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NATO Enlargement and US Grand Strategy: A Net Assessment

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Evaluating NATO Enlargement

Abstract

This chapter assesses NATO’s enlargement and its consequences for US post-Cold War grand strategy. It unfolds in eight segments. First, as a prelude to a discussion of enlargement, we consider the basic case for NATO’s continuing relevance after the Cold War. Second, we turn to NATO’s post-Cold War expansion and the debate surrounding it. Third, we consider the consequences of the alliance’s incorporation of states on Russia’s border. Fourth, we consider Russian reactions to NATO enlargement and its effects on US–Russian relations. The fifth segment considers a counterfactual: Could post-Soviet Europe’s stability have been ensured without NATO expansion, and if so, how? Sixth, we discuss the hazard of continued NATO enlargement, especially in regard to Ukraine and Georgia. Seventh, we explain why a more sober assessment of the threat posed by Russia helps place enlargement, past, present, and prospective, in context. We conclude with a discussion of the future of NATO and Europe in light of the Russia–Ukraine war and the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Talbott is a prominent, well-regarded expert on Russia, who served as deputy secretary of state and Clinton’s principle advisor on Russia from 1994 to 2001.

  2. 2.

    As this chapter goes to press, Sweden and Finland look likely to NATO in the next few months. This would bring the alliance’s membership up to 32 states.

  3. 3.

    For the reasons discussed above, we find this interpretation of events wanting. Not only had Russian leaders across the board been clear that Ukraine movement toward NATO would cross Russian red-lines, but analysts attributing the Russian attack to, e.g., Putin’s own vision for Russia or a particularly warped world view, fail to account for the real possibility that Putin’s goals and ambitions may be a product of prior bouts of NATO enlargement and fears about Russia’s future security position should Ukraine enter fully into the U.S.-dominated West. Indeed, one could argue that, just as with the Bush administration’s attempt to sell the Iraq War by throwing everything against the wall to see what would stick and motivate support, Putin’s later pronouncements could be as much or more about rallying support as revealing long-standing grand strategic goals or war aims. A proper and fuller treatment of the causes of the current conflict is beyond the scope of this paper and will require greater sources than are currently available. But a treatment that ignores NATO expansion would be one that ignores the deeper soils of history.

  4. 4.

    This section on Georgia draws on work that first appeared in William Ruger, “An Georgia Be A Useful American Ally?” War on the Rocks (August 8, 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/can-georgia-be-a-useful-american-ally/.

  5. 5.

    This section on Georgia draws on work that first appeared in William Ruger, “Can Georgia Be A Useful American Ally?” War on the Rocks (August 8, 2017), https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/can-georgia-be-a-useful-american-ally/.

  6. 6.

    This section draws on work that first appeared in Ruger 2019b. We Should Firmly Shut the Open Door. Law and Liberty, April 24. Avaiable at https://lawliberty.org/forum/we-should-firmly-shut-the-open-door/.

  7. 7.

    There is one caveat here. If Republicans return to power and the current foreign policy battle within conservatism leads to a Republican shift against liberal internationalism, that could foil the American establishment’s long-held aim to bring Ukraine under its wing. The chance of this happening would be even higher should former president Donald Trump return to the White House. And what the United States doesn’t want, NATO won’t do.

  8. 8.

    “NATO Plans Huge Upgrade in Rapid Reaction Force,” BBC News, June 27, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61954516.

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Correspondence to Rajan Menon .

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Menon, R., Ruger, W. (2023). NATO Enlargement and US Grand Strategy: A Net Assessment. In: Goldgeier, J., Shifrinson, J.R.I. (eds) Evaluating NATO Enlargement. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23364-7_6

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