Abstract
This chapter focuses on synchromodal planning problems in which information is shared between all agents in the system and they choose their routes based on an individual optimisation objective. We show the effect of the information availability by developing three different methods to determine the optimal paths, to motivate logistic players to cooperate in a synchromodal system.
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Bruijns, L.A.M. (2023). User Equilibrium in a Transportation Space-Time Network. In: Phillipson, F. (eds) Optimisation in Synchromodal Logistics. Lecture Notes in Operations Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15655-7_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15655-7_11
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