Keywords

Introduction

Since 2018, approximately 9000 refugees in Sweden who arrived as unaccompanied minors, but who had their asylum applications rejected, have had the opportunity to remain in Sweden on short-term permits if enrolled in educational programs. The policy, known as Gymnasielagen, or the “High School Law,” allows for these young refugees to receive permanent residency if employment of a certain duration is found within six months of completing their education. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 made this possibility exceptionally difficult for most young refugees, as companies throughout the Swedish labor market minimized hiring and furloughed substantial numbers of staff.

The national economic challenges that resulted from the pandemic were highly salient in the Swedish media, as well as for policymakers and the general public. Like legislative bodies in many other advanced industrialized states, the Swedish parliament passed historically expansive support packages, providing much-needed assistance to both specific industries and sectors, in a bid not just to support producers, but to minimize the potentially profound financial effects of the pandemic on everyday people. Yet, the adoption of such ambitious and innovative policy reforms was not extended to the case of unaccompanied minors present in Sweden as part of the High School Law. Indeed, the issue was hotly debated in the Swedish media and on the floor of the Swedish parliament throughout 2020 and 2021. A proposed reform to the law, which would have provided a modest improvement in the opportunities for these refugees to secure employment and remain in Sweden, was rejected after highly publicized debate.

This chapter primarily details how this proposed piece of legislative reform—which would have granted eligible refugee youth both more time to locate employment and with a shorter employment contract—was framed by Swedish political parties throughout 2020 and 2021 before it was rejected. We begin by putting the empirical spotlight on relevant debates in the Swedish parliament and, to a lesser extent, comments made by politicians in the Swedish media. While some Swedish politicians sought to frame the problem in terms of compassion toward refugees, as well as a related critique of legally unsound asylum decisions, such arguments were very much in the minority. In contrast, most Swedish political parties sidestepped the issue of the employment (and deportation) challenges faced by refugee youth present in Sweden through the High School Law. Rather, they sought to portray the situation as one in which the proposed policy reforms would undermine the sanctity of the asylum determination process (for an interesting contrast, see Malm Lindberg, 2023, this volume, on the gap between policy and implementation).

Yet, policymakers may enact legislation that would offer protection to individuals whose asylum claims have been rejected or whose situation does not meet anticipated formal criteria; for example, in terms of documentation. To identify whether there are traits associated with this group of young refugees that may have disadvantaged them in the eyes of the Swedish parliament when considering beneficial reform, we consider two later debates among Swedish policymakers regarding refugee reception: that of Afghanistan following the return to power in late 2021 of the Taliban, and that of Ukrainian refugees in the face of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. We argue that young refugees in Sweden subject to the High School Law are viewed in less positive terms by many political elites—thus less deserving of specific policy reform measures—for two reasons: they are male and they are associated with a conflict that is both comparatively remote in time and place.

In the case of refugees fleeing Afghanistan, Sweden’s strong commitment to gender equality was particularly pronounced in framing the need to admit refugees. In the case of Ukraine, the ongoing wide-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine highlights the importance of interrelated factors: temporality, scope, geography, and, to some extent, gender. Across the Swedish political spectrum, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is characterized as resulting in an immediate challenge in the form of a vast number of refugees, all of whom are not only at the European Union’s door, but whose legal access is guaranteed by the European Commission’s March 2022 implementation of the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive (EC, 2022).

Sweden: An Ideational Context of Exceptional Universalism, Gender Equality, and Regulated Immigration

Institutionalist scholars highlight the central role of ideas in policy processes and change (cf. Béland, 2009). The point is that, in addition to purely materialist conditions, policy change and policy stability are better understood with attention to ideas about reality and the issue at hand. In the case of migration policy in Sweden, such ideas include the norm of gender equality and the universal benefit structures as the basis for social cohesion and trust.

In 2015, Sweden became the first country ever with a self-declared feminist government, with an exceptional and explicit dedication to pursue a feminist foreign policy (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; Aggestam et al., 2019). Towns (2002) shows how the articulated and conscious political self-branding of Sweden as gender equal paradoxically came to accentuate divisions within the state, most prominently between immigrants and Swedes. In the wake of increasing refugee reception in the 1990s from Iran, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, the Other increasingly became synonymous with the immigrant male of a patriarchal culture, often contrasted with the gender equal and modern Sweden.

A constitutive part of the Swedish state’s self-identity is the idea of Sweden as a humanitarian super-power (Dahl, 2006; Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). The commitment to norms of human rights is explained by pure pragmatism and by a rooted commitment to universal values entrenched in the social democratic welfare state (Towns, 2002; Aggestam et al., 2019; Karlsson Schaffer, 2020).

In addition to the internationalist component, the social democratic welfare state is articulated on the basis of fairness, equality, and solidarity. The idea of reciprocity is what motivates, for instance flat rate universal benefits to all rather than needs based, targeted support of the kind more common in liberal welfare systems (Rothstein, 1998). The perception of the state as just is presented as the main reason for, in international comparison, the high willingness to pay taxes in Scandinavia and low corruption rates.

These principled foreign policy stances, both in terms of gender equality and humanitarianism, as well as the importance of a welfare statement whose institutional practice emphasizes equal treatment, are important underlying contexts for making sense of the lack of success facing proponents seeking to reform the High School Law.

Research Design and Methodology

We are inspired by a broadly interpretivist policy framework emphasizing the overall relevance of case-specific context (Boswell et al., 2019) when contrasting refugee reception from Afghanistan and Ukraine with that of unaccompanied refugee youth subject to the High School Law. As Wagenaar notes, interpretivist policy analysis, as a written product, is often difficult for the reader to penetrate, stronger on dense theory, and weaker on clear empirical application. Yet, Wagenaar (2011, p. 9) stresses that it need not be that way, putting the point directly,

[i]n my opinion, the issue is at heart clear and simple. Interpretive policy analysis is always an interpretation of something: people acting, fighting, communicating, negotiating, experimenting, and so on.

At the same time, many interpretivist policy scholars emphasize a comparatively stringent approach to data collection and analysis. By contrast, we share the view of those who view this methodological stance as advocating “a truism or a concession too far to positivism” (Marsh, 2015, p. 231). Rather, we subscribe to an interpretivism that affords place to key features of context that can assist in understanding policy choices and consequences. As Bevir and Kedar (2008, p. 506) note, we “cannot explain social phenomena adequately if we fail fully to take into account both their inherent flux and their concrete links to specific contexts.” A more idiographic approach to case description and comparison may, of course, feel alien or even antithetical to those who chiefly put trust in structured comparisons. Yet, we share the conviction of Rhodes (2014, p. 321) that “small facts speak to large issues” when considering what may be significant in cases. To that end, we align ourselves with the subset of interpretive policy scholars emphasizing impressionism as a methodological virtue, particularly the claim that interpretivist approaches—while emphasizing methodological coherency—need not be carried out in a systematic application of method (Boswell & Corbett, 2015).

Against that backdrop, the chapter makes a specific contribution to the broader migration policy literature: through an impressionistic analysis, we demonstrate how deeply internalized societal norms regarding gender, or the sudden presence of a large-scale group of refugees at one’s own regional door, inevitably results in either an implicit or explicit definition of which categories of refugees are seen as deserving of protection. Quite simply, political and societal advocates on behalf of refugee youth in Sweden subject to the High School Law are unable to mobilize salient norms that would persuade their claims for safety and security to be seen as a priority.

This chapter contrasts the political debate about the requirements for permanent residence of unaccompanied minors during the Covid-19 pandemic with the political party discourse focusing on refugees during the aftermath of the Taliban takeover in 2021 and the war in Ukraine initiated in 2022. The chapter relies on three types of data: (1) parliamentary records, (2) op-eds in major newspapers, and (3) social media statements on Twitter. The parliamentary records were identified using the search term “gymnasielagen.” In the other two cases, the search terms were “Afghanistan AND asyl” or “Afghanistan AND flykting*” and, simply “Ukraina.” For statements in news media, we used the Mediearkivet database. After a first selection of documents, relevant sources were imported to Nvivo software for reading and the development of broad thematic coding, with a particular emphasis on preferential treatment, gender and gender equality, as well as gender equality and humanitarian initiatives.

Introducing the Case: Reforming the High School Law

As mentioned above, the proposed amendment to the initial High School Law—intended to compensate affected individuals for the deteriorating labor market situation during early days of the Covid-19 pandemic—generated substantial political debate, despite a proposal of only marginally easing criteria for permanent residency for a notably small group of approximately 9000 individuals (Swedish Migration Agency, 2020). This section details the key arguments characterizing the debate, relating those to the ideational context of Swedish migration and integration policy formation (see also Jerneck, 2023, this volume).

Pandemic as a Moment of Opportunity Versus the Sanctity of Asylum Decisions

Initially, the proponents of the amendment tried to argue that the amendment was a logical consequence of the pandemic, similar to other labor market policy adjustments being made. In a migration policy debate, one Miljöpartiet (MP—Green Party) member of parliament, Rasmus Ling stated that “[e]xceptional measures are being taken in all kinds of areas” (Riksdagen, 2020), with a similar line of argumentation advanced by a member of parliament from Vänsterpartiet (V—Left Party):

Now, in the midst of the corona crisis, it is obvious that the government and the Riksdag need to take the same responsibility for the consequences of Covid-19 as they do in other areas. This means, among other things, to make sure that people are not deprived of their opportunity to live with their families if family members lose their jobs and that the children and young people who are now affected by fluctuations in migration policy, legal uncertainty, and now the corona crisis have an opportunity to stay.

Christina Höj Larsen, (V) in parliamentary debate. (Riksdagen, 2020)

Those who wanted to pass the amendment found themselves faced with the task of defending the original High School Law, which was highly criticized at the time, as well as the amendment itself, needing to respond to criticism from parliamentary opponents such as Moderaterna (M—Moderate Party) Member of parliament Malmer Stenegård who stated, “[o]ne refers to Covid-19, but many of these parties were pushing for an amnesty or change in the High School Law already before the virus hit us” (Riksdagen, 2020).

The opponents of the amendment focused their attention on one thing: the legitimacy of the individuals’ claim to asylum in the first place in combination with a highlighting of the dangers of “special legislation” favoring a particular group of people. Liberalerna (L–the Liberal Party) noted this in an April 2021 parliamentary motion, stating that,

[w]ith the series of High School Laws the government has tailormade a special legislation so a certain group of people, that according to court decisions lack grounds for protection and that are today adults, may stay in Sweden anyways. (Riksdagen, 2021a)

In calling for a more sustainable approach to migration policy over the long term, Centerpartiet (C—the Centre Party) also highlighted concerns over preferential treatment, noting that, “the proposed legal changes risk to be unfair an only apply to certain people” (Riksdagen, 2021b). Sverigedemokraterna (SD—Sweden Democrats) member of parliament Julia Kronlid asked rhetorically how the situation of unaccompanied minors differed from others who were regarded as legally lacking the basis to remain in Sweden, observing pointedly that,

[h]owever, it is no more a pity for that group [unaccompanied minors] than for others who have no reason to stay in Sweden. If you have no reason to stay in the country, you need to leave the country. (Riksdagen, 2020)

The Double Bind of Unaccompanied Refugee Youth from Afghanistan: Gender and Distance to Conflict

The unaccompanied refugee youth were frequently identified not just by their formal status—as asylum seekers whose claims had been rejected—but specifically as male asylum seekers whose claims had been rejected. This, in and of itself, would not be of any analytical interest if both proponents and opponents of policy reform had mobilized gender as an element of overall discursive strategies. Yet, this is not the case. It was primarily opponents of the policy reform measure that emphasized gender. In doing so, we argue that opponents were strategically tapping into norms within Swedish society that have to do with gender equality as an overarching and widely-shared societal objective (Towns, 2002; Aggestam et al., 2019), as well as more general racist arguments that characterize male Muslim migrants as societal and personal threats (Wigger, 2019). In terms of conflict situations, the gender equality norm is especially visible (and, indeed, its objectives are overwhelmingly supported by conflict research; see Carpenter, 2005) in the form of policies and measures designed to ensure that the needs of vulnerable girls and women are explicitly identified, prioritized, and met (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; Aggestam et al., 2019). By emphasizing the gender of these refugee youth—even in passing—reform opponents were able to highlight implicitly that the benefits would not be women or girls, but men. At the same time, by emphasizing their maleness, reform opponents were drawing upon a virulent racist discourse that had quickly taken root in 2014 and 2015: that refugee men from Syria and Afghanistan constituted a threat to national security, public order, and, often, the physical safety of white Western women (Burrell & Hörschelmann, 2019).

Throughout 2020 and until June 2021, in both the Swedish parliament and in the Swedish press, opponents of policy reform would identify a rather narrow set of characteristics when discussing the presence of Afghan refugee youth in Sweden. Chief among these was gender, labeling them as “unidentified, adult males.”

In addition to the importance ascribed to a sustainable migration policy and the perils of giving “preferential treatment” to a particular group, one of the most notable features in a majority of statements from opponents to the amendment was the repeated description of the affected individuals as male, unidentified, or with unverifiable identities from Afghanistan; all of them ultimately referred to as “young men of unclear identity,” by Julia Kronlid, member of the Swedish Democrats (Riksdagen, 2020), “young adults without ground for asylum” by Malmer Stenegård, member of the Moderate Party (Riksdagen, 2020), and “young men with unverified identity and without grounds for protection” (Christian Democrats; Riksdagen, 2021c).

Indeed, the emphasis on these young refugees specifically as men was, at times, made in relation to Swedish norms of gender equality. As one example, the chair of Kristdemokratiska Kvinnoförbundet (KDK—the Christian Democratic Women’s Organization), Sarah Havneraas, wrote an op-ed for the Swedish tabloid Expressen, where she posed the rhetorical question of why a special solution was necessary for men, stressing that:

it is the groups that are most in need of protection that are disadvantaged by today’s migration policy. It is not morally defensible. If Sweden has the opportunity and capacity, why is it possible to produce special legislation similar to the High School Law to protect young men who lack protection reasons, but not regulations or laws that benefit the most vulnerable groups who need our help the most? The feminist government often problematizes the gender differences that exist within occupational groups in the labor market. Then it is suddenly absolutely vital that there is a 50/50 distribution between the sexes. But when it comes to the skewed gender distribution of migration policy, the government insists on closing its eyes. (Havneraas, 2020)

In addition to preferential treatment for men, either implicitly or explicitly, being framed as inconsistent with Swedish gender equality norms, reform opponents regularly aligned themselves with a racist discourse prevalent in dominantly white Western societies: that non-white male migrants constitute multiple forms of threat to security, order, and physical safety. As Sager and Mulinari note, this type of rhetoric is central to framing by the Sweden Democrats when highlighting threats associated with non-Western migration. Quite simply, the party presents a narrative in which “dangerous Muslim others” constitute a threat to vulnerable Swedish women, who can only be protected by the “white/male SD savior” (Sager & Mulinari, 2018).

The Taliban Take Power and the Russian Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

The Taliban offensive in Afghanistan during the summer of 2021 led to the sudden and dramatic evacuation of international diplomatic personnel, foreign citizens, and many Afghans who had worked with foreign militaries, diplomatic services, and international organizations. Sweden was no exception in this regard. Between June and December 2021, debate in the Swedish parliament centered on the nature of Sweden’s evacuation from Afghanistan, the humanitarian conditions inside Afghanistan, and how Swedish humanitarian aid should be organized in the future. A central issue discussed was how to prevent a humanitarian crisis without legitimizing the Taliban regime, with a particular focus on the situation for girls and women in Afghanistan, as noted by Social Democratic Minister of Justice and Migration Morgan Johansson:

You have all followed the media development and seen what it has been like in Afghanistan, not least at the airport, in recent weeks and how difficult it has been to get people out. This work will naturally be continued. But it is a fundamentalist darkness that descends over the country, so one understands very well that there are many who want to leave the country. And the religious fundamentalism mainly affects women and children. Many are desperate. Many want to leave. And our main message is still that Sweden and the EU have an important role to play in helping those who are now in acute danger. (Riksdagen, 2021d)

In an answer to a written member of parliament question focusing on Sweden’s feminist foreign policy and the situation in Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover, Socialdemokraterna (S—Social Democrats) Minister Ann Linde underscored that the government was keeping a close eye on the situation regarding Afghan women fleeing the country and arriving in Sweden:

Recent developments in Afghanistan are deeply worrying, especially for women and girls. Sweden has paid special attention to their situation in the evacuation of Afghans in need of protection. Of the 612 who have arrived as quota refugees, and will be processed for residence permits, 75% are women and children (459). This group also includes human rights defenders, including women’s rights defenders. (Riksdagen, 2021e)

Speaking several days later, September 13, at a parliamentary debate also addressing feminist foreign policy and the situation in Afghanistan, Linde once again highlighted that Sweden should prioritize support for Afghan women, though this time focusing on those who had not left the country:

It is also important that we find ways to support those who remain in Afghanistan. If all the well-educated are taken from there, the future will be even more difficult for Afghanistan. However, we must be assured that they can remain and be supported both in humanitarian and in other ways, and now more and more attention is being paid to the possibility and security of, not least, women, to continue operating in Afghanistan. (Riksdagen, 2021f)

More specific calls to support Afghan women by facilitating their ability to come to Sweden as quota refugees was voiced at the same debate by Left Party member of parliament Håkan Svenneling, who urged the government to double the number of quota refugees:

The chaotic evacuation began too late and left many who helped us and who needed our protection. We must now take responsibility for to protect all human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, journalists, and interpreters who remain in Afghanistan and who are now at risk of being tortured and killed by the Taliban. Sweden must therefore immediately increase the reception of quota refugees from 5,000 to 10,000. (Riksdagen, 2021f)

While such debate did not lead to concrete proposals to privilege admitting Afghan woman as quota refugees at the expense of men, they are nevertheless indicative of the policy priorities of the Swedish state at the time. Afghanistan was indeed an important foreign policy concern for Sweden with the return of the Taliban to power, but it was women whose vulnerable situation was made most salient by policymakers.

The consequences of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan were quickly overshadowed when the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine took place on February 24, 2022, producing the largest refugee events in Europe since World War II. Of particular note is the demographic composition of these refugees and internally displaced people. While the elderly is an especially large category among the internally displaced, they are oftentimes unable to weather the challenges associated with fleeing abroad. Shortly after the wide-scale invasion began, the Ukrainian government implemented a policy prohibiting men between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country. As such, Ukrainian refugees are predominantly women and children, with international aid organizations estimating that roughly one-half of those who have fled Ukraine are children (UNHCR, 2022).

The outpouring of Western support for Ukrainian refugees, particularly within the European Union, was substantial. Here, we highlight how the question of Ukrainian refugees was framed by Swedish politicians. We do so, not as an end in and of itself, as a contrasting case to that of the unaccompanied refugee youth. We aim to demonstrate that this instance of refugee reception has taken on a particular level of salience that vastly eclipses how unaccompanied refugee youth from Afghanistan have been seen and that it is not only the scope of the crisis that has caused refugee reception to be regarded as a near-societal mandate. In addition to the sheer volume, the geographic proximity of Ukraine to Sweden, both parts of Europe, has figured very broadly in the framing. To a lesser extent, and from different sides of the political spectrum, cultural factors (for the anti-immigrant far right) and gender (for the pro-refugee reception left and center) have also been drawn upon to frame why it is that refugee reception is such a sudden imperative.

For the first time, the European Commission implemented the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive. Adopted in the wake of the Balkan wars, the directive is intended to remove pressure from national asylum application processing systems in instances where mass refugee events take place. The directive allows for a designated group of refugees to receive a maximum three years of temporary protection in the European Union, consisting of a joint residence/work permit, access to education for children, emergency healthcare for adults, complete healthcare for children, free housing, and modest financial assistance (EC, 2022). The implementation of the directive shows that when there is political will at the European level, quick and comprehensive solutions can be put into place to provide real protection to a substantial number of refugees.

Even within EU member states, the level of political and public support spans the political spectrum as a whole, with there being no meaningful opposition to the adoption of the directive.Footnote 1 In Sweden, the rhetoric from political parties mirrored that of what was being expressed across Europe: that this is a time of profound crisis, essentially unparalleled in scope, which requires that Sweden do its part to assist in providing a safe harbor to those fleeing. In the immediate days following the full-scale Russian invasion, Swedish politicians stated unequivocally that asylum for Ukrainians was of the utmost importance. Such pronouncements were, of course, common among those political parties in Sweden that had an ideational (if not always programmatic) stance in favor of generous refugee admission policies. Per Bolund, one of the two spokespeople for the Green Party and a former Deputy Prime Minister until November 2021, was unequivocal in highlighting the importance of asylum being granted in the face of war:

This is a time when people again are fleeing across our continent, through Europe. The right to asylum once emerged from the experiences of the Second World War. People whose life and safety are threated always have the right to protection. (Riksdagen, 2022a)

A similar sentiment was expressed by Annie Lööf, leader of the Swedish Center Party. While the Center Party ultimately opposed the proposed reforms of the High School Law, the party generally has a reputation in Swedish politics as one of the few that is willing to support initiatives allowing for more generous refugee admissions. Speaking in rather prosaic terms, Lööf stated:

We will defend the right to seek asylum and get protection when one tries to escape a war only two hours flight from Sweden. We have to, alone and together with EU, send the solidaristic signal to the people in a Ukraine of chaos and war. When freedom, safety and future is shattered, we stand united with open arms for protection and safety. (Riksdagen, 2022a)

Of particular note in Lööf’s remarks is the reference to the comparatively small geographic distance from Ukraine to Sweden—that the war was taking place “only two hours flight from Sweden.” Indeed, this reference to proximity is far from isolated. Speaking the same day as Lööf and Bolund, Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist first addressed the immediate implications of the war for peace and security in Europe, while also underscoring the physical proximity of the war as a reason for why it was especially significant for Sweden:

Their struggle is also ours. Russia and its regime is threatening the European security order, it is our right to make our own choices, make our own decisions, and live our lives in peace and security […] Ukraine is a neighboring country to our neighboring countries, that is 1,200 kilometers from here. That is not a long distance. Today, that is a short distance. (Riksdagen, 2022a)

The willingness to welcome Ukrainian refugees to Swedish soil was not simply limited to the parties of the center-left. Shortly before the Temporary Protection Directive took effect, the leader of the center-right Moderate Party, Ulf Kristersson, was interviewed on Swedish state television about what the appropriate policy should be, stating that:

All EU countries will need to admit very many Ukrainians. In the best case, this will only be for a period of time and they will be able to return again to a free and peaceful Ukraine. (SVT, 2022)

The interviewing journalist was quick to point out that Kristersson’s remarks suggest a reversal of party line on the refugee question, which was decidedly restrictive in the late 2010s. Kristersson dismissed that there was a contradiction in the stance of the party, stressing that, “[w]hen we have a war in Europe, there are lots of things that no longer apply.”

While Kristersson’s remarks met with some pointed criticism in social media of flip-flopping, the charges of hypocrisy were mild in comparison to those that were leveled against the traditionally anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats, who first gained seats in the Swedish parliament with 5.7% of the popular vote in 2010 but are the third-largest party in 2022 in most opinion polls, hovering between approximately 18 and 20%. In an early March 2022 interview with the public service broadcaster Sveriges Radio, Sweden Democrats foreign policy spokesperson Aron Emilsson explained why it was that the party supported activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, highlighting not only the relevance of geographical proximity, but what the party saw as cultural similarities between Ukraine and Swedish society, as well as the differences between the current case of refugee reception and those from Afghanistan and Syria:

We take responsibility when a country that is geographically and culturally close to us is set on fire. We do this through acute humanitarian support and do what we can to help internally displaced peoples in large numbers, but also refugees that have gone to Poland and other neighboring countries, as well as when it comes to the capacity of those who make it all the way here […] The difference is that Ukraine is Europe, it is a part of our geographical and cultural local area, and we maintain that we have a higher moral and practical responsibility and ability to admit (refugees) from Ukraine, there is another type of reasonableness in the priority of doing so. (SR, 2022)

As a result, the Sweden Democrats immediately came under substantial criticism and scrutiny for supporting Ukrainian refugee reception, particularly on the basis of alleged cultural similarities. In an attempt to stave off criticism, the party leader, Jimmie Åkesson, sought to reframe the support as being entirely consistent with the party’s previous emphasis on linking refugee admission to available resources and also expecting that protection would only be temporary in nature:

I have said that, of course, we will house people from Ukraine based on the capacity that we have. But we will not, as has been the case for decades now, integrate those people that come. Rather, they will be here to get temporary protection and then, as soon [as the situation] has stabilized, they will return to Ukraine. (Ageman, 2022)

Gender is a significant factor when Swedish politicians have sought to call attention to the importance of Ukrainian refugee reception. According to UNHCR, 90% of those who have fled Ukraine are women and children, with fighting-age Ukrainian men required to remain in the country (UNHCR, 2022). This makes it not only reasonable for politicians to highlight the gendered dimension of refugee reception in this case, but it also is a situation that ties quite naturally into Swedish norms that put an emphasis on identifying the particular vulnerabilities and needs of women and children in crisis situations, thus ensuring that these are prioritized and not forgotten. The Left Party is especially pointed in highlighting how gender figures decisively as a rational for Ukrainian refugee reception, with Left Party member of parliament, Hanna Gunnarsson, declaring that:

It is always women and children that suffers the most in war. Sweden must accept refugees from Ukraine. (Riksdagen, 2022a)

Similarly, framing the issue as one not just of refugees, but specifically refugees as women and children, Emma Hult, a Green Party parliamentarian, characterized the dire consequences of the war in Ukraine as one where:

Women and children are fleeing their homes […] and we must now do all in our power to offer them a safe place to be. (Riksdagen, 2022b)

The broad political support for refugee reception and the factors that are highlighted as making Ukrainian refugee reception essential all serve to illustrate the disadvantage that unaccompanied refugee youth from Afghanistan who are in Sweden under the High School Laws experience. In rather blunt terms: unaccompanied refugee youth in Sweden are associated with a crisis that has, by and large, fled from the public eye, whereas the war in Ukraine effectively dominated the public consciousness. Unaccompanied refugee youth in Sweden are associated with a conflict on a distant part of the globe, while the war in Ukraine is seen as happening effectively in Sweden’s backyard. For those who opposed refugee reception during the events of 2015 and after, unaccompanied refugee youth in Sweden are seen as culturally distant, whereas Ukrainian refugees are portrayed as having much in common culturally with Sweden. Lastly, unaccompanied refugee youth in Sweden are largely male, which disadvantages them in a normative climate where the genuine vulnerability of women in war and conflict is seen as the more pressing priority.

Discussion and Conclusion

By drawing on impressionistic approaches to interpretive policy analysis and, as informed by the ideational turn in institutionalism and governance research, this chapter highlights the complex and contingent processes that affect how vulnerable individuals are viewed by policymakers and society. Shaped by underlying values and broader events, those processes determine individuals’ worthiness as candidates for persistent public attention and policy solutions that speak to their needs.

The Swedish Covid-19 pandemic response consisted of fewer restrictions on both business and people relative to many other countries. Nonetheless, as an open, export-dependent economy, Sweden experienced a decline in economic activity, resulting in layoffs and broad hiring freezes. In response, the Swedish parliament adopted several emergency policies to mitigate the consequences for both businesses and employees. These measures were implemented within a broader public health context that emphasized the need to ensure that measures to address the pandemic would take into account the needs of young people in particular.

For the group of unaccompanied refugee minors who came to Sweden in 2015 and were subject to the provisions of the High School Law, deteriorating labor market conditions reduced their chances of being able to find employment within six months of graduation in order to avoid losing their status and being deported. Supporters pointed this out and suggested a reform to provide a more generous time frame for securing employment. Yet, such proposals were rejected. This chapter highlights how arguments regarding preferential treatment, claims about the need to avoid “ad hoc” approaches to policy reform, and a gendered understanding of deservedness all figured prominently in the successful strategy to block policy reform.

Our own positionality within this policy (non-)reform process should be acknowledged, not necessarily for purposes of full disclosure, but in relation to our overall assessment of reform prospects going forward. We are both, in different ways, active in issues of refugee reception in Sweden. We were greatly heartened by some claims by Swedish politicians, such as former Prime Minister Reinfeldt who stated in 2014 that Sweden needed to open its heart to refugees from Syria, but were equally disheartened by the decision of the Social Democrats to join the European race to the bottom in adopting restrictive refugee admission policies in late 2015. Even in 2022, at the time of writing, we find ourselves active in assisting Ukrainians in Sweden who have received temporary protection, as well as those who remain in Ukraine by choice or who lack options to flee.

Policymakers and the public have limited capacity to keep multiple pressing situations high on the agenda or front and center in their thoughts. Sadly, new humanitarian catastrophes force previous ones out of the policy spotlight. For the case of unaccompanied refugee youth who now remain temporarily in Sweden because of the non-reformed High School Law, the chances that they will wind up back in the policy spotlight are small. They have, as this chapter shows, too much going against them: be it values, be it proximity, be it notions of deservedness, or be it just the passing of time. But most likely: all of these at once.