Abstract
This part introduces the discussion of human free will, including of the problem of whether free will is compatible with determinism and of what free will amounts to if it exists. We begin by presenting standard compatibilist, incompatibilist and libertarian responses to this problem. Against this background, we discuss in detail the idealist views of freedom presented by Ellen Bliss Talbot, Marjorie Silliman Harris and Grace Andrus de Laguna in the articles included here. All three authors argue that an individual’s freedom is grounded in their unique and unrepeatable, self-determining nature.
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Notes
- 1.
When, however, our authors talk about being able to do otherwise, they are concerned with being able to do otherwise without any change in circumstances, including external conditions, characteristics of the self and the laws of nature. This contrasts with what many in the analytic tradition have meant by ‘being able to do otherwise’.
- 2.
Qualitative unity and qualitative uniqueness are to be distinguished from the corresponding quantitative features of individuals. Quantitative unity is just being numerically one. Quantitative uniqueness is just being numerically different from everything else.
- 3.
Katzav and Rogers discussed the stances of Ritchie and Talbot on free will/determinism at some length. See Rogers (2021; pp. 38–40; 68–70), who argues that while Talbot may have accepted a qualified determinism, Ritchie objected to theological or metaphysical notions of free will.
- 4.
For more on Bergson’s view about the interdependence of the states of the self, see the section on time (Part V: ‘Time’).
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Katzav, J., Rogers, D. (2023). Introduction. In: Katzav, J., Vaesen, K., Rogers, D. (eds) Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24437-7_26
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