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Specification is Law: Safe Creation and Upgrade of Ethereum Smart Contracts

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Software Engineering and Formal Methods (SEFM 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13550))

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Abstract

Smart contracts are the building blocks of the “code is law” paradigm: the smart contract’s code indisputably describes how its assets are to be managed - once it is created, its code is typically immutable. Faulty smart contracts present the most significant evidence against the practicality of this paradigm; they are well-documented and resulted in assets worth vast sums of money being compromised. To address this issue, the Ethereum community proposed (i) tools and processes to audit/analyse smart contracts, and (ii) design patterns implementing a mechanism to make contract code mutable. Individually, (i) and (ii) only partially address the challenges raised by the “code is law” paradigm. In this paper, we combine elements from (i) and (ii) to create a systematic framework that moves away from “code is law” and gives rise to a new “specification is law” paradigm. It allows contracts to be created and upgraded but only if they meet a corresponding formal specification. The framework is centered around a trusted deployer: an off-chain service that formally verifies and enforces this notion of conformance. We have prototyped this framework, and investigated its applicability to contracts implementing three widely used Ethereum standards: the ERC20 Token Standard, ERC3156 Flash Loans and ERC1155 Multi Token Standard, with promising results.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In fact, the function also delegates control to but it does in such a restricted way that it cannot perform any side-effect computation. So, for the purpose of this paper and to simplify our exposition, we ignore this delegation.

  2. 2.

    The Ethereum concept of gas, i.e. execution resources, is purposely abstracted away/disregarded in our exposition.

  3. 3.

    Instead of using the proxy pattern initialize function to initialise the state of the proxy instance, we place the code that carries out the desired initialisation directly into the proxy’s constructor. Our approach benefits from the inherent behaviour of constructors - which only execute once and at creation time - instead of having to implement this behaviour for the non-constructor function initialize. Our Trusted Deployer, available at https://github.com/formalblocks/safeevolution, automatically generates the code for such a proxy.

  4. 4.

    The prototype is implemented as a standalone tool available at https://github.com/formalblocks/safeevolution. We do not provide a service running inside a Trusted Execution Environment yet but such a service will be provided in the future.

  5. 5.

    All the instructions, the specifications, the sample contracts, and scripts used in this evaluation can be found at https://github.com/formalblocks/safeevolution.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Blockhouse Technology Limited, Oxford, UK

    Pedro Antonino & A. W. Roscoe

  2. Centro de Informática, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

    Juliandson Ferreira & Augusto Sampaio

  3. Department of Computer Science, Oxford University, Oxford, UK

    A. W. Roscoe

  4. University College Oxford Blockchain Research Centre, Oxford, UK

    A. W. Roscoe

Authors
  1. Pedro Antonino
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  2. Juliandson Ferreira
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  3. Augusto Sampaio
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  4. A. W. Roscoe
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Pedro Antonino .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Bernd-Holger Schlingloff

  2. Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China

    Ming Chai

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Antonino, P., Ferreira, J., Sampaio, A., Roscoe, A.W. (2022). Specification is Law: Safe Creation and Upgrade of Ethereum Smart Contracts. In: Schlingloff, BH., Chai, M. (eds) Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13550. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17108-6_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17108-6_14

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