Keywords

1 Introduction

After proclaiming independence in 1991, Kazakhstan, like other former Soviet states, faced the challenge of establishing its own independent governance framework. Kazakhstan’s abundance of natural resources resulted in a rapid economic boost and a smooth transition to a privatised economy (Olcott, 2011). In fact, Kazakhstan’s economic development significantly contributed to a public sense of social satisfaction, resulting in the absence of uprisings and in overall political stability (Rico, 2010). Therefore, civil activist movements were largely inactive. Research on activism in Kazakhstan conducted before the 2010s often characterises the population, especially the youth, as apolitical and passive (Beisembayeva, 2016; Laruelle, 2019).

The 2019 power transition has served as a catalyst for Kazakhstan’s civil activist movement. The transition took place when Nursultan Nazarbayev, the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, resigned after nearly thirty years in power. The glimpses of hope for political change were shattered the next day (Ashim, 2019), after President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed the renaming of Kazakhstan’s capital Astana to Nur-Sultan, in honour of the First President. Moreover, while Nazarbayev resigned, the title of the First President, granted to him by the amendments to Kazakhstan’s Constitution passed in 2010, allowed him to maintain power by becoming the Head of Kazakhstan’s Security Council (The Constitutional Law on the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2010). The unlikelihood of political change coming from the top became even more evident and resulted in increased political involvement among the youth, the formation of several activist movements, and online activism projects focused on civil education and holding the government to standards of transparency and accountability.

While civil activism resurged in a new form in 2019, various forms of activism such as feminist and climate activism have been present since the early 2000s. According to the activists interviewed for the present study, the activist movements had a fair degree of freedom as the government considered the movements apolitical and, therefore, non-threatening to the regime.Footnote 1 The first grassroots activist movement was feminist and was founded in 2015. Along with civil activist movements, the feminist movement experienced a revival in 2019. As the events occurred recently, there is a significant gap in the literature on activism in Kazakhstan and how it is influenced by cyber-reality (Kurambayev, 2020). This chapter aims to examine whether a connection exists between the feminist activist movement established in 2015 and the civil activist movement established in 2019.

To address this question, the following research methods were employed:

  • First, an inductive study was carried out through sixteen interviews with feminist and civil activists ages eighteen to fifty. Among participants, thirteen were identified as women and three were identified as men. The interviews took place between January 2021 and March 2021. The interviews were semi-structured with over-arching themes of feminist activism, civil activism, and social media platforms’ employment. The participants were identified based on their social media presence and whether they specified that they were activists, openly wrote their opinions, and posted pictures from protests and other activist demonstrations.

  • Second, a deductive study was carried out through a qualitative survey to test the hypothesis formed in the initial inductive analysis. The survey was conducted online in the Russian language in Kazakhstan. The survey explored the entry points into activism, the role of social media, and the interconnection between feminist and civil activism. Overall, sixty-five responses were collected. The survey featured twenty-four questions which were presented in four sections: respondents’ demographics, use of the internet, involvement in Kazakhstan’s activism, and stance on feminism.

Based on analysis of the survey results, the study compares feminist and civil activisms in Kazakhstan as well as their intersections and interconnections.

2 Civic Engagement and Activism in Kazakhstan

With the increased societal tensions caused by the economic crises of 2008 and 2014, political dissatisfaction, and the rising popularity of social media platforms, the state’s poor handling of economic crises and overall poor management became more visible.

Based on the interviews with study participants, until 2019, feminist activism was the most visible activist movement in Kazakhstan. Both feminist and civil activisms have engaged in offline activities but established larger networks thanks to their online presence. It is worth noting that the feminist movement is not considered political by the state authorities, which is why organising protests for women’s rights is relatively easier (Cooper & Traugott, 2003).

The feminist grassroots activist movement is relatively new. Radical feminist group KazFem is Kazakhstan’s first grassroots activist group founded in 2015. KazFem focuses on educational enlightenment on women rights and dismantlement of the systems of oppression. Activists explain that KazFem was the most active in the first two years after its foundation, but that many activists later experienced burn-out.Footnote 2 Today, Kazakhstan’s feminist activist landscape comprises older activist groups such as KazFem, Feminita, and FemAgora and newer activist projects and individual activists. Examples are multiple, such as Feminizm Prizm, Fem Tendik, Femin Erkin, Artyq Emes, and Tolyq Qogam.

This study employs Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) theoretical framework of personalised action formation and the logic of connective action. The logic of connective action between Social Media and Social Action is defined as the “recognition of digital media as organising agents” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Unlike collective action, where participation requires significant group affiliation and involves hierarchical organisation, connective action is based on individuals’ personal involvement with a low-greed organisation. The interpersonal connections amplified by the digital platforms result in an effect similar to collective action yet without a rigid formal organisation (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). In collective action, expressing personal views and contributing to a common good strengthens the movement.

Bennett and Segerberg’s framework remains topical for Kazakhstan’s activist context, particularly for feminist and activist movements. During the interviews, several respondents pointed out that Oyan, Qazaqstan! (OQ, from Kazakh: Wake up Kazakhstan!), a civil activist movement formed after 2019, started as group of friends but amplified and grew outside of Almaty thanks to social media. While the movement is decentralised, the activists’ personal ties form its backbone. Bennett and Segerberg’s framework also holds true for Kazakhstan’s feminist activist movement. During the interviews, it was highlighted that Kazakhstan’s radical feminist group KazFem was likewise formed by several friends and later grew and spread outside of Almaty through social media. While the affiliation of civil activists with OQ is common, feminist activists in Kazakhstan often do not affiliate themselves with any particular group or organisation. Despite minimal affiliation, the solidarity and support among feminist activists and their allies is strong. Hence, in this chapter I argue that in Kazakhstan, local feminist cyber-activism increases the likelihood of women’s involvement in civil activism. The survey’s framework, which was used to test this hypothesis, is based on Heger and Hoffman’s study which aimed to explore whether feminism impacts women’s political efficacy by increasing the likelihood of women’s political participation online (Heger & Hoffman, 2021). Heger and Hoffman (2021) based their research question on the assumption that feminism empowers women by reasserting the importance of their political participation. While Heger and Hoffman’s study could not demonstrate significant results, the authors concluded that feminism is an essential variable for examining women’s political participation online (Heger & Hoffman, 2021).

Based on Heger and Hoffman’s framework, this study also employs a survey, which was taken by sixty-five participants, of whom 84.6% identify as women, 10.8% as men, and 4.6% prefer to self-identify.Footnote 3 The majority of the respondents (50.8%) were aged between eighteen and twenty-four. Most respondents had graduated with a bachelor’s degree (47.7%) or a high school diploma (29.2%).

The majority (89.2%) responded that they have unrestricted access to the internet, 9.2% reported partially restricted access, and one respondent said that the Internet was unavailable during public demonstrations. While the respondents use various devices to access the internet, 100% access it through their phones alongside other devices. Interestingly, more respondents use social media for educational purposes (93.8%) than entertainment (87.7%). Moreover, 87.7% use social media to access news. Instagram is the most popular platform (93.8%) used to read news, followed by Telegram (78.5%) and YouTube (61.5%). The majority of participants (88.15%) express their political opinion online. Among them, 80% do it via Instagram.

Since online activism in Kazakhstan is mainly employed by youth (Kilybayeva & Nurshanov, 2020; Kosnazarov, 2019; Laruelle, 2019), the thirty-two responses of women and self-identifying persons aged between eighteen and twenty-four who identify as activists were analysed. Of these, 81.2% became activists after 2019. Interestingly all women and self-identifying participants identify as feminists. Among them, 60% do not consider themselves to be a part of any activist groups, while 21.9% are part of more than one activist group. Among the younger group of women (aged between eighteen and twenty-four), 90.625% are somewhat or highly politically involved. For 42.9%, feminism was the first entry point into activism, while 21.4% became involved in feminist and civil activism around the same time.

Based on the survey responses, the following results were highlighted:

  • The overwhelming majority of participants (96.8%) follow feminist blogs and social media accounts. Among them, 97% found these accounts empowering and helpful in learning about women’s rights. Interestingly, out of the sixty-five responses, only seven mentioned feminist blogs which were not from Kazakhstan. These blogs are in Russian. Among the respondents, three mentioned @feminism_visually, which posts about feminism in the form of digital art, and the other four mentioned sex-positive bloggers. Both kinds of content are limited in Kazakhstan’s cyberspace. The remaining 89% mentioned Kazakhstan’s bloggers and cyber-initiatives.

  • The majority of the respondents aged between eighteen and twenty-four engaged in activism after 2019 when the new civil activism surged, and feminist activism was revived. The majority of feminist initiatives were also established after 2019. Prior to that, locally produced content was scarce. The respondents confirmed that they follow feminist accounts to learn more about feminism, empowerment, and women’s rights. The overwhelming majority mentioned a Kazakhstan-based initiative when asked about their favourite blog. This development is outstanding considering that, while local content generation has increased dramatically, there are plenty of feminist blogs in Russian from Russia to choose from. Almost a half of the female participants who identify as activists became feminist activists before they identified as civil activists.

While no hard conclusion can be drawn from these findings due to the small sample size, the age group imbalance, and the absence of the non-Russian-speaking population’s perspective (the survey was only available in Russian), the results show exciting tendencies:

  1. 1.

    Women are more likely to become feminists and feminist activists when they come across local feminist blogs representing their reality.

  2. 2.

    For the majority, feminism was an entry point generally into activism.

  3. 3.

    The majority do not have a group affiliation which shows that activism’s character today has changed in comparison with the early 2000s. One does not necessarily need a personal connection to become involved, something which is facilitated by the accessibility provided by social media.

3 Social Media in Kazakhstan

Even though social media platforms have become instrumental for the development of numerous activist initiatives across all five Central Asian states, the impact of online activisms varies. Cases of online activism, especially feminist activism, are present in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; however, they are too few to draw substantial analyses. Turkmenistan remains a closed state, where any form of political activism is dangerous; hence, conducting research there is nearly impossible. Since civil activism in Kyrgyzstan developed along a more traditional offline trajectory, the development of cyber-activism was complementary and, therefore, slow—many online activist initiatives often serve as the representation for offline activism. In Kazakhstan, many activist initiatives were founded online and then moved offline; therefore, the use of social media platforms for grassroots activism and societal mobilisation is most prominent in that state.

After Nazarbayev’s resignation in 2019, he set the precedent for Central Asian and other autocracies in the post-Soviet region. His resignation was followed by several peaceful demonstrations, the leaders of which were detained and publicly trailed (Putz, 2019). The trials, which involved multiple legal violations, were actively covered by independent media and fresh Instagram news media accounts such as Rukh (from the Kazakh for Spirit) and ZaNamiUzheVyehali (from the Russian for “They Are Already Coming for Us”). The demonstrations and actions were referred to as #qazaqkoktemi (From the Kazakh for Kazakh Spring) and marked an unprecedented rise in citizen activism, which in turn prompted the creation of multiple new media initiatives to raise awareness about civil activism. Since the Kazakh government harshly suppresses peaceful protests, violating its citizens’ civil and political rights, most notably the right to peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of speech, the newly emerged activist movements had to “migrate” into cyberspace.

The so-called Kazakh Spring created a critical juncture for the further development of civil society’s further development. The new initiatives created after the Kazakh Spring are (1) based on new media platforms, such as Instagram and Telegram, and (2) led mainly by women who identify as feminists. Therefore, Kazakhstan presents a substantial case for analysing how feminist cyber-activism in Central Asia has impacted the region’s advocacy for civil and political rights.

In relation to Kazakhstan’s feminist activist movement, two survey responses particularly stood out, as these participants have been a part of the feminist activist movement since either the 1990s or early 2000s. Both respondents emphasised that there is a generational divide between the feminist activists. These findings allow for the identification of three critical periods in the formation of Kazakhstan’s feminist movement: (1) the 1990s, after Kazakhstan gained independence in 1991; (2) the 2010s, when the grassroots groups started forming; and (3) post-2019 with the resurgence of political activism.

The 1990s movements were not explicitly called feminist, more often referred to as “women’s movements.” The state did not perceive women’s rights as a political topic, which made such movements a more accessible entry point for international organisations and NGOs.Footnote 4 The women’s movement was niche activism, funded mainly by Western organisations and aimed at solving the most pressing issues such as women’s poor economic states. The second stage of feminist movement development in Kazakhstan started in 2015, through a resurgence of the first feminist grassroots initiatives from within the state.

The third stage of activism formation happened in 2019. Nazarbayev’s resignations and the events which followed prompted a rise in discontent among the youth. Many feminist activists reconnected and joined the newly established civil activist groups.Footnote 5 While most feminist activist respondents had left the civil activist groups within the next six months, the feminist movement strengthened due to newly established connections. Thanks to social media’s connective effect, post-2019 feminist activism became a horizontally growing low-greed movement with a high degree of cooperation and mutual support among the activists and activist groups, and a clear set of goals that the study participants confidently outlined. Among the most pressing demands are those for adequate legislature against domestic violence, criminalisation of harmful traditional practices, and equal opportunities for women in all spheres.

Social media platforms played a significant role in overcoming feminism’s stigmatisation. Instagram, Telegram, and, recently, TikTok have helped to make feminism trendy and popular, and have made information on the topic accessible. When asked about the strategies and tools that feminist activists employ to achieve their goals, all feminist activist respondents mentioned social media. According to the responses of the study participants, feminist activists use social media to:

  1. 1.

    to raise awareness about the global feminist movement,

  2. 2.

    raise awareness and bring attention to the threats to women in Kazakhstan,

  3. 3.

    to seek support when activists are unlawfully detained, and

  4. 4.

    to crowdfund for state charges and, recently, for demonstrations.

The feminist activists emphasised that today’s most important goal is to destigmatise feminism and raise awareness about women’s lack of protection, which is feasible to do via social media platforms. Just in the recent year, several online projects were launched. The projects focus on amplifying feminist and activist voices (Feminizm Prizm), destigmatising menstrual health (umaicup), and building feminist communities (Femin Erkin). The most striking case is Batyr Jamal, Kazakhstan’s registered online independent media specialising in women’s rights and empowerment. The media platform was launched on 8 March 2021, and has thus far gained over 17,800 followers on Instagram, its central content platform. Batyr Jamal publishes various educational content and news items in Russian and Kazakh, popularising feminist ideas and values among the wider population.

While the study participants highlighted the critical role that social media plays in feminist discourse, they also notedFootnote 6 that cyber-activism alone is not enough:

We are truly visible when we are on the streets. We can make however many petitions, but the true change only comes with the live protests.

Both the interview and the survey conducted for the present study highlighted the importance of social media’s impact on activist movement development. In the case of civil activism, social media provided various tools for activism entry, cooperation not only within one city but also across Kazakhstan, and the development of coherent demands for political reform. In the case of feminist activism, social media allowed for inclusive community building and mobilisation, as well as feminism’s de-stigmatisation and reclamation as a local movement.

The connective effect of social media has contributed to the relatively rapid growth of both civil and feminist activist movements which were initially begun as initiatives by small groups of people but grew progressively across Kazakhstan into movements with substantial numbers of supporters.

Similarly to the feminist activist landscape, Kazakhstan’s civil activist landscape is quite diverse; however, there is less cooperation among civil activist communities as each community has its own agenda. The communities founded in 2019 are low greed and mainly involve young people; therefore, these communities represent grassroots activism (Kalkamanova, 2020). Kalkamanova argues that these activist communities appeared as an outcome of the protests organised by Demokraticheskiy Vybor Kazahstana (DVK, from the Russian for “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan”) prior to the 2019 events. In Kazakhstan, DVK has been given the status of a terrorist organisation and its leader resides outside of the county. There is no evidence to conclude that the DVK’s activities substantially impacted the activist community’s development post-2019. Moreover, none of the study participants noted DVK’s impact after March 2019, when Kazakhstan’s activist movement resurged and civil activists founded several initiatives such as Qaharman (from the Kazakh for Hero), Oyan, Qazaqstan! (From the Kazakh for “Wake Up Kazakhstan!”), and Respublika (From the Kazakh for Republic).

OQ was formed in response to the unlawful detention of activists at the 2019 Almaty Marathon. Qahraman emphasises that they are not a political organisation, and their main goals are to raise awareness about Kazakhstan’s politics (Qaharman, 2019). Respublika does not seem to be active as its social media accounts are deactivated, and none of the study participants mentioned the movement. Moreover, when the participants were asked which events had shaped the civil activist community, the most common answers were the Zhanaozen Massacre (2011), Land Reform Protests (2016), and the Fire in Astana (2019). Participants mentioned these events in connection with increased societal pressure and growing dissatisfaction with the government. The next group of events that was mentioned repeatedly included Denis Ten’s Death (2018), Nazarbayev’s Resignation (2019), the renaming of Astana (2019), and the Presidential Elections (2019). The study participants emphasised that Nazarbayev’s resignation brought about hopes that there could be substantial political change, but Astana’s re-naming signalled the opposite.Footnote 7

Two years after Nazarbayev’s resignation, the civil society remains active, especially the OQ Community. In fact, the OQ is the only activist movement that spreads further than Almaty and has several groups in other cities. The OQ is active in cyberspace, mainly via its Instagram account; several OQ activists have their own Instagram blogs dedicated to civil activism. Among the mentioned activist communities, the OQ is horizontal and has the lowest entry barrier, as anyone sharing the community’s values can join via participation in online and offline campaigns. The movement is friendly and supportive towards the feminist community, and some OQ activists are outspoken LGBTQI+ allies.

The participants also mentioned that misconceptions about feminism are present within the community and that members regularly hold educational workshops to destigmatise feminism. Several feminist study participants reported that they used to be OQ members but left the movement within six months of joining.

There was no complete mutual understanding. Some people acted like you can ‘take off’ feminism for your convenience. I was not okay with it.

Several statements like the one above highlighted that feminist and LGBTQI+ activisms are perceived as separate from one another: the first is tolerated and the second is often ignored. However, this tendency has been slowly changing and could prompt the OQ to become the first intersectional civil activist movement in Kazakhstan.

Despite Kazakhstan’s restrictive protest law, the civil activist community has managed to “migrate” to offline space. In the summer of 2019, the OQ introduced the seruen (From the Kazakh for a walk). In practice, a seruen is not much different from a protest: activists gather, give speeches, network, and discuss political themes. One of participantsFootnote 8 recalls:

Officially, it is not a protest – it is a walk. We gather with friends, hang out, and play music. But practically, I’d say it’s the same as a protest. We gathered where we chose to, we chanted ‘Nazarbayev, leave!’ and we expressed our political position.

Based on the existing literature and the interviews conducted, it is safe to conclude that Kazakhstan’s civil society has developed more within the past two years than over the entire independence period. Post-2019 civil activism is mostly driven by the youth (Kosnazarov, 2019). While a substantial part of the activism takes place in cyberspace, the activists have made substantial visible efforts to transfer the community mobilisation effects acquired via social media’s connective action to the streets and across the country.

4 Online Activism

Offline and online feminist and civil activisms are young in Kazakhstan. Despite having different development timelines, the movements share a set of similarities. First, both activist movements originated from a clique of friends or acquaintances and later developed into a broader activist community thanks to the connecting power of social media. Second, both movements use social media to develop and strengthen citizens’ political participation through online educational and news projects on Instagram, Telegram, YouTube, and TikTok. In both cases, cyber-activism complements traditional grassroots activism and is used to enlighten and involve more people. Third, both activist groups realise that the core of the movement is based in urban Almaty; therefore, they make an effort to expand the movement to Kazakhstan’s lower-income cities.

There are also significant differences in the developments of both movements. First, the movements have various degrees of diversity. Feminist activism is represented by several organisations, NGOs, women’s centres, media initiatives, and individual activists. These actors represent different views on feminism: from radical to liberal to intersectional. Civil activism’s landscape is less diverse. Despite the initial surge of activist communities, only the OQ has remained consistently active. While there are various civil activist media projects, their authors are often affiliated with the OQ.

Second, a generational divide is present in both movements, but the interactions within the movements are different. While the generational divide is more defined in the feminist community, activists and initiatives interact, collaborate, and support each other more often. In the discussions about civil activism, the focus often skewed towards youth (Kilybayeva & Nurshanov, 2020). Moreover, there are very few collaborations among the few civil activist communities.

Third, the movements’ agendas are dissimilar in terms of the clarity of their objectives. From 2015 to 2021, the feminist movement has developed a clear agenda consisting of tangible demands, such as re-evaluating laws aimed to protect women. Despite the feminist movement’s diverse landscape, the study participants recalled the feminist agenda items in almost the same order. The civil activist agenda remains vaguely formulated. While the OQ has a published manifesto outlining their demands, the study participants could not recall these in detail. At present, the civil activist movement is focused on community building, promising a more sustainable and stable movement in the future.

Lastly, state perception of the movements is different. According to study participants, the state does not consider the feminist movement to be political. Therefore, the regime does not consider it to be a threat. While such perception is invalidating, feminist activists were able to use it to their benefit, since they could exercise their rights to freedom of assembly and expression more freely though still in a restricted manner. Since civil activists demand parliamentary republic and state transparency, directly criticising the regime, the civil activist movement faces targeted restrictions and suppression.

To test the hypothesis that cyberfeminist activism in Kazakhstan increased women’s participation in civil activism, the study employed an anonymous online survey conducted in Kazakhstan in the Russian language. It is important to consider that the feminist discourse in cyberspace in the Russian language has predominantly come from Russian feminists and that its agenda has been chiefly centred around Russian women’s issues. Therefore, the voices of Kazakhstan’s feminists were traditionally under-represented in cyberspace.

The lack of a Kazakh perspective in feminist discourse initially resulted in shallow activist involvement. With the rise of local feminist blogs on Instagram and TikTok, Kazakhstan’s feminist community has grown exponentially. This development can be traced even in recent years when comparing Women’s Marches from 2017 to 2021. According to the study and survey participants, the 2021 march garnered historically high participation numbers, included various feminist actors, and is considered the most significant victory of Kazakhstan’s feminist movement.

It is worth noting that several study participants highlighted that they became feminists first, and then became involved with civil activism. Study participants reflected:

Imagine a pyramid: feminist activism is the base because it is the most essential. We become feminists first and then, level by level, get involved with civil, climate, LGBTQI+ activisms and so on. How can you advocate for a parliamentary republic without advocating for women’s place in that parliament?Footnote 9

Men are less involved in activism because they are privileged, so they don’t question the system which caters to them. And women fight because this system is unjust.Footnote 10

5 Conclusion

The present study provided an in-depth analysis of feminist and civil activist movements’ development in Kazakhstan. The study employed inductive analysis using Bennett and Segerberg’s theoretical framework of connective action (2012) and deductive analysis using Heger and Hoffman’s survey model (2021). Based on the results, the study identified a tangible link between Kazakhstan’s feminist and civil activist communities. While there are substantial differences as to how both movements have formed and developed, they share a number of significant similarities, including the use of social media for awareness raising, community building, and online and offline mobilisation. Based on the initial survey results, there is a strong suggestion that (1) online feminist content prompts more women to become feminist activists and (2) the feminist content generated locally in Kazakhstan and centred around the local agenda prompts more women to become feminist activists, and consequently to join other activist communities.

While the research design was developed for Kazakhstan as a case study, this framework could potentially be used to analyse how social media impacts feminist and civil activisms in other Central Asian states and potentially in other post-Soviet autocracies. While the activist movements might not yet be as prominent in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan due to the features of their political systems, social media has the potential to accelerate the formation and growth of activist movements online, and these could later transfer offline.