Sandwiched? Sri Lankan Civic Space Amidst a Repressive Regime and a Pandemic

Abstract

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Sri Lanka coincided in the immediate aftermath of a political regime change with the election of a new President while general elections were to be held in early 2020. Mitigating the spread of the virus and the exigencies of holding an election to further consolidate the power at the level of legislature became competing interests. The nationalist fervour with which the new President came into power, triggered by an alleged threat to national security, continued to remain in the political sphere as a key driver. Hence, the pandemic invariably became politicized. Against this backdrop, the space and relative freedom that the Sri Lankan civil society organizations secured were significantly restricted. The paper observes the way in which the civil society organizations coped and navigated the repressive policy and political environment, how their aims were compromised, self-censored and re-strategized.

1 Introduction

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Sri Lanka coincided with the immediate aftermath of a significant political regime change. In November 2019, a new President was elected and general elections were to be held in early 2020. Mitigating the spread of the virus and the exigencies of holding an election to further consolidating power at the level of legislature became competing interests. The nationalist fervour with which the new President came into power, triggered by an alleged threat to national security, continued to remain in the political sphere as a key driver. Hence, the pandemic invariably became politicized and the sentiments against the minority ethnic groups, particularly, the Muslims, following the Easter bomb explosions in April 2019, re-emerged during the pandemic period. This chapter brings these contemporary historical narratives together with a focus on and interest to understand how civic space in Sri Lanka functioned amidst these two significant events unfolding in the context.

The overview and analysis cover the three-year period from April 2019 to end March 2022. The main methodology is a desk review, and data gathered from two unpublished studies of civil society organizations carried out by the author.¹ These studies included field work in the Northern, Eastern, Western and Southern part of the country. The particular emphasis of this chapter is thus on civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (to be defined in the ensuing section) functioning at the District and Divisional levels of the country.² The broader civic space dynamics, will be discussed based on a literature survey.

This chapter is organized in the following manner. First, a brief summary on the distinctive nature and features of the civic space in Sri Lanka is presented as a basis to understand the behaviour and dynamics of different actors, sub-categories and organizational/non-organizational forms that are explained later. Thereafter, the two major contextual changes that took place in the period under review—emergence of a new political regime and COVID-19—are discussed. How the civic space was impacted by these two contextual changes, with special reference to CSOs and NGOs, are presented in detail before a final analysis of how they coped and navigated the situation.

2 Understanding the Civic Space: Related Concepts and Their Usage in Sri Lanka

In line with the approach of this volume, this chapter employs the overarching conceptual category of ‘civic space’. It is sometimes used interchangeably with the term ‘civil society’. There is a certain degree of overlap between the two categories both at a conceptual and operational level. However, for reasons of conceptual clarity as well as to guide the categories and terminology used to denote different organizational forms, civic space is distinguished from civil society and is defined in the following way: ‘the public arena used by citizens and civil society organizations, and provided by the state, to exercise the fundamental rights of association, assembly, and expression’ (CIVICUS, cited by Biekart and Fowler, this volume). This broad definition is premised on the following ideas, boundaries and features:

Civic space is the bedrock of any open and democratic society. When civic space is open, citizens and civil society organisations are able to organise, participate and communicate without hindrance. In doing so, they are able to claim their rights and influence the political and social structures around them. This can only happen when a state holds by its duty to protect its citizens and respects and facilitates their fundamental rights to associate, assemble peacefully and freely express views and opinions. These are the three key rights that civil society depends upon. (CIVICUS, 2022)

As such, civic space is considered a broader realm in which civil society functions as one of the sub areas and within which formations called civil society organizations (CSOs) are active. Civil society can be defined as an ‘intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values’ (White, 1994: 379, cited by Biekart and Fowler, this volume). Civil society is thus also defined as a space of contestation with different civic and political interests, not necessarily in the sense of a ‘good society’, representing oppositional voices vis-à-vis the state. For further clarity, the CSOs do not equate with service delivery/advocacy NGOs but include broader unions as well as pro-government civic organizations as well as ‘uncivil’ elements, in the sense that they do not necessarily conform with the normative formulaic CSOs. However, civic space, as an overarching concept encapsulates all these variants ranging from political to apolitical pursuits. The sub-components would have their own interests, values and ethos that are not necessarily harmonious and as such they would also be contradictory, conflicting and competing with each other.

In order to understand the contextual usage of the above-mentioned concepts, categories in Sri Lankan literature on the subject need close scrutiny. Comprehensive studies with an exclusive focus on Sri Lankan civic space and/or civil society have been carried out by a combination of Sri Lankan and non-Sri Lankan scholars. Some examples of such works are Bastian (2003), Kloos (1999), Wickramasinghe (2001), Uyangoda (2001), Orjuella (2004), Fernando (2003), Fernando (2007), Fernando (2018), Fernando (2021) and Fernando (2022). Though the emphasis was on transformation of Buddhism, the work by Gombrich and Obeysekere (1988) sheds a great deal of light on the ideological currents of the voluntary organizations in the fifties adapting to the transformation in society. Similarly, Uyangoda (2001) makes an in-depth analysis of the intrinsic relationship in the evolution of the left movement in Sri Lanka and civic space, with special reference to NGOs. Fernando (2007) documents and analyses how NGOs and civil society strivings have become extensions or results of political persuasions and how political activists have become NGO/CSO leaders and vice versa.

Sri Lankan literature related to civic space have used a variety of terms such as Voluntary Organizations (VOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to denote various forms and manifestations of actors outside the realm of the state and market. In general, civil society is denoted as the larger category and NGOs are considered a sub-category. The terms are often used loosely and interchangeably, which can be misguiding and confusing. A way out of this is to focus on the ‘acquired meaning’ of the term (Nauta, 2001). Kloos, who is a pioneer scholar on Sri Lankan NGOs/CSOs, asserts that ‘an NGO is what is called an NGO in Sri Lanka’ (1999: 5), emphasizing the importance of the particularity and specificity of the usage of the term in the context concerned. Hence, there is a need to position the CBO, NGO or CSO in a historical and contextual canvas to understand the larger picture in which they play a particular role. Such a spectrum of terminology gained currency in society as well as in the academic sphere at different stages of history.

The civil society and/or CSOs gained currency in Sri Lanka in the nineties, with the influence of the broader civil society discourse following the collapse of the Soviet-bloc, the Berlin Wall and the end of cold war period. The renewed role attached to civil societies following this third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) and the flow of large amounts of funding to CSOs in many parts of the world, had an impact on Sri Lanka as well. However, the boundary between the CSOs and NGOs remained blurred as different funding regimes used different definitions to these two categories. It should also be noted that the NGOs started calling themselves CSOs, to give them a broader value and at times, when their accountability was questioned by donors.

There is another aspect which is important in understanding the landscape of CSOs, NGOs and CBOs in Sri Lanka. Often all these three categories are understood from an instrumentalist perspective, treating them as a means of achieving something. Hence, they are classified on what they do—gender, savings, good governance, health, income generation, etc. Such a treatment obscures the broader political role these organizations might play in a particular historical moment. Even a seemingly small and insignificant CBO cannot be a neutral and apolitical entity. An alternative terminology that sheds more light on understanding the character and dynamics of above organizational forms are Non-party Political Formations (Kothari, 1984) and Non-party Left Formations (Kamat, 2002). The substance of these types of groups is understood as transformatory politics ‘which do not necessarily require capturing or possessing state power in a traditional instrumentalist sense, but rebuilding spheres of social mobilization in such a way that democratic and progressive constituencies will once again begin to define the terms of political engagement in society’ (Uyangoda, 2001: 189). The particular political manifestations described by Kothari (1984), Kamat (2002) and Uyangoda (2001) are inclined towards the realm of civil society which has its own contesting and conflicting political interests. The categories and respective features are further discussed below to gain a better understanding of the particularity and specificity in the Sri Lankan context that has also evolved over time.

Based on the above discussion on concepts, categories and terminology and their particular usage in Sri Lanka, the terms CSOs and NGOs are used as distinct categories, in which the term CSO is used as a broader category and NGO is a sub-category. The field work included both these categories of organizations, and the bulk of the sections that discuss the field work findings represents the experience of both these categories. However, this treatment will not be followed when works of others are cited as their basis of usage could be different. An explanatory note will be added on to such citations to avoid misunderstanding and also to maintain consistency of the conceptual basis employed in this chapter. It should be noted that CSOs/NGOs included in the field work are largely focusing on rights/advocacy and social development NGOs. It is this particular ‘section’ of civil society—democracy-and/or development-oriented that is the focus of the analyses.

3 Civic Space in Sri Lanka—Forms, Nature and Features

This section is heavily drawn by author’s own work on the subject: Fernando (2007, 2018).

The predominant civil society orientation and identity in Sri Lanka has been more closely connected to the political—in its wider meaning—(Fernando, 2007) and is a reflection of the history of the dynamics of state-(civil) society relations informing civic space: social action and voluntary organizations have been in the forefront of social and political reforms since the pre-independence period. The Temperance Movement (a mass mobilization during the British period, initially organized against alcoholism but later evolved as a broad-based force to advocate independence) is a prominent example. As such, the forte of Sri Lankan civil society actors is not so much ‘development’ (in the sense that they are largely engaged in service delivery) but ‘rights’. Insurgencies in 1971 and 1987/89 as well as an insurgency that turned into a three-decade war have arguably further intensified this character of civil society. Their impact has been high on the fronts of lobbying and advocacy, human rights issues and the promotion of concepts such as pluralism, devolution, federalism, etc. The political orientation of Sri Lankan civil society organizations means that they invariably capture the political realm as part of their environment. However, the political orientation does not necessarily mean that there is a homogeneous counter-state position. While a certain degree of homogeneity existed in the early stages, such as the eighties, that feature changed gradually in the 90s (and onwards) particularly with the escalation of the civil war that led to a spawning of a ‘new’ wave of civil society actors that toed a line with the government and in support of the military as well as the war as a means of eliminating the Tamil resistance. Irrespective of these orientations vis-à-vis the state, this means that Sri Lankan civil society organizations are highly sensitive towards the shifts taking place in the political realm. However, the above does not mean that there is a paucity of development-oriented actors in Sri Lanka. They are largely identified as NGOs. But the two terms—CSOs and NGOs—are often used loosely and interchangeably, which from a conceptual and analytical perspective is of course problematic.

The link between Sri Lankan CSOs and the left movement is also a special feature. The pioneer justice-oriented groups maintained close links with the old left parties. The entrance of new left activists (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—JVP³ and others) into CSOs in the post-1977 period, and trade union activists in the post-1980 period, gave Sri Lankan CSOs a strong political identity. This generation of left political activists dominated the CSO/NGO scene in the eighties and early nineties. In a way, the CSO activism in the eighties and the early nineties partially replaced the void created by the weakening of the leftist parties and trade unionism. The leftist parties suffered a massive defeat in the general election of 1977 which was won by the rightist United National Party (UNP) with an overwhelming 5/6th majority in the Parliament. Such a working majority in the Parliament and a newly created all-powerful executive presidential system gave the ruling party an upper hand to curb all forms of opposition and resistance to the liberal economic policies being introduced. The government crushed a general strike in 1980 which marked the milestone of the further decline and weakening of the left political parties and trade unionism. In this regard, some CSOs have played the role of gap fillers for a moribund left and trade unions. A reversal of this trend was witnessed from the mid-nineties. This trend became established firmly in the post-2002 period (Fernando, 2007). The key staff and leaders who entered CSOs in the mid-nineties and beyond came from professional and academic backgrounds with little or no background in political activism (Fernando, 2007). Their political sympathies were mostly with liberal thinking (Uyangoda, 2001). The gradual depoliticization of civil society, in the periods mentioned above, i.e., 80s and 90s, suggest that the major impact of economic and political reforms that Sri Lanka had been subjected to in the forms of liberalization of the economy from a hitherto protectionist and welfarist orientation.

The relationship between the Sri Lankan CSOs and the government has predominantly been an antagonistic one. However, there had been short periods of collaboration, engagement and even co-optation on the part of the CSOs with different governments. These collaborations have been short-lived within a tenure of a certain government or certain collaborative relationships have come to an abrupt end with the transition of governments. There had been different degrees of regulation, control and space offered for civil society functioning under successive governments. The history of relationships between the civil society and government suggests a fluctuation of trust and maturity in dealing with each other. Hence, the orientation, spread (or contraction) and impact on civil society in Sri Lanka cannot be understood without the orientation of the successive governments whose policy and action towards on the former.

4 Changes in the Context: The Political Sphere

As mentioned before, 1977 marked a watershed when the UNP party formed a very strong government with a 5/6th majority. This was also the government that introduced the most radical form of liberalization of the economy. The party won elections and stayed in government for seventeen successive years before they were defeated by the People’s Alliance (PA) party in 1994. But the liberalization trend could not be reversed. From 1994 till 2019, there was several changes of governments formed by different parties. However, from 1983 till 2009, the main preoccupation of the respective governments was the war. Although the war mostly affected the North and East, it had an impact on the entire country as the rebel group was a force to reckon with. The war ended in 2009 and there was relative stability in the country in the decade that followed. The economy was not performing extra ordinarily well but there was no major crisis.

In November 2019, there was a major change in the political administration, starting with a Presidential Election that year and followed by General Elections in August 2020. These electoral campaigns were heavily coloured by the bombings of April 2019⁴ which gave a new lease of life to a national security agenda and rise to an unhealthy spread of communal tensions, particularly against the Muslim community (Amarasuriya, 2020). This in turn paved the way for a new political appeal to mobilize the majoritarian ethnic and religious group, which is Sinhala and Buddhist. This new wave of a nationalist agenda fuelled by the imperative for national security in the aftermath of the bomb attacks, gained popularity.

4.1 Assessment of the 2015–2019 Experience

The inefficiencies and failures of the government from 2015 to 2019 and the tensions between the President and Prime Minister in that period were contributory factors in strengthening the nationalist campaign that fielded a presidential candidate claimed as a fresh hope. In addition to the charges against the previous government on corruption (involving a bond scam and some transactions with China and India in relation to ports), the new nationalist and security fervour augured well with the military background of the presidential candidate and his claim of playing a role in bringing the thirty-year war to an end in 2009 during his tenure as Defence Secretary. This political wave was able to bring Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Mahinda Rajapaksa into power as President and Prime Minister in November 2019 and August 2020, respectively. The unprecedented 2/3rd majority at the general elections and popular support in an environment where the opposition parties suffered heavy electoral losses, placed the new political administration in a comfortable position of power to effect changes without a formidable opposition.

The progressive governance reforms effected by the previous government (e.g., balance of legislature and executive powers, introduction of independent commissions, Right to Information Act, etc.) by way of the introduction of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution were reconsidered by the new government. The 20th Amendment, passed in October 2020, significantly diluted the above-mentioned progressive advancements in terms of governance and accountability. In sum, the 20th Amendment left the power balance between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary, substantially skewed towards the Executive, thus weakening the power and independence of the other two institutions. The democratic transformations introduced by the 19th Amendment were partly a result of years of advocacy work of rights-based, think-tank-oriented CSOs, particularly the introduction of independent commissions on elections, police, corruption, audit as well as the right to information as a fundamental right. Except for the Right to Information Act, most of these progressive transformations were reversed by the 20th Amendment. With the passage of the 20th Amendment, not only did their advocacy work become futile; their own existence was faced with a plethora of challenges under a new difficult constitutional environment as well. CSOs’ ability to carry out their advocacy work towards democratic practices and institutions was seriously constrained.

5 The Experience of COVID-19

Some parts of this subsection are drawn from the author’s own publication: Fernando (2020) Facing a Pandemic at a time of Elections and Cricket: Socio-political consequences of Sri Lanka’s COVID-19 curfew in Asia Pacific Journal, Special Issue: Pandemic Asia, August 1, 2020, Volume 18, Issue 15, Number 1.

The first confirmed case of coronavirus was reported in Sri Lanka on 27 January 2020. The patient was a 44-year-old Chinese woman who was visiting Sri Lanka. Meantime, the president dissolved the Parliament on 2 March, and called snap elections to be held on 25 April, 6 months early. But only a day after the announcement, on March 3, the first case involving a person of Sri Lankan origin was reported in Italy. One week later, on 10 March, the first local case was reported: a tourist guide who had led a group of Italian tourists. Both the Chinese woman and the tourist guide were treated at the Infectious Disease Hospital, which later came to be known as the National Institute of Infectious Diseases. Quarantine centres were also set up by the Army initially in their facilities in different parts of the island, using military infrastructure in out of Colombo. Private hotels were also allowed to offer quarantine facilities for a considerable tariff.

A 40-member ‘Presidential Task Force to Coordinate and Monitor the Delivery of Continuous Services for the Sustenance of Overall Community Life’ was formed under Basil Rajapaksa, a brother of the President. In mid-March, a National Operation Centre for Prevention of Covid-19 (NOCPOC) was tasked with curbing the spread of COVID-19, with the Army Commander appointed at its head. The Centre was mandated to coordinate preventive and management measures to ensure that health care and other services would be well equipped to serve the general public during the outbreak period. The mandates of these two structures were vague and lacked clarity regarding the division of labour. The legitimacy of introducing these new structures while existing structures were not being used drew heavy criticism raised by a key CSO (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2020).

Despite some unease over COVID-19 strategies, the dissolution of the Parliament and call for elections on 25 April created a distraction that placed all of Sri Lanka in an election mode. While the numbers of affected people were gradually rising by the third week of March, there were still no concrete measures being introduced by the interim government (in the context of a dissolved Parliament) and the president. This passivity can be ascribed to the desire of the President and his party to hold elections in April. The deadline for nominations was at noon on 19 March, and the Election Commission was apparently under pressure to downplay the coronavirus outbreak to ensure the election would proceed. However, only a few hours later, the president gave instructions to declare an island-wide curfew, and to close the airport for inbound flights. At first, people did not follow the curfew rules, but within a few days it became strictly enforced. The island-wide curfew was gradually relaxed, but a few districts, including Colombo, were subject to the full curfew of 52 days, until 10 May 2020.

In mid-March 2020, the Election Commission decided to postpone the planned 25 April 2020 election indefinitely due to the pandemic outbreak. But there was substantial pressure on the commission to hold the elections before 2 June because the dissolved Parliament needed to reconvene by then as required by the Constitution, only allowing for a maximum three months’ closure. In response, the Election Commission wrote to the president to inform him that due to COVID-19, they could not organize an election before 2 June. However, considering the constitutional constraints, the commission requested that the president seek the opinion of the Supreme Court, which would have the power to invoke force majeure as a way out of the constitutional deadlock. The president responded that it was not necessary, and he disregarded appeals by political parties, trade unions,⁵ religious leaders and CSOs to reconvene the Parliament by annulling his gazette that had dissolved it. The adamant behaviour exhibited by the president in his resolve to not parley with the Supreme Court highlighted his preference for exercising strong executive powers at the expense of the legislature and judiciary. However, the election commission’s independence, granted by the 19th amendment, could withstand the pressure and a general election to elect a new parliament, with proper COVID-19 precautions and measures, had to wait till August 2020.

5.1 The Increased Role of the Military in Governance

The military played a key role in Sri Lanka’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak. The Army Commander was appointed as the head of the National Operations Centre on COVID-19 and the special intelligence units of the military and the police were tasked with carrying out search operations for contact tracing and arrests of those who violated curfew and quarantine regulations. The quarantine centres were also run by the military, often using their camps, infrastructure and personnel. Moreover, the Secretaries to the Ministries of Health and Agriculture were replaced by two military officers when the country began to reopen after the 52-day curfew. The military was also disproportionately represented on the Presidential Task Force in charge of economic revival and poverty eradication.

As such, the response of the government to the pandemic also impacted the sphere of governance, rule of law and accountability with a shift towards rising militarization and authoritarianism. Such features posed serious threats to the values and principles many sections of civil society uphold and the institutions of governance and accountability they strive to promote. The processes of reconciliation and transitional justice initiatives—including establishing the Office on the Missing Persons and the Office of Reparations during the 2015–2019 period—were at stake as the new political administration adopted a different approach. It should be noted that these initiatives were already losing momentum towards the end of the previous government, particularly following the Easter Explosions in April 2019.

The measures introduced by the government during the pandemic under the pretext containing a health issue also challenged the space of democratic freedoms and space. The identification of infected persons and their close contacts was carried out jointly by the intelligence, military and the police. At times, these identification missions were akin to an arrest of criminals. The infected persons (or suspected persons) were taken by the military without prior notice and with little or no information on where they would be taken. Media reports on such incidents as well as public views on social media were curtailed and threatened with legal action. A number of warnings were issued by the authorities. The curfews, travel restrictions and restrictions of gatherings made a negative impact on CSO work. Their fieldwork was severely limited. Meetings and public events came almost to a halt.

6 Impact on the Civic Space

This section of the chapter discusses the specific manner in which civil society was impacted by the two major changes described above. One of the ways in which civil society activity is controlled is through the legal and regulatory frameworks. Therefore, an explanatory subsection is presented as a basis to understand the overall impact.

6.1 The Policy, Legal and Regulatory Environment of CSOs/NGOs in Sri Lanka

For some time, there were no specific laws and regulations governing the operation of CSOs in Sri Lanka. In 1980, the government enacted the Voluntary Social Services Organizations (Registration & Supervision) Act which sought to introduce a system of registration and supervision of activities. The National Secretariat for the Registration of NGOs (better known as the NGO Secretariat) was established in 1996. (The term NGOs in this Act encapsulated the CSOs as well. From this legalistic definition, the overarching and blanket term is NGOs.) The NGO Secretariat was brought under the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development in 2010. In June 2013, a statement issued by the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development declared that the ‘oversight of the country’s NGOs is necessary for national security and to counter terrorism in compliance with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, in countering financing of terrorism, money laundering or other related transnational crimes’ (Library of Congress, 2014). Under these circumstances, both Sri Lankan and International NGOs found it difficult to work due to the administrative red-tape directives by the NGO Secretariat (Bastians, 2014).

During 2015–2019, the NGO Secretariat functioned under the purview of the Ministry of National Co-existence, Dialogue and Official Languages. This reflects a seemingly more benign approach to CSOs by the then government with a certain level of openness and flexibility. However, this very same Ministry tried to bring in a new law to restrict CSOs. The proposed legislation was withdrawn following strong representation by the CSO community to oppose the move. Civic space opened up after the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in January and August 2015, respectively. However, the legal environment for CSOs deteriorated again from 2018 as CSOs faced delays in registration, continued state scrutiny and surveillance, and weak legal and support services (Verite, 2018).

In April 2019, the government responded to the Easter attacks with social media blocks, efforts to enhance surveillance and restrictive emergency regulations that greatly curbed the freedom of expression and press freedom online (Freedom House, 2019). The change of political administration with the change of the President (November 2019) and Parliament (August 2020) resulted in a change of attitude and policy on civil society. A few weeks after being sworn in as President, Gotabaya Rajapaksha made some explicit remarks about his displeasure on the problematic and undesirable role played by NGOs: ‘Sri Lanka’s new government will not succumb to pressures from non-governmental organisations, NGOs cannot do what they want and the situation needs to be changed’ and that he will not be acting in the interests of the NGOs (Times of India, 2019). The NGO Secretariat, that oversaw the work of CSOs, was brought back under the Ministry of Defence which comes under the purview of the President as the Minister of Defence.

6.2 Increased Control by the District-Level Bureaucracy

The CSOs working at district and divisional levels have been expected to work closely with the relevant bureaucracy from the concept stage of a project to completion with corresponding requirements of approvals, reporting, supervision, scrutiny and coordination. During the period under review, the degree of the above forms of compliance to be observed by CSOs was further increased. Permission for an activity or an event to be held at a village was only allowed by the Grama Niladhari (village level administrative officer of the government) if the CSO concerned had duly obtained permission or approval from the divisional or district authority. The paperwork required for the approval process was said to be cumbersome and time-consuming.

In addition to the bureaucracy of the District Secretariat, another key position called the District NGO Coordinator has been created by the NGO Secretariat. The initial screening of the project concepts and proposals by CSOs is said to be carried out by the District NGO Coordinator whose main reporting line is with the NGO Secretariat which comes under the Ministry of Defence. As such, the considerations and criteria for screening by the District NGO Coordinator, can be different from the regular state bureaucracy at district level, given the different interests of the agencies concerned.

As such, the CSOs were under heavy pressure to comply and keep pace with the changes. This apparently diverted their energy from operations to administrative compliance. The abrupt and arbitrary procedures and standards introduced by some administrative authorities also curtailed the scope of the work particularly of the CSOs. The mandatory approval also introduced a certain level of self-censorship on the part of the CSOs so that work preferred by the authorities were stressed and enhanced. The areas of work that were preferred was toned down, diluted or completely dropped.

6.3 NGO Secretariat and Close Surveillance

Another trend observed during the period of review was more visits by the NGO Secretariat, either to CSO’s main offices or at the district level. These visits were made by a team of staff from the NGO Secretariat, often led by the Director General himself, and sometimes made unannounced. The officials of the NGO Secretariat held long interrogations on the work of the CSO concerned. The CSOs raised the legality and formality of such abrupt visits to offices by the NGO Secretariat. Some CSOs interpreted this as a form of intimidation and conduct that lacked clear procedural and legal basis.

The active role played by the NGO Secretariat including the particular initiatives and actions by the Director General created an environment of unnecessary close scrutiny, control and regulation at a national level. The apparent cavalier behaviour of the NGO Secretariat leadership, as observed by the CSOs, appear to have gotten worse with (unannounced) visits to CSO offices and convening of CSOs at district levels. While the NGO Secretariat had a role to play vis-à-vis CSOs, it appears to have resorted to a policing role.

Close surveillance of CSOs by the intelligence service became a common occurrence in the North, East and the rest of the South. Receiving telephone calls from those who identified themselves as being from intelligence agencies, the police, the military or in some instances from a particular military camp became a frequent experience of the CSOs. During these calls, the intelligence was apparently keen to know general information about the CSOs such as where they worked, what they did and their funding sources, as well as some specific information on events or persons. A large section of the CSOs, fearing unnecessary consequences, shared the required information with the intelligence. Some of the CSO leaders have been assertive enough to say that the information can be given if they visit the organization during office hours or that all the information the intelligence officials seek are already contained in regular reports furnished to the District Secretariat and can be obtained from the District Secretary.

The intelligence personnel and the police were also reported to be visiting offices and events organized by the CSOs in their own premises or elsewhere. The lists of participants of events and training material were scrutinized and photographs taken of the office premises and events. In some cases, the intelligence officers observed the entire event to listen to the deliberations of the meeting, workshop and seminar. The interpretation of the CSOs on this nature of surveillance was that it was conducted to inculcate a sense that they are being watched closely and their information is gathered. Some interpreted this as a form of causing fear, threat and intimidation. Others extended the interpretation to the extent that the current phase might be followed by harsher actions such as arrests, at least in a few instances, to inculcate fear and self-censorship.

6.4 Civic Space Under Pressure—External Observations

The above trends observed at the district level have also been noted at a macro and national level under the banner of civic space by international indices and monitoring tools. A key Civil Society Index called the CIVICUS Monitor, annually monitors the different dimensions of civil societies in several countries, classifying the Civil Society status as Open, Narrowed, Obstructed, Repressed, Closed. Under this Index, Sri Lanka’s Civic Space in 2020 was rated as Obstructed (CIVICUS, 2020). CIVICUS together with other organizations (Amnesty International, Forum Asia, Franciscans International, Human Rights Watch, International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism, ISHR, Minority rights group international) that closely monitored the civil society in Sri Lanka, submitted a Joint Statement 44th session of the Human Rights Council in July 2020. The main submissions included:

The space for Sri Lankan civil society is rapidly shrinking. For several months now, civil society organisations have been subject to intensified military surveillance and questioning by different government authorities.

Worryingly, the COVID-19 pandemic has been exploited by the Sri Lankan government to impose restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, resulting in the arrest and detention of social media commentators…

Considering growing concerns over shrinking space for dissent domestically, the Council remains effectively the only forum where Sri Lankan civil society has the possibility to engage openly in dialogue with the Government and other States on human rights concerns in Sri Lanka, and even this space is increasingly under threat due to deepening risks of reprisals against Sri Lankan civil society actors who speak at the Council. Those human right defenders are increasingly vilified as “traitors” in both mainstream and social media. (CIVICUS, 2020, accessed on 24 July 2022)

Another Index by Freedom House scored Sri Lanka 56/100 and classified the country as ‘partly free’ with the sub-scores of Political Rights 23/40 and Civil Liberties 33/60 (Freedom House, 2021). Under the Freedom House Index, the Associational and Organizational Rights are assessed with the question: “Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights—and governance-related work?”. Sri Lanka’s score on this was 3/4 and the description to the score elaborated thus:

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are generally free to operate without interference, but some NGOs and activists—particularly those in the north and east that focus on sensitive topics such as military impunity—have been subjected to denial of registration, surveillance, harassment, and assaults. Intelligence personnel began attending civil society meetings and questioning some organizations about their personnel and funding sources soon after Gotabaya Rajapaksa became president. Many NGOs cooperated with the government to distribute aid during COVID-19 lockdowns. Some analysts have expressed concern that the collaboration also provided intelligence officials information about NGO operations and personnel, which may assist authorities should they decide to crack down on those groups. (Freedom House, 2021)

7 Coping Strategies by CSOs

The response of the CSOs to the bureaucratic pressures and surveillance have taken an individual nature that varies from one CSO to another and one area to another. Clearly, the general trend of the responses by CSOs have taken a non-confrontational nature. The CSOs, particularly at the divisional and regional levels, have not resisted or challenged the excessive bureaucratic administrative requirements at the district and divisional levels. They have cooperated with the bureaucracy and have observed the many standards of compliance of reporting and approval seeking as well as attended meetings convened by the bureaucratic agencies. The CSOs at divisional and district levels stressed the need to be pragmatic in a reality where they are left alone with little or no support, back-up and solidarity from powerful national-level CSOs.⁶

Concerning the surveillance, the CSOs at district level have been at the receiving end. Their ability to challenge the legality of ways in which the questions are posed, information sought and sites/events being visited have been limited. As such, they have succumbed to these pressures out of helplessness and desperation. To avoid negative consequences and the danger of being blacklisted, many CSOs have cooperated with the intelligence personnel in terms of furnishing information, including personal details of staff, board and beneficiaries when they are particularly targeted. It is only in a very few instances that, CSOs have requested the intelligence officers to follow the due procedure such as visiting the offices during working hours, presenting their credentials and resisting the disclosure of personal details of staff, board and beneficiaries. Further, there were some exceptional cases of certain CSO leaders who have been able to exercise some assertiveness and resistance under conditions explained before. Some of them have used their seniority as well the recognition and reputation earned over many decades as community leaders to withstand the pressure and interference. Some such as CSO leaders have refused to reveal information to the intelligence and instead asked them obtain information from the District Secretary to whom the CSOs furnish comprehensive reports from the inception, progress and end of projects as well as organizations.

Operating in the environment described above, many CSOs have tried to highlight the aspects of their work which are preferred by the government: the so-called development, relief and charity work. As such, CSOs have made sure that their portfolio contains a visible number of such projects that provide them with some cover and protection. This means that there has been a gradual shift—knowingly or unknowingly—by some CSOs towards development work. For some CSO leaders, this shift is made by the CSOs not of their own choice but under pressure as a method of coping. The donors, both locally based and overseas as well as the embassies, who usually exert pressure on the government to allow space for civil society actors, have not been successful during this period with their influence. In fact, the donors, particularly the Embassies, were heavily criticized by the government during this period for their role of causing instability and potential interference.

Another coping mechanism used by some CSOs to continue their rights-oriented work, has been to ‘rebrand’ their work in developmental language. For instance, as a CSO leader explained, their work on Political Participation of Women, was presented as a Women’s Leadership Development to attract less attention from the authorities and intelligence officers. CSOs have also tried to enhance their degree of interaction and engagement with the district and divisional bureaucracies and other state and provincial agencies. Deliberate efforts have been made to invite the dignitaries of the bureaucracy for CSO events as guests and speakers to allow them to witness their work. It was reported that some CSOs organized their workshops and training events at auditoriums at the District and Divisional Secretariats. It was also reported that CSOs have made small contributions to events organized by the Divisional and District Secretariats such as New Year or religious festivals. There have thus been a great deal of interaction and engagement between the CSOs and District and Divisional Secretariats during the initial crisis stages of COVID-19 in many areas. CSOs have worked closely with the district and divisional agencies as well as the Grama Niladharis at the village level. Such gestures by the CSOs have been acknowledged by the authorities. When some of the CSOs have faced issues of surveillance by intelligence officers, their renewed relationships with the district-, divisional- and village-level officials have been found to be useful as the officials have defended the CSOs.

8 Conclusions

The coping measures of CSOs at the divisional and district levels have taken a predominantly conciliatory nature. The CSOs appear to have cooperated with the police, the military and the intelligence officers, apparently to avoid further consequences and in a bid to assure their survival. It is only in a few instances that the CSOs have questioned the basis of investigations and requested the intelligence officers to follow due procedure. The CSOs have taken various steps to work closely with the government agencies, engage the officials and use government facilities to carry out their work as an apparent safety cover. Overall, the coping strategies adopted by CSOs at district levels show the relatively weak position of CSOs to resist pressure. District-level organizations have also expressed their frustration and displeasure with national-level CSOs which have more clout but have not used their advantage to safeguard the interests of the (district) CSOs.

Development-oriented NGOs have maintained a satisfactory working relationship with the state ministries, agencies, bureaucracy and local government authorities. These relationships have evolved into substantive collaborations and partnerships with a high degree of engagement on the part of the governmental/local governmental counterpart. Particularly, during the intensity of the collaboration between the NGOs and public authorities in terms of pooling of resources and coordination of work that have enhanced the trust and working relationship between the two. NGOs based in divisions and districts thus display a closer and cordial relationship with the state bureaucracy given their localized work, proximity and trust earned over time. This is an important ‘bridge’ between the state agencies/local government agencies and CSOs which can be consolidated at this stage where the overall role of CSOs is under criticism and threat.

Sri Lankan CSOs have been under severe pressure, control and surveillance in the past, particularly in the periods of 1990–1993 and 2005–2014. Their work has also been curtailed and disrupted during these periods. The two key contextual changes during the period of review—the change of political regime and the onset of COVID-19—resulted in certain changes in forms of governance, with a concentration of power in the Executive and a weakening the Legislature and Judiciary. The role of the military was enhanced and their engagement gradually permeated civil administration. The COVID-19 situation further strengthened and consolidated the above trend with the justification of exigencies of mitigating a pandemic. Civic space has not been immune to this overall trend. The period reviewed in this chapter has been one of the most challenging ones for CSOs. Their freedom to function has been substantially constrained and compromised. The overall civic space has shrunk or remained stagnant without the ability to play the role they wished to play in society. Their relative strength, particularly the CSOs functioning at the district and divisional levels, have been weak. As such, their coping mechanisms have been a mixture of adaptation, compromise, cosmetic collaborations, re-branding, self-censorship and lie-low in a bid to survive in an unfavourable and repressive environment. The forms of resilience, resistance and defiance were not completely absent but can only be seen as an exception and a rarity.