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RATLS: Integrating Transport Layer Security with Remote Attestation

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Applied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops (ACNS 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13285))

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Abstract

We present RATLS, a companion library for OpenSSL that integrates the Trusted Computing concept of Remote Attestation into Transport Layer Security (TLS). RATLS builds upon handshake extensions that are specified in version 1.3 of the TLS standard. It therefore does not require any changes to the TLS protocol or the OpenSSL library, which offers a suitable API for handshake extensions. RATLS supports remote attestation as part of a complete TLS handshake for new connections and it augments session resumption by binding session tickets to the platform state of TLS peers. We demonstrate that RATLS enables both client and server to attest their respective software stacks using widely-used Trusted Platform Modules. Our evaluation shows that the number of round trips during handshake is the same as for traditional TLS and that session resumption can reduce cryptographic overhead caused by remote attestation for frequently communicating peers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    TLS v1.2 supports extensions, too, but on fewer message types than TLS v1.3.

  2. 2.

    Some implementations use symmetric keys or a physically unclonable function (PUF) instead, but the general concept is the same.

  3. 3.

    There are implementations of remote attestation that are software only, but they assume a weaker attacker model.

References

  1. Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX). https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-technology/software-guard-extensions.html. Accessed 1 May 2022

  2. OpenSSL. https://www.openssl.org/

  3. The Trusted Computing Group - TPM Software Stack (TSS). https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/software-stack/

  4. The Trusted Computing Group - Trusted Platform Module (TPM). https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/trusted-platform-module/

  5. TSS.MSR. https://github.com/microsoft/TSS.MSR

  6. Duan, H., Wang, C., Yuan, X., Zhou, Y., Wang, Q., Ren, K.: LightBox: full-stack protected stateful middlebox at lightning speed, pp. 2351–2367 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3339814

  7. Kim, S., Shin, Y., Ha, J., Kim, T., Han, D.: A first step towards leveraging commodity trusted execution environments for network applications (2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/2834050.2834100

  8. King, G., Wang, H.: HTTPA: HTTPS attestable protocol. CoRR abs/2110.07954 (2021). https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.07954

  9. Knauth, T., Steiner, M., Chakrabarti, S., Lei, L., Xing, C., Vij, M.: Integrating remote attestation with transport layer security. CoRR abs/1801.05863 (2018). http://arxiv.org/abs/1801.05863

  10. Rescorla, E.: The transport layer security (TLS) protocol version 1.3. RFC 8446, RFC Editor, August 2018. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.txt

  11. Zheng, H., Arden, O.: Building secure distributed applications the DECENT way. CoRR abs/2004.02020 (2020). https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.02020

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Acknowledgements

This research was co-financed by public funding of the state of Saxony/Germany. It has also received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No. 957216.

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Correspondence to Carsten Weinhold .

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Walther, R., Weinhold, C., Roitzsch, M. (2022). RATLS: Integrating Transport Layer Security with Remote Attestation. In: Zhou, J., et al. Applied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops. ACNS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13285. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16815-4_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16815-4_20

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-16814-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-16815-4

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