Abstract
Amie Thomasson’s work provides numerous ways to rethink and improve our approach to metaphysics. This chapter is my attempt to begin to sketch why I still think the easy approach leaves room for substantive metaphysical work, and why I do not think that metaphysics need rely on any ‘epistemically metaphysical’ knowledge. After distinguishing two possible forms of deflationism, I argue that the easy ontologist needs to accept (implicitly or explicitly) that there are worldly constraints on what sorts of entities could exist, and could co-exist. I argue this leaves room for a substantive role for metaphysics if (following the work of E.J. Lowe) we take metaphysics to be concerned with the possible ways that reality could be. I explain how this conception does not need to appeal to any ‘epistemically metaphysical’ knowledge, and need only make use of conceptual and/or empirical means to arrive at views on what could exist (and co-exist). Thus, the answer I propose to the question posed in the title, at least in my view, is no-one. Or, at least, no-one should be afraid of conceptual analysis. Not even metaphysicians.
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Notes
- 1.
Hence the chapter title’s hidden subheading: Or, how I learned to stop worrying and love metaphysics.
- 2.
I will use the terms ‘reality’ and ‘the world’ interchangeably throughout.
- 3.
See Miller (2022) for a more general discussion of various views that deny our ability to ‘access’ reality in the way presupposed by substantive (or perhaps realist) metaphysicians. Note that although I mention these figures as arguing for some version of content deflationism, this does not mean that these views only deflate the content of metaphysics. Many of them also argue for the second form of deflationism—methodological deflationism—as well. The specifics of how content and methodological deflationism interact for each of these figures will vary. For some, content deflationism underpins methodological deflationism; for others, it is methodological deflationism that leads to content deflationism. A full discussion of each of these views and the specific structure and interaction of the different forms of deflationism is not possible here, but could be interesting in future work to see if any patterns emerge in terms of whether concerns about the content of metaphysics drives claims about its methods or vice versa.
- 4.
A useful history of easy arguments can be found in Thomasson (2020b).
- 5.
After all, a non-deflationary metaphysician might agree with Thomasson that there is no single universal criteria of existence.
- 6.
Note that by including ‘typical’ here, Thomasson only means to allow that some social and cultural entities may depend on language or concepts (2015, p. 217).
- 7.
If there were no worldly constraints on what might be included in any particular application condition, then it is unclear how the easy ontologist can avoid being some form of linguistic idealism wherein what exists, and the nature of those things that exist, is determined not by the world, but by how we think or conceive of the world. As Thomasson is clear that easy ontology is not a form of idealism, I will not even consider this line of thought here.
- 8.
More accurately, it might be that what we hold is that there cannot be a square circle on the basis of the property of being a square excluding the property of being a circle. Thus, no object could have both of these properties. This additional level of detail does not affect my argument here.
- 9.
To stress, although I will suggest we can arrive at views on this via conceptual analysis, this does not mean that it is a mere conceptual matter. The issue is whether the world could contain entities of the right sort to be the referent of our terms with certain coapplication conditions. This is a worldly matter. I do rely on the claim that our concepts can be reflective and/or responsive to the world, however this is something that the easy ontologist also accepts, hence I will simply assume it here, though see also fn. 14 below.
- 10.
I am not here endorsing Lowe’s whole metametaphysical view which also includes a strong commitment to essences. I will remain neutral about those elements of Lowe’s metametaphysics here.
- 11.
We might, I suppose, try to establish that spatiotemporal coincidence implies identity for all physical objects. However, this is a controversial claim, and certainly there are those that do not accept that spatiotemporally coincidence implies identity for all physical objects, as the literature on the material composition and statues/lumps illustrates.
- 12.
Note, Lowe connects this claim with his views about essence, but we need not accept essences to accept this role for metaphysical theorising.
- 13.
I am happy to accept that it might be the case that the majority of the work of the metaphysicians is on the conceptual side of this. I illustrate the empirical side here to show how it is the case that knowledge of what is possible and compossible can be gained by conceptual and/or empirical means.
- 14.
Some might object here that it could be that we cannot gain any knowledge into how the world might be. That is, we might take a radical sceptic view, and say that no amount of conceptual analysis could ever arrive at claims that we can take to be true about how the world itself might be. I accept that there could be such a radical sceptic response, and I will not seek to refute it here. My own view is that we can be reasonably sure about a number of claims about how the world cannot be. For example, I accept the law of non-contradiction. My view is that it is simply not possible that the world is such that the law of non-contradiction is false. Again, I will not argue for this here, but it illustrates how radical such a sceptical position would have to be. I also take it that Thomasson’s commitment to simple realism means that she will also wish to reject the sceptics claim that we cannot have any knowledge of the world or how it might be.
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Miller, J. (2023). Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Analysis?. In: Garcia-Godinez, M. (eds) Thomasson on Ontology. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23672-3_5
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