorist organisations, and that of his co-religionist, President Duque (2018–2022), whose policy of peace with legality implemented the Agreement in a highly restrictive and selective way and included the use of coercive measures in the territories. According to several sources in the EU Delegation in Bogotá, these discrepancies have led to difficulties and conflict with the Duque government on some issues. The forced eradication of illicit crops by military means, which causes a clash with local communities, is the result of ‘an obsession with the idea that coca is illegal’ and an unbalanced security doctrine based on that of the US, which fails to see that it is a development problem. In contrast, the EU focuses on crop substitution through rural development, using an ‘integrated approach’ that combines numerous aspects (security, development, humanitarian action, etc.). ‘We would like to see more development and a different security doctrine’.¹

These varying approaches thus resulted in disagreements between the EU and the Duque government on several issues, such as illicit crops and the attacks and assassinations suffered by social leaders and ex-guerrillas in the territories. These are areas in which each side is aware of the other’s position. Despite this, the EU has always endeavoured to maintain positive relations with the Colombian government, issuing numerous public statements underlining that good relationship, and praising the government’s efforts to make progress in implementing the Agreement, all with the aim of keeping the Agreement alive. An example of this difficult task of balancing diplomatic language could be seen in the statement by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, following a meeting with President Duque. She acknowledged that the situation of human rights defenders and social activists was one of the greatest challenges and causes for concern, but asserted that bilateral relations were in excellent health and recognised the Colombian government’s efforts and continued commitment to the peacebuilding process, while also calling for those efforts to be increased (EEAS, 2019).

Through political dialogue, the EU has therefore been able to put challenges and disagreements on the table, but with restraint and avoiding any open confrontation with the Colombian government. Apart from a few European Parliament resolutions, it is only very recently that the EU as a whole has publicly expressed criticism of President Duque’s government with regard to the assassinations of social leaders. Indeed, the chief reproach made against the EU by different Colombian social and political sectors was specifically its failure to confront the government over serious human rights violations committed in the country.

In this regard, aside from human rights violations and other conflictive issues, the dialogue with the government has been open and positive on issues such as public policies for reincorporation and land restoration. According to those responsible for European cooperation in Colombia, agreements have been reached to promote the implementation of the Peace Agreement.² In fact, they maintain that the EU has a level of influence in Colombia that is unusual in other countries, due to several factors: its track record of cooperation in the country; its role as an international observer in the Peace Agreement, which gives it legitimacy to take part in some strategic debates; and the credibility and widespread recognition of the advisory role played by the Special Envoy for Peace.³ For their part, government sources confirmed that they enjoy a relationship of great trust with the EU, and that, unlike other countries, the EU is characterised by the fact that it collaborates with the government to support national development goals without imposing its own priorities, which has allowed for a cooperation of greater visibility and impact.⁴

With regard to the EU’s approach, it should be added that this exclusively civilian and soft approach is also markedly different from the interventionist approach of the US, based on its objectives centred on security and war against two threats: drugs and guerrilla groups. Numerous interviewees, particularly from social organisations, highlighted these differences. The fact that USAID at the time supported president Uribe’s Plan Colombia, based on military intervention against drugs and guerrilla groups in the territories, means that many organisations refuse to work with the agency, which is now barely present in the territories. Furthermore, it has supported the Duque government in forcing the eradication of coca crops and banning the beneficiaries of its projects from growing coca crops or being engaged in the process of substitution. In contrast, the EU does not impose this requirement and works in areas where coca crops are grown in order to promote production alternatives, which leads to an alternative perspective based on greater respect for human rights and an increased impact on local politics. According to the interviewees, the EU has a greater capacity for dialogue, including with critical organisations, and its perspective is more democratic, progressive, flexible and respectful of Colombian actors.⁵ In addition, USAID has not provided any specific aid for reincorporated ex-combatants, which is a priority group for the EU.⁶

The EU has jointly deployed a wide range of instruments to support peacebuilding in Colombia. First, it has provided political support in the form of public statements (by the Delegation and ambassadors in Bogotá, the European Parliament and other EU institutions) as well as regional dialogue, high-level bilateral dialogue with the Colombian government, and discussions with civil society and other actors. In this regard, a particularly significant move was the appointment in 2015 of a Special Envoy for the Colombian Peace Process, of high political profile, who visits the country regularly to monitor implementation. Second, another important instrument is budget support provided to the government (40 million euros in 2022), which is conditional on fulfilling a series of specific objectives and is mostly oriented towards developing public policies related to the armed conflict, such as comprehensive rural development, the reincorporation of ex-guerrillas (housing, health, children) and providing land to peasants. Third, it has deployed various development cooperation instruments, such as calls for projects involving civil society and human rights, or the innovative European Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia.

In the period since the Agreement was signed, EU actions have prioritised rural economic development and the reincorporation of ex-guerrillas. However, they have also tackled a wide range of other areas, such as the strengthening of civil society and transitional justice. Geographically, these have been concentrated in the departments of Putumayo, Caquetá, Guaviare and Nariño, whereas support for the various aspects of reincorporation is being given across the country.

In the Introduction to this book, we asked to what extent the EU has managed to construct a peacebuilding model in Colombia that goes beyond the dominant formulations of the international peacebuilding agenda. Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that it seems to have developed a hybrid model, with some objectives and principles typical of liberal peace, but with others that suggest certain elements of post-liberal peace.

The elements typical of liberal peace are visible essentially on two levels. First, in the importance given to the development of state institutions and their establishment in territories where they were absent; as we have seen, this has been captured in a strong relationship with the government based on political dialogue and support for various public policies. In this respect, although the EU has been a power in its role as a cooperation donor, it has shown insufficient political and diplomatic muscle in asserting its demands that the government be held accountable for failing to comply with the Agreement or allowing the security situation to deteriorate. The second level is the commitment to economic development within the framework of the market economy, although two clarifications should be made: that this is consistent with the fact that the Agreement does not call into question either the country’s economic model or its private property; and that, as we shall see, many of the EU’s actions support social and solidarity-based economic initiatives centred on principles other than those of the market economy. The predominance of economic interests has meant that the democracy and human rights clause included in the Trade Agreement has not been activated or used to put pressure on the government.

However, different innovative approaches and instruments can be seen in the actions the EU has taken to support the Colombian peace process, particularly in the area of development cooperation. Although they may have their shortcomings and limitations, they go further than conventional liberal peace. As we will break down in the following points, three of them are worth highlighting. First, its commitment to strengthening civil society, an objective that is also present in other countries but which is of particular significance in Colombia. Indeed, for two decades the EU has formed a special partnership with civil society, based on a common position in favour of tackling the root causes of the conflict, which has given the EU considerable social legitimacy. Second, the defence of human rights, a controversial but relevant area, as it incorporates cross-cutting aspects of socio-economic rights as well as the rights of various groups such as women and ethnic communities. And third, perhaps the most innovative element with respect to actions deployed in other countries, a territorial approach that has enabled the EU to adapt noticeably to the specific circumstances of each local context, something that the liberal peace framework tends to lack.

2 Support for the Strengthening of Civil Society

The EU has worked closely with Colombian civil society over two decades. Of all donors, the EU is the one that has made the strongest commitment to supporting civil society⁷ and maintained the most consistent partnership with it over time.⁸ This support has primarily been financial, via projects funded through bilateral cooperation of EU countries or through calls for proposals in the framework of the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ISP), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and the Non-state Actors and Local Authorities in Development programme. In addition, the EU has supported Trust Fund projects since the Agreement was signed, and given the government budgetary support, which is conditional on the participation of civil society.⁹ Second, the EU has also provided political support in the form of questions submitted in the European Parliament, statements issued by various EU bodies, and spaces created for political dialogue with the Colombian government.

The importance that the EU attaches to Colombian civil society has been motivated by the fact that it is very broad, diverse, representative and organised. It has a proven ability to perform analyses, construct discourses and voice criticism to the government, as well as putting forward proposals and implementing projects. Furthermore, it is well-connected in international networks, which gives it a considerable influence at the United Nations and in the EU institutions in Brussels. Indeed, a network of Colombian organisations and European NGOs has traditionally been very active in lobbying European governments and the European Parliament and Commission; it helped to secure the EU’s rejection of the Uribe government’s Plan Colombia, and, at the start of the 2000s, played a role in developing the EU’s own peace programme based on the Peace Laboratories (Bocchi, 2009: 193–194; Castañeda, 2012: 23–25).

These laboratories, through which the EU supported a variety of local peace and development initiatives during the armed conflict, are often cited as the origin of the EU’s links with numerous civil society organisations. Indeed, the two forged an alliance in defence of a negotiated peace that would tackle the underlying causes of the conflict, thus sharing a discourse that deviated from the postulates of the Uribe government. This strong relationship of trust continued through the New Territories for Peace programme and has survived to the present day.

Certainly, supporting civil society is an objective of EU action in all countries, not only in Colombia. However, as we can see, in this case specific circumstances have led the EU to play a particularly relevant role for Colombian social organisations.

Since 2014, EU support for civil society in all countries has been based on the EU Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society. These documents constitute a framework for establishing a more regular and strategic dialogue between civil society organisations and the EU, and are based on a common approach by the EU Delegation in the country and the EU Member States (Concord, 2018: 2; Roadmap Facility, 2017). They provide a roadmap that defines the space for dialogue, long-term objectives and priorities to be supported by European cooperation

In the case of Colombia, the first Roadmap was drawn up for the period 2014–17, and was then updated for the periods 2018–20 and 2021–24 after consultation with various platforms and social organisations. The document in Colombia has obviously been influenced by the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The Roadmap for the period 2021–24 focuses on two key themes—the environment and peace—and defines the following three main priorities (Unión Europea, 2021: 9–10):

• a. Fostering an enabling environment, i.e. the conditions and rights that create an appropriate space for civil society to operate. This is a problematic issue, as some government policies, such as the 2016 tax reform and a decree that made it more difficult for social organisations to recruit staff, can reduce the space in which civil society organisations can work. The EU has funded studies on the impact of such measures and advocates new laws being broad enough for organisations to operate and become established.¹⁰

• b. Promoting the involvement of civil society organisations in public policymaking by encouraging their participation in drafting, implementing or monitoring policies. The EU has thus pushed for civil society to oversee the implementation policies of the Peace Agreement. An interesting example is the ‘Te da Paz’ project (https://tedapaz.co/), which has supported the creation of a network in Alto Patía, North of Cauca and South of Valle, made up of grassroots community organisations, with the aim of monitoring and influencing the manner in which the Development Programmes with a Territorial Approach (PDET) are implemented in those areas. Likewise, the EU has maintained a process of consultation with civil society with regard to its development cooperation, for example the updating of the Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021–2027, the Roadmap, as well as its strategies for democracy, human rights and gender.

• c. Strengthening the capabilities of grassroots organisations, both internally (organisational strengthening; work plans) and externally (networking, fundraising, advocacy with the authorities, etc.). This is the area with the greatest impact on the organisations, as all EU-funded projects include activities aimed at bolstering them. For this purpose, since 2005, the EU Delegation has used the OCI (organisational capacity index) methodology, which consists of a series of indicators to measure the strengthening of organisations’ capacities, enabling them to self-assess their capacities and draw up plans to fortify their organisation. For many of its projects, the EU requires organisations to present these plans, and provides support during the implementation phase. Ultimately, this helps to improve the organisations’ capacities and impact.¹¹

Several of the people interviewed expressed their appreciation for the positive support that the EU gives to social organisations in numerous fields.

First, several sources confirm that EU-funded projects have helped to strengthen social organisations that represent vulnerable groups (such as women and indigenous peoples), especially in the areas hardest hit by the conflict, and even to create new organisations in order to implement them. The projects have helped to enhance their management capacities, train their leaders, and ensure their participation in policymaking processes at the territorial level.¹²

Second, thanks to its ongoing dialogue and partnership with the EU, civil society has increased its capacity for advocacy. This dialogue allows civil society organizations (hereinafter CSO) to give the EU their opinion on what is happening in the territories, the progress of public policies, the issues to be addressed in bilateral talks with the government, and EU actions and policies. Moreover, when civil society has needed to put an issue on the political agenda, for example in the field of human rights and the protection of human rights defenders, the EU has facilitated dialogue between civil society and national, regional or local authorities, organising consultations in contexts where spaces for dialogue were previously lacking.¹³ The presence of EU representatives in these forums has enabled the opinions of social organisations to be taken more seriously.¹⁴ The dialogues have been held in the spirit of ensuring compliance with the Agreement¹⁵ and maintaining good relations with both parties and a neutral position.¹⁶ This neutral attitude has been considered problematic by certain sectors of civil society,¹⁷ especially during the Duque presidency, when some believe that the close relationship between the EU and civil society weakened compared to the period of President Santos’ term of office (2010–2018).

Nevertheless, many believe that the EU’s support for civil society has helped not only to support and draw attention to their work in the territories, but also to provide them with a form of protection and shelter in violent contexts. Such support has even allowed many organisations to continue operating and avoid closure,¹⁸ as it has had a preventive effect in some areas where ‘there are very powerful forces that would have silenced these voices if they could’.¹⁹

Finally, we should add that European cooperation, from the definition of its priorities, has also had an impact on and raised awareness of some of the country’s social organisations. Thus, the EU has promoted the incorporation of a gender perspective in projects, despite the reluctance shown by some rural organisations.²⁰ Likewise, it is worth mentioning the peace education work carried out through a project with evangelical churches—a sector that previously opposed the Agreement—in which so-called schools of non-violence were organised with the participation of pastors and ex-combatants.²¹

Even so, the EU’s relationship with civil society has been subject to some criticism. One of the main complaints, which was already pointed out at the time of the Peace Laboratories, warns that the EU’s strict administrative procedures for selecting and implementing projects results in the exclusion of grassroots organisations with less technical capacity (Barreto et al., 2015: 20). Moreover, this forces organisations to focus on technical and administrative requirements (budget management, indicators, results, etc.) rather than on peace and development objectives (Castañeda, 2014) and on grassroots empowerment and mobilisation processes.²²

Indeed, as EU staff themselves acknowledge, their procedures are demanding because they require organisations to prove their capacity to develop and manage projects, while also providing financial guarantees. This prevents many organisations from leading projects, but not from participating in them, as a consortium-based model with cascading grants is used. In other words, a large international or Colombian NGO is responsible for the project, but it is implemented with several local grassroots organisations. To be sure, this model establishes unequal power relations between organisations, with tensions arising over issues such as salary differences.²³ However, civil society sources consider this system useful for strengthening and empowering small and medium-sized local organisations, which would not be able to present projects but can still take part in them accompanied by larger organisations. This allows them to improve their capacity to mobilise and to influence local governance, thus making it more transparent and accountable.²⁴

Finally, there are those who value the EU’s contribution to establishing a stronger civil society, but also understand that its role as a donor subjects the recipients of its funds to asymmetrical power relations. In their opinion, the EU sets the agenda by promoting the issues prioritised in its calls for proposals or in its own standpoints on issues such as peacebuilding or territorial peace.²⁵

3 Defending and Promoting Human Rights

Much of the EU’s action in Colombia has centred on defending and promoting human rights, which it considers crucial to reduce violence, build trust even during armed conflict, and encourage peaceful coexistence (Kurtenbach, 2014: 504). To this end, the EU has worked, and continues to work, with public institutions and civil society at local and national level.

Work in this area has been particularly sensitive and controversial, and has been conditioned by a variety of circumstances. On the one hand, the security conditions on the ground have deteriorated since 2020, with a sharp rise in threats and assassinations of social leaders, ex-combatants and human rights defenders. This situation has hindered actions on the ground. On the other hand, successive Colombian governments have adopted inconsistent approaches and policies on security, peace and human rights. According to various members of the Delegation, human rights have not been a priority for the Duque government, with its doctrine of peace with legality, which has made it difficult to maintain a dialogue in this area, where there have been differences and disagreements.²⁶

Despite this, dialogue has been possible. According to European External Action Service (EEAS) representatives, unlike in other countries, where working on human rights can mean being shut out of ministries, the Colombian government has been open to multilateral action and diplomatic dialogue on the issue, with the intention of making improvements in this area.²⁷

The EU’s action on human rights has relied on a variety of mechanisms. One of them has been based on various cooperation projects implemented by CSOs and financed through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and through calls for projects from civil society. The Trust Fund, on the other hand, which focuses mainly on productive aspects, does not finance specific human rights projects. Nevertheless, it does address human rights issues in a cross-cutting manner, particularly economic and social rights, while its projects are flexible enough to be adapted in situations of insecurity and to assist leaders under threat.

The projects focus on promoting, preventing, protecting and guaranteeing the human rights of vulnerable groups such as indigenous people and women. With regard to women, it is worth mentioning an emblematic project, ‘Mujeres que Transforman’ (Women who Transform), implemented in Putumayo by the Dutch NGO ICCO and the association Mujeres Tejedoras de Vida (Women Weavers of Life), which brings together numerous local organisations. It centres on women who are victims of gender-based violence, through activities focused on accompaniment and protection, economic empowerment, radio campaigns, and advocacy for the development of municipal gender policies.²⁸

In the area of victims’ rights, the EU has worked directly with organisations that bring victims together. To a large extent, however, they have reached them indirectly through projects on issues such as land restitution, sexual violence, recruitment of minors, etc. This indirect impact can be seen, for example, in the two areas on which the Trust Fund has focused: its Comprehensive Rural Reform projects have provided access to land for people who have been dispossessed of it; while in the area of reincorporating ex-combatants, several projects have been implemented to rebuild the social fabric, aimed at beginning the reconciliation process between victims and perpetrators.²⁹

Some of the human rights projects have also had some impact on public policies, but indirectly, depending on the capacity for advocacy of the social organisations that implement the projects. For example, a Christian Aid project with the Red Nacional de Mujeres Defensoras (National Network of Women Defenders) has ensured that the protection given to women under threat has a stronger gender focus.³⁰

Another mechanism for EU action has been its support for public policies, although this has been limited by insufficient policy development and differences of opinion with the government. One of the policies supported has been the Comprehensive Programme for Safeguards for Women Leaders and Human Rights Defenders, in which there has been convergence between civil society and government. Similarly, support is being provided to the Ombudsman’s Office to strengthen its strategy to protect threatened leaders, which includes increasing the capacities of local authorities to improve their response to early warnings and the protection measures they offer. However, work in this field has been hampered because, according to a Delegation official, the EU ‘has not had sufficient mutual understanding with the Ministry of the Interior’, and has seen no way of supporting the ministry’s protection policies because its analysis of the context and proposals for a response were not sufficiently comprehensive. In other words, the government has given the EU little opportunity to help it to improve its public policy in this area.³¹ Similarly, the EU was keen to support the National Commission for Security Guarantees, but this has not been possible due to the government’s lack of political will to make it function properly.³² In this respect, EU staff acknowledge that it is difficult to estimate the EU’s impact on human rights public policies, concluding that there has been some change but no real transformation.³³

Another important area of action in the field of human rights has been the political and financial support given to the transitional justice system, in particular to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and the Truth Commission. With regard to the latter, for example, the EU has provided full and continuous political support through visits, meetings and public messages, which has been particularly important when the Commission has faced difficult situations. At the financial level, the EU has provided crucial funds to strengthen it as an institution and to implement three strands of the Commission’s work: deploying its teams in the country’s territories; defining its work with ethnic peoples; and establishing a communications strategy, for which the EU communications team also provided technical support. On the other hand, the EU decided not to finance the Commission’s work with people in exile, as its priority was the activities carried out within Colombia.³⁴

Another area of activity in the sphere of human rights has been the bilateral dialogue between the EU and the Colombian government, in a variety of spaces. These include regular dialogues on human rights, which are meant to be held annually—although the government has sometimes postponed or cancelled them—and which make it possible to tackle issues and adopt commitments at a high diplomatic level. We should also mention the high-level dialogue held with the government during the Special Envoy’s visits to the country, approximately twice a year. In addition, the EU Delegation carries out advocacy work at the level of the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, and holds regular discussions with different ministries and government bodies (such as the National Protection Unit) on various issues, particularly on the threats and assassinations of social leaders, human rights defenders and ex-combatants, which are seen as a serious impediment to achieving durable peace.³⁵ For example, the EU has alerted the government to situations in which people have been at risk or threatened, urging it to protect them and pointing out the weaknesses of the state protection system.

On this point, a source in the Delegation insisted that this is a sensitive issue but not a particularly controversial one, as both parties share the need to overcome the situation. Moreover, the interviewee added that in diplomatic dialogues the EU’s role is not to assess whether or not the government is doing enough to curb the problem; instead it repeatedly urges the government to act, and shows its willingness to help.³⁶ However, several sources have stressed that the Duque government was not very open to dialogue on this issue, which has been difficult to tackle as a result.³⁷

Finally, the EU has also carried out intense public advocacy on human rights. The Delegation, the ambassador, the Special Envoy and the Member States themselves have contributed with messages, public statements and visits to conflict zones. It has sought to put the issue on the agenda and press the government to shoulder its responsibility to protect and address the situation of threats and killings in the territories, without seeking confrontation on the issue.³⁸

Added to this is the diplomatic support given to CSO advocacy work. This has involved holding regular meetings with human rights defenders and building bridges between them and the government.³⁹ A notable example is the Defendamos la Vida (Defend Life) campaign, organised jointly by the Delegation and all the European embassies, to protect social leaders and human rights defenders, drawing attention to their situation with a strong media campaign (Colombia#defendamoslavidacolombia). The 16 EU ambassadors have travelled to the territories bringing ministers as guests to meet with CSO. These meetings help to reduce the stigmatisation of social leaders and strengthen the security of social organisations; they require the security forces and authorities to shoulder their responsibilities and commitments towards them⁴⁰; and they facilitate dialogue between civil society and the government, where lacking.⁴¹ The campaign model can be applied to other countries where there is little space for CSOs.⁴²

Despite all these types of activities, it is perhaps in the area of human rights that the EU has received the most criticism, both from academics and civil society. It is already 10 years since Castañeda, for example, claimed that the EU had ‘been able to maintain a continuous ambiguity over its demands to the central government with regards to respect for human rights’: the European Parliament made statements condemning government-paramilitary links and army abuses, while the European Council adopted a low-profile position on the issue (Castañeda, 2012: 55–6). It was also noted that the EU did not always take a public stance on violence or rights violations committed against people involved in the programmes it funded (Barreto, 2016: 460).

Similar criticism has also been voiced since the Peace Agreement was signed, as threats and murders of social activists and ex-combatants have since increased in many areas of the country. Some argue that the EU has often failed to go beyond statements and has not been tough enough in pressuring the government at high-level summits on human rights (Ioannides, 2019: 1). It is claimed that although various EU bodies have shown concern for the plight of human rights defenders and social leaders, they have exerted insufficient pressure on the government.⁴³ Instead, their key approach has been to highlight the importance of consolidating the bilateral partnership, and recognise the commitment and efforts made by the Colombian government in the peacebuilding process (Forero, 2021: 449).

Moreover, although the European Parliament has made several pronouncements on such killings, European diplomats have done little more than communicate their concern and had, until recently, failed to issue any express and formal criticism of the government’s role. According to Forero, the EU has only made a few statements on the matter since 2020, when Special Envoy Gilmore referred to the need for the government to make its presence in rural areas a reality, not only in terms of security but also social services (Forero, 2021: 45). Even more explicitly, in January 2021 the current High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, demanded ‘an effective response by the Colombian state’ to the upsurge in murders of social leaders, human rights defenders and FARC-EP ex-combatants, which requires ‘adopting structural measures’, starting with ‘implementing the Peace Agreement in its entirety’ (INFOBAE, 2021).

Similarly, the EU has been criticised for ‘being very indulgent with the government’s pace and decisions’, and for its failure to make progress on or allocate funds for the implementation of the Agreement. Numerous people have spoken of the EU’s same weakness and lack of assertiveness on contentious issues such as the reduction of public funding for the Special Jurisdiction for Peace or the resumption of coca crop spraying (Forero, 2021: 44–46). Likewise, it has said little about the protestors killed by police in recent years, or the cases of corruption and misappropriation of funds in the government’s system of awarding contracts with funding earmarked for peace.⁴⁴ It should be added that, as mentioned above, the ‘democracy and human rights clause’ of the EU-Colombia Trade Agreement has never been activated, on the grounds that dialogue and cooperation with Colombian actors is the most appropriate instrument to improve their situation (Ioannides, 2019: 20).

There may be several reasons for the EU’s somewhat cautious position on human rights. One of them is its determination to show that the Peace Agreement has not failed and is still alive, and this is reflected in its discourse, which has always highlighted the progress made. Another explanation is its desire to maintain smooth relations with the government, given the importance attached to the country and to bilateral economic relations. As several sources in the Delegation pointed out, the EU has tried to strike a balance by establishing good relations both with successive governments and with CSOs, thereby helping to strengthen civil society and improve public policies, and building bridges for dialogue from a neutral standpoint.⁴⁵ It should also be added that, according to Delegation sources, much of the human rights advocacy has not been publicised, but has been done discreetly with the government by diplomatic means, seeking to keep the channels of communication open in order to be effective.⁴⁶ Ambassadors’ efforts to influence the Duque government have required diplomatic skill in raising the issues of insecurity and reincorporation without generating controversy, in order to prevent the dialogue from breaking down and to expand the available spaces and move forward.⁴⁷

4 The Territorial Approach

One of the most characteristic features of EU cooperation in Colombia, from its origins to the present day, has been its territorial approach. This is due to the country’s great diversity and the needs triggered by precarious government presence in many areas. But it is also linked to the EU’s other objectives, such as tackling the causes of the armed conflict and strengthening civil society. Although the territorial approach may also be part of the EU’s external action in other countries, many of the actors interviewed consider it to be fundamental in Colombia. It cuts across the different policy areas, enabling the EU to prioritize the territories most affected by the armed conflict and adapt to the conditions in each of them.

The EU has been developing and applying its territorial approach for two decades: it therefore predates and can be considered a precursor to the concept of ‘territorial peace’ that inspired the 2016 Peace Agreement. In fact, its origins can be traced back to the financial and political support given to the Peace Laboratories since the early 2000s. This marked a commitment to peacebuilding at the local and territorial level, in the midst of war and without waiting for armed actors to achieve peace at the national level. The support and visibility given to previously marginalized local processes and actors was like ‘a vast oxygen tank in the middle of the war’, and in fact transcended the local level, as it was a political gesture of support for a negotiated solution to the conflict.⁴⁸

Later, the territorial approach materialised as support for initiatives inherited from the Laboratories, such as the Regional Development, Peace and Stability programmes between 2009 and 2016 and the New Territories for Peace between 2011 and 2016. The EU has also supported numerous local initiatives focused on peacebuilding, resisting armed actors, reconstructing the social fabric, boosting socio-economic development and defending rights, thus strengthening so-called ‘zones of peace’ (Castañeda, 2012: 33). The territorial approach continued to be implemented after the Peace Agreement was signed, particularly through the Trust Fund, which aims to finance activities in the areas most affected by the conflict. These activities are mainly dedicated to supporting the implementation of two points of the Agreement that have a deep-rooted territorial aspect: rural reform and the reincorporation of ex-combatants. The Trust Fund is concentrated in four departments (Putumayo, Caquetá, Guaviare & Nariño), which has given it greater territorial impact.⁴⁹

The territorial approach means that EU-funded projects are implemented by grassroots and other local social organisations, with the close involvement of peasants, women, indigenous people, Afro-descendants and ex-combatants. These links with local grassroots organisations ensures that the EU’s approach remains context-aware and responds to local needs (Forero, 2021: 29). This territorial, bottom-up perspective based on the participation and strengthening of local social organisations contrasts sharply with that of the Duque government, which was top-down and has prioritised the presence of military forces in conflict zones, which has affected the reconciliation process (Forero, 2021: 39).

Likewise, several interviewees, both from the EU and from CSOs, stress that the EU’s territorial approach is characterised by a very open dialogue with local actors that include social organisations and communities as well as local authorities. Regular visits from the EU Ambassador and Delegation staff on the ground contribute to this.⁵⁰

There are reportedly some cases of EU cooperation projects that have been developed by foreign technical staff, with minimal participation from the local population.⁵¹ However, most sources emphasise that the projects originate in the territories and are based on their own reality and context. Some appreciate the fact that ‘the EU has the sensitivity to go into the territories and listen to them’,⁵² and that its actions show respect for the dynamics of the country and the territories, as well as being flexible and adapting to complex contexts and changes in government. This, they say, contrasts with USAID’s policy, which they describe as rigid, vertical, imposing and having minimal contact with the territories.⁵³

The territorial approach has materialised in a wide range of actions aimed at boosting socio-economic development in the territories and fostering a dialogue between the various actors on the ground, as well as improving local governance capacity. Indeed, one of the EU’s main contributions, which distinguishes it from other international cooperation actors, is to facilitate local spaces in which communities and local CSOs can engage in dialogue with local and national authorities and the private sector. The aim is to build strategic alliances for territorial development⁵⁴ and to strengthen local institutions and their capacity for democratic governance and service provision. In turn, these spaces have allowed the EU to influence local processes⁵⁵ and, at the request of local CSOs themselves, to act as a go-between with national institutions in order to communicate CSOs’ concerns about the situation in the territories, including the violence they experience.⁵⁶

Many projects have aimed to strengthen local capacities, such as the ‘Municipios Visibles para la Paz’ (‘Visible Municipalities for Peace’) project in 2017–18 organised jointly with the Colombian Federation of Municipalities.⁵⁷ But perhaps the most striking example of the way the EU has applied its territorial approach is the department of Nariño, where the strongest territorial network has been established. In this department, an interlocking structure has been created involving the governor’s office, the mayors’ offices and CSOs—with the latter creating a platform for social innovation, ‘Nariño Decide’ (‘Nariño Decides’), which has enabled all of the department’s social groups to be involved in territorial decisions. By means of this organisational structure, territorial planning has been carried out based on local needs, mobilising various sources of funding to implement actions in a range of areas. Specifically, water has been the key sector that has catalysed joint work and territorial planning through the creation of water boards and a dedicated unit in the Nariño governor’s office, which has developed several water projects. In addition, Spain has cooperated by providing experts in decentralisation and municipal management, while pilot projects focused on tax collection, land registry etc. have been implemented.⁵⁸

One interesting mechanism promoted by the Fund has been the Territorial Roundtables. These are spaces for dialogue organised in the territories once or twice a year with the participation of all actors: the governor’s office, mayors’ offices, national government agencies, social organisations, etc. The Roundtables have several objectives: to listen to what is needed in the territories so as to better understand the context; to promote the exchange of valuable experiences; to encourage joint political advocacy; and to improve coordination between the Fund’s various projects in a given department. Indeed, the Roundtables have sought to mitigate the fact that the Fund has lacked a territorial strategy or agenda at the departmental level. In fact, in its early days the Fund approved individual projects, each with its own objectives, proposed by its participating states and linked to their own bilateral cooperation.⁵⁹ But the fact that the Roundtables have lacked a clear methodology seems to have limited their capacity as a space for coordinating actions and making decisions.⁶⁰

However, in 2018 it was decided that the Fund would replace micro-actions with projects that take a more strategic and comprehensive approach in order to have a greater territorial impact. This resulted in the heavily funded (22 million euros) ‘PDET Routes’ project, which operates in areas covered by the Development Programmes with a Territorial Approach (PDET) in the departments of Caquetá and Putumayo. This is a pilot initiative that seeks to implement the PDET as a key tool for realising Point 1 of the Agreement, on the Comprehensive Rural Reform. It has a clear focus on territorial development, aiming to achieve sustainable production in the territories by involving sectors such as business, institutions and communities. Although the government’s initial intention was to limit the project to road-building, it has gradually included other aspects such as support for cocoa (Putumayo) or dairy (Caquetá) marketing chains, funding for small and medium-sized enterprises, governance, etc..⁶¹

Another indicator of the EU’s territorial approach has been its strong support for Colombia’s Network of Local Development Agencies (ADELCO), which brings together 14 agencies, many of them working in areas with vulnerable communities affected by the armed conflict. Many of these were created with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), but were later backed by the EU, which has provided ADELCO with 70% of its funding for more than a decade.⁶² Each agency implements projects with a territorial focus in areas related to livelihoods (water, tourism, fishing, etc.), bringing together the work of local actors: organised civil society, the private sector and the public sector.⁶³ These actors are working with a methodology called ‘shared vision of the territory’ in order to develop, with the support of the EU, a common economic development agenda adapted to their territory’s specific conditions. Representatives of ADELCO value two particular features of EU support: first, it backs projects that are adapted to each territory’s circumstances, including the different capacities of its actors; and second, although the projects may be short-term, they are developed with a view to long-term processes.

Another area in which the territorial approach is being seen is in the support given to the reincorporation of ex-combatants, with a view to reconciliation. The projects seek to enhance their links with the surrounding communities (with whom their relationships have varied, ranging from close to hostile) and promote local spaces for coexistence, peace and sustainable ‘territorial development’ (EUTF, 2021). Specifically, the EU has made a decisive contribution in three areas with territorial implications. First, it has remained steadfast in its commitment to the collective reincorporation model adopted in the Agreement, despite the government’s reluctance. Second, its political backing and funding of productive projects have built confidence among reincorporated ex-combatants and ensured their unwavering commitment to the Agreement, despite the government’s non-compliance. And third, as in the Agua Bonita ETCR (Territorial Space for Training and Reincorporation) (Caquetá), it has built bridges between ex-combatants and neighbouring communities, addressing their misgivings and helping them to work and reflect together in their territory.

The EU’s territorial approach can also be seen in other spheres of action. For example, the EU was instrumental in supporting the land restitution process after President Santos came to office. Its support for the territorial deployment of the Truth Commission was also crucial, as it largely financed the so-called Houses of Truth. It has also boosted the image of the territories in the media, as a contribution to the culture of peace in Colombia. For example, the Colombia 2020 project has broadcast journalistic analyses on various topics, so that the country’s population becomes aware of the problems and progress made in achieving peace.⁶⁴ Similarly, in the area of rural development with a territorial approach, it has supported the government’s budget to anchor its land policies and governance in specific territories, improving cooperation at territorial level between the relevant government agencies.⁶⁵

To sum up, the EU’s territorial approach has been applied with striking results at the community level in the municipalities where projects have been implemented. However, its impact, particularly in terms of the implementation of the Havana Agreement at national level, has been limited for a number of reasons.

First of all, the territorial approach is hindered by a precarious institutional presence in large areas of the country. This is exacerbated by the fact that Colombia has not implemented a decentralisation process, resulting in a significant lack of resources for departments and municipalities.⁶⁶

Another major obstacle to peacebuilding has been the worsening security situation in the communities most affected by the conflict, where the EU is active. In addition to the actions of various armed groups and the assassinations of social leaders and ex-combatants, there has been an higher police and army presence in many areas, sometimes sparking tensions in communities.

Another hindrance to the EU’s strongly civilian and civil society-supported territorial approach is that it has not matched the Duque government’s approach, which has prioritised military control of the territories. This divergence has limited the EU’s capacity to build sustainable peace in those areas (Forero, 2021: 48). Indeed, according to EU staff in Bogotá, the EU’s territorial approach—based on dialogue with all actors, including the national authorities—has failed to ensure that the Duque government has developed a parallel territorial approach. In fact, territorial policies should be realised through the PDETs (to which the EU has tried to contribute through its ‘PDET Routes’ project), but the government has failed to implement them, meaning they are little more than a wish list compiled by municipalities for their territories.⁶⁷

One relevant issue is that, according to various sources, although the EU’s discourse on the territorial approach is clear, the fact is that when it comes to actually implementing the approach, it lacks an explicit written strategy on territorial development. In the Trust Fund in particular, each project establishes its own objectives and activities, with its own individual vision, so that the territorial construction is carried out according to the organisations behind the project. As mentioned above, efforts have been made to address this strategic weakness through the Territorial Roundtables, which aim to link all the projects in each department under a shared agenda, as well as through the ‘PDET Routes’ project, based on a unifying approach.⁶⁸

In this respect, two further factors seem to limit the implementation of the territorial approach. On the one hand, although the EU has extensive historical experience in territorial development, this is focused on the economic sphere rather than peacebuilding contexts. On the other hand, many of the European projects in Colombia are not in line with existing land-use planning in the country’s departments, which sometimes generates parallel development agendas and fragmented initiatives.⁶⁹

5 Lessons Learned for Other Contexts

The EU’s action in Colombia in recent years has followed the principles and standards that have guided its presence in other countries. It is worth noting, however, that in this case some aspects have taken on particular significance and are more innovative than its practices in other contexts. It can therefore be said that the EU’s experience in Colombia offers some useful lessons that can help to enhance the range of peace-building strategies and instruments that it uses throughout the world. The following list details what we consider to be the most relevant lessons.

• a. The first striking aspect is the type of peacebuilding approach that the EU has adopted in Colombia, even in the midst of the armed conflict: it seeks to address the root causes of the conflict and is multidimensional. In other words, it combines actions in a variety of areas, mainly socio-economic development of the most vulnerable sectors, human rights and the strengthening of institutions (especially local ones) and their public policies. It also includes activities in the fields of historical memory, transitional justice and the culture of peace, among others.

• b. Second is peacebuilding with a territorial approach, which the EU has developed during its two decades of engagement in the country. This approach prioritises the territories most affected by violence, focusing on the specificities of each of them, boosting the capacity and participation of local social organisations, strengthening local institutions and promoting local spaces for dialogue between civil society, institutions and even private actors. An interesting mechanism for this is the Territorial Roundtables, as spaces for dialogue in the territories, which help to prevent individual projects from fragmenting. In addition, the EU has supported these actors in forming strategic alliances to make progress with territorial planning processes, often through practical initiatives such as promoting certain productive and commercial activities or managing essential services such as water. The territorial approach has also been reflected in the EU’s support for the collective model of socio-economic reincorporation of ex-combatants, with productive projects and other activities involving neighbouring communities, with the aim of promoting local development with a territorial vision and fostering reconciliation. Likewise, it can be seen in the EU’s funding of local development agencies, which are adapted to local conditions and whose projects form part of long-term territorial development processes.

• c. A third lesson is the multi-level dialogue that the EU holds with all actors, at both political and technical levels, building on its good relations with civil society and government and facilitating communication between the two. The EU has played a particularly noteworthy role in promoting spaces for dialogue and acting as a catalyst for building bridges between CSOs and institutions, both at territorial and national level. The EU’s ‘good offices’ function has helped to overcome the lack of trust caused by years of armed conflict, and has been particularly useful in a context of increasing political polarisation during the Duque government. Striking a sometimes difficult balance, the EU has helped to draw the government’s attention to civil society’s concerns about the situation in the territories, while at the same time helping to make the institutions more accountable to local populations.

  As senior EEAS representatives in Colombia point out, the EU has highly developed mechanisms for dialogue with the government on numerous issues (human rights, security, etc.), more so than in other countries.⁷⁰ These channels have been open at all times, despite differences with the Duque government’s approach and the EU’s insistence on the need to implement the Peace Agreement in its entirety.

• d. It is worth highlighting the impact of the EU’s budgetary support to the government, particularly in a context in which, under President Duque, the government has been unwilling to implement several points of the Agreement. This mechanism has enabled a direct and continuous dialogue with government agencies, as well as technical work that has allowed various issues to be raised to a higher political level so as to motivate the government to address them. One such issue, discussed in the Trust Fund’s governance bodies, was the government’s need to adopt a holistic approach to land governance, instead of considering land titling, registration and formalisation to be separate processes. By including this issue in the budget support framework, it was given a compliance indicator, which has encouraged the government to promote common agendas among the government agencies involved – with common objectives that have improved their joint work – and to create mechanisms for territorial land governance.⁷¹

  Another example of the impact of budget support is that, by including relevant indicators, it has encouraged the Duque government to develop its policy on the reincorporation of ex-combatants, in particular by granting them land.⁷²

• e. Of all the instruments used by the EU, the European Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia stands out as particularly relevant. Its importance is demonstrated by the fact that, of the four funds created by the EU, it is the only one focused on supporting a specific peace process. Established a few weeks after the Agreement was signed and designed to support its implementation, it was allocated 130 million euros, which have supported different projects related to rural reform and the reincorporation of ex-combatants and provided budgetary support to the government for reincorporation efforts. The Fund ceased to exist on 1 December 2021, although it continues to implement the actions to which it is committed. Indeed, through its new Team Europe Initiative (TEI), the EU aims to increase coordination with Member States in order to make it more effective and impactful. According to several people in the Bogotá Delegation, the Fund resulted in experiences and lessons that can be seen as precedents for the TEI.⁷³

  One of the main distinguishing features of the Fund is that it is the only one with decentralised management, in Colombia rather than in Brussels, which has allowed participating states to be more involved and have a direct link with the Colombian government. The TEI, on the other hand, aims to centralise decision-making in Brussels. However, the delegation and Member States have called for the decentralised decision-making bodies of the Trust Fund to remain within the TEI.⁷⁴

  Both EU development cooperation staff and diplomatic staff in Colombia express their satisfaction with the Fund’s contributions. They highlight that it has created a space for more coordinated cooperation between all Member States, fostering a culture of working together.⁷⁵ The Fund has also helped to give cooperation a more holistic perspective. Although it initially financed small projects proposed by individual Member States, with no strategic vision or shared priorities, it later adopted a more coordinated and comprehensive standpoint, for example in the ‘PDET Routes’ project mentioned above. The Fund has sometimes required a major effort to reach common positions among EU Member States on some issues, such as land. But once those were achieved, it has provided much greater visibility and political impact with the government than individual States could have done.⁷⁶ For example, the Fund boosted the Duque government’s reincorporation policy, convincing it to tackle issues such as the granting of lands, housing provision, and health, education and childcare services.⁷⁷

  One of the Fund’s contributions is that it designed an innovative monitoring system for its projects, structured around several pillars and with follow-up indicators. Another aspect highlighted is the Fund’s flexibility and adaptability in responding to new demands from the government, such as support for the reincorporation of ex-combatants, and in incorporating already existing projects. In this respect, the Fund is also innovative in its use of EU mechanisms, both projects with civil society and budget support for public policies.

• f. Another relevant feature of EU action in Colombia, emphasised by a prominent representative of European diplomacy in Bogotá, is the high degree of unity—apparently higher than in other countries—among the various EU bodies. On the one hand, the EEAS and the Commission’s development cooperation work together. On the other hand, there is a high degree of consensus among ambassadors on the issues at stake, and they are closely involved in supporting the Delegation’s activities, unanimously backing its positions on sensitive issues such as human rights.⁷⁸

• g. Although strengthening civil society is a key position of the EU on a global scale, the strong commitment made to civil society in Colombia is noteworthy. For example, the fact that the EU has maintained a permanent alliance with CSOs to continue to move towards negotiated peace and a fully implemented Agreement. While we should not overlook the criticism voiced with regard to its heavy bureaucratic requirements, EU cooperation in support of social organisations offers a wide range of interesting experiences, areas for action and working mechanisms. Moreover, it is worth emphasising the steps it has taken to move beyond a logic based on individual projects towards support for broader social and territorial processes.⁷⁹

• h. Related to the above, another highly relevant experience is the support given to social and solidarity-based economic initiatives—a model that already had roots in the country—as a mechanism for promoting peace in the areas most affected by the conflict. For example, through local development agencies and other types of organisations, the EU is supporting various projects to promote production and marketing chains for coffee and cocoa, as well as sustainable tourism, local trade, etc. It also promotes this economic model through its support for ECOMUN, the association of cooperatives for ex-combatants, which, despite the many internal and external problems it faces, is an entirely new experience in reincorporation processes around the world. The EU is giving funding for productive projects such as fish farms, training in the principles of the social and solidarity-based economy, and consultation on its organisation and operation. In short, EU action in this area provides practical lessons that can be extremely useful for other peace processes around the globe, as well as empirical inputs that can enrich debates on the relationship between peacebuilding and local human development.

• i. One final experience that deserves to be highlighted is the Defendamos la Vida (Defend Life) campaign in support of threatened leaders, as it provides lessons that can be replicated in other countries with high levels of violence. This campaign unanimously involved both the Delegation and the Member States and reflects the Delegation’s strong commitment to taking a coordinated approach to human rights and civil society. The EU is reportedly considering it as a model for other countries where civil society does not have a strong presence.⁸⁰

6 Future Prospects and Room for Improvement

The appointment of Gustavo Petro as President of Colombia in August 2022 has opened up a new landscape for the country and for the peace process. The new government has expressed its commitment to fully implementing the Havana Agreement and has already begun to unblock some of the points on which little progress has been made, such as the comprehensive rural reform, while also taking on board the recommendations of the Truth Commission’s final report.

In this context, all sources predict a strengthening of the space for cooperation between the new Colombian government and the EU with a view to implementing the Agreement. With good reason, both parties now share a common approach that the EU has been promoting for two decades, based on addressing the root causes of the conflict and dialogue with civil society and the territories. They also share the same concerns, as EU cooperation, in its new Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2020–2027, has defined peace (including human rights) and the environment as its priorities, which are also two focal points of President Petro’s programme. In fact, shortly after he came to office, both he and various ministers held their first meetings with the EU in order to establish cooperation.

Delegation sources interviewed expressed a strong interest in supporting the government on aspects such as rural development and dialogue with the territories. They believe that the EU has added value that can give it a relevant role for this new era: so far it has been an important and reliable partner in the pursuit of peace, and has experience in the territories, as well as links and legitimacy in civil society.

In this new scenario, some areas are emerging as challenges that will become increasingly important and require greater attention from the EU in Colombia. One of these is comprehensive rural reform—a point of the Agreement that was ignored by the previous administration, but which the current government has made a priority. This is a major challenge of historic significance, requiring substantial financial resources and careful dialogue with relevant actors in each territory—two areas in which the EU can contribute.

Another area that will become increasingly important for both the government and the EU is the environment. Beyond relevant issues such as biodiversity protection or energy transition, the EU will need to develop strategies and operational mechanisms that link environmental issues with those of peacebuilding and human rights protection. In this way, it could make a stronger contribution to preventing and managing environmental conflicts, which are a growing source of tension in the territories, to protecting environmental leaders in situations of risk, and to developing environmental policies with greater involvement from civil society.

Learning from the experience garnered in recent years, the EU also faces the challenge of improving the quality and sustainability of the productive projects it has supported in the areas of rural development and the reincorporation of ex-combatants. As various sources have pointed out, many of these projects were launched hurriedly in order to demonstrate the EU’s support for the Agreement and to build confidence in its implementation. However, many of the initiatives are not workable due to a lack of marketing infrastructure and many other factors. A key challenge is therefore to transform such initiatives so that they are sustainable over the long term.

Another area for improvement concerns the EU’s territorial approach in Colombia. Although, as we have seen, this is one of the most deeply rooted and inspiring features of EU action, it has been implemented without a clear strategy at national or departmental level, but to a large extent according to the actions of the implementing organisations. It would therefore be of great interest to analyse and systematise the EU experience of applying the territorial approach in Colombia. This would provide the EU with valuable input for a task which, in our view, would contribute decisively to the development of its peacebuilding policy around the world: creating a strategy or programme document on peacebuilding and territorial construction in post-conflict contexts, incorporating local human development objectives, local governance and civil society participation. Its theoretical foundations could be drawn from existing debates on the local turn in Peace Studies and on the relationship between space and peace in the Critical Geography of Peace.

Similarly, as noted in previous chapters, the Colombian experience highlights the need for the EU to develop strategies and methodologies that focus on indigenous populations and other ethnic minorities, which in some countries are often among the groups worst affected by armed conflict. With reason, there is a growing awareness of the importance of identity in peacebuilding processes, in conjunction with other economic and political aspects. Similarly, it would be appropriate to develop policies and strategies specifically designed for the victims of armed conflict, rather than merely reaching them indirectly through actions in other areas. Furthermore, although gender equality has been incorporated into the EU’s foreign policy discourse and objectives, there is room for improvement in gender mainstreaming in its various policies and actions in Colombia, in particular based on an analysis of the causes of gender inequality.

One final aspect that deserves attention is the degree of internal coherence of the various EU instruments in Colombia. As numerous studies have shown, the different policy instruments used by the EU in the context of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have been characterised by a fragmentation of their objectives and rationales. This problem has recently been addressed by developing an integrated approach that seeks to increase coherence between them all, but this has only been achieved to a limited extent (Debuysere & Blockmans, 2019; Pérez de Armiño, 2020).

In this regard, the EU representatives interviewed in Colombia generally underline a high level of internal coherence between the EU areas of cooperation, EEAS policies and trade policy. However, it is worth recalling that this assessment is mitigated by criticism from civil society. Civil society acknowledges that EU development cooperation has worked to promote the human rights, including socio-economic rights, of the most vulnerable groups. However, it also often questions whether the EU’s political and diplomatic action towards the Duque government was assertive enough in view of its non-compliance with the Agreement (especially in areas of priority for the EU, such as comprehensive rural reform and the reincorporation of ex-combatants) and its inadequate response to the killings of social leaders, human rights defenders and reincorporated ex-combatants. Indeed, in its political dialogue with the Duque government, the EU consistently raised these and other human rights violations, but always with restraint and without jeopardising the channels of communication. Furthermore, the EU’s trade policy does not seem to have been conditioned by human rights issues in the country. In this respect, the EU has never activated the democracy and human rights clause of its Trade Agreement with Colombia, nor has it used it to put pressure on the government.

Therefore, as can be seen at the global level, there is still room for greater coherence and integration of EU policies (cooperation, diplomacy and trade) with Colombia. Its action so far has been coherent in two respects, both of which are worth highlighting. First, it has shown commitment over time, maintaining a consistent discourse in favour of a peace process based on tackling the root causes of the conflict. Second, it has maintained a high level of coordination and joint work between the Member States, as a result of the gradual development of a common position, culminating in the Trust Fund for Peace. However, there remains the challenge of improving coherence in a third sense: linking the different areas of EU presence in Colombia.

As a final assessment, it is worth emphasising the innovation found in many of the approaches and operational mechanisms used by the EU in Colombia over two decades, especially after the Havana Agreement was signed in 2016. When these innovations are examined in depth, they provide interesting insights to illustrate and feed many of the recent debates in the field of Peace Studies. They also offers lessons that can be useful for moving beyond conventional formulations of liberal peace and, specifically, for broadening the normative and operational framework of European peacebuilding policies around the world.